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LAW, DEVELOPMENT AND THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION
  Paul Herman Brietzke
ABSTRACT
This thesis explores a series of middle-range hypotheses concerning 
the interrelation of law and development* These hypotheses are made 
concrete enough to serve as policy prescriptions by applying them to the 
problems of Ethiopia, a country which displays most of the development 
constraints that have been' identified in other Third World countries. 
Development is best understood as a dynamic process, as the broadening of 
subsistence and small-scale economic, political, legal and social 'markets 
that effects a cumulative growth in a wide variety of resources. In 
Ethiopia, given her highly stratified and fragmented societies, this 
entails a socio-economic equalisation and integration, a wholesale 
structural transformation rather than the narrow policies of an economic 
growth advocated by many development theorists. The magnitude of this 
transformation, the manifest need for extensive and intensive development 
planning and the socialist predilections of Ethiopia's revolutionary 
military rulers (the Derg) suggest that massive state intervention in 
the economy is both inevitable and the only feasible path to an Ethiopian 
development which is, nevertheless, fraught with many hazards. It is 
therefore impossible to segregate economic activity from what is, in 
Ethiopia, an undifferentiated mass of law, politics and administration. 
The largest single bottleneck to Ethiopian development is the virtual 
absence of any political development registered under Haile Selassie 
or the Derg. The role of law in eliminating an Ethiopian "soft state" 
(Myrdal's term), which is far from soft on the poor and powerless, is 
surveyed and law's role in the aggregation, allocation and delegation 
of a variety of resources, in the formulation and implementation of 
interrelated policies, and in the amelioration of species of injustice 
is analysed in detail.
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Part I : Introduction
In September 1973» I began teaching Law and Development at Addis 
Ababa (then Haile Selassie I) University and started to research a 
Ph.D. thesis I had tentatively entitled '"Law and Development in 
Ethiopia". The revolutionary events that began in February 197^ 
caused me fundamentally to re-think the historical processes of Eth­
iopian underdevelopment and the nature of the choices and constraints 
related to future development prospects. One purpose of this study is 
to offer a tentative interpretation of a Revolution which is still
unfolding and to attempt to convey a measure of the excitement and
1frustration the Revolution engendered. The major focus is, however, 
the description of underdevelopment in relation to the Ethiopian 
legal systems, and the analysis of middle-range hypotheses concerning 
processes of Ethiopian underdevelopment and the potential for devel­
opment in' the future. I do not claim to have devised a universally 
valid general theory of development or law and development, but argue 
that the theoretical portions of my analysis can be profitably 
applied, after careful modification,*to specific problems in many
other countries. An outline of the approach utilised in this study is
2
presented in the footnote.
The fragmentary nature of knowledge about Ethiopia and its laws, 
and about legal and developmental processes generally, makes it 
desirable to assemble some of these fragments into coherent patterns 
in the first two Chapters. The themes started in these Chapters are 
pursued in greater detail throughout the study, with politics taking 
the lead in Part II - as it does in the real world of underdevelopment 
and development efforts. The socio-economic impact of the new 
Ethiopian regime's policies is then evaluated in Part III. Man;/ 
examples and analyses have been abridged or even eliminated, in an 
attempt to keep this lengthy study within manageable bounds. While 
a more detailed analysis of a narrower topic could have been offered, 
it is clear that a critical overview of the effects of Ethiopian 
policies,■past and present,’is what is needed at this time, to consol­
idate and update the detailed analyses of the past and to pinpoint 
matters for future investigation. That law should provide the
2unifying thread for these analyses may seem unusual or even peculiar to 
the non-lawyer. If he reads on, I hope he finds this perspective 
both interesting and useful, moving as it does towards a genuinely 
interdisciplinary approach to Ethiopian -underdevelopment and develop­
ment prospects.
I am very grateful to those who read and commented upon portions 
of this study:- Ato Andargatchew Tiruneh, Dr. Maureen Gain and Pro­
fessors George Keeton, Heinrich Scholler and John Harbeson* Special 
thanks go to my thesis advisor, Professor James Read, whose encourage­
ment, tireless assistance and constructive criticism have-proved^ 
invaluable. The responsibility for errors of fact or judgement is, 
of course, solely mine. Finally, the patience and forebearance of 
my wife Susan .and son Colin are appreciated deeply.
v
3Chapter 1 : Images of Ethiopia
We emphasise Ethiopian ’images' in order to reflect the fact
that knowledge about her societies and political, legal and economic
affairs is partial, fragmented and often contradictory, both absol-
utely and in relation to what is known about most African and other
Third World states. Ethiopia remains relatively unstudied because
of a perceived physical, cultural and linguistic inaccessibility ;
an absence of the colonial points of reference that still - like it
1or not - provide the framework for most Third World studies.; and, 
more recently, the disruptions resulting from the Revolution. Most 
of the studies that are available do not address themselves to 
development-related questions. They have also given rise to many 
myths and shibboleths, the result of poorly-documented and excessively 
romantic armchair descriptions, sweeping generalisations based on 
narrowxoase studies, the forcing of inaccurate and conflicting data 
into preconceived Western moulds, a failure to comprehend local 
languages, social stratifications and the nature and impact of Eth­
iopian history, and,.most importantly, a failure to deal meaning­
fully with Ethiopia as a whole through analyses linking centres and 
peripheries (enclaves superimposed upon vast rural areas) - a major 
aim of this study. We therefore discard many of the conventional 
criteria regularly applied to Ethiopia and to other African societies,
defending our choice of theories and interpretations of Ethiopian
2affairs as we proceed.
The relative lack of interest in her affairs is surprising,
given that Ethiopia is the third largest and third most populous
country in Africa, her strategic position - straddling the African
and Arab worlds - involves her in Middle Eastern geopolitics, and
many of her social groups possess a cultural distinctiveness which
rewards careful study. We shall argue that Ethiopian social systems
3are permeated with an indigenous 'feudal colonialism' , and that the 
tenacity of many Ethiopian cultures and the absence of the disruptions 
associated with a European colonialism make for an historical con­
tinuity like that ofthe states of Western Europe. Haile Selassie 
laid claim to traditional sources of legitimacy that were traced back 
some 2,000 years, and these claims were accepted automatically by
if
many Ethiopians, although fervently rejected by others. The absence 
of twentieth century European colonialism in Ethiopia (except for the 
brief Italian Interregnum) is important for at least three reasons: 
comparisons between Ethiopia and pre-Revolutionary Russia, European 
states on the eve of the Industrial Revolution or contemporary Latin 
American states are probably more fruitful than comparisons with 
other African states; Ethiopian political independence delayed the 
growth of foreign political, cultural and economic influence and a 
subsequent dependence on Europe; and the nature of European colon­
ialism can be more fully understood if former colonies are compared
if
with Ethiopia.
. It is the extraordinary degree of continuity in Ethiopian history 
that makes an historical perspective essential to an understanding 
of the processes of underdevelopment, and the'‘constraints and choices 
relating to development in the future. Likewise, the explanatory 
..effectiveness of any theory, and the middle-range theories we develop 
in particular, can only be demonstrated by their application to 
concrete historical situations. Any such analyses of events must 
fasten upon the points that connect present concerns with previous 
experiences. For example, economic change cannot be explained on 
the basis of present economic conditions alone; the economic state of 
a people emerges gradually from the preceding total situation.
That this is true in Ethiopia, despite the historical watershed 
represented by the 197^ Revolution, ought to surprise no one. The 
Revolution grows no crops and has not, by itself, changed patterns 
of social stratification or bridged the socio-economic distances 
between isolated rural groups. Distance, stratification and the 
related extreme inequalities in the distribution of wealth and power 
evolved slowly over long periods of time and will not be funda­
mentally changed by neutralising or even executing a few traditional 
elites or through tentative attempts to broaden the economic - but 
not the political - base of wealth and power. Although the content 
of the policies pursued in Ethiopia has changed radically since the 
Revolution, historic problems of resource allocation remain largely 
unresolved and the manner in which politics are conducted remains 
unchanged. For example, and despite the new Government’s stated
5commitments, residents of Addis Ababa have an influence on events 
that peasants lack, and the political ’style’ continues to follow hist­
oric patterns of manipulation, repression, paternalism and faction­
alism^ (see Part II). Recent eventd in Ethiopia are nevertheless 
interesting in terms of their actual and potential impact and as an 
example of an emerging international trend, the socialist revolution 
mounted by soldiers. While these phenomena have occurred in Peru, 
Algeria and, initially, in Portugal, they most frequently occur 
in north-east Africa. In Egypt and Sudan their impact was soon 
dissipated, and in Somalia and Libya strong Islamic strands are in 
evidence•
Knowledge about Ethiopia has been subtly but pervasively coloured
by two often-quoted images offered in Gibbon’s Decline, and Pall and
by Arnold J. Toynbee:
Encompassed on all sides by the enemies of their religion, the 
Ethiopians slept near a thousand years, forgetful of the world 
by whom they were forgotten. 7
The survival of her political independence in the midst of an 
Africa under European domination,the survival of her mono- 
physite Christianity in the borderland between Islam and 
paganism, the survival of her Semitic language between the 
Hamitic and Nilotic .language-areas. • . derive from the same 
cause: that is, from the virtual impregnability of the high-
land-fastness. This is the explanation of Ethiopian survival- 
power. 8
Toynbee’s assertion follows logically from Gibbon’s and, taken to­
gether, they seem to explain a cultural distinctiveness, the xenophobia 
attributed to Ethiopians,the continuity of Ethiopian history and 
the absence of European colonialism on die basis of a few general­
isations. As we shall see, the Ethiopian experience is not suscep­
tible to such gross generalisation. Ethiopia slept only from the 
vantage point of Europe; prior to the fifteenth-century Muslim 
invasions, Ethiopia's material and non-material cultures were as 
advanced as those of Europe. An emphasis on isolation does not 
satisfactorily explain certain contradictions within Ethiopian 
societies and, while geography is certainly a factor in Ethiopian 
history and the processes of her underdevelopment, it is neither the 
determining nor,probably, even a predominating factor.
6Fairly
extensive trade and marketing networks developed throughout Ethiopian 
history, subject to the constraints posed by political fragmentation, 
social stratifications and ethnic antagonisms which eure largely 
unrelated to geography. Traditional notions of chivalry tended to 
negate the influence of geography on military outcomes: defenders
did not employ the guerrilla tactics of large-scale fortifications 
that would have taken advantage of rugged geographical features, 
although shifta (bandits) traditionally used hit-and-run tactics and 
contemporary separatist groups are applying the lessons learnedlin 
other guerrilla wars. Although large-scale invasions and internal 
wars demonstrate that Ethiopia's impregnability is a myth,^her 
boundaries are less artificial than those of many other Third World 
countries, as Ethiopia's were created -and are-tenuously maintained,; through 
the ability of an indigenous army to police its b o r d e r s . i f • - • y 
The xenophobic element in Ethiopian attitudes has been grossly exagger­
ated, and such distrust as exists has been and continues to be a
q
rational response to foreign actions and intentions.
Throughout this study, we shall identify development constraints 
and choices which are particularly Ethiopian in the sense that, 
although they may be analogous to the constraints and choices found 
in many other countries,they exist in a unique combination which is the 
product of an historical experience not shared by Ethiopia's 
neighbours. We nevertheless argue that the analyses presented are 
relevant to other Third World countries. Virtually all of the 
development problems stressed by theorists (except overpopulation, for 
example) are present in Ethiopia in their most extreme form, and 
textbook solutions to development problems have been regularly 
murdered by a host of Ethiopian social and political realities.
Ethiopia thus constitutes an important limiting case on the often 
partial or dubious successes claimed for particular development theories, 
and forces a concentration on the broadening .of approaches to develop­
ment. Following Gunnar Myrdal, Ethiopia should not be classified as a 
"developing" country: to do so i^ ould beg an important question. It
is "underdeveloped" because conscious political processes have given
7ris.e to "a constellation of numerous undesirable conditions for work
and life • • . While "development" is "a characterization
afflicted with vagueness", it is nevertheless "definite enough to 
10permit its use" (see Chapter Two).
11I. An Ethiopian ’Morphology1
Tom Farer argues that the "depth of Ethiopian misery is pretty
much invulnerable to exaggeration"', aiid.that, for most Ethiopians*
life displays the Hobbesian characteristics of being nasty, brutish
and short Although some anthropologists might quarrel with these
assertions, they are certainly borne out by the application of
criteria commonly adopted by development theorists. 1968 estimates
-of per capita incomes in Ethiopia range from US $60 - 85 per year
($90 in 1973)i which means that Ethiopia lags behind roughly 39 of
the (^hen) ^3 countries in Africa - the most impoverished continent.
, When gross inequalities in the distribution of land and income are
taken into account,, the vast majority of Ethiopia’s people must be
regarded as among the poorest in the world. Ethiopia has also failed
to progress in comparison with other African countries: the annual
rates of increase of her Gross Domestic Product (and population)
were slightly below the African average during the years 1950-73*
.Per capita food consumption in Ethiopia averages 1600 calories per.
day, a shortfall of about *tOO calories compared to what is deemed
necessary to maintain minimal nutritional standards. Only about
7$ of the population is literate, compared to an African average of
Vyfo and a Kenyan literacy rate of 20 - 25%. A Physical Quality of
Life-'Index has been calculated for various countries on the basis of
life expectancy, infant mortality and literacy, by the Overseas
Development Council. Ethiopia scored 16 on this Index, compared to,
13for example, 38 for Iran, 83 for Sri Lanka and 88 for Taiwan.
Approximately 27 million people live in the roughly triangular 
^72,000 square mile (1,221,900 sq. km.) area bordered by the Bed 
Sea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and Sudan. Ethiopia’s population 
structure is fairly typical for an underdeveloped country: 90%
of the people live in rural areas, and a pyramidal population struc­
ture, in which each age group p.s smaller than the younger group just 
below it, results from a fairly high annual birth rate of 2.6%.
Estimates made in 19&7 show that half of the Ethiopian population is 
under the age of 20, 44% were aged 0 - 1 5  years, and only 51% 
were in the economically-active bracket of 15 - 59 years of age. 
Ethiopia’s population density is low relative to that of other 
Third World states and to the amount of potentially arable land 
available, although land is in short supply in many densely-popu­
lated areas. In development terms, the absolute size of Ethiopia’s 
population poses few problems in the absence of severe drought, since 
the population would not have grown so large if, historically, the 
economy had been incapable of supporting it. The problem is, 
rather, the fairly rapid rate of population Increase that-places a 
strain on facilities such as schools and hospitals, makes for a 
smaller percentage of economically-active taxpayers, and progressively 
results in a labour force which expands faster than it can be absorbed 
into agriculture and industry. For example, a modest annual growth 
in Ethiopian agricultural production of 1.8% throughout the 1960s was
swamped by annual population increases of 2%, resulting in a net
14deterioration in living standards.
Ethiopia can be divided'into three climatic zones: Afro-alpine
areas .with altitudes of over 8,000 feet and temperatures from 60 /
degrees F to near freezing; temperate areas with altitudes of 5*000 -
8,000 feet and a climate and vegetation similar to those of the 
milder Western European seasons; and hot and tropical or arid areas 
below 5,000 feet with a temperature range , of 8 a -..120 degrees-F— . . 
Highland areas, the traditional ’homeland’ of Amharas and Tigreans, 
have the highest population densities and consist of a network of 
plateaux varying widely in size and degree of isolation. The climate, 
agriculture, cultures and political orientations found in the lowland 
areas', on the other hand, have more in common with those of adjacent 
countries than with the highlands. Soil types and rainfall vary 
widely -from 2.5 inches/year near the Red Sea to 106 inches on the 
Southwestern plateau. All of these variations make for a wide variety 
of crops and farming and animal husbandry techniques. 90% of the 
population are engaged in agricultural pursuits and they generated 
54% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 97% of exports in 1970-71* 
About 45% of GDP is produced at the subsistence level. The low pro­
ductivity of the traditional sector and transport and storage
9difficulties contrast sharply with the high productivity associated 
with the growth of sugar and cotton output in the recently-national­
ised estate sector* This tiny sector has accounted for most of the 
growth in agricultural production in recent years. Fifty years 
ago, forests covered one-half of Ethiopia’s surface area but they 
now account for only about Alternate fuel and building supplies
are urgently needed? deforestation, combined with over-grazing and 
cultivation methods inimical to conservation, have resulted in serious 
erosion problems. Ethiopia has the highest livestock population in 
Africa - about 72 million animals (plus 33 million chickens) in 
197^» or 2.7 animals per person. A high" proportion are over-grazers
- sheep, 22 millions and goats, 17 millions - and most of the .25
million cattle are of little economic value and are kept as trad-
15itional status symbols* ^
Stressing the interrelatedness of the rural and urban areas of
Ethiopia, Gerard Gill offers a useful interpretation of the facts
cited in the last few paragraphs:
It.'has been estimated . . .  that the Ethiopian labor force will 
grow by perhaps 3*3 to k million over the next decade, but even
the most optimistic forecasts suggest that not more than 1
million new jobs will be created outside of agriculture, so 
that the farm sector must become capable of productively absorb­
ing the surplus. . « • The indirect economic, and even finan­
cial cost of labor displacement £  from agriculture^/ stem 
largely.from increased pressure on urban facilities caused by 
the influx of rural migrants. 16
The absorptive capacity of the urban areas is extremely limited, 
owing to the retardation of Ethiopian urbanisation that resulted 
from the absence of European colonialism and from traditional 
factors such as the lack of an influential permanent capital during 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Urban populations are, 
however, growing at the rate of 6.6% annually (7% for Addis Ababa).
Only 10?o of Ethiopians live in ’urban1 areas and, once the indep­
endent chartered municipalities - Addis Ababa (with a population of one 
million) , Asmara and Gondar - are accounted for, few genuinely 
urban areas remain. Almost half of these supposedly urban dwellers 
live in the towns of less than 20,000 inhabitants that are really 
rural groupings and follow a rural lifestyle. Living conditions in 
the major urban areas are deplorable: there are few employment
10
opportunities; many of the minimal services provided in the urban areas 
of nearby countries are unavailable; housing is overcrowded, substan­
dard and often inaccessible by road; overcrowding aggravates poor 
transportation, sanitation and health facilities; relatively high 
infant mortality rates and malnutrition are in evidence; and the 
retail price of food and drink increased 67. ^  from 1963 to 1971, 
while wages for unskilled labour-remained virtually unchanged at 
Eth. $ 1 per day (Eth. $2,08 = U.S. $l).17
Meagre employment opportunities in urban areas of Ethiopia are 
explained by the low productivity of traditional cornmerce-and the 
small size of the manufacturing sector; meaningful industrial growth 
cannot be sustained by so small an urban population. Following a 
pattern common in much of the Third World, Ethiopian industrial 
manufacturers accounted., for about of GDP in 1970, compared to
25 - 2.7% in such agricultural countries as Denmark and Australia and 
to the roughly of Ethiopian GDP which represents traditional 
handicrafts. About 90^ of the gross value of Ethiopian manufactures is 
produced by firms with more than fifty employees and, as these firms 
constitute infant industries in an international context, they produce 
expensive import substitutes for a small domestic market, protected 
by high tariff barriers and transport costs. The reported profitabil­
ity of these firms averaged only 10 - annually prior to the Revol­
ution, yet products were sold at. an average of 60% above the price, of 
equivalent imports (minus the relevant import tariffs). The growth 
in Ethiopian manufacturing attained through import substitution has 
come to a dead end; levels of domestic demand for additional products 
are presently below the output of the minimum size of factories 
employing modem technology, although both income distributions and 
the kinds of technology used may change as a result of the Revol­
ution. Manufacturing is currently dominated by food and beverages,
J>€>% of total manufactures, and textiles and clothing, 32%. The value 
added in Ethiopia to the finished product is estimated to average 
only hOfa for manufactures as a whole. Prior to the Revolution,, many 
firms operated at 60 to 8($ of capacity and suffered from inexperienced 
and inefficient management and labour, lack of demand for their 
products, and difficulties in securing raw materials. Through
11
licensing policies, investment and tax incentives and tariff struc­
tures, Haile Selassie's Government played a decisive role in deter-
18mining the structure of manufacturing output,
Ethiopia also displays familiar patterns of underdevelopment with
regard to foreign trade: exports consist almost entirely of primary
produce, and imports are dominated by manufactures and raw materials.
Export prices and. earnings are subject to great cyclical swings while the
prices of imports have risen steadily. Despite these trends,
the terms of trade altered in Ethiopia's favour from 1968 to 1973*
the weighted wholesale price index of Ethiopian exports stood at„158
in 1973 (1968 = 100) while the import index reached only 123-8, and
net foreign exchange earnings stood at Eth. $^21.6 millions in
March 197^- This state of affairs can be attributed largely to
favourable international coffee price trends; coffee accounted for _
at least half of total export earnings from 196^ to 1972, although
its relative importance is declining. Ethiopia must obviously
diversify its exports towards goods with more stable prices, such
as animal products, processed foods and manufactures, and seek new
markets. Only 7% of her exports are sold in Africa, for example,
19and 8096 :of these are sent to Djibouti.
In'1969» mining accounted for only 0-3% of Ethiopia's GDP.
‘Mineral deposits which could foster large-scale industrial activity 
have not been discovered, although gold, platinum, potash and salt - 
are mined. Small quantities of iron ore, copper, manganese, nickel, 
asbestos and natural gas have been discovered, and exploration for 
oil continues fitfully in the Ogaden. As Somalia asserts what she 
considers to be good claims to the Ogaden, the fact that geological 
conditions favour the existence of large oil reserves constitutes a 
serious and permanent source of friction. *f31 million kwh of elec­
tricity were produced during fiscal year 1971~72, 7 of which was 
hydroelectricity. The consumption of energy in Ethiopia is the lowest 
in the world on a per capita basis, although demand has not exceeded 
supply, given the small size of the manufacturing sector and per
capita incomes. Ethiopia has a vast potential for producing hydro-
20electricity and for generating electricity by geothermal means.
Ethiopia has about 9*000 km. of all-weather roads, a very small 
total for so large a country. Extensions of the trunk road system 
outpaced the construction of access and feeder roads, although these
12
priorities were somewhat reversed in the Third Five Year Plan 
(1968 - 73)* If we consider a 10 kilometer strip on either side of 
a road as being within easy reach of it, only 12% of the population 
has ready access to a road. Transport deficiencies constitute a 
major development bottleneck in Ethiopia, as an extensive transport 
network is needed to organise the division of labour and regional 
specialisation, collect raw materials, increase the competitiveness 
of exports by reducing transport costs, disperse goods (particularly 
food) to isolated markets, enable ’agents of change* such as agri­
cultural extension workers to travel more widely, and, of-course, to 
permit a mechanised army to be mobilised quickly. One study has 
shown that the traditional transport of goods by pack animals takes 
50 times as long and costs ten times as much as transport by lorry.
9096 of domestic freight and 95% of all passengers in the modem 
transport sector are carried by road, and 70% of both were carried 
in vehicles provided by individual owner-operators prior to the Re­
volution. Ethiopia also has two narrow-gauge railways running 
from Addis Ababa to Djibouti (880 Jan.) and Asmara to Massawa (306 km.); 
they operate at a loss despite high freight charges and are frequently 
inoperable due to sabotage by separatist movements. There are few 
navigable inland waterways and only three seaports of any importance. 
As Assab, which is linked to road transport and has an oil refinery, 
and Massawa are in Eritrea, and Djibouti has recently become *indo- ' 
pendent*, Ethiopia faces the prospect of being totally cut off from 
the sea. Air transport is used extensively for access to remote 
areas. Ethiopian Air Lines serves 30 domestic airports regularly 
and carried 125,000 domestic passengers and a freight volume of 
*fl*f,00p. ton-miles during 1971
Internal telecommunications are adequate and, surprisingly, 
more towns have telephone services than have postal services. The 
media are underdeveloped in comparison with those of most Third 
World countries, and low literacy levels require that much public 
information be dispersed through local speeches or radio loudspeakers
installed in town squares. Censorship is stifling and puts an
22unbearable stress on positive achievements, out it has been relaxed 
periodically during the course of the Revolution. As a result of
13
censorship,'cultural traditions and underdeveloped media, the 
rapi'd-fire underground dissemination of information has developed 
into an art form. Although rumours are also propagated, they often 
have the character of self-fulfilling prophecies* Like people in 
many other countries, Ethiopians tend to pride themselves on being 
well-informed and, given a secretive bureaucracy, information 
constitutes a potent source of personal power.
Government revenue (excluding foreign aid and loans) accounts 
for less than 2096 of GDP, and revenue estimates for the last few 
years have been over-pptimistic, in light of disruptions related to 
the Revolution. The Budget for 1976-77? for example, envisaged 
domestic revenues of Eth. $Sk3 millions, and only 21% of this sum 
was to be raised through direct taxation. Indirect domestic taxes 
were expected to contribute 2396 and tariffs 32%- More than 59% of dom­
estic revenue was thus to be obtained through easily-collected but 
highly-regressive forms of indirect taxation. When anticipated
svv
foreign aid and loan funds, totalling Eth. $280 millions, are added
to domestic revenue, a deficit of Eth. $3^1 millions remained,
against anticipated expenditures of Eth. $l,*f66 millions. The
manner in which governments allocate budgetary expenditures is a
revealing indication of their overall priorities. In the Ethiopia
of 1976-77? defense and internal security accounted for more than
2Wo of total expenditures (about the ,same as the Latin American
average of 2596) , education for 1296,health for 596, justice for 0.996
and planning for 0.396. While domestic revenue expanded at an annual
rate of 7 - 1296 during the 1960s, two-thirds of this increase was
absorbed by a growth in defense and internal security expenditures.
Ethiopia’s income tax ratio of 896 of GDP is low even by Third World
standards, and export tariffs cannot be increased further without
23damaging her international competitiveness. The foundations of a dy­
namic tax system must therefore be laid. ;
It is paradoxical that the only sub-Saharan country with a
2,000 year old literate culture should have the lowest literacy 
rate in Africa. The usual obstacles to educational advance in Af­
rica - poor communications, lack of finance, shortages of qualified 
staff and teaching materials and irrelevant curricular content - are 
present in Ethiopia in their most extreme form. Only about 19/6
I k
of the relevant age group are attending primary school, only y/a
are’ at secondary school, and there is a particularly high dropout
rate in the lower primary grades. Traditional education is oriented
towards training clergymen for the extremely conservative Orthodox
Church, and is irrelevant to modern needs. The educational system has
created a surplus of low-level clerical manpower, while shortages of
skilled workers of all kinds persist, particularly in agricultural
and technical fields. There is also a general shortage of very
competent and experienced high-level manpower in all fields,
2kparticularly in engineering and medicine.
In 1970 it was estimated that the average life expectancy of 
Ethiopians is 35 years, and infant mortality before one year is 
somewhere in the range of 16 - 30^» The major endemic diseases, 
malaria (where the altitude is below 5*000 feet) and tuberculosis, 
affect 30 ~-.kC$ of the population, and relatively high levels of the 
following diseases have been noted: parasitic and gastroenteric
infections (including Bilharzia), leprosy, venereal diseases, small­
pox, typhus, typhoid, cholera, trachoma, conjunctivitis and the 
common childhood diseases. The general state of health is also 
affected by nutritional and sanitation deficiencies and the narrowly 
limited availability of medical and public health facilities. Health 
care under Haile Selassie was oriented towards curing the ills of 
wealthy citydwellers. „ In 1969 for example, there was one doctor 
for every 2,300 residents of Asmara, while the ratio in the rural 
areas was 1:63*000. Although annual expenditures in the areas of 
health and education increased by an average of 10 - 12?/o during the 
1960s, these expansions operated upon a desperately small base and 
benefits were conferred almost exclusively on tiny, privileged social
pts
groups-
II. Social Stratification and Ethnic Antagonisms.
The preceding Section suggests that, while Ethiopian under­
development displays patterns which are commonly found throughout the 
Third World, life in Ethiopia tends to be nastier, more brutish and 
shorter than it is in other countries. While they have deep hist­
orical roots, the phenomena of underdevelopment have only become 
apparent and acquired political significance in Ethiopia recently.
She did not lag behind the rest of Africa (Southern Africa apart) in
15
economic development at the end of the nineteenth century yet, by 
the 1960s, Ethiopia was far behind most of the newly-independent 
countries. If, as Walter ]Rodney argues so forcefully, Europe under­
developed Africa, how much more was Ethiopia underdeveloped through 
her traditional political systems? In this Section, some of the social 
and political factors that underlie processes of Ethiopian underdev­
elopment will be examined. Our analyses emphasise the impact of
two major organising principles of Ethiopian social systems, strat-
26ification and ethnicity.
A. A Brief Ethnology
There are at least 95 distinct languages in Ethiopia, but lin­
guists group them into three families: the Semitic - about 37% of
the population, the Cushitic or Hamitic - about 5&% and the Nilo- 
Saharan or Negroid - about tyo. Numerous differences in forms of 
social organisation, dress, customs and religious beliefs both overlap 
and reinforce the many linguistic boundaries. Although religious 
distinctions can become quite blurred among some ethnic groups, the 
major religions are Ethiopian Orthodox or Coptic Christianity - about 
3J%i and Islam - about by/o* Much of the balance consists of a 
variety of localised religions, termed animist or tribal by anthro­
pologists and pagan by some Ethiopians. There are a number of small, 
submerged or pariah groups which are despised and feared because of 
their religious beliefs and/or their occupations - blacksmiths, potters, 
dressers of skins and hunters of "unclean" animals. For example, 
some 30»000 Falasha are scattered throughout the population and 
practice an archaic Judaism; they are thought to possess the capabil­
ities associated with the !evil eye' and engage in despised occupa­
tions, largely because they were prevented from acquiring permanent 
land rights prior to 1975- Finally, there is a small foreign com­
munity of about 65,000 consisting largely of Yemenis, Saudi Arabians, 
Armenians, Italians and Greeks. These people are insulated from 
political power and traditional social relations, and are typically
27engaged m  commerce or pursue skilled and professional occupations.
Linguistic, cultural', religious and physical differences have, 
over the centuries, had a major influence on the course of Ethiopian 
social relations. In Ethiopia and elsewhere, tolerance in the face 
of cultural differences is always in short supply when harsh material
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conditions coexist with virile and sophisticated non-material cultures,
deeply-rooted antagonisms and glaring disparities in the distribution
of wealth and power. Most Ethiopians pursue their interests within a
narrowly-defined cultural group or locality and display prejudice
and hostility towards stereotyped "outsiders”; an Ethiopian.national
society is but a remote abstraction. Although assertions of ethnic
identities can be found in all 'plural' societies, the feudal and
imperial character of Ethiopian politics has exacerbated ethnic
tensions to the point where regional rebellions have become virtually 
28continuous. -— —
The politically-dominant Amharas, about 2 of the population, and
Tigreans, about 9^,form the bulk of the Semitic population and live
in the central and northern highlands, respectively. Despite the
numerous cultural differences perceived by these groups, they have
much in common, including an austere indigenous Christianity, a
spirited military tradition, and a pragmatic peasant agriculture
closer to the Mediterranean traditions of, say, Sicily than to those
of Africa. The foundation of their social relations is a regularised
inequality (often accompanied by what is termed corruption in the
West) in the social roles of individuals, resulting from the gross
disparities in the distribution of wealth and power that have evolved
from the organisational requirements of traditional armies. Although
some family and sociable relations occur among equals, many relations
which are significant economically and politically can be reduced to
some form of vertical, patron-client relationship. These hierarchical
relations generate a degree of vertical social integration at the
expense of effective horizontal relationships, tend to reduce
antagonisms between strata, and achieve an unstable balance between
localised forces of social integration and disintegration.. While "cli-
entelisra” is found in most states where political processes are
deficient, bureaucracies are inefficient and markets are imperfect,
patron-client relations in Ethiopia are sufficiently distinct to
. 29warrant further discussion m  Chapters Three and Six. We argue 
that crude Marxian analyses are largely irrelevant to a consideration 
of social stratifications among the Amhara-Tigre because, as in many 
other Third World states, their social strata do not form classes in 
any politically relevant sense of that term: social interactions
tend to be personal and localised, while the distribution of wealth
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is almost entirely a consequence of antecedent political structures,
military requirements and legal rules. Economic ’'substructures'* do
not,in other words, determine the content of political and cultural
30’’superstructures” to any great extent.
Social stratification patterns among the Amhara-Tigre and eth­
nicity among Ethiopians as a whole tend to operate as independent 
social forces. The Ethiopian state, dominated by Amhara-Tigre social 
structures for some 1200 years, and by Amhara from Shoa Province in 
the twentieth century, lacked the power and authority needed to over­
throw the generally more egalitarian and communitarian traditions of 
other ethnic groups. Military conquest did give rise to"a feudal 
and imperial political system, but imperialism achieved only modest 
economic successes, particularly the intermittant exaction of tribute, 
usually in the form of small agricultural surpluses. Half-hearted 
attempts at political and cultural imperialism were neb, for the 
most part, successful in rural areas. Many of the conquered peoples 
saw little reason to adopt Amhara culture and, like English colonists, 
the Amhara did not allow themselves to become assimilated by local 
ethnic groups. Only a few non-Amhara were absorbed by the Amhara 
political system, and their participation was limited to distinct 
and subordinate roles, to localised functions within a system of 
’indirect rule* and, more recently, to those of an educated but 
politically-isolated group of modernisers within the bureaucracy. 
Non-Amhara were kept far away from the levers of a national political 
power, and low levels of national integration were preserved largely 
through the application of military force. Many contemporary Ethiopian
problems can therefore be viewed els the outcomes of divergent inter-
■51ests asserted by distinct and increasingly militant ethnic groups.
"Most separatist groups in Ethiopia are to be found among the 
Cushitic peoples, all of whom live along the Ned Sea coast, the border 
with Somalia or in the South: the Oromo (Galla) ** about of
the population; Somali - about 5%; Afar (Danakil) - about 3 
Sidamo - about 8%; and Saho, Beja and Agau - about 2%. Although many 
of these peoples are at least nominally Muslim, Islam has not proved 
a unifying force among them, unlike the Christianity of the Amhara- 
Tigre, and is clearly dominant only on the Eritrean coast and in a
i
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few towns. Islam is more tolerant and flexible than Ethiopian 
Christianity in countenancing tribal or animist religious practices, 
and numerous, admixtures of religious beliefs have been noted. The 
Sidamo have become partially Amharicised and have a highly-developed 
system of terraced agriculture and animal husbandry. The Gallas 
appear to be divided evenly among Islamic, Ethiopian Christian and 
traditional religious beliefs. Although the Galla are a pastoral 
and semi-nomadic people in hot lowland areas, many have successfully 
adjusted to sedentary agriculture in the uplands. Geographical 
dispersion and religious and cultural differences have, meant that a 
pan-Galla (Oromo) ethnic identity has only begun to be rediscovered 
in the twentieth century. Despite the diversities, Galla social life 
has numerous common elements such as a emphasis on group action, 
neighbourliness in political and everyday affairs, a mobility from 
one community to another, and traditional assemblies of elders, 
often with elected leaders - the virtual antithesis of Amhara social 
life.52
While a fair degree of integration was achieved by co-opting 
a few Galla leaders into a Government dominated by Amhara and through 
the influence of Amhara culture on the Gallas, the Muslim and nomadic 
or semi-nomadic Afar and Somalis remain all but unadministered by 
central government. Although clans and lineages within these groups 
quarrel over water and gracing rights in an arid environment and 
rarely unite, they have fought, usually in small groups, against the 
Amhara-Tigre for centuries. Somali antagonisms have been reinforced 
by the growth of Somali nationalism across the border. Nilotic or 
Negroid peoples live along the western border that bisects closely- 
related ethnic groupings in Ethiopia and Sudan. These peoples were 
among the last to be incorporated into the Empire and the derogatory 
name given to them by the Amhara - shankella - means both black and 
slave, a reflection of the fact that Ethiopia was one of the last 
countries to attempt to abolish slavery.55
While the Amhara-Tigre can be validly termed subsistence 
peasants (even though some of them were tenants on the land of an­
other prior to 1975) > many sedentary agriculturalists belonging to, 
other ethnic groups - except, for example, the Gurage and Sidamo
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peoples - can be more accurately compared to the subsistence farmers 
found in other parts of Africa. Throughout history, peasants have 
been the "prey of civilisation" and the broad base of social strat­
ifications, and Ethiopia is one of the few countries in which they 
have not been drawn into either market or socialist systems of 
production. Some Ethiopian fanners have become peasants as a result 
of twentieth century contacts with Amhara-Tigre land tenures and 
farming practices, especially among the Galla. For these peasants, 
a self-perpetuating family farm is the major unit of property, 
socialisation, sociability and welfare; if anything resembling a 
village can be found in rural Ethiopia, it is virtually self-con­
tained. There was little contact between the nobility, who often 
lived in urban areas under Haile Selassie, and peasants, who usually 
dealt with the lords1 retainers; the upper social strata are usually 
vacant in the rural areas. Levels of living may not differ signif­
icantly within a given area, but differentials in status and economic 
prospects are nevertheless maintained between those who must work 
hard and those who do little or no work. Peasants may have recog­
nised that their enforced social obligations amounted to exploi­
tation, land patron-client relations offered the only hope for security 
during hard times, but feelings of injustice seldom achieved pol­
itical results because they lacked shape and organisation prior to . 
the Revolution. By definition, all Ethiopian subsistence producers 
are dependent on neither imports to nor exports from their locality, 
and an economic subsistence combines with small-scale and subsistence 
political and social 'markets' to create an impoverished and powerless 
rural lifestyle (see Chapters Two and Six). There is little 
specialisation of labour, or communication with farmers or peasants 
living outside the narrow community, and the individual's knowledge 
of the outside world, and hence of the possibility that socio-economic 
relations can be organised in a different way, is extremely limited. 
One result of the Revolution is, however, the progressive politic­
isation of the peasantry - as we shall see in Chapter Six. The 
effects pf urban-oriented modernisations on the rural areas are 
negligible, apart from the drain on rural resources caused by 
urbanisation, and struggles within and among elites had almost no 
impact on living conditions prior to the Revolution, except when
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warfare destroyed the peasants' and farmers' livelihood.
B. The Amhara-Tigre Empire
Like many other countries, Ethiopia has experienced recurrent
patterns of integration and disintegration, from local isolation to
a 'universal' empire with a fair degree of ciiltural assimilation
within the upper strata, and back again to a "new age of localism1*, or 
35feudalism. Simplifying the richness of Ethiopian history, the
•zg
political formula or myth of an unbroken dynasty stretching back to 
Solomon and Sheba which marks Ethiopian Christians as God's chosen 
people, the embalming of cultural traditions within the”Orthodox 
Church and the capacity to unite in the face of foreign aggression 
prevented a complete dismemberment of the Empire. Answers to the 
question of who was an Ethiopian varied from time to time, in ac­
cordance with the amount of power and authority wielded at the core 
of an Empire-state manned by the Amhara-Tigre. The forces of localism 
predominated during the seventh to twelfth centuries, but a mediaeval 
period (1250 - 1^50) saw the re-establishment of territorial unity 
under scholar-fighter emperors who encouraged art, literature and 
codifications concerning civil and religious institutions. The 
growing ethnic diversities in an expanded Empire, the Jehad of Ahmed 
Gran and periodic Galla invasions in the sixteenth century, greatly 
weakened the Amhara-Tigre state at the centre, although a brief 
renaissance, and re-assertion of central administrative authority has 
been noted, culminating in the reign of Yasu the Great (1682 - 1709). 
The 150-year Era of the Judges (as in the Old Testament) followed,
when puppet-kings were completely at the mercy of ambitious npbles
37who usually grouped themselves into two warring camps.
To generalise a bit, the Amhara-Tigre Empire can be viewed as 
consisting of two groups, although no simple dichotomy of rulers 
and the' ruled can be identified. There were several categories 
of elites who, while they quarrelled among themselves, were bound 
together by a common'interest, that of dominating the localised and 
fairly diverse societies of the Empire. The latter group usually 
deferred, willingly or unwillingly, to the elites but exerted a 
measure of'influence by periodically displaying their discontent.
In a pre-industrial society such as the Empire, the interests of two 
such p;roups were fundamentally opposed, yet feelings of 'us' and
I
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•them’ did not often acquire political significance; meta-social
guarantees of the political order profoundly legitimated the power of
the elites among the Amhara-Tigre. The political formula of a
Solomonic dynasty closely linked to the Orthodox Church provided a
sophisticated and elaborate justification for the survival of what
was seen as the natural order of things, in which each ’ estate*
performs essential functions. In a world of unavoidable scarcity
and seemingly inevitable hardship, minimal subsistence and thasafety
of life and limb depended upon the protection of the strong. This
protection of the weak by the strong was granted in return for a
recognition of the right of the powerful to control large landholdings.
Given the abundance of land and the virtual non-existence of capital,
new technologies and entrepreneurship, the value of these landholdings
lay in an ability to command labour time, from those with little or
no land, in excess of what was needed to secure subsistence. It was
not always possible to attain subsistence by expending the maximum
of human effort hoxyever, even in the absence of pillage or natural
calamities. Growing inequalities in landholding led to little capital
accumulation: rent or tribute was rendered in a perishable form which
could be exchanged for few goods or services - apart from the services
of unspecialised courtiers or hangers-on - in the absence of large-
38scale trade, urbanisation or a marked division of labour.
Although the Empire of the Amhara-Tigre always contained aris­
tocratic, socially-stratified components, many Ethiopianists agree 
that specifically feudal political arrangements only emerged in the 
seventeenth century, as a result of internal and external conflicts
which sapped the Emperors1 political, administrative and military 
39strength. As in the German Standestaat, this feudalism was the 
fallback position adopted after premature efforts to centralise the 
Government of a large territory. The element of personal dependence 
was pushed to extremes, and there occurred an almost total fusion 
of localised economic control, the exercise of political and military 
power and the impact of legal rules and institutions, especially with 
regard to the administration'of justice. In an agrarian system which 
was rare in Africa, extremely complex systems of land tenure evolved 
to form the base of■ a large, hierarchical structure of claimants to
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the.peasants’ output. A landed ’gentry’ moved increasingly from a 
preoccupation with military matters towards taxation and adminis­
trative activities; they represented a fragmentation of political 
power resulting from the granting of ’service tenements’ or ’fiefs’ 
(gult)in lieu of salary, under the ultimate, if theoretical, authority 
of an Emperor. Most of the characteristics of a European-style 
feudalism could be found in Ethiopia but, as the concept of feudal­
ism has no precise agreed content, some semantic quibbling has 
occurred among Ethiopianists. The new military Government has, however,
analysed this system as a feudal one in the 1975 Land Reform Proc- 
40lamation, and this perception has influenced the policies discussed 
in Chapter Six.
When Kassa came to the Throne as the charismatic Tewodros in 
18551 he displayed a genuine commitment to the ideals of the trad­
itional political formula and attempted to reunify and reconstruct 
the Empire. New.imeans were used to pursue this traditional goal, 
however. Tewodros’s attempts to create a national army and salaried 
bureaucracy collapsed and were temporarily forgotten when, in 1872, 
he was succeeded by the last Tigrean Emperor, Yohannes IV. Menelik 
IX, ruling from 1889 to 19151 was an Amhara from Shoa Province who 
revived Tewodros’s policies and used them to establish the Shoan 
hegemony that constitutes a festering cause for dissatisfaction 
among Tigreans and Amhara from Gojjam Province to this daj. Although 
Tigre is the cradle of both the ancient Aksumite and Ethiopian 
Christian civilisations, the locus of Imperial power slowly shifted 
southward from the seventh century. The periodic loss of the Red 
Sea coastline to Muslims and the Italians, and the declining soil 
fertility and populations that resulted from overcropping and con­
tinuous warfare, encouraged attempts to extend the Empire to the 
east, west and south. Menelik expanded the Empire to its present 
ill-defined boundaries in a search for food, tax revenues and com­
mercial possibilities. Compared to the conquered peoples, the Amhara 
combined a military aptitude and access to an adequate supply of 
modern arms with a relative material poverty. The Amhara conquerors
displayed - and to some extent still display - attitudes surprisingly
klsimilar to those of European colonists*
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Menelik1s military prowess quickly outpaced modest improvements 
in his regime’s political and administrative capacities; his Empire 
expanded much faster than did the assimilation of new and diverse 
ethnic groups. Tewodros, Menelik and Haile Selassie pursued distinct 
but interrelated goals of centralisation,modernisation - albeit 
at a snail’s pace - and integration, but integration was thought of 
as a natural outcome of the progressive implementation of the other 
policies. Amharisation was pursued in a rather complacent fashion 
and there were few formal attempts to spread Orthodox Christianity 
and the Amhara culture, although traders and soldiers occasionally 
acted as culture brokers. The Church lacked the centralised organi­
sational control and the keen interest in missionary activity that 
would have made wholesale conversions possible, and most non-Christians 
rejected outright the political formula of a Solomonic rule. Amharas 
saw their function as one of administering a desirable status quo, 
of consolidating an imperial rule by displacing localised, often 
democratic institutions and creating more centralising Shoan ones.
These new political arrangements operated so-»as to stifle local 
initiative and many traditional forms of cooperation in the South, 
yet the new rulers lacked the political and economic strength 
necessary to create locally-useful central institutions. The lack of 
local participation in an Amhara state has promoted feelings of 
alienation and quietism, both symptoms of powerlessness, as well as 
subversive and rebellious attitudes. These attitudes were manipul­
ated by provincial leaders, and ethnic rivalries and dissatisfactions 
were blended into a centrifugal regionalism; harrow, Shoan Amhara 
definitions of a national identity called forth the equally narrow 
reactions that served only to reinforce feudal arrangements among 
the Amhara. In the South, justice was seen as the prerogative of the 
descendants of Menelik’s armies, who dominated the courts and used 
them to expropriate additional lands. Even today, the social dis­
tance between Amhara and non-Amhara in the rural areas is so great 
that little social change can take place through peaceable inter- 
action.
2h
G* Haile Selassie1s Empire
John Cohen and Dov Weintraub argue that Ras Tafari, who became 
Regent in 1917 and Emperor Haile Selassie in 1930» simply took up 
Menelik's feudal and colonial southern policies and applied them 
throughout the country. IThis kind of involuted imperialism has the 
effect of keeping the populace in a permanent state of underdevelop­
ment and has been termed "despotism" by Wheeler, who maintains that
this type of regime can only be eliminated by some form of revol- 
■ .utxon. The realities of Haile "Selassie's reign are much more com­
plex, however.
Continuing to press for centralisation and, in the early years 
of his reign, modernisation, he also made some attempt to secure a 
greater degree c£ national integration by diffusing the Araharic 
. language and the culture and political formula of the Amhara, through 
the emerging educational processes and communications media that 
radiated outward from the geographic centre established by Menelik - 
Addis Ababa. New and subordinate elite groups, typically distin­
guished by the possession of secondary school certificates, emerged 
to gain access to a few of the privileges previously reserved for the 
nobility. These new elites, microscopically small in relation to the 
population as a whole,consisted largely of Amhara occupying bureau­
cratic posts. In 1962, for example, 10if top officials were surveyed 
and the 95 respondents, included 66 Amhara, nine Tigreans from Tigre 
Province, thirteen Tigres from Eritrea (including one Protestant and 
at least one Muslim), and seven Gallas. A few persons entered these 
elite groups through indigenous commerce or by serving as window- 
dressing for the growing number of foreign corporations. Many 
bureaucratic and business activities were dominated by what were 
termed modernising members of the feudal nobility, and the patron- 
client relations found among rural Amharas and Tigreans were repro­
duced in the new urban areas. Commerce and government continued to 
suffer from poor horizontal communication, secrecy and intrigue. 
Beginning with Tewodros, Emperors began to elevate larger numbers of 
capable men who had no ancestral claims to high position. These 
new members of the ruling elite usually served as counterweights to 
parochial and'isolationist rural rulers. Yet, as late as the end of
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Haile Selassie's reign, key tasks in provincial governments and in 
the Defense and Interior Ministries could only be performed by men 
whose authority stemmed from the traditional sources. Every care was 
taken to ensure that traditional agrarian institutions were not 
undermined. It is interesting to note that Ethiopia is often compared 
to Japan,where the nobility countenanced modernisation by an auto­
cratic oligarchy, the continuity of an Imperial tradition served as 
the focus of a new national identity, and the loyalties of the popu­
lation were drawn towards the centre by bureaucratic means. The 
similarities are exaggerated: although Japan's experiences could
conceivably have been replicated in 'Ethiopia, the bulk of the Ethiopian
nobility was.unwilling to permit the massive changes that would have 
¥ f
been necessary. These issues are dealt with in greater detail in 
Chapter Three.
While there is some evidence to suggest that Rene Dumont's 
"bureaucratic bourgeoisie" began to emerge in Ethiopia, generalised 
statements about the growth of an Ethiopian bourgeoisie, middle 
class?or petty bourgeoisie are premature. Lower-level elites were 
locked into personalised patron-client relations with the nobility, 
which prevented the emergence of the solidarity associated with 
Marx's concept of a "class for itself". Except for a few students, 
teachers and businessmen, new elites were usually under the political 
control of the aristocracy and were unable fully to work out inde­
pendent lifestyles; new elites lacked the power and economic 
independence mecessary to refashion government in a manner that would 
satisfy their demands. The growth of indigenous and foreign capital­
ism complemented rather than replaced fuedalism.
In* sixteenth century Europe, a slow metamorphosis - the grafting 
of a mercantile economy onto a feudal one - initially resulted in 
few conflicts of interest or changes in feudal structures, yet it 
enabled the nobility to diversify its consumption patterns. A 
roughly analogous process occurred in twentieth century Ethiopia,>'but 
there were numerous differences too. As in pre-Revolutionary Russia, 
Ethiopia was exposed to Western technology, economic penetration and 
modernising educational values, the state controlled many of‘the modern 
meana of production, and a Westem-style liberalism never emerged as a
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political force to be reckoned with. Foreign investors, their 
governments and the Ethiopian nobility found a community of interests 
in the preservation of the political and social status quo, part­
icularly in an avoidance of expropriation and the redistribution of
46wealth.
Given an extremely small industrial and commercial sector,
retarded.processes of urbanisation and, in the 1960s and early 1970s,
tbe.privileged position of organised labour in relation to peasants and
the unemployed,it makes little sense to speak of an'Ethiopian
proletariat and lumpen proletariat. Although Haile Selassie^
politics ignored peasants who were not rebelling, he did attempt
to deal with the threat posed by dissatisfied city dwellers who
periodically asserted a political independence and an ability to
communicate with each other and organise a rudimentary opposition.
While genuine threats to the regime materialised only briefly,
during'the abortive I960 coup, disgruntled workers and the unemployed,
encouraged by intellectuals and students, participated actively in
the 1974 Revolution, although they were quickly overshadowed by the
military. Prior to about 1965* Haile Selassie managed to co-opt
most students by offering them relatively well-paid bureaucratic
posts which prevented them from giving political effect to their
modernising ideas. While activist students tended to be idealistic
and radical, most students eventually acted so as to protect their •
privileged position. From the mid-1960s onwards, however, fundamental
changes in student commitment, organisation and ideology occurred;
they became the militant and extremely radical "conscience of the
4?nation", that could not be repressed by the most brutal of means. .
On the eve of the Revolution, the Ethiopian regime was no longer 
a purely feudal one, although historical processes of stratification 
and the growth of ethnic antagonisms continued to exert a major 
influence on the course of events. Centrifugal tendencies were more 
evenly balanced by the centripedal military, national bureaucracy 
and commercial/industrial enclaves, but this balance was an unstable 
one. Perhaps the most accurate model of this composite of'ethnic groups
within the stratified Ethiopian state is Gerhard Lenski’s "agrarian
48society" or S.N. Eisenstadt's "centralized empire". Although the
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initiative for the creation of such a state came from those already 
in p'ower, specialised political and administrative institutions could 
only be manned by other, newly-created elites, Ethiopia displayed 
Lenski's "matter-of-course confusion of public business with private 
enterprise" and the virtually continuous struggles and intrigues 
associated v/ith this proprietary concept of a state, in. which wealth 
follows power m  a largely pre-market economy.
Despite the unique history of Ethiopia and the continuity of 
her socio-political traditions, she also shares much with many other 
countries - her underdeveloped status. For example, TJphoff and 
Ilchman’s "suggestive inventory" of Third World social groups could 
have been devised for Ethiopia, containing as it does feudal land­
lords, middle-level peasants-, moneylenders, landless labour, tenant 
farmers, priests, teachers, regionalists, feudalists, small business­
men, industrialists, minority group merchants, the military, high-
level civil servants, other civil servants, intellectuals, moderate
50workers,- radical workers, and pro-Peking communists. Once students, 
the urban unemployed, nomads, overlapping ethnic identities and the 
large number of groups within the military are added to the list, 
there is a large number of groups who have to be treated as distinct 
from one another. Most of-them Have periodically asserted divergent 
demands and, therefore, presumably have distinct interests which 
make an analysis based on the concept of class and, more importantly, 
the creation of an overarching political consensus, virtually impos­
sible. Contrary to typical Marxian assumptions, intermediate social 
groups expanded upon their privileges rather than becoming absorbed 
into an Ethiopian "proletariat", yet these groups do not constitute a 
middle class either. Looking from the bottom up, peasants are an. 
exploited group and urban workers are privileged*, from the top down, 
all but the upper levels of the elite appear to be underprivileged. 
The only realistic picture of Ethiopian social strata is one "of a
continuum of influence and a combination of conflicts and converging
51interests of different groups"..
Within this continuum, the criteria for judging social status, 
in addition to wealth and power, are occupation, cultural background, 
educational attainment, the ability to speak "clean" Amharic, the
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following of an Amharicised (rather than Westernised) "civilised way 
of life" and (as in England) "good manners" - a sensitivity towards 
status differences. Although the Revolution of 197^ will undoubtedly al­
ter the composition of the various strata somewhat, many deeply-rooted 
rural social relations are presently immune to centralised control and 
it is likely that occupational categories and the criteria of status 
differentiation will not change markedly. At least the first 
five criteria listed above - wealth, power, occupation, cultural 
background and education - constitute the basis for social strat­
ification in most socialist countries, where stratifications based
on merit criteria such as educational attainment tend to favour the
*52children of non-manual workers.
As a result of attempts to liquidate feudalism and, until 1978 at
least, to lessen the political dominance of the Shoan Amhara, the
new military Government faces, for the first time and in an extreme
form, virtually all of the modern problems associated with nation-
53building in the Third World.^ A feudal and virtually absolute 
monarchy cannot provide the basis for a modern state late in the 
twentieth century; it is too late to. replicate Japan’s experiences. 
Political development and development in general can only be secured 
through governmental policies which foster a simultaneous socio­
economic equalisation, political participation and a meaningful 
national integration (see Chapter Two)• Some form of social strat­
ification (not necessarily a class structure)is inevitable in Revol­
utionary Ethiopia, and new and just strata in which status distinctions 
no longer coincide with ethnic divisions must be fostered nationwide, 
as an alternative to further 'retribalisation*. Amhara peasants 
and the non-Amhara must have access to the centre.
III. Conflict or Consensus?
Many sociologists explicitly or implicitly adopt one of the 
grand images or models of society, a consensus model which has been 
most fully elaborated by Talcott Parsons or a conflict model derived 
from insights found in', the writings of Marx and the Rationalists.
Owing to a lack of space; we shall paint these complex models in 
broader strokes than they perhaps deserve. Although it is no longer 
fashionable among sociologists to argue over these issues, the
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theoretical difficulties they have failed to resolve satisfactorily 
continue to plague many other social scientists.
Those sociologists who see a consensus omnium or volonte generale 
as outweighing all possible differences of interest among individuals 
and groups, perceive an "integrated’' society in which common inter­
ests, the functional requirements of social systems, the internal­
isation of norms and roles and the success of social control 
mechanisms such as law guarantee consensus, conformity and stability. 
Through a process analogous to homeostasis in biology, social systems 
are. held in equilibrium through patterned and recurrent processes 
which permit only incremental, long-term changes. Conflicts are to 
be avoided, managed through dispute settlement processes, 'treated - 
■ somewhat unhelpfully - as isolated instances of deviance from 
socially-approved norms, or seen as reflections of the fact that 
something is missing from the social system. The consensus image of 
society thus contains a conservative bias against social change, 
postulates a one-sided relationship in which man is the passive 
perceptor of and reactor to social forces, and serves to reify or even 
to mystify the status quo, providing little basis for the criticism of
EC
social reality. Julius Stone notes that if the legal order is 
substituted, for Parsonses social system, much of his theory would
cC
be regarded as true and even as commonplace by most Western jurists-.
The image of a societal consensus can be regarded as diametrically
opposed to the conflict model of society, where the central postulate
is the ubiquity of conflict and change resulting from struggles for
goods and services in short supply. These struggles occur in
successive stages and social systems are viewed as unstable and
continually reach beyond themselves, in the sense that the forces.of
unending social change are produced from within the systems. Under
this image of a society, exploitation is rife and order can be
achieved only through domination, constraint and coercion, the moving
forces of social integration and stratification and the outcomes of
differences in the distribution of power and wealth. This slightly
simplistic image of a society continually moving under the impetus of
ruthless power and typically organised into clearly-defined classes
offers effective interpretations of many events in which political
57interests dominate,
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A. The Models Applied to Ethiopia
It is,of course, the existence of at least a minimal degree of 
localised consensus which makes organised social life possible, 
enables individuals and groups to understand one another and gener­
ates the expectations of predictable behaviour that are the pre­
conditions to all types of transactions. We have, however, seen that 
a single system of values, which theorists of a societal consensus see 
as universally accepted within a unitary social structure, does not 
exist in Ethiopia, Talcott Parsons’s schema assumes the existence of 
a high degree of voluntary activity within a society dominated Jby a 
market economy, in which overtly political processes have little 
effect, on the distribution of wealth or on the settlement of the 
disputes of individuals. These conditions do not obtain in Ethiopia, 
where the conflict theorists' perceptions of divergent and conflicting 
values, subscribed to by different strata and ethnic groups and
selectively imposed by those in power and rejected by others, are far
'v
more realistic. Many sociologists have concluded that the image of 
an integrated social system is clearly contrary to the observable 
characteristics of most societies. Hugo Jaguribe, for example, argues 
that:
There is no criterion for forming an adequate consensus in a 
severely underdeveloped community where the area of social 
integration is minimal and the differences in expectations 
founded on the extreme differences in participation are 
maximal. 58
As this statement characterises Ethiopia fairly accurately, it can 
be viewed as a polar extreme on a continuum of integration and non­
integration (see Chapter Two) .
The almost complete absence of national integration does not 
necessarily mean that the ubiquity of change postulated by the conflict 
model of society exists in Ethiopia. Myrdal's generalisation can be 
applied to Ethiopia:
All our evidence suggests that social stability and equilibrium is 
the norm and all societies, particularly underdeveloped 
societies, possess institutions of a strongly stabilising 
character. In view of these findings *■ the real mystery is how 
they can escape from .equilibrium and can develop. 59
In a fragmented society composed of isolated groups, no political
significance attaches to many potential sources of conflict because
i
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individuals and groups with conflicting interests simply do not enter 
into competition or even into contact with one another. Localised 
patterns of social stratification, especially among the Amhara-Tigre, 
foster integration at the community level, but only to the extent 
that differentiations are seen as justice fulfilled or virtue re­
warded and as a -part of the natural order of things. In a tightly- 
bound community of sentiments, the individual is encouraged to 
identify that which ought to be with that which already exists 
yet, even so, doubts creep in about the naturalness of established 
hierarchies:
the sense of being surrounded by injustice without knowing 
where justice lies . . .  is the political side of that general 
sentiment of arbitrariness and even absurdity which gradually 
enters into the consciousness of every social group. 60
These half-formed and largely dormant attitudes do not, of 
themselves, constitute a social force to be reckoned with. In trad­
itional Ethiopian societies, there is little awareness of explicit 
common goals and few attempts are made to organise groups in pursuit 
of these goals, apart from voluntary associations among a few groups 
and the establishment of patron-client relations among the Amhara- 
Tigre. The latter dissolve when the interests of patron and client 
come into conflict unless, as often happens, the patron can convince 
his clients of a community of interests. All of this is beginning 
to change under the military Government but, for theppresent, 
low levels of group organisation and the diffusion of political power 
at the local level continues to inhibit the formation of the large-,
monolithic conflict groups that are characteristic of many industrial
. .. 6l societies.
The high degree of social stability displayed by most ethnic 
groups 'contradicts expectations of social changes arising out of 
conflicts that have persisted for centuries in Ethiopia. Most of 
these armed rebellions were localised and remote from the everyday 
lives of peasants and farmers who were not directly involved, and 
rebels - often led by disgruntled aristocrats - struck like lightning 
in the pursuit of specific, personal and short-term goals, and then 
disappeared without having made much of an impact on the slowly- 
working forces that operate upon Ethiopian-'.social structures and
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institutions. The permanent monopoly of power held by the Amhara-
Tigre, and later by the Shoan Amhara, was exercised in such a way as
to prevent the emergence of the national consensus that some socio-
6?logists see as a natural byproduct of a pluralist society, ' yet 
the Empire did not dissolve. Numerous tightly knit but small and 
isolated groups tried to ignore Imperial governments, lacking the 
power to overthrow them. Whether this state of affairs will change 
markedly as a result of the broad social changes advocated by the 
military government and by some separatist groups, remains to be seen.
Our analyses suggest that neither the consensus nor the ‘conflict 
model accurately and adequately explains stratification and ethnicity 
within and among Ethiopian societies, although each model has a 
comparative advantage, in that it explains certain things better 
than its rival. Additionally, numerous areas of social life in 
Ethiopia (and elsewhere) reflect an ignorance of possible alternatives, 
an absence of clearly-defined individual and group goals, or in­
decision, rathertthan consensus or conflict. These conclusions are 
hardly surprising, since many sociologists have reached similar ones 
after applying the consensus and conflict models to societies other 
than Ethiopia’s. Although several syntheses of the two models have 
been attempted, we agree with Ralf Dahrendorf that such a synthesis 
is impossible, requiring as it does the resolution of most of the 
contentious issues found in Western philosophy, including the view . 
that ought to be taken of human nature. He analyses conflict and 
consensus in the following manner:
We cannot conceive of society unless we realize the dialectics 
of stability and change, integration and conflict, function and 
motive force, consensus and coercion. 63
This dialectical image is a useful one: human existence, in Ethiopia
and elsewhere, displaysa^curious intermingling of good and evil
which leads to demands for both liberation and constraint; individuals
never totally accept or reject the vague value systems ascribed to
particular groups, and conflicting value systems can operate within
the same person, especially during periods of rapid modernisation;
coercion is an inevitable and necessary part of social control, and
the exercise of control fosters both consensus and the changes
brought about through conflict; patterns of social organisation can
only f! 0’-r the contradictory yet interrelated needs and demands of
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men; and, in societies which aspire to modernisation, the simple
maintenance of order is insufficient to satisfy individual and group
needs and demands. Social arrangements must he consciously created
$l±
and justifiable in terms of attractive images of the "good life”.
Like much of sociological analysis, the consensus and conflict 
models are not value-neutral and amount to ideologies- supporting and 
opposing the status quo. For this reason we ought to state briefly 
what we feel' to be the appropriate value judgements for a study of 
Ethiopian societies. There is little reason to foster the pattern 
maintenance emphasised by Parsons since the pattern to be maintained 
is still developing. If the status quo of Ethiopian underdevelopment 
that we described is regarded as indefensible, a critical examination 
of potential processes of change is in order, and the spirit - but not 
always the letter - of Marxian inquiry ought to be incorporated into oug*
65analyses. We have, however, tried to describe the persistence of 
Ethiopian social stability within low-level equilibriums; the 
centuiries of conflict and social, economic and political activity that 
were all but fruitless from the standpoint of development and social 
change. We cannot ignore the fact that the conflict model offers 
inadequate explanations of these processes. The balance of this 
Section will- be devoted to drawing out the insights offered by con­
sensus and conflict models in relation to Ethiopian politics, law, 
process of conflict regulation and the potential for social change and 
development in general. Additional analyses of the inadequate explan­
ations of Ethiopian legal processes offered by the '’jural analogues of 
the consensus and conflict models, analytical positivism/social 
engineering and socialist jurisprudence, are postponed to Chapters 
Two, Three and Five.
Social and Political Change
The conflict model leads us to believe that the potential for 
political conflict nears its theoretical maximum in Ethiopia, where 
most political, industrial, regional, rural/urban, religious, and < 
ethnic conflicts can be superimposed to form a single and all-embracing 
antagonism at the national level, and where heterogeneous but partially— 
interchangeable elite groups uniformly dominate what they see as 
undifferentiated masses of rural and of urban dwellers* There is 
little basis for political cooperation in Ethiopia, apart from
3k
temporary expedients such as patron-client relations and, as in some 
•Latin American states, there is a cultural tradition, particularly 
among the Amhara-Tigre, of dissent and rebellion for its own sake, of 
a militant ’machismo’ in a harsh material environment. Given the 
persistence of traditional antagonisms, it is doubtful whether any 
government could resolve or even hope to contain them, barring rad­
ical changes in political practices and social structures; merely 
changing the content of policies will accomplish little. Discussion 
must precede decision-making processes resting on consensus, and 
dissension and stratification in Ethiopia confine debates over 
political issues within extremely narrow social spectra. The virtual 
absence of widely-shared values associated with competitions for and 
the exercise of power mean that Ethiopian politics are not "econ­
omical” , in the sense that the workings of Government are often - 
unpredictable.^
Despite high levels of conflict and an even higher potential for
\
conflict, few long-term political changes occurred during Ethiopia’s 
long history; in the politically unstable twentieth century, Haile 
Selassie was able to maintain an effective and largely traditional 
political power from about 1922 to 19351 and from the expulsion.>of 
the Italians in 19^1 to the beginning of 197^* All political 
struggles in Ethiopia (and elsewhere) are intermittent and inconclusive, 
for no individual or small group possesses the means of permanently ' 
guaranteeing political victory and political institutions evolve 
slowly and only serve to regulate those areas of political life where 
temporary coalitions of elite interests can be maintained. The 
patron-client relations we describe at various junctures foster a 
narrow and vertical consensus; each patron looks after the interest 
of his clients and, as a client himself, relies on favour from his 
own patron. Since the power of a leader in a feudal system is 
contributed from below, nothing was'done in Ethiopia until the inter­
ests of a great number of people had been dealt with. This was the 
pattern of Haile Selassie’s reign, the achievement of a minimal 
consensus by suppressing some demands, under-representing others and 
carefully balancing the rest - what the new military Government has 
correctly characterised as the politics of divide and rule. The 
pursuit of these policies may also be termed the politics of subsistence,
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in which the minimum degree of law and order necessary for survival 
was maintained in the urban areas and by an occasional show of force 
in rural areas to keep presumptive nobles from overreaching the 
centre. This Government was stable because it reflected with a fair 
degree of accuracy the distribution of traditional power, although a 
failure to deal meaningfully with emerging loci of power within the 
military, bureaucracy and separatist groups eventually led to its 
downfall. Haile Selassie's main political aim was to prevent the 
consolidation of organised or institutional sources of power, and 
modernising institutions which did not contribute directly, and narrowly 
to the strengthening of mechanisms of Imperial control were either 
never created or were made monuments to formalism, having little 
actual influence over events. The only significant exceptions were 
found in the new commercial and industrial enclaves, where businesses 
were either controlled directly by the powerful or provided state 
revenue without asserting demands which conflicted with the interests 
of ruling elites. Old institutions were preserved and assigned 
new functions because they were conducive to the preservation of 
power within the nobility. If we discount the warnings given during 
the abortive i960 coup - as Haile Selassie subsequently did - the 
only effective domestic challenges to his policies prior to 197^ 
came from conservative opposition to his extremely mild reformist 
efforts.^
We have argued that the nature of traditional Ethiopian politics 
and social structures inhibited socio-political change. Can high 
levels of social change, oriented towards development, now be fostered 
under the new regime? A revolution does not substitute one social 
structure for another; it merely overthrows the existing balance of 
power within the political order. The means by which individuals are 
recruited to the upper social strata usually change, but it is by no 
means a foregone conclusion that the'developmental dimensions of a 
radical social change - an increase in the number of occupants of the 
upper strata and alterations in- occupational structures to favour more 
productive individuals - will be pursued actively. It is only after 
such changes take place, accompanied by a growing consensus concerning - 
basic social values and the legitimacy of the state, that political
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struggles serve to further a national integration and social
changes which are conducive to modernisation. It is the absence of
these elements throughout much of Ethiopia’s history that contributed
to the perpetuation of conflict-prone societies which are nevertheless
static and isolated. A conscious policy of altering traditional
political practices and social stratifications and of encouraging
integration would relax the change-inhibiting factors in Ethiopian
68societies which, we argue, are otherwise predisposed to change; 
the explicit recognition and regulation of conflicts of interest 
among numerous groups would ensure fairly high rates of change, while 
socio-economic equalisation and integration would help to build a new 
consensus and to keep these changes within manageable bounds.
Such a process would undoubtedly be violent, uneven and imper­
fect, but it is also virtually the only means by which the stated aims 
of the Ethiopian Revolution, which are nation-building and the disman­
tling of traditional social and political processes in order to foster 
development, can be achieved. If the existing facts of social strat­
ification, ethnic fragmentation, and underdevelopment in general were 
created primarily through political actions, they can also be dis­
mantled politically. This point has never been grasped by theorists 
who explicitly or implicitly adopt a consensus model of society.
They have, nevertheless, offered numerous development prescriptions: 
an international consensus can be fostered through industrialisation 
and the transfer of technology rather than, for example, through the 
elimination of neocolonialism, exploitation and military intervention; 
social harmony and increasing socio-economic equality will be the 
outcome of slow and gradual changes; a middle class will emerge 
to adopt Western values and to halt the polarisation of other social 
groups; and government ought to be helping disoriented individuals to 
adjust to change. These prescriptions have little relevance in 
Ethiopia, where the historic trend is towards higher levels of 
inequality, conflict and recurrent starvation - conditions to which
69
it is difficult to adjust.
It,is, of course, true that social organisation and conscious­
ness (the collective counterparts of an individual's behaviour and 
values or beliefs) are inseparable in their social effect, yet we
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choose to emphasise conscious attempts to change structures rather 
th,an values for a variety of reasons. While an appropriate 
ideology can, for example,have important but indirect effects on 
integration and development, changes in systems of social strat­
ification directly alter the v/ay in which people relate to each other 
and act within a social system. The extent to which peasant associations 
k^ frelles can perform these functions is discussed in Chapters 
Six and Seven, while the military government’s vague ideology is 
analysed in Chapter Four. .Forthe present, we note that it is within 
the realm of influencing behaviour rather than belief that law and 
governmental policies in general can have their best effect, and that 
development ultimately occurs as a result of what people do rather 
than what they think. There is, in any event, a marked confusion 
among sociologists concerning the relationship between social change and 
the kinds of values adopted by particular individuals and groups, and 
this confusion is reproduced in numerous analyses of an Ethiopian
peasant "fatalism”, irrationality, resistance to change and high rates
70of perceived social mobility, which are discussed in the footnote.
It is difficult to determine whether these images of Ethiopians 
reflect accurate interpretations of observed behaviour, Western 
anthropological preoccupations, or ethnocentric preconceptions of 
particular observers. To some extent, the value systems of Ethiopian 
groups - assuming that they can be identified and generalised mean-, 
ingfully - must reflect the vitality of people who feel at home in 
their culture and with the past, but they must also mirror the fact 
that peasants and farmers, unlike their observers, must somehow'Sur­
vive in the face of harsh material conditions, exploitation and 
oppression. Change these circumstances, we argue, and many social 
values will change, slowly but automatically, because they are no 
longer rational responses to changed living conditions. Ethiopians are 
no different from 'us', save that different conditions have left 
different marks on their minds and bodies. Since it is unlikely that 
the criteria of status differentiation within Ethiopian societies will 
bhange markedly as a result of the Revolution, social change will 
depend upon more people obtaining the means to fulfil these criteria.
If a peasant fatalism persists, there is little that can be done
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about it anyway, and it is best dealt with as a ’given' , a constraint
on development which cannot be manipulated, like the absence of huge
copper deposits. This perspective parallels the interesting way in
which Hutton and Cohen deal with issues related to social change:
We all resist changes that are threatening. . .; and need not accept 
in an a priori manner that anyone is expecially resistant to change. 
Rather we should ask; Who is resisting whom? What is the 
content of this resistance? Who defines the behaviour in 
question as resistant?
• • .The 'diffusion of innovations' studies called one set of 
persons 'planners', 'initiators', or 'change agents' . . . .
The other set was known . . .  as 'receivers*who . . .  were 
supposed to accept gratefully the well intentioned ministrations 
of the former. Where they did not, resistance to change was 
discovered. But how sensible was the plan? Whose interests 
did it serve? Did resistant behaviour follow, after a genuine 
trial, the discovery of error or impractibility on the part of 
the initiators? 71
In Ethiopia, the answers to questions of who resisted whom and 
how reflect the social cleavages brought about through stratifi­
cation, ethnicity, education, urbanisation and a host of other 
factors. Answers to the kinds of questions posed by Hutton and 
Cohen would also promote an understanding of the manner in which 
laws are adopted, ignored, distorted or rejected in Ethiopia. Whose 
interests were and were not served by various laws? Were the chosen 
legal solutions the relevant and practical ones? These questions are 
treated throughout this study.
C. Conflict and Consensus in Law
At the most general level, laws are simply recurring modes of 
interaction which, like all other social structures, generate reciprocal 
expectations. Laws are formal structural frames which reflect, 
albeit imperfectly and subject to time leads and lags, what goes on 
within more informal processes of social stratification and ethnic 
fragmentation;. The Lilliputian nature of this relationship was 
grasped by Karl Renner:
Legal ties are mere threads compared with the Herculean power of 
natural life. Yet this Hercules stretches his limbs so grad­
ually and imperceptibly that the threads do not suddenly snap 
in all places. 72
Abstract legal concepts like citizenship define an ideal if unreal­
ised social equality, while specific rules describe categories and 
rights which exnress and support particular group differences, values 
and ideologies.
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In the West, lav/ is seen to flourish in countries where the most
fundamental of social values are not at issue, where enforcement
problems are not too acute and where society conserves more than it
wishes to change. Marginal disequilibria are eliminated through trial
and error, ad hoc and incremental legal changes. Rule by the few is
replaced, not by a volonte generate but by the Rule of Law that, in
the eyes of its proponents, serves both to harmonise private wills and
to protect the rights of minorities. Legal institutions, especially
constitutions and courts, are seen as perpetual and impartial umpires
of peaceable competitions for wealth and power within an agreed
framework. This consensus model of law is employed as an" ideological!
bulwark of the freei market and as a justification for limitations on 
73state power. Haile Selassie formally subscribed to this model and 
promulgated many Westem-style laws to placate educated elites and 
foreign aid donors, but the realities of stratification, ethnicity 
and traditional politics gave a different face to the Ethiopian 
law-intact i on.
In highly stratified societies such as Ethiopia1s, individuals 
at both ends of the social spectrum tend to feel that law is of no 
concern to them,try to manipulate or to ignore its strictures and 
often succeed in doing so. Haile Selassie’s state was not strong 
enough to resist the pressures of the powerful, yet it was sufficiently 
strong to override nominal, Westem-style legal restraints on pol­
itical action. The ideal of legality is not achieved when, as is 
all too often the case in Ethiopia, arbitrary rules bearing no clear 
relation’to concrete goals are created without consulting those 
affected. Errors and policy confusion reflect the fact that internal 
principles of legal criticism, such as those utilised under the 
rubrics of judicial review, the Rule of Law or socialist legality, 
were and are almost never used effectively. Under Haile Selassie, 
legal rules were extremely cool towards the interests of emerging 
elite groups, the political conflicts inherent in landlord-tenant 
and labour-management relations were not successfully regulated 
within a positivised civil law (see Chapters Six and Seven), and 
Government's courts were seen to be exceedingly partial to Amhara
7 if.
belonging to the upper social strata. Far from being an umpire, 
Ethiopian lav; is a weapon of political struggle, and laws v/hich are 
advantageous to particular individuals and groups do not survive 
their political eclipse.
ko
All of these tendencies are accorded clear recognition in the
conflict models of law devised by socialist jurists, but they have
also been observed in Western legal systems.. Some Western theorists argue
that formal law presupposes a climate of conflict, that most rules are
not shared norms and are often in dispute or even created by disputes,
that a legal system is little more than a sequence of sets of rules
which are continually changing, and that law can be used actively to
foster social change where such changes are congruent with the
interests of the powerful. Law and power are viewed as coexisting in
a continual state of tension: law needs the support of force when
disobeyed and, while law does more than merely preserve the power of
ruling elites, to the extent that law aims at the preservation of
peace and order,legal values must be roughly consistent with the
75interests of those elites who are in power. A study of the use of 
law in Northern Ireland demonstrates, for example, that in areas of 
social and economic life which are not endangered by political in­
stability, law stands above and apart from society, helping to 
regulate and control it; political and social disruption, on the
other hand, cause law to recede into the background and the realities
76of political, economic and military power come to the fore* This 
dialectic of consensus and conflict represents the most accurate 
image of Ethiopian legal systems: the prominence of numerous areas
of political conflict should not blind us to the existence of many 
areas of a., (often localised) legal consensus.
Having adopted such an approach, conflict regulation (or tension
management) through law becomes much more problematic than a consensus
model would lead us to expect. If a democratic consensus is assumed,
a legislature becomes a well-patronised framework for discussion and
decision and creates the legal conduits that govern but do not
predetermine the outcome of individualised and temporary disputes.
Particular disputes are then permanently resolved by courts following
77widely-accepted procedures. These conditions do not exist in 
Ethiopia (see Chapters Three and Five) and are subject to numerous 
and significant qualifications in all countries. The problem is that, 
while a complete national integration can only be brought about through 
the resolution of all serious conflicts, conflict cannot be merely 
suppressed: it simmers and then erupts, even if an incremental
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satisfaction of demands takes place. Conflict regulation is impos­
sible where both sides are not organised, and conflict can only be 
brought within the reach of legal systems if the right of groups to 
organise is recognised legally - guerrillas cannot be regulated. A 
degree of recognition makes the most violent forms of conflict 
unnecessary and therefore less likely, although conflicts such as a 
media-oriented terrorism will continue to be a problem. Further, the 
proliferation of organised groups with conflicting interests tends to 
diffuse the areas of conflict: fewer antagonisms are superimposed
and power and wealth are spread more widely. Many Ethiopian conflicts, 
and particularly those involving separatist groups, have not been 
institutionalised: the parties have not demarcated, by legal or
other means, the point at which victory is achieved, and losers feel 
unable to concede or even to know when they have lost. All of this 
argues for broad and legally-guaranteed forms of political partici­
pation xand political and material rights, in order that law can serve
78as a safety valve which helps to avert confrontations, but these 
conditions do not obtain in Ethiopia. Finally, conflicts must be 
encouraged rather than suppressed in some areas, if rapid social 
change is to be achieved. While Haile Selassie usually succeeded in 
forcibly suppressing conflicts, this policy is becoming increasingly 
untenable. There is a growing scarcity of coercive resources relative 
to the strength of newly-crganised, militant expressions of interests 
that,often remained latent under Haile Selassie.
D. The Economic Dimension
Social stratifications always have an economic dimension and in 
many traditional African societies such as Ethiopia’s, the polity 
dominates the formation .of strata by circulating land and profitable 
honours and offices in accordance with the political needs of the 
moment. There is a greater degree of,political and military special­
isation than there is a division of labour in the economic sphere, and 
traditional’ / Ethiopian societies are manipulated politically and 
exploited economically, although the nature of this exploitation has 
changed markedly as a result of the Revolution. The five means by which 
an agricultural surplus can be extracted for the benefit of elites - 
feudalism, imperialism,colonialism, centralised taxation and differential
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pricing - have all been utilised in twentieth- century Ethiopia; recip­
rocal benefits conferred on farmers were minimal and recurrent famine 
resulted. The potential for economic growth through this sheer 
extortion of tribute is obviously limited, and much revenue was con­
sumed immediately rather than used to increase economic productivity. 
Ethiopian stratifications and political processes were economically 
irrational, in the sense that they rewarded economically unproductive 
people whose political and military productivity benefited only 
themselves and their retainers, and this was not conducive to national 
development or integration. As Amhara-Tigre social systems were 
overwhelmingly based on an unstable control over land (see Chapter 
Six), these systems lacked the economic and social complexity, 
security or incentives to foster development or to make them attrac­
tive to other ethnic groups. Economic activity was splintered into 
unintegrated and isolated sectors which traded but little with each
other, as a result of political fragmentation, chronic warfare,
\ * 79customs posts between regions and a rugged typography.
The introduction of cash crops, wage labour and Westernised 
education and the extension of the money economy stimulated the 
formation of new social groups, particularly those which reflect a 
specialisation by occupation. There were few points of contact between 
traditional social strata and these new groups, whose access to 
political power by virtue of occupation was limited. As in other 
colonial states, the growth of education was not a consequence of 
development processes or of the desire for development; educated 
groups became the agents of traditional rulers within the expanding 
legal, administrative and educational institutions of imperial rule.
The growth in the number of educated persons outstripped economic- 
growth during the 1960s. Burgeoning expectations of unlimited 
employment opportunities for the educated were frustrated, and dissat­
isfactions with Haile Selassie’s regime mounted. Even today, the 
Ethiopian bureaucracy probably consumes more than it produces and 
constitutes yet another burden on productive processes. An indigenous 
’primitive’ capitalism emerged, but resources within the new enclaves 
continued to be allocated in accordance with traditional political 
criteria. These new economic activities were little more than 
extensions of the old ones: commerce was emphasised at the expense of
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the production of goods, and small and poorly-serviced channels of 
collection and distribution were not rapidly expanded or diversified. 
Manufacturing was partly controlled by foreigners who cheerfully 
remitted revenue to the State and their profits abroad. In general, 
these twentieth century changes represented logical extensions of 
feudal and colonial processes of exploitation, only modest rates of 
economic growth were recorded, and new institutions and social strata 
made virtually no contribution to a broadly-based development and 
social change.80
An economically rational restructuring of Ethiopian social 
strata would attempt to reward those who apply enterprise,..and know­
ledge (including new forms of technology) and exercise authority 
effectively in the production of socially-valued goods and services - 
particularly inexpensive food, clothing and shelter, in a society 
hovering near subsistence. These activities need not be regarded as 
the entrepreneurial function of a tiny minority, as in classical econ­
omics and Western-oriented social change theories; they are the kinds 
of things a predominantly rural and isolated people could do with 
small inputs of capital and labour, if social, political and economic 
strictures on incentives and security were removed. Development and 
socio-economic equalisation would then cause traditional antagonisms 
to lose much of their relevance, although new conflicts would undoubtedly 
emerge. As de Tocqueville noted, however, the love of equality 
paradoxically increases with every step taken towards equalisation, 
and we argue that these new conflicts would tend less towards frag­
mentation and more towards modernising social changes. The apparently 
complex motivations of Ethiopian social groups make them both a 
potential obstacle to and a vehicle for development, depending on
what kinds of elites represent them and, more importantly, the kinds
8Xof programmes that are implemented.
IV. Dualism and Distance 
A dualistic pattern of social and economic organisation - small 
urban areas and enclaves of agrarian progress superimposed upon a 
huge rural subsistence sector - has been detected by many Ethiopian- 
ists. John Cohen has argued for a "dynamic dualism" in which
82changes in feudal patterns are small and confined to a few areas,
Ijif
83John Markakis sees "a society bisected by an urban-rural dichotomy”,
and Assefa and Eshetu add that "Ethiopia is basically a nation masked
8^behmd its capital city and the facade of modernism. . . . ” These
kinds of arguments are more fully elaborated by Detlev Karsten:
A remarkable feature of the Ethiopian economy is the prevailing 
dualism, that is the existence of almost completely separate 
traditional and modem sectors. There is a wide discrepancy 
between the two with hardly any contact between them and 
consequently little prospect for an evolutionary change of the 
traditional sector. The dualism partly coincides with the imbal­
ance in regional development - some towns and a few cash-crop 
areas are developing relatively quickly,/’ while the remainder 
of the country remains stagnant. This backwardness can partly 
be explained by the fact that the very idea of development is 
relatively new to Ethiopia. . . .
• . • There are, on the one''hand, relatively modem factories
- working with imported machinery and methods, and, on the other,
the traditional handicrafts, which inrrural areas are the only 
supplementary to the main occupation of farming. More than 90* 
per cent of all industrial establishments are concentrated in 
less than 1 per cent of the area of the country. . . .85 
\ . .
These opinions, we argue, are based on accurate observations but offer 
misleading interpretations of complex processes of Ethiopian under­
development.
A. Dualism and Ethiopia
Dualistic theories of underdevelopment and development were first
advanced systematically in 1953 by J.H. Boeke, who attempted to
explain economic conditions in Indonesia on the basis of ,Ta distinct
86cleavage of two synchronic and fully grown social styles" - the East . 
and the West of Kipling1s poem, subscribing to divergent economic 
theories. Boeke was right to emphasise that a single policy would 
not promote development in both rural and urban areas, and that 
policies which benefit one sector often disadvantage another.
While many theorists postulate useful dichotomies and, for some 
analytical purposes, Ethiopia and many other countries can be 
divided into rural and urban areas which are structurally and 
behaviourally so different that they deal with each other largely on 
the basis of trade, much oversimplification results from the excessive 
reductionism found in Boeke*s theory. There are a large number of 
distinct' but overlapping Ethiopian dichotomies and continuums which
87are not accounted for by so simple a theory.
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Boeke might be forgiven his oversimplifications, but they have 
had. pernicious consequences when adopted and adapted by economists 
such as W. Arthur Lewis and Ragnar Nurkse. In their theories of 
development based on "unlimited supplies of labour”, the contribution 
of a "closed” rural economy to development is,in effect, to supply 
Marx’s "reserve army of the unemployed”, which is unwilling or unable 
to respond to agricultural production incentives. Development is 
viewed as the outcome of "transferring" this seemingly-homogeneous 
"surplus":labour to the capital-intensive and large-scale industrial 
and agribusiness sectors, where wages remain low because labour 
supplies are virtually unlimited and the higher profitability brought 
about by low wages will stimulate further investments. This was the 
development strategy that many foreign- experts advised Haile Selassie 
to adopt, despite the fact that it3 assumptions have been disproved, 
theoretically and empirically, in Ethiopia and elsewhere. Peasants 
and farmers do tend to maximise .meagre resources, respond to incentives 
and, given the opportunity, accumulate savings; unemployment or 
underemployment is almost non-existent in rural areas, especially 
if a feudal hierarchy must be supported; markets for new manufactures 
do not expand rapidly because workers cannot afford tc purchase the 
goods they produce; additional profits are often spent on luxury 
goods or remitted abroad; most investments continue to run in pre­
existing channels towards cash crops, commerce and speculation in .. 
real estate; and the spread of capitalism in the enclaves is accom­
panied by deteriorating living conditions in rural areas because the
O Q
benefits associated with economic growth are not diffused widely.
Despite these difficulties, Haile Selassie adopted, explicitly 
or implicitly, many of the policies associated with surplus labour 
models. From the standpoint of traditional Ethiopian politics, rural 
labour was surplusage if it was not needed to till the farms of the 
powerful or if an incompetent bureaucracy was unable to extract tax 
revenue from relatively impoverished, isolated and small-scale pro­
ducers who, far from being a political asset, were potential trouble- 
( makers. Given these apparent political constraints, it is not sur­
prising that Government did little to promote small-scale agriculture 
and concentrated its meagre efforts on economic growth in areas where
h €
taxes and the fruits of political control were relatively easy to
collect. The result, over the years, v/as the growth of elitist
(administrative, military and industrial) enclaves or centres, small
and fragile islands of modernity floating increasingly free of their
social bases and, eventually,open to a relatively easy and perhaps
temporary capture by the willing and able. This tendency has been
noted throughout the Third World yet,under the surplus labour model
and many other development theories as well, politicians, bureaucrats
and businessmen are encouraged to ignore the so-called dead weight of
traditional societies and to get on with the expansion of enclaves
which perpetuate and intensify instability, foreign dependence and
89processes of underdevelopment.
The -undifferentiated mass of rural people assumed by dualistic 
theories of development (and by those who continually refer to Tlthe 
masses’1) may exist in a few countries, but ethnically-fragmented 
Ethiopia, where numerous reciprocal relations between rural and urban 
areas have been observed, is not one of them. An Ethiopian pluralism 
would therefore be a more descriptive rubric than dualism but, as 
pluralism has already acquired a definite meaning among sociologists 
who adopt the consensus model, we prefer to discuss a wide variety of 
physical, political, social, economic, technological and legal 
distances between Ethiopian individuals, groups, sectors and regions. 
These distances have arisen because a variety of social forces have 
been exempt historically from the control of those who are kept at 
a distance through the policies of internal colonialism we have 
described. Differences in distances reflect varying degrees of dis­
engagement of political, social and economic activities from diver­
gent traditional social structures and processes of production. One of 
the criteria of development, then, is a decreasing of these distances, 
a linking of peripheries with centres which is distinguished from 
economic growth in enclaves by the number and types of links that are 
created - a process to be described in Part III of this study.
Although political processes are extremely important, there are 
distinct limits to what can be done through conscious political changes 
in patterns of stratification, ethnic fragmentation, conflict and
dependence; economic forces must also be set free in an attempt
90indirectly to remould the social order.
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B.. Illustrations from Ethiopia's Legal Systems
* One of the best ways to appreciate the variety of these distances 
in Ethiopia today is to analyse her numerous and overlapping systems of 
laws. Adopting attitudes analogous to those of theorists of a 
developmental dualism, many jurists and anthropologists describe a 
simple dichotomy of customary and ’modem1 law in the Third World. For 
a variety of reasons, this image is extremely misleading, in Ethiopia and 
elsewhere. Numerous economically, socially and politically isolated 
and ethnically-fragmented Ethiopian groups utilise a wide variety 
of customary (the term typically adopted) rules to regulate their 
daily lives. Overlapping and impinging upon these normative orders 
are rules which may be termed traditional, in that they were used to reg­
ulate affairs within the Amhara-Tigre Empire and the Orthodox .church 
from the fourteenth century onwards. As in all premature attempts to 
create a centralised empire and the establishment of subsequent 
feudal arrangements, these rules have a fairly narrow compass and 
are confined to successions to power, the application of penal 
sanctions to preserve order, ecclesiastical and family matters and the 
regulation of trade and, more importantly, rights in land. These laws 
were a part of the baggage that followed in the wake of Menelik’s 
southern conquests, and their impact on indigenous rules was similar 
to that of the laws transplanted to otherparts of the Third World 
under European colonialism. Designed to further interests expressed 
within traditional Amhara-Tigre society, these laws were not responsive 
to demands arising within the emerging enclaves, and Haile Selassie 
saw fit to complement and, In many cases, to supplant them with 
Western imports or adaptations of indigenous practices. The Revol­
ution of 197 ,^ in turn, rendered much of this nominally national .legal 
system irrelevant to the achievement of new political aims, and 
important rights and duties are increasingly regulated under social­
ist-inspired proclamations emanating, from the military Government. 
Localised normative systems are thus modified in part by three suc­
cessively overlapping layers of national laws, and differing legal 
distances (’pluralism1) stem from legal and ethnic complexity, the 
divergence of customary and non-customary rules, and the fusion of 
these laws with extremely large amounts of the traditional administrative 
discretion that is seldom circumscribed by national laws. To the
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extent that an individual comes into contact with agents of the
91centre, he may live a poly-normative or even a partially normless life. 
Despite the numerous conflicts that arise between these normative orders, 
Ethiopian governments have never adopted conflicts of law (private 
international law) rules, and conflicts are settled solely on the 
basis of political expedience. No hierarchy can be confidently post­
ulated among these legal systems, as particular outcomes depend 
upon who is taking the decision and for what purpose.
There are few contemporary, reliable and detailed studies of
Ethiopian customary laws, apart from portions of the work of William
Shack, Herbert Lewis, Billilign Mandefro, Alice Morton, Norman Singer,
92John Bruce and Alan Hoben, and even the few generalisations that 
warrant a brief mention are hazardous. For-example, James Paul’s 
characterisation of customary Ethiopian laws as "unwritten, . . .  
personal, ad hoc, geographically particularistic, informal, and 
undifferentiated from other norms and usages" is undoubtedly a 
valid"generalisation, but it is subject to numerous qualifications 
when the rules of particular ethnic groups are considered, especially 
with regard to a lack of differentiation. Compared with adjudication 
in the West, customary Ethiopian processes place a greater emphasis 
upon correct procedures and the persuasive presentation of facts 
rather than the complex interpretations of substantive rules, upon 
a quick, flexible and local conciliation or arbitration which restores 
social harmony rather than the implementation of abstract concepts 
of justice and, in some areas, upon supernatural sanctions and 
processes of adjudication. Many groups - and the Amhara in part­
icular - are noted for their high development of and keen interest 
in litigation; as among pre-Revolutionary Russian peasants, much, of 
procedure involves wagering on the outcome and determining who will 
take the oath that decides the dispute. Guarantors play the same role 
that they did in early Anglo-Saxon procedure. There is a large gap 
in Ethiopian studies concerning the precise influence of the Koranic 
core of Islamic law on localised customary rules, and national Ethio­
pian laws have never followed coherent and consistent policies with
94
regard to the status of Islamic laws. Particular rules of cust­
omary laws are discussed throughout this study.
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The traditional laws of Empire and Church seem to date from the
fourteenth century •; the apparently indigenous Ser'ata Mangest
(Law of the State), for example, was compiled from the fourteenth
to seventeenth century and regulated the organisation of the royal
court, the status of dignitaries and, to some extent, the civil lia-
95bility of the royal family. The origins of the Senodos, Didascala 
and- Fetha Negast are even more obscure, although they seem to take 
their structure from the Egyptian Coptic Church Code3 compiled 
in the thirteenth century* Jean Doresse "maintains that Abba Salama 
(1350 - 90), an Egyptian bishop of the Ethiopian Church, spurred 
the translation of these. Codes from the Arabic, but the compilation 
of the Fetha Negast (law of the Kings), which concerns ecclesiastical 
and .family laws, succession to property and public' law in general, may 
have been completed as late as I56O. While it is difficult to trace 
the legal influences on the Egyptian model for the Fetha Negast, much 
of it seems to derive from Roman law, as applied in the Eastern
X.
Roman Empire. There are few apparent Syriac or Oriental influences,
and Books One and Three of the Fetha Negast are translations of the
Procheiron and Eclogia. There is no evidence that the Fetha Negast was
ever officially promulgated and, although it stimulated a lively
jurisprudence, it has often been subordinated to localised applications
of customary laws and 'equity' - personal feelings of justice in-
96fluenced by the desire to maintain order and social harmony.
While it is true that, as the eighteenth century Scots explorer
James Bruce noted, "kings of Abyssinia are above all laws and . . .
97every inhabitant of their kingdom is born their slave", a public . 
sense of injustice often served to limit royal arbitrariness.. As 
under the Jewish halakhah, an emperor had to contend with independent 
nobles and priests - partners in power who offered constant reminders 
that he might be overthrown if he disobeyed sacred rules. Further, 
Imperial proclamations were only binding to the extent that an 
Emperor had the means to enforce them physically. Many decrees are 
believed to have been lost or disregarded - this clearly happened 
under Tewodros - and an official legislative journal, the Negarit Gazeta 
was not instituted until 1942. As in pre-Revolutionary Russia, Haile 
Selassie inherited a jumble of fossilised traditional rules and 
contradictory decrees containing few overarching legal principles, and 
the impulse to codify national Ethiopian laws is said to date from 1942,
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98after the expulsion of the Italian invaders. Prior to that time, 
the ’only important legal consolidations during his reign v/ere the 
Constitution of 1931 aud the harsh and vengeful Penal Code of 1930.
A Revised Constitution marked the Silver Jubilee in 1955 (see Chapter 
Three) and a new Penal Code was introduced in 1957 (see Chapter Five)- . 
In rapid succession, Civil, Commercial and Maritime Codes were pro­
mulgated in I960 (see Chapter Seven), a Criminal Procedure Code in 
1961 and a Civil Procedure Code in 1965, but legal rules relating to 
administration and public enterprises were modified without consol­
idating or codifying them- The military Government - the Provisional 
Military Administration Council or Derg, the Amharic word for committee 
has, in turn, introduced major changes in 'constitutional* and penal 
law in order to consolidate military rule (see Chapter Five) and 
has nationalised Western-style businesses and rural and urban lands 
(see Chapters Six and Seven)•
Article 28 of the Nationalisation of Rural Lands Proclamation- of 
99 v1975 contains one example of the far-reaching changes intended.
It purports to annul existing land disputes in "ordinary courts" and 
bars these courts from hearing future land cases or suits challenging 
actions taken under the Proclamation- Litigation has been extremely 
popular in most parts of Ethiopia and rights to land - the pivotal 
point of most rural relations - accounted for about 5Q& of the disputes 
in Government courts prior to the 1975 Proclamation- The ratio of 
trial judges (excluding local judges) to the population is about 
1:20,000, compared with 1:50,000 for doctors. Although judges 
usually sit in benches of three, they commonly hear three cases 
simultaneously, one judge concentrating on each case. Most disputes 
never reach these courts, however, and are settled successfully under 
localised customary rules by tribunals which are beyond the control 
of the centre and its laws- This lack of control by the centre cannot 
be explained on the basis of geographical isolation alone; for example, 
Ross and Zemariam have noted that shamageilles (local elders) 
arbitrate commercial disputes in the heart of Addis Ababa - the 
Mercato - in such a way as to bar recourse to Government courts.
In most other areas however, customary conciliators or arbitrators must 
maintain a delicate balance between the observance of customary rules 
and the kind of decision a Government court might deliver, since a
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disgruntled disputant can usually appeal to a Government court* In 
general, therefore, effective everyday social control is maintained 
under customary rules which are modified, occasionally and partially, 
when a dispute reaches a local tribunal. Recourse to what the parties 
call government law occurs only in extraordinary instances - criminal 
cases, tax disputes, and situations in which customary processes 
have failed. Dispute regulation processes in Ethiopia thus parallel 
those that emerged under British systems of Indirect Rule. Even in a 
Government court, the judge is often unaware of the existence of a 
relevant state-sanctioned rule, misunderstands it or refuses to. 
apply it and, as in many other countries, a case represents a power 
struggle which continues until one party exhausts his resources. 
Government is often less interested in the preservation of an order 
it has created than in the restoration of a localised status quo, 
the nature of which is not even understood, much less manipulated,
by the centre. The absence of a rationalised, effective and exten-\
sively centralised Government in Ethiopia hindered the emergence of a 
national, centralised and efficient administration of justice which 
is the hallmark of, for example, English legal history.
These brief descriptions of Ethiopia's legal systems - to be 
expanded upon throughout this study - show a dualistic image of her 
laws to be excessively simplistic. Dualistic theories of develop­
ment, in which economic growth within enclaves is expected to promote 
the absorption of rural areas into a national economy, have their 
jural analogue in the belief that 'modern' national laws will
engulf custom. This kind of thinking, which led to the creation of
101what Arthur Schiller terms an Ethiopian "fantasy law", is typified
by Civil Code Art. 33^7(1):
Unless otherwise expressly provided, all rules whether written 
or customary previously in force concerning matters provided for 
in this Code shall be replaced by this Code and are hereby 
repealed.
Many centuries of legal history and social relations are not 
transformed into a tabula rasa by simply legislating custom out of 
existence - or by nationalising all rural lands. Following Roberto 
Unger, we argue that all of Ethiopia's legal systems are "species of 
the genus of normative order", distinguished from other species such
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as religion and art by a primary emphasis on externally observable
102behaviour and the use of secular sanctions, A lawless society is
a practical impossibility as even small groups need enforceable rules,
although specialised legal institutions may be dispensed with.
Ethiopian law has a marked impact on social relations but, as in pre-
Revolutionary Russia, law creates fewer special and unique social
103relations, when compared to the role of law in the West* Unger’s
legal "species" can thus be understood to be residual categories of
social control, as sets
of rules too practical to be backed up by religious sanctions, 
too burdensome to be left to mere goodwill, too personally vital 
to individuals to be enforced by any abstract agency. lO^ f
The spheres of influence of all laws are sporadic and interstitial,
and other social controls (normative species), such as religion, custom,
habit, and practical prudence, are left intact where the relevant
political authorities perceive that intervention would be hazardous
to the pursuit of power. Many differences in Ethiopian legal systems
can thus be explained by the ways in which local politics are organised,
by the extent to which centralised political institutions are willing
and able to intervene in local affairs, by the differing ways in which
rules are legitimated, and by the extent to which they can be changed 
105rapidly. These interpretations differ radically from those 
offered by most authropologists, and we argue that the traditional 
anthropological perspective has little to say with regard to the 
problems posed in law and development studies. An elaboration of this
106assertion is presented in the footnote.
The legal distance between litigants or, for example, between 
peasant and bureaucrat is not forever fixed within the bounds of a 
unitary set of either localised rules or national laws. Distances, 
vary widely in different situations as a result of complex interactions 
of numerous factors: the ethnic affiliations of the individuals or
groups concerned; their relative wealth, status, educational level and 
ability to influence particular decision-makers; the type of activity 
at issue - contracts disputes among foreign businessmen are not, for 
example, regulated by the customary laws applied in the vicinity of 
Addis Ababa; the political exigencies of the situation - whether, for 
example, the relevant authority wishes to create or restore social 
harmony or to implement radical social changes; and whether agents
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o.f the centre are willing and able to intervene and the extent to 
which their discretion will be exercised on the basis of one of the 
layers of national law.
C. An Introduction to Ethiopian Law Reform
Ethiopian legal outcomes are therefore personalised excessively, 
like decisions under the laws of the estates in pre-Revolutionary 
France or Russia, and law does not promote the disengagement of 
economic activities from traditional social structures. Compared to 
the substantive rules found in the'Ethiopian Civil Code (see Chapter 
Seven), customary rules place a greater emphasis on the past relation­
ships and statuses of the parties, but judicial expedience,''venality 
and, in some cases, incompetence tend to negate these differences.
While personalised decision-making is valued in Ethiopia to the 
extent that.it is perceived as an attempt to secure justice and 
equity, the equal protection of laws which classify individuals, 
groups or fact situations solely on the basis of broadly-accepted 
criteria is much neglected, as is the explicit formulation of con­
crete and development-oriented goals. A legal reform which strikes 
an appropriate balance among these partly-conflicting aims - justice, 
equal protection and goal formulation - and ensures that this balance 
is maintained by judges and bureaucrats would, of course, be an 
excellent means of fostering a social consensus and political inte­
gration. It is perhaps unfortunate that such a reform cannot be 
pursued by simply adopting laws designed to engulf customary rules.
So long as ethnic fragmentation and the varying types of non-legal 
distances we described persist, and so long as traditional politicians 
and their Revolutionary successors will not brook the containment of 
their demands within a unitary system of fair judgement based on 
objective rules (see Chapters Three and Five), a bewildering variety of 
legal distances ('pluralism') will continue to flourish and to help
one group, such as the military or the’Shoan Amhara, to dominate 
107others. Given this state of affairs, law^  reform efforts must 
offer pragmatic justifications to overcome political opposition and 
then construct new and meaningful links between the legal systems of 
the peripheries and those of the centre, systems which exist on a 
continuum of Ethiopian laws and as a part of a larger genus of the 
normative order (see Part III,).
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Most law reforms face, to a greater or lesser extent, inapprop­
riate norms and unpredictable or inflexible results within a chaotic 
legal system in which established rules are sometimes ignored* In 
Ethiopia and in much of the Third World there is, however, an additional 
problem: customary systems display a hardy resistance to reform*
By definition, the customary laws of a given community cannot move 
ahead of customary - not necessarily contemporary - structures, values, 
and beliefs. The regularised amendment procedures necessary for the 
adaptation of law during periods of rapid change are lacking.
Further, the decentralised, vague and diverse nature of Ethiopian 
customary laws makes them inefficient tools for the implementation 
of development policies, and social pressures inducing compliance 
with customary laws are .often too diffuse. Different ethnic, 
cultural, religious and land tenure‘groups have different rules, 
impairing the uniformity of rural development administration. Un­
written custom, as applied to a particular dispute, is vague, as it 
depends upon the knowledge and origin of particular judges or jurors. 
People cannot predict the consequences of their actions with the 
degree of certainty required for development. Transactions and 
relations between persons with differing customary laws are made more
"i 08difficult by the diversity of rules.~ A codification of customary 
rules such as was attempted in Kenya could only result in a lowest 
common denominator type of law that would mean little to particular . 
ethnic groups and would bear little relation to attempts to promote 
development.
The difficulties inherent in attempting to harmonise diverse 
systems of law are analogous to many of the problems faced in inter­
national law because of a common lack of a legal consensus and weak­
nesses in integrative political institutions and centrally-organised
sanctions; international law techniques could profitably be adapted 
109for Ethiopia. New rules must be devised which are as consistent 
as possible with the core of both development needs and traditional 
lifestyles. This process would require a high degree of political 
commitment, creative social science research and careful legal 
draftsmanship - conditions which are sorely lacking in Ethiopia. 
Determinations of the precise extent to which the demands of devel­
opment and tradition actually conflict, and the intensity of these
conflicts, must be made; the costs and benefits of overcoming resis­
tance in various ways must be calculated; the extent to which the ideal 
of national uniformity must"be sacrificed to regional interests
should be ascertained; and the kinds of questions Hutton and Cohen
110ask in relation to social change ought to be kept in mind.
New rules must be carefully communicated, propagandised, implemented 
and enforced, a process which will absorb large amounts of scarce 
resources (see Chapter Two). Once again, we argue that genuine 
changes in social structures will accelerate the acceptance of new 
norms as the customary ones progressively lose their relevance to 
changed circumstances, but this lengthy process presupposes' a long­
term political commitment, stability and the consistent application 
of sensible p o l i c i e s . T h e  means by which specific legal and non- 
legal distances may be decreased or bridged are discussed in subse­
quent Chapters.
V. Dependence
In order to make our topic more manageable, the study focuses on 
the purely domestic problems of Ethiopian underdevelopment and devel­
opment prospects, and we therefore discuss briefly some aspects of 
Ethiopia1s external relations in this Section. The admittedly impor­
tant influence of the policies pursued by multinational corporations, 
private international finance and national and multinational aid and
credit agencies, of international patterns and prices of•imports and .
112exports, and of currency exchange rates are not discussed in
detail as they are being dealt with adequately by others and are, in
any event, largely beyond the control of Ethiopia’s leaders and the 
scope of her legal systems. These international factors are receiving 
increased attention from the growing number of theorists who see ■ 
development processes as fugues on the theme of an interdependence 
of developed and underdeveloped states. Writers such as Andre 
Gunder Frank, Keith Griffen and Clive Thomas go further, viewing 
underdevelopment as a process sustained by the vested interests of 
national and international institutions. The high degree of depend­
ence observed in the Third World is, they argue, the logical outcome 
of asymetrical relations arising under international capitalism: 
industrialisation is retarded by the dependence on external capital 
that drains off the fruits of economic growth; and the close links
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that have been created between domestic and international systems of
social stratification foster an 'embourgeoisment' of the Third World,
in which the desires of the wealthy to keep and increase their
113wealth augment their own dependence and aggressiveness. Finding 
that the Third World has 70% of the world's population and 56% of 
the land area yet accounts for only 20% of world income, 17% of 
trade, 11% of industrial production and 3% of scientific capacity,
Clive Thomas largely ascribes this state of affairs to the evolution 
of an external dependence, measured by the extenb to which a Third 
World economy depends upon foreign trade, payments, capital, tech-
11^nology and decision-making to generate domestic economic processes.
On the basis of these criteria, how externally dependent is 
Ethiopia? Most of the analyses of the theorists of dependence revolve 
around a European colonialism commuted to an international capitalism, 
factors which are not of great importance in Ethiopia although, as we 
have seen, internal conquest, slavery and the exacting of tribute 
must have retarded potential development processes substantially.
While production in the Ethiopian enclaves is heavily dependent 
on foreign technology, foreign capital plays a much smaller role and 
the policies of a few multinational companies a smaller role still.
These enclaves are fairly small and emerged relatively late - during 
the last twenty years, for the most part. We therefore estimate 
that the externally-dependent portion of the Ethiopian economy 
accounted for only 6-8% of GDP in 197^ 1 and the subsequent national­
isation of landholdings and Westem-style businesses by the Derg 
reduces this dependence markedly. Ethiopians in';the upper social 
strata did become dependent on imported luxury and capital goods, but 
we have seen that processes of social stratification were largely 
immune"to foreign manipulation. Amharisation better describes 
urban social changbs . than Westernisation, and lessons in rapacity 
from foreigners were not required. The penetration of foreign capital­
ism into Third World enclaves always'produces some hybrid of capitalist 
and traditional systems Ibut, in Ethiopia,the impact of foreign 
capitalism in terms of, for example, the amount of labour absorbed or 
taxes paid, was relatively small. Finally, inflation does have an 
important impact on life in urban Ethiopia and was a significant factor 
in Haile Selassie's downfall (see Chapter Four); as Cohen and Sileshi note,
inflation in Ethiopia reflects the operation of a wide variety of exter- 
115nal forces.
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To argue that Ethiopia is not externally-dependent to any great 
extent under criteria postulated by certain development economists is 
not to assert that high levels of other forms of dependence do not 
exist. The felt need for an oversized military, police and bureau­
cracy that characterised Haile Selassie1s regime resulted in a high 
degree of dependence upon those governments willing to supply funds, 
training and weapons.'1^  Revolts and invasions which began or inten­
sified after the Revolution have increased this dependence markedly, 
seemingly justified a large military establishment, and encouraged 
arms suppliers to play musical chairs around the Horn of Africa.
Further, it became increasingly difficult simply to ignore'"the pro­
tracted famine conditions that contributed to the collapse of Haile 
Selassie’s Government (see Chapters Three and Four). As the magnitude 
of drought and famine relief efforts greatly exceeds domestic 
resources, Ethiopia is dependent upon a variety of humanitarian and 
developmental activities by foreign governments, charities and multi­
lateral" organisations. This is an appropriate juncture at which to 
detail briefly some of these types of dependence, since they funda­
mentally colour future development strategies and prospects, and 
chances for the survival of the Derg and even the dismemberment of 
the State itself. :
While the military regime has experienced sharp internal conflicts 
and varying degrees of urbanised resistance) such as the militant 
opposition of the leftist and underground Ethiopian Peoples Revolut­
ionary Party (see Chapter Four) , it is the threats posed by rural 
revolts, separatist movements and invasions from Somalia and, perhaps,
x17Sudan that have exacerbated a dependence on foreign military supplies. 
Regional rebellions have been a constant feature of Ethiopian history, 
and Patrick Gilkes has analysed recent ones in detail: in Goj jam
Province in 19k2-k1 1950 and 1967-8, in opposition to Shoan rule, the 
virtual absence of local people from most levels of Provincial 
government, and changes in landholding and taxation arrangements; in 
Wollo in 1958 and 1970 and in Wollega in 1968 - attempts to improve
the living conditions of peasants; and in Bale in 1968, in response
ll3to the policies of internal colonialism we described.
Rebellions were virtually continuous in most provinces during 
1975 and 1976, in reaction to a perceived power vacuum, rural land
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reforms and the ways in which the Derg has treated the nobility
and provincial elites (see Chapter Six)*' The Derg’s public
reactions to these revolts were not particularly informative and
usually took the following form:
bandits who took to the bush. . • after being confused by 
reactionaries whose interests have been adversely affected by 
the Revolution gave themselves up. • • .119
The Ethiopian National Democratic Union (succeeded by the EDU), was 
founded in London in 1975 by emigres hostile to the Revolution and 
notably by ex-Generals lyassu Menegesha and Nega Tegegne and the 
former Governor of Tigre Province, Ras Menegesha Seyoum. Although 
the EDU claims to be organising and coordinating many rural-revolts, 
its actual influence is fairly narrow. At the peak of its popularity, 
the EDU attracted only about 3»000 lightly-armed supporters. A 
well-organised EDU force captured the town of Humera, on the Sudan 
border, in. January 19771 but the EDU suffered a major defeat when 
Humera was recaptured in June. The Afar and Tigre Liberation Fronts 
are relatively well armed and organised forces with sepa ratist 
inclinations, and often cooperate with each other and with the power­
ful ELF/PLF fighting incEritrea Province (duscussed infra). The Tigre 
Liberation Front apparently shares its leadership with the EDU.
The northern Afars, armed by the Saudis and led by Sultan Ali Mirah, 
who fears the confiscation of his rich cotton lands, scored a major 
victory after attacking eight garrison towns in the Danakil desert 
in June 1975• The Afars have continued to fight sporadically in 
eastern Eritrea and Wollo and to halt traffic periodically on the 
Assab road and the rail link with Djibouti. In general and with the 
prominent exception of the ELF/PLF, the forces participating in these 
regional revolts have only a limited capacity to score significant 
victories in a vast and forbidding terrain. Surprisingly, the Galla 
(Oromo). peoples, the largest ethnic grouping in Ethiopia and the 
peoples many Ethiopianists writing before the Revolution regarded as 
posing the most significant threat to national unity,have remained 
relatively quiet, although an Oromo Liberation Front made significant 
gains in Bale Province during the early months of 1977* Since Oromo 
revolts in 1963 and 1970 in. Bale Province v/ere linked with revolts
by the Liberation Front for Western Somalia (discussed infra)* future
120cooperation between these groups is likely.
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A, Eritrea
• Eritrean separatist groups have been fighting for independence
since 1961. They reject Ethiopian claims to Eritrea as a lost province,
a natural part of the nation for ethnic, religious and historical
reasons, and assert ethnic, religious and historical claims of their
own. Either assertion can be supported by a careful selection of the
facts, for Eritrea is evenly divided within itself between Orthodox
Christians and Muslims, In 1890, the Italians consolidated inland
portions of the Amhara-Tigre Empire with the Red Sea coastline that
has been successively occupied by Turks, Egyptians and the Sudanese
Mathdi. The Italian occupation was no more accidental or anomalous
than most colonial incursions, and it was Italy’s defeat in World
War II which led eventually to a federation-of Ethiopia and Eritrea
under U,N, General Assembly Resolution 390 (V) of 1952, After years
of patient Ethiopian encouragement of the predominantly Orthodox \
Christian Unionist Party of Eritrea, and subversion and alienation
of a largely Muslim opposition, federalism was dismantled and Eritrea became
part of a unitary state in 1962, The fortunes and degree of internal
unity of the Eritrean separatists have fluctuated ever since, as has
the diplomatic support and war materiel supplied at various times
by Syria, Iraq,Libya, South Yemen, China, Sudan, Tunisia, Saudi '
Arabia, Cuba, the U.S.S.R, and, apparently, some Western states. Like
many other Ethiopian revolts, this one combines the dissatisfactions
of individuals, Muslim separatism, anti-Amhara feelings, peasant
121unrest and socialist theorising*'
Haile Selassie's response to separatist activities alternated 
between the relatively passive maintenance of garrison towns and 
brutal repressions, such as those which occurred after the declar­
ation of a state of emergency and martial law in Eritrea in 1971 •
The Derg has continued to pursue the same kinds of policies, and the 
manner in which Eritrean aspirations-have been dealt with is one of
the more damaging disparities between the promise and reality of 
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military rule* Assuming, somewhat simplistically, that Eritrean 
grievances stem solely from the imperial nature of Haile Selassie's 
maladministered regime, the Derg initially attempted to negotiate 
a settlement. High hopes on both sides were dashed when the chief
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Government negotiator, an Eritrean Protestant and the first Chairman 
of the Derg, General Aman Michael Andom, was killed in November 
197;+, as a result of conflicts within the Derg (see Chapter Four).
His successor,. Brig. General Teferi Benti, was a hardliner on Eritrea, 
and attempts at a quick military solution which followed his appoint­
ment were unsuccessful. Bloody fighting led to a renewed declaration 
of a state of emergency by the Derg in February 1975? martial law was 
applied throughout the Province, and the broad new powers conferred 
upon Special Courts-Martial (see Chapter Seven) were extended to 
Eritrean prosecutors and courts-martial.
Despite half-hearted attempts at negotiation, such asJGovern- 
ment's announcement in May 1975 of pardons and clemency for many 
Eritrean prisoners and a nine-point Derg peace plan broached in May 
1976, fighting anil allegations of atrocities have escalated. The 
Derg repeated its offer of an amnesty in June 1978, but it was also 
announced that ominous-sounding "reception centres" were being pre­
pared. The most that the Derg is prepared to concede is the vague 
degree of autonomy that is promised, to Ethiopia’s other provinces; 
Eritreans demand nothing less than total independence and claim that 
the Derg is trying to "kill the fish by drying up the sea." Although 
changes in military positions are reported almost daily, the Derg 
steadily lost ground up to April 1978, and one-third to one-half 
of the regular Army is periodically tied down by the fighting. Asmara, 
the Eritrean capital, has been the pawn in numerous battles, and has 
been taken by Eritrean separatists on several occasions, only to be 
' retaken- by the Derg. By August 1977 Eritreans were able to disrupt 
road links and move around the City at night with some degree of 
freedom. Separatists claimed in May 1976 that the number of military 
bases.under the Derg's control in Eritrea had shrank from 60 to 17 and 
several garrisons have fallen since then, but provincial towns are 
continually under seige and changing hands, particularly Keren,
Nacfa, Agordat and Decamere. The available evidence suggests that 
the Derg's troops will be able to keep an urban foothold in the Pro­
vince for the foreseeable future. A poorly armed and led People's 
Militia, some 50,000-strong, was recruited from urban areas and 
peasant associations in central and southern Ethiopia in May and June
1976, and collapsed after a battle with the Tigre Liberation Front on
124on the Eritrean border.
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After the fighting between Ethiopia and Somalia tapered off 
(see isiis} ’ there have been repeated reports of Ethiopian bombing 
raids into Eritrea, attempts to end the separatists’ siege of Asmara, 
the launching of a full-scale Ethiopian counter-offensive, and even a 
Soviet naval bombardment of the Eritrean port of Massawa. As of this 
writing (July 1978), a massive offensive by the Derg has yet to mater­
ialise, apparently because the U.S.S.R. and Cuba (see infra). who 
previously aided the Eritreans, oppose such a step- Voicing his latest 
thoughts on the subject, Fidel Castro said that Cuba is "absolutely 
opposed'to the secession of Eritrea" and favours a "political sol­
ution with a unified Ethiopia based on Marxist-Leninist principles 
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While Eritrean separatists have experienced only localised and 
temporary shortages of v/eapons, ammunition and military training 
facilities, shortages of medicines and food are chronic, and there is a 
heavy reliance on supplies transported from Sudan, across the Red Sea 
or captured from the Ethiopian forces- The rugged and arid Eritrean 
terrain favours guerrilla warfare. Most separatist factions are grouped 
within either the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF - formed in 1961) 
or the Popular Liberation Front (PLF) that broke away from its parent 
in 1969» The ELF numbers some 15,000 fighters with parochial and 
conservative attitudes and an air of puritanical Islam about them.
The PLF has more of a Marxist than a religious orientation, is 
better-organised and reportedly recruits up to 1,000 soldiers a 
month to augment a fighting force of 25,000- As in the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation, these factions often work at cross-purposes 
and fight among themselves (especially from 1972 to 197*0, despite 
the fact that unity was agreed in principle in September 1975, 
reaffirmed in May 1977 and renegotiated, with Sudanese help, in 
March 19?8. Fears have been expressed among the separatists, in 
February and August 1977, that the Derg will collapse before intense 
factional disputes are resolved in Eritrea, paving the way for an 
Angola-style civil war. In our opinion, religious, ethnic and ideo­
logical antagonisms will not be resolved in the foreseeable future in 
Eritrea, which is, in any event, too small in all respects to be 
economically viable, save as a satellite of the U.S., the U.S.S.R. 
or an Arab oil state - the likely outcome of an Eritrean ’independ­
ence1. There are too many potential Eritreas in the Third World
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and separatism ought in most cases to be resisted, but the Derg must 
genuinely attempt to promote political and economic justice in this 
breakaway Province.
B« Somalia
Somali ambitions pose an even more serious threat to the Derg 
and, once again, contemporary antagonisms are rooted deeply in the 
past, dating back to the sixteenth century invasions of the Galla and 
Ahmed Gran which swept across the Amhara-Tigre Empire from what is 
now Somalia. Colonisation by the British, Italians, and, to a lesser 
extent, the French divided ethnically-homogeneous but politically-frag­
mented Somali kim.groups, and portions of the boundaries separating 
these colonies from Ethiopia were never thoroughly demarcated. The 
roughly one million Somalis who live in Ethiopia or regularly 
cross the border support Mogadishu’s call for an ethnically-deter­
mined Greater Somalia, which would include the Ethiopian Ogaden 
desert- (all of the territory to the east of the Awash River) , Djibouti 
and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya. With some justification, 
the Derg has termed Greater Somalia a ’’fantasy” inspired by the 
British, and by Aneurin Bevan in particular. Ethiopia rebuts 
Somali allegations of ’’colonially-determined” boundaries by citing 
the Organisation of African Unity’s (OAU) policy of maintaining the 
boundaries hammered out under colonialism, a policy which is adhered 
to fairly consistently, in spite of the fact that it results in 
ethnic fragmentation throughout Africa. Unlike the Somalis, Ethiopian 
armies have hitherto been able to defend their boundaries, which were
roughly-drawn but accurately reflected the extent to which the European
127colonists thought they could push their luck against the Ethiopians.
A variety of border clashes have occurred since the independence 
of Somalia, most prominently the crushing defeat of Somali armour 
administered by General Aman Michael Andom deep in the Ogaden in 
196^. Both sides have been braced for an all-out war since the Ethiopi an 
Revolution, and a gradual escalation of the usual Somali raids on 
Ethiopian convoys and police and customs posts worried the Derg.
Although Somalia denies it, she began revamping the 3,000 to 000- 
man Western Somalia Liberation Front early in 1977* The Front cut 
Ethiopia’s rail link with Djibouti on 1 June 1977, both sides began 
a military buildup along the border, and some 6,000 troops invaded
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Ethiopia in July 1977, before Ethiopia had time to assimilate the new 
weaponry supplied by the U.S.S.R. Few insights into the course of 
the war could be gleaned from an equally fierce radio propaganda 
battle. New Ethiopian army commanders were appointed in an attempt to 
improve a lacklustre performance, and some 70,000 members of a 
revitalised People's Militia were thrown into the fray and performed 
poorly. Although Somalia denied a direct involvement in the war 
until February 1978, it seems that her soldiers had been encouraged 
to take long leave and fight with the Front. The Derg has captured 
soldiers from Somalia - including the Commander of the 10th Tank 
Battalion, Somalia-registered lorries and Russian tanks - and hais shot 
down MiGs bearing Somalia's insignia. Although the invading troops 
overran most of the Ogaden and a few fertile areas in Harar Pro­
vince, Ethiopian troops managed to keep control of the major towns -
123Harar and Dire Dawa - although Gode and Jijiga were taken.
The low point in the Derg’s military fortunes was reached by 
September 1977• the Somalis had managed to exclude Ethiopian troops 
from about 90$ of the Ogaden. An uneasy stalemate them prevailed until 
the Derg began a series of probing counter-offensives in January 1978* 
The decisive blow was struck early in March, when Ethiopian troops 
and 70 tanks were airlifted far behind the heavily-defended Somali 
lines and recaptured Jijiga. With their supply lines cut, Somali troops 
retreated rapidly and in disarray, in the face of a head-on assault and 
Ethiopia's overwhelming air superiority. The Derg stopped short of 
the border and did not invade Somalia as the Somalis predicted, 
however. The Somalis vowed to fall back on guerrilla tactics, and 
periodic skirmishes have taken place since March 1978 - as well 
as retaliatory strikes by the Ethiopian Air Force against Somali 
towns. ■" Somalia has spumed Ethiopian suggestions of a peace treaty, 
which are based on "Somalia abandoning her claim to the Ogaden. In 
April 1978, an unsuccessful coup attempt against Siad Barre was 
reported to be one result of having lost the War. The Derg made 
effective propaganda use of pictures of Somali troops using half­
finished irrigation ditches as trenches; over U.S. $10 millions in 
development aid has been negated by the Ogaden War, and it is impossible 
even to estimate the loss of life and livestock. On balance, and 
judging from the London newspapers, Ethiopia’s pronaganda was less
effective than Somalia’s, which manipulated Western unease over the
intentions of the 3*000 to 16,000 Cubans (estimates varied wildly)
and 1,000 to 1500 Soviets who helped the Derg. Some of the Cubans
129engaged actively in combat.
The Soviet Union slowed down the delivery of weapons to its 
former client Somalia in July 1977 and halted arms shipments alto- 
gether in October. Somalia revoked its friendship treaty with the 
U.S.S.R. and expelled Cuban and some 6,000 Soviet advisors one month 
later. Desperately short of weapons, Somalia paid an estimated $2 
millions per day to private arms dealers during February 1978, 
almost all of it donated by the Arab League, and by Saudi Arabia in 
particular. Iran, the Saudis and, to a lesser extent, Sudan shipped 
arms direct to Somalia - the tacit acquiescence of the U.S. has to be 
assumed - and the Shah threatened to commit his Army and Air Force to 
the War. Egypt also sent arms, and was only slightly embarrassed 
when an airliner carrying shells to Somalia violated Kenyan airspace 
and was forced to land in Nairobi. Despite tantalizing hints that 
they "would do so, Western countries have refused to supply arms 
directly toJSomalia, possibly because the Derg has threatened to 
break off diplomatic relations. Israel, in turn, was criticised in 
the West for supplying arras to Ethiopia, and Western diplomats repeat­
edly warned the Soviet Union that its activities in the Horn of Africa
130threatened detente.
A side-issue in Ethio-Somali struggles is the tiny French entrepot 
of Djibouti, which was given a nominal independence on 27 June 1977; 
its dependence on Ethiopian trade and on French subventions, admin­
istrators, businessmen and a French military presence is complete.
The fluctuating population of about 200,000 is divided evenly between 
Somali-speaking Issas and the Afars, who dominated the Issas under 
their pro-French leader, Ali Aref, and who are divided from other Afar 
peoples by the border between Ethiopia and Djibouti. The political 
situation is confused, and Somalia b.acks the internal African People’s 
League for Independence and the external Front for the Liberation of 
the Somali Coast, which clashed with French troops in February 1976 
after kidnapping 30 French children in a school bus. Ethiopia 
nominally supports the new Government of President Hassan Gulled, 
and is reportedly training the pro-Afar Movement for the Liberation 
of Djibouti. At a ministerial council meeting of the OAU in June 1976,
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Somalia refused Ethiopia’s offer of a joint declaration renouncing
claims to, and guaranteeing the sovereignty of, Djibouti, arguing
that this would "limit the options" of Djibouti’s people* President
Giscard of France has promised to "guarantee the security" of the
territory and Hassan Gulled cleverly gained admission to the Arab
League, whose more conservative members may be able to keep Somalia
in line and to maintain the enclave (where unemployment is reported
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to average 80?6) in the manner to which it has grown accustomed*
C. Dependence and Foreign Relations
The common thread running through the conflicts in or near Ethiopia 
(and in Black Africa generally) is that, with the exception- of some 
of the localised rebellions led by traditional politicians, all of 
the participants are heavily dependent on external diplomatic 
support, military training, and supplies of weaponry, medicines 
and foodstuffs* Even Sudan displays a high degree of such depend­
ence, and there is a constant threat that minor clashes and rival 
claims'*to a small triangle of land along the Sudanese-Ethiopian 
border will grow into a large-scale conflict, Sudan and Ethiopia 
have sheltered one another’s refugees from famine and warfare and 
have given support to each other’s separatist movements from.time to 
time. In June 1977* President Numeri promised to "stand on the side 
of Somalia" in the event of an Ethio-Somali war, but he did little 
more than supply a modest amount of weapons. In October 19771 
talks were held in Khartum in an attempt to heal the rift between 
Ethiopia and Sudan; a mediation committee of the OATJ announced in
December that the parties had agreed to settle their differences,
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but no formal agreement has been concluded.
In the face of the numerous conflicts or threats of conflict 
that tie down their troops, the Derg, and Ethiopia as a territorial 
entity, have only managed to survive through a combination of military 
tenacity, high levels of disunity and/or incompetence among her 
opponents, and the vacillations of their patrons* Repeated 
assertions by journalists of a gross political and military incom­
petence and intransigence on the part of the Derg are misleading; 
faced with similar pressures, the governments of most other states 
would have crumbled long ago, and many of the Derg’s repressive 
policies can be understood - but not necessarily condoned - as the 
typical and, often, effective reactions of a  government committed to 
fighting against a national dismemberment.
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The Revolution has resulted in a fundamental reorientation of 
Ethiopian foreign policies and, indirectly, of international relations 
throughout the Horn. Addis Ababa is an important centre of inter­
national and inter-African affairs, housing over 65 embassies and the 
headquarters of the OAU and theUN Economic Commission for Africa.
Haile Selassie tried to secure a place in history as an advocate of 
collective security and independence from (European) colonialism, 
and as a Pan-African 'honest broker' unaffected by ideological 
divisions. Until about 1970, his diplomatic activities also had the 
effect of making him less vulnerable to the demands of both his 
educated elites and the nobility, who saw in his international 
prominence a confirmation of Ethiopian superiority. He realised, 
early on, that the revenue gained through diplomacy need not be 
extracted from land and labour or one's political supporters, and 
he developed the acquisition of foreign aid into an art form. While 
maintaining an overall orientation towards the United States, he 
exploited religious and historical connections with the U.S.S.R., and 
successfully courted many of the smaller states that are slighted by 
many Third World regimes. Sweden, Norway, India, Israel, Yugoslavia
and Germany, for example, assumed important roles in training portions
133of the Military and the police.
The Derg lacks Haile Selassie's diplomatic finesse, and trad­
itional sources of weaponry dried up after a time. Although a small 
portion of Ethiopia's foreign aid receipts was disinterested charity, 
the bulk of it was attracted by the political influence Haile Sel-
ixi+
assie exerted in the Third World and Ethiopia's strategic position. 
From 1953 to 197^ American contributions to the "stabilising force" 
and "bulwark against Soviet expansionism" on the Horn included 
US $250 millions in economic aid and $170 millions in military aid, 
plus large cash sales of arms and a Military Assistance Advisory 
Group. After the Revolution, the U.S. initially stepped up arms 
deliveries to the Derg, in an attempt to counter further Soviet- 
financed buildups in Somalia and in reaction to the construction 
of Soviet missile storage facilities near Berbera. The Derg soon 
ran afoul of the U.S. Congress, unwelcome State Department advice, to 
scale down its activities in Eritrea and President Carter's human 
rights campaign, however. American arms delivei-i.es were stopped in
February 1977, and Ethiopia claims that U.S. $40 millions worth of
arms which were already paid for have never been delivered. Although
the House of Representatives attempted to ban any future military
aid to Ethiopia (and Uruguay) in October 1977, lorries, jeeps and
spares were delivered in February 1978, after a conciliatory delegation
visited Addis Ababa. Some Congressmen have subsequently criticised
American funding of the World Bank on the basis that it' assists
countries like Ethiopia. American "advice" is almost always contrary
to the Derg's best interests and, when it is not followed, relations
135become "strained" still further.
The Ethiopian military was in deep trouble, for it was almost 
solely dependent upon the U.S. for weaponry. Commentators were 
astonished when,with almost indecent haste, the Soviet Union 
offered in May 1977 to supply arms to Ethiopia, thereby endangering 
relations with her client, Somalia, and reversing a recent policy of 
keeping her distance from "unstable" African regimes. Fidel Castro 
visited Addis Ababa in May 1977, Cuban "military technicians" began 
arriving in May, and moderate quantities of small arms from Eastern 
Europe followed soon after. The Soviet Union has since shipped arms 
worth an estimated U.S. $1,000 millions to Ethiopia, and relations 
between the two countries have grown closer: bilateral arms deals
in the Third World inevitably entail a political partnership, as 
the recipient relies on the donor's supply lines, instructors and 
mechanics. It does not seem too unreasonable to take the Russians . 
at their word; they saw an opportunity to acquire leverage in a 
country somewhat similar to the Russia of 1917, and a chance to 
mediate a war with Somalia, about which they must have had advance 
knowledge* The importance to the Soviets of bases in Somalia has, 
in our--view, been exaggerated in the West; what is seldom mentioned 
is that the U.S. Government fears domestic political pressure to 
abandon its base on Diego Garcia if the Russians lose all access 
to Red Sea ports.
The diplomatic game became even more complex when Sudan expelled 
several Russian diplomats in May 1977. The U.S. quickly offered to 
increase military aid to Sudan and was joined by France and Britain 
in July 1977 in offering arms to Somalia, although this offer was 
later made conditional on the ending of the Ethio-Somali war. China,
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which hitherto followed quiet and even-handed policies towards 
Ethiopia and Somalia, offered arms to Somalia in August. The 
mercurial Gaddafy, one of the major supporters of Eritrean separatists, 
announced in May that Libya would hereafter support the Derg.
Except for Libya and South Yemen (Aden), Arab states are uniformly 
anti-Derg and undoubtedly anti-Ethiopian. Some South Yemeni officials 
have felt uncomfortable while assisting their Soviet patron: as
members of the Arab League, they are supporting a Christian state 
against Muslim Somalia. Ethiopians see the manoeuvres of "reactionary" 
Muslim states as an attempt to turn the Red Sea into an Arab Lake - 
a prospect which must make the Americans uneasy, although 'their 
withdrawal of military aid to Ethiopia has made Its success more 
likely.. At the July 1975 OAU Summit meeting in Kampala, Ethiopia 
succeeded in blocking the admission of the ELF as an observer and 
led an abortive anti-Arab initiative. There appears to be fertile 
ground for an enterprising Ethiopian foreign policy in this area, 
as many African countries feel that the diplomatic and financial 
promises made by Arab oil states in return for an anti-Israeli 
stance have not been1'kept. Although Haile Selassie severed rather 
emotional ties with Israel after the Yom Kippur War on the ba^is of 
these promises, the Israelis are again supplying arms and training 
soldiers under the Derg. Adversaries around the Horn have, from time 
to time, appealed to the OAU for help, but little diplomatic headway 
has been made towards the resolution of a series of political 
stalemates. Nigeria and Tanzania have announced support for the 
maintenance of Ethiopian territorial integrity (but not necessarily 
for the Derg). Kenya, which sees itself as the next victim of pol­
icies of a Greater Somalia, has supported the Derg actively, and 
President Carter's promise, in March 1978, of "adequate defense
157capabilities" for Kenya must serve as a check on Somali aspirations.
The moral for the Derg in all of this is clear: enemies can be
kept at bay through more effective military and political policies 
and an adroit diplomacy which secures adequate supplies of arms. The 
Derg's diplomacy has been fairly successful, at least from the stand­
point of obtaining the support of some strange bedfellows, including 
East and West Germany, North and South Korea, Libya and Israel.. 
Nevertheless, high levels of conflict are likely to persist in the 
Horn. Ethiopia's permanent allies are small and few in number, the
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conservative Arab states are implacably opposed to the Derg, and
thetGreat Powers are able to shift their support rapidly and in ways
which offset any gains or losses made. This was recognised by, among
others, General Haig, the NATO Commander. Lav/s and development
policies must take account of these factors. Protracted famine also
looms large in future policy decisions, for Sudan and Somalia as well
as for Ethiopia. By the end of 19731 the combination of a protracted
drought and Ethiopian maladministration and callous indifference had
caused an estimated 200,000 deaths in Wollo Province. During the next
few years the effects of the drought spread into Eritrea, Tigre and
the Ogaden, resulting in acute food shortages when combined-with the
effects of rural disorders and the disruptions in marketing and
administration caused by the Revolution. The Derg has refused to
allow international'relief agencies to enter Eritrea, provoking
138charges that food is being used as a military weapon.
It has been estimated that in order to overcome the effects of 
drought in Ethiopia, U.S. $1.2 million worth of plow oxen, $1.8 
million worth of seed and 100 million trees (to combat erosion) 
are needed. A 197^ Food and Agriculture Organisation report pre­
dicted an annual Ethiopian grain deficit of 150,000 metric tons by 
19851 and a shortfall of 70,000 tons was later forecast for the 
1977/78 growing season. Government's Relief and Rehabilitation 
Commission concluded, in April 197&, that 2^0,000 tons of grain 
(including buffer stocks) , 57 five-ton“.lorries and $*f2 millions were 
needed. These kinds; of remedies are clearly beyond Ethiopia’s dom­
estic and diplomatic capacities, and the U.S. promised $6.5 
millions in famine relief aid in December 1977 and the UN added-some 
$9 millions in May 1978. International relief agencies have termed 
Ethiopia's requests gross exaggerations. These agencies have fought 
a running newspaper battle against allegations of their incompetence, 
notably those made by Jonathan Dimbleby, the European 'discoverer' 
of the 1973 Wollo famine. The performance of many agencies has 
been far from laudable, even given the constraints under which they 
operated; problems associated with the types of dependence we dis­
cussed do not simply disappear when external aid is administered by 
charitable and multilateral donors. Similar projects continue to 
be staffed by the same kinds of experts using the materials, techniques
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and funds of the major donors of bilateral aid. International agencies 
are often poorly organised and deal with famine on a country-by- 
country basis rather than throughout the area affected* 'Diplomats' 
from these agencies often go to extraordinary lengths to avoid jeo­
pardising friendly arrangements with the 'host' government and its 
senior officials, including the undermining of relief efforts.
As of this writing, a/arms of locusts are destroying crops in a wide
swath on the Horn, as a result of the suspension of locust control
139efforts during the fighting in Eritrea and the Ogaden, Problems
of maintaining an adequate food supply in Ethiopia are discussed
throughout this study* ..
On the Horn of Africa, someone is always willing to feed the
military dependence of someone else, but not necessarily to feed
those who have become dependent as a result of drought. While their
economic interdependence demands that Ethiopians, Eritreans and
Somalis live together peaceably, foreign interventions have destroyed
such meagre bases for cooperation as existed. Events since 1973
have made a mockery of the notion of the sovereign state of Ethiopia
(or Somalia or Djibouti), yet sovereign it is under international
law. The actions of separatist groups create a fragmentation within
the State that mirrors the fragmentation among nation-states and,
although international law falls outside the scope of this study, we
can note that it has never provided effective solutions to the problems
posed by dependence. Jean Bodin's rigid, sixteenth century insistence
on the proposition that a sovereign can never be subject to the
commands of others has given way to practical politics and to clever
evasions, such as Raz's suggestion that, as sovereignty can be
fragmented, every law can be treated as an independent unit
1^ +0
unaffected by other laws. We are left with an image of Ethiopian 
laws which resembles coercive military commands - presumably an 
image congenial to the Derg. Consistency within complex legal systems 
is seldom achieved, and individuals and groups must reconcile isol­
ated rules with other laws and non-legal forces as best they can.
* * * * *
While we do not claim a high degree of originality for our 
analyses, the fragmentary nature of social science theories, inter­
pretations of Ethiopian affairs and descriptions of recent events have
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made it necessary to shake the kaleidoscope in an attempt to arrive
at coherent images of Ethiopian underdevelopment and development
prospects* While some overlapping of analyses is inevitable, we
have, in lawyerly fashion, presented and re-presented our arguments
from various vantage points in an attempt to construct solid analyses
from the numerous inconclusive aspects of Ethiopian underdevelopment
and development prospects that are elaborated throughout this study.
Like those of the common law, our conclusions emerge from an almost
endless succession of reasons, rather than from the pure reason
of a general theory-, removed from the real world and the rough-and-
l*fl
tumble of politics.
Consensus, conflict, distance and dependence are little more
than different perspectives on the facts of contemporary Ethiopian
life, as they emerge from historical processes of social stratifi- -
cation and ethnic fragmentation. Increasingly, Ethiopians are coming
to deny the intrinsic goodness of these processes, and even to view
them as the result of naked acts of power. This is an important
precondition to modernisation,for a preventable evil is only viewed
as a disgrace after people have learned how to manipulate public
affairs, although these attitudes can also stimulate uncontrolled
conflict. They also give rise to what Roberto Unger calls the puzzle
of modernity: "How, then, can there be consensus without authority,
l^t*?
stability without belief, order without justification?" " O n  
the answers to these kinds of questions hangs much of the potential 
for development in Ethiopia.
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Chapter 2 : Law and Development
In this Chapter, a brief review of some of the theories that 
underpin notions of law and development which are relevant to Ethiopia 
will be offered. Unfortunately, full justice cannot be done to the 
richness of these theories.
"Law" and "development”, considered in isolation, have no 
generally agreed definition; it is therefore unlikely that their 
complex interrelation can ever be described briefly in an uncontro- 
versial fashion. This should not concern us: definitions are not
absolutes but mere aids to analysis, and the nature of the inter­
relation of law and development in one country will emerge from the 
analyses found throughout this study. A legal perspective is the 
newest and most uncharted contribution to development studies. It is 
questioned and, more typically, ignored by conventional practitioners 
of the arcane development craft, and one aim of our study is to 
proselytise for the important role law can play in development 
processes.
I. Development
A search for new development perspectives continues, fuelled 
by the failures recorded during the past twenty years and attributed, 
in part at least, to the application of simplistic, largely economic 
theories of development; nostrums have provided no panaceas. The 
1960s were designated as the United Nations Development Decade under 
General Assembly Resolution 1710 (xvi) and, by 1966, it had become 
apparent that the modest minimum target of a ^  annual growth rate 
would not be achieved. Per capita annual increases in the gross 
material product of the Third World had been a disappointing 
2%, only 1.2% for Africa as a whole and a bit less for Ethiopia, 
compared to an average of 3*5% for capitalist and 6% for socialist 
(communist party-state) countries. The folly of expecting serious 
results from a largely symbolic attempt to legislate development was 
not grasped by everyone and a Second Development Decade was duly 
decreed, with objectives scaled down to match declining expectations. 
At the same time, inflation, unemployment and a general slackening of 
economic growth in the West during the 1970s forced a thoroughgoing 
reassessment of traditional social science wisdom and international 
economic relations. These kinds of considerations led Dudley Seers
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to observe:
, Since development is far from being achieved at presentT 
the need is not, as generally imagined, to accelerate 
economic growth - which could even be dangerous - but to 
change the nature of the development process. 3
This revolutionary reversal of the economist’s customary priorities 
is gaining support,but it will have an uphill fight against what 
amounts to an established religion of development which has, in a 
surprisingly short time, prejudged the world, castigated tradition 
and. the "backward masses", exalted Westernised elites, invoked the 
magic of econometrics and revealed industrialisation as the source 
of man’s salvation. While many academics are currently rethinking 
their approaches to development, the same cannot really be said about 
practitioners in the field who were trained in the 1950s stfkL 1960s.
Much of the apparently neutral development theory they apply is 
grounded in a scientism which has been found wanting through empirical 
studies; it is also anti-historical and detached from reality, based as 
it is on a reasoning from first principles not grounded in fact. Most 
of these principles are questionable generalisations - cliches, 
stereotypes, ideal types - of Western experience and, in the positivist 
tradition, crucial normative issues such as income distribution and 
social justice are successfully evaded. One contribution a legal per­
spective can make to discourses on development is to effect a shift 
of emphasis towards these kinds of normative considerations. Among 
the Western cliches that tended to create a mythology oi development 
when transplanted to the Third World are: that modernisation both 
benefits, and is desired by, a traditional populace; that material 
motivations and desires for a Western standard of living will give 
rise to mass-consumption Third World societies; that democracy is 
the natural outcome of increased literacy and economic growth; that 
clear distinctions between civilian and military authorities will 
emerge, based on a public disdain for military culture; and, most 
crucially, that a desirable social stability will be fostered by
4
something called modernisation and the growth of a middle class.
A. Towards a Definition
Discarding these myths (having noted that they are reflected 
in the foreign policies of many Western states) what is development?
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First, development involves real progress towards the attainment of 
speoifically national goals, and definitions must therefore be related 
to the political and social cultures of particular states. Given the 
low levels of political stability and participation in much of the 
Third World, however, governmental goals are typically those of 
elite groups who pass in and out of power and who may see themselves 
as the proxy representatives of an ignorant populace. The goals 
pursued by various Ethiopian elites are therefore discussed throughout 
this study and contemporary elite goals can be divided into the three 
broad categories discussed in the footnote and in Chapter Five.
We also emphasise that development is an integrated, self-conscious 
and goal-oriented social process - men in Ethiopian societies attempt­
ing to mould the conditions of their existence - a total process 
which can be divided into its economic, political, social, tech- 
nological, legal, etc. parts for analytical convenience only.
The various parts must then be recombined meaningfully, in order to 
avoid i:he simplistic conclusions that flow from simple models.
The popular trend in academic treatments of Third World issues
is to define development in terms of progress towards a complex of
welfare goals, such as the amelioration of poverty, unemployment and
socio-economic inequality. Although these definitions have been
devised on behalf of the Third World, they are little more than
restatements of goals that have been pursued in the West since World
War II. A selective use of theories which analyse Western problems
7is therefore appropriate. For example, Jurgen Habermas’s critical 
study of the crises faced by "advanced capitalist" countries shows a 
simple dichotomy of developed/underdeveloped states to be too sim­
plistic, that nations exist in a continuum of development based on 
criteria other than per capita income levels. Habermas has general­
ised four interrelated crises faced by Western states:
- the economic system does not produce the requisite quantity 
of consumable values, or;
- the administrative system does not produce the requisite 
quantity of rational decisions, or;
- the legitimation system does not provide the requisite 
quantity of generalized motivations, or;
- the socio-cultural system does not generate the requisite 
quantity of action-motivating meaning. 8
These are precisely the primary constraints on development that exist in
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Ethiopia (and throughout the Third World) today, and the tendency 
towards recurrent crises - but not the ability to deal effectively 
v/ith these crises - therefore exists independent of a country’s level 
of development. As we shall see, the concepts underlying these crises 
are pregnant with implications for a lav; and development analysis*
Habermas works towards a regulation of these crises through what he 
terms a three-dimensional evolution of social systems: the develop­
ment of productive forces, increases in systems autonomy (power) 
and changes in normative structures. He views development as a learning 
process which takes place through exchange: the political and
administrative system performs steering functions for the-economic
system,, in return for revenue, and confers \*elfare benefits upon
9the socio-cultural system in order to obtain public loyalty.
The relevance of this complex (and somewhat jargonistic) theory to 
Ethiopian development will be discussed at various points in this 
study, and at the end of this Chapter in particular.
To what extent is this kind of broadly based, interdisciplinary 
approach to development problems* adopted by economists? The most 
popular set of readings - Gerald Meier’s Leading Issues in Economic 
Development - confesses that economic development is not the only 
relevant variable and then proceeds grossly to underrepresent non­
economic factors. Meier approves of Gunnar Myrdal's definition of 
an "upward movement of the entire social system" (which nevertheless 
leaves unanswered the question of which direction is "upward" for 
non-economic variables) and emphasises that development involves both growth 
and change,that there are qualitative dimensions beyond a simple 
widening of economic activity. In the end, however, Meier adopts 
an economics definition, that of a process resulting in long-term 
real per canita income increases, matched by a decline in the absolute 
number (rather than percentage) of people below a minimum income 
level.10
Although non-economists tend to offer broader definitions 
of development, most of these are heavily influenced by the defin­
itions of economists. For example, Uphoff and Ilchman’s broad "pol­
itical economy" approach to development is nevertheless tied to 
raising the level of productivity; that is, the capacity or potential 
for production or the "capability over time to satisfy human needs and
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11
desires" where individuals value gains differently. Does the
satisfaction of human needs and desires necessarily require that
something be produced? If, for example, freedom of speech is valued,
must such preconditions as political stability, participation and
tolerance be 'produced1? Is freedom of speech, which is valued
by some people in all societies although it cannot be measured
statistically or in per capita terms, to be forgotten or excluded
automatically from development theories? If not, what priority
ought to be accorded to this fairly vague concept? To cite another
example, many sociologists and anthropologists argue, inter alia,
that development requires the segregation of economic activity from
12its traditional social setting. What if, as Is the case in Ethiopia 
most people prefer an integration of work, family and kinship re­
lations? Are tradition and development mutually exclusive, requiring 
each individual to choose between them, or can and will government 
and the economic system make this choice for each person?
B. A Critique of Leading Theories
All development theories display serious defects when particular
problems are considered* A brief examination of various theories
and of their relevance to Ethiopia will demonstrate that they all
contain useful elements and prescriptions, although none of them
comes to grips with development as a whole. Until a "general theory"
is devised, broader even than those of Keynes, Marx or Parsons, we
are left with an acute theoretical fragmentation; particular theories
can only be applied to particular problems. The easiest ideas to
dismiss are those involving "vicious cycles", which are really descrxp
tioris of non-development rather than theoretical prescriptions for
development. Two representative examples are discussed in .the 
' 13footnote. These cycles can be reduced to the unastounding 
proposition that the poor are poor because they are poor. They 
provide a means of visualising some degree of interrelation among 
aspects of underdevelopment, but the impressions they convey are 
misleading: each element in these development equations is seen as
causing only its successor and being affected only by i'fes predecessor. 
A more accurate metaphor would be a molecular structure, with each 
problem of underdevelopment affecting the others in diverse ways.
Also, the image of a vicious cycle can lead to two equally erroneous
77
conclusion: either the links between problems appear to be so
strong that the cycle cannot be broken or, if it seems that the cycle 
can be broken at any juncture, it does not matter where this break 
occurs and development priorities need not be established carefully, 
in light of limited resources.
A group of "single-barrier*1 theories can also be dealt with 
briefly; although each contains a .grain of truth, the notion that 
the absence of any one element constrains development is simplistic*. 
Perhaps the most important of these theories is a species of unsoph­
isticated Marxism, in which the liquidation of imperialism^or the 
reappropriation of labour's surplus value will, in and of itself, 
foster development. Studies of industrial capitalism by Marxists 
(or anyone else) cannot be applied without serious qualification 
in the Third World: Marx himself warned us not to "metamorphose
my historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe 
into an historico-philosophic theory of the general path every people
lif
is fated to tread." Western approaches to development typically 
share Marx's view that superstructures (including law) adjust rapidly 
to changes in the mode of production, thereby neglecting the work of 
Engels and Lenin. To state these criticisms is not to deny the 
tremendous impact Marx has had on social science, the relevance of a 
closely-argued Marxian analysis to Ethiopia's present circumstances and 
the appeal of development models based on the experiences of Ghina, 
Yugoslavia and the USSR. It would, however, serve little purpose to 
expunge one religion of development only to replace it with another, 
equally uncritical theology. As Basil Davidson notes,
Marx ha.d written when next to nothing was known about Africa,
Lenin's situation was not much better, and China, as we have.
since had ample reason to see, is also another continent. 15
Other common single-barrier theories envisage one of the following: 
raising the marginal propensity to save; identifying and assisting 
Western-style (or Schumpeterian) entrepreneurs; orienting investment 
towards more productive uses; rapidly augmenting social overhead 
capital; or radically expanding investments in human resources. 
Additional savings are being compulsorily mobilised from higher- 
and middle-income groups in Ethiorvia since the Devolution, but the 
total effect is uncertain, as those who are starving would like to
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consume more than they produce. In the past, expenditures on urban 
housing investments and conspicuous consumption by higher income groups 
resulted primarily from the absence of attractive investment incentives in 
small fragmented markets and the unwillingness and inability of Haile 
Selassie's government to acquire adequate investible surpluses through 
taxation and to plan sensibly for their allocation. The Revolution 
has resulted in large confiscations but, as yet, carefully-planned 
reallocations have not been implemented. Social overhead capital in 
Ethiopia has tended to be expensive, pays off only in the long run and 
has often amounted to excuses for gleaming, status-enhancing projects - 
what Galbraith terms the "edifice complex", the prime motivation for 
the enactment of many of Ethiopia's symbolic laws (see Chapter Three). 
Small, labour-intensive and piecemeal but carefully-planned infra­
structure components are needed in the future. Prior to the Revolution, 
there was too much investment in the wrong kinds of human resources. 
Education, for example, largely ignored agricultural, vocational and tech­
nical peeds while offering an upward mobility to the privileged
l6few, most of whom became unproductive, urbanised bureaucrats.
Theories of economic growth held sway in the West during the 
late 1950s and much of the early 1960s, and they are now criticised 
in the academic literature as particularly fragile and removed from 
reality. Many Western1 'experts' and more than a few Ethiopian policy­
makers were trained during the ascendancy of these theories and 
continued to attempt to apply their formulae through 1973* viewing 
all other aspects of development as prior conditions or subsequent 
results, as either given or exogenous. Growth theories assume that 
all growth is good growth; the question of what should grow and for 
whom is deemed irrelevant. A single goal which is relatively easy to 
measure, an increase in real aggregate production, is to be pursued.
For example, W. Arthur Lewis once advocated a redistribution of 
income in favour of the "saving class" in order to promote growth, 
thus reviving the spectre of mercantilism in the Third World. There 
is now a broader acceptance of the notion that low incomes retard 
development processes by hampering consumption rather than by limiting 
savings; the margin between production and consumption (savings) can 
be increased more rapidly and less brutally by increasing production 
rather than restraining consumption. The key growth theory variables
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are massive capital injections, usually in the form of a modern tech­
nology which is not adapted to Third World labour supplies. Capital 
is allocated throughout the economy on the basis of a rough guess 
termed the incremental capital/output ratio, and computers are often 
called upon to compile endless input/output tables and solve an 
infinite series of quantification problems. These problems are 
created by the competing econometric models that will remain empir­
ically unproved, so long as the margin of error in Third World stat­
istics exceeds the benefits claimed for particular models and 
extreme socio-economic fragmentation flies in the face of an assumed 
general equilibrium. Anything which cannot be quantified-conveniently, 
such as political processes, an economic or military dependence, or
the impact of law, is ignored, and a ’neutral1, facilitative framework
17of private law is tacitly assumed.
If these models are so fragile and unrealistic, it is indeed 
fortunate that they do little more than entertain their devotees; 
recommendations are seldom embodied fully in development plans and 
are almost never effectively implemented against the wishes of power­
ful interest groups. As we shall see, a classic example of this 
process was to be found in Haile Selassie’s Ethiopia. The major 
reason for the popularity of economic growth theories in pre-Revol- 
utionary Ethiopia is that they purport to be value-free; they posed 
little threat to the maintenance of a political power based on feudal 
social structures, since they require no fundamental social or 
political changes. This Ethiopian 'development strategy', based as 
it was on existing institutions and markets, hindered productivity 
increases and the resource reallocations necessary to improve 
the living standards of the entire population, particularly since 
many of the crucial investment decisions were not subjected to 
meaningful centralised control. Attempts at import substitution 
left the country with small-scale and inefficient producers who 
added little value to the imported materials and components that 
claimed a large portion of foreign exchange earnings. Ethiopia's 
experiences thus bear out Dudley Seer's assertion that■ economic growth 
may strengthen the dynamics of underdevelopment (supra) ; investments 
prescribed by growth theories may make existing activities more 
profitable and generate temporary income benefits, but these benefits
S o
are soon absorbed without sustaining growth yet serve to freeze 
existing social stratifications. Donald Levine argues that, in 
Haile Selassie’s Ethiopia, "new forms of wealth and power ^ rovide7
. • . new bases for competition and conflict, processes which tend
18to be structured along lines already laid out. • . ."
Modernisation theories, devised by non-economists, have focused 
on social and political changes, in reaction to the manifest short­
comings of growth theories. Some of them, for example, emphasise 
genuine and radical health and education reforms, as a counterweight 
to the preoccupation of many economists with "productive” investment - 
an uncritical transplantation of Western experiences. Restating(an 
emphasis upon the segregation of economic activities from their 
traditional setting, a commonly-expressed goal of Western sociolo­
gists
is to explain how men build a type of industrial scciety when 
their objectives, their forms of social relationships, and 
their personal experiences are all fashioned by a pre-indust­
rial society; how the past creates the future. 19
A socio-political formulation, based on Parson’s ideas, sees
modernisation as ”a process of progressive penetration of the values of
elites into the total society or, alternatively stated, a progressive
20inclusion of the population in the institutional order." This 
definition ignores the possibility that elites may not possess 
modernising values - both traditional and modernising elite groups 
are found, in conflict with each other, m  Ethiopia. Related criteria 
of change are typically: from traditional to a scientific technol­
ogy; from subsistence towards commercialisation and specialisation 
in agriculture; from human and animal power to machines manned by 
wage-earners; and from farm and village to urban life. Other changes 
include "simple" authority systems giving way to bureaucracies, 
ideologies, political parties and free elections, the secularisation
21of society and "the infusion of a rationalist and positivist spirit." 
That many (but by no means all) of these changes will occur eventually 
in Ethiopia and elsewhere is certain; their relation to the overall 
development process is never precisely delineated by modernisation 
theorists, however, and they may be causes, effects or even 
spuriously correlated with develonment.
Harold Brookfield argues that modernisation theories have develop­
ed within the comfortable world of a Dr. Pangloss: dynamic forces
are necessarily external to traditional societies, modernising 
patterns will be imposed from above and stubborn resistance overcome, 
and achievement-oriented elites will then proceed to mobilise their 
society. We will argue that the application of these kinds of 
assumptions with regard to the future course of events in Ethiopia is 
excessively naive. Modernisation theories tend towards diachronic 
snapshots of traditional society and the desired end-product of change 
(a Charles Atlas theory of development) without a description of 
the often painful transition processes. The end-product turns out 
to be, somewhat suspiciously, a carbon copy of the Western urban, 
industrial and, usually, democratic society of the theorist, com­
plete with its own Protestant Ethic. These criticisms can also be 
applied to theories of a legal modernisation, as we shall see.
Rather than rely on exaggerated notions of an Ethiopian xenophobia, 
we wi11Nsimply point out that, unlike many politicians in European- 
colonised Africa, Ethiopian elites possessed sufficient cultural 
self-confidence to give modernisation theories short shrift. To 
a limited extent, this is unfortunate: once Westernised teleological
assumptions were found wanting, some theorists have recently taken a 
more relativisitic view of specific cultural constraints to develop­
ment, focusing on the role of social and political change in expanding
the range of choice of individuals, groups and the state, and in
? 2promoting new methods of resource allocation and distribution.”
An offshoot of modernisation theories is the concept of instit­
ution **building, the battle cry adopted by the U.S. Agency for International 
Development in Addis Ababa (while peasants were starving in Wollo 
Province). If institutions are defined as repetitive behaviour 
patterns circumscribed by norms, the relevance of law, particularly 
the definition and control of individual responsibilities through 
administrative law, to this development theory immediately becomes 
apparent. The main problem is that theoretical preoccupations with 
leadership, doctrine, programme, resources, internal structure and 
"linkage variables" result in a neglect of more important questions 
such as which institutions are actually needed and how and in which 
order they can best be created. It is probably true, in Ethiopia and
82
elsewhere in the Third World, that
the inability of governments and non-governmental organisations 
' to perform adequately the necessary functions in economic
institutions represents the largest single proximate bottleneck 
to achieving rapid economic growth. 23
Which are the■"necessary functions", however? The problems and
potential associated with an Ethiopian institution-building will
be discussed in Chapters Five through Seven.
Despite serious drawbacks, the development theories that are
most relevant in Ethiopia's present situation fall broadly under the
rubric of structural transformation (rather than simply building nev;
institutions) and include analyses of Latin American underdevelopment
by Celso Furtado, Demas, Keith Griffen and, to a lesser extent,
Andre Gunder Frank. For example, Furtado argues that (prior to the
recent repressions) in Brazil, "the liberty enjoyed by the minority
in our society is paid for by delay in general economic development,
2hf
hence is at the expense of the welfare of the great majority."
So, one answer to the questions posed supra is that freedom of speech 
may be truncated or, more typically,never allowed to emerge in 
the first place, as the price that must be paid for a rapid socialist 
development. Once freedom of speech has been extended, however, 
even in so symbolic a form as a .Third World constitution, government 
invites itself to bear the burden of proof - a favourite lawyer’s ... 
concept - of demonstrating both a real antithesis of this freedom and 
development, and a record of substantial development gains. The 
point Furtado is making is that Brazil has recorded impressive 
economic growth and achieved some of the goals set by elitist 
governments concerned with enriching the consumption patterns of a 
privileged minority. Brazilian governments are, however, unwilling 
and unable to. transform systems of production and distribution so 
radically as to achieve the conditions necessary to the widescale 
diffusion of new technologies and a meaningful import substitution. 
The declining value of the real incomes of Brazil's lower strata 
is ameliorated by the creation of a few more jobs and enforced 
through the brutal suppression of opposition. The consumption 
patterns of a Westernised minority and the instability of export 
markets and international economic relations make the economy and 
the state progressively more dependent, vulnerable and unstable.
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Except for substantial economic growth, Furtado's abstract description
also serves to characterise Haile Selassie’s Ethiopia; temporary
controls over chronic instability were exerted at the expense of
2S
structural changes. * As we shall see, Ethiopia's revolutionary 
regime is utilising many techniques, including legal ones, in an 
attempt to reverse the effects of these kinds of policies. It may be 
more fruitful to compare Ethiopia with some Latin American states 
than with other African states: they share quasi-feudal social
structures, farming peasantries, vigorous traditional cultures and . 
the absence of a direct twentieth century European colonisation.
"In the main"# Myrdal argues, the obstacles to rapid economic 
expansion are "rooted in the inefficiency, rigidity and inequality 
of the established institutions and attitudes, and in^the
26
economic and social power relations embodied in this framework."
Some of the aims of stiuctural transformation theories that are 
listed by Demas are relevant to Ethiopia: decreasing the degree of
"dualism" and dependence (see Chapter One); eliminating "surplus" 
labour through high productivity employment; replacing subsistence 
production with national markets; increasing the shares of GDP 
accounted for by manufacturing and non-traditional services - in 
responseVto changes in the structure of demand; expanding inter­
industry transactions within the economy; and decreasing the share ■ 
of GDP that is imported, especially the proportion devoted to con­
sumption goods. Three common concerns pervade these aims and 
transformation theories as a whole, which are also echoed in classical 
Marxism. First, Third World economies are seen as disjointed and 
poorly-articulated: disequilibria - resulting from low labour pro­
ductivity and savings ratios, the rapid growth of the population and 
the use of capital-intensive technologies - create a situation in 
which such income as is generated fosters inflation and..unemployment 
simultaneouslyr'-and’'-projected increases in savings and investment 
are never realised. It is submitted that this is an accurate (albeit 
abstract) picture of Haile Selassie's economy. Many Third World 
governments exacerbate these tendencies by applying the extrapolations 
from Keynes that are offered by growth .theorists. The inability of 
economic theory to deal simultaneously with inflation and unemployment 
does, of course, have its parallels in the West although it is even
8A
more difficult to apply the concepts of inflation and deflation where
both capital and labour are chronically underutilised. The Milton
Eriedmanites have not been any more successful, although the human
costs of their policies, such as in Chile, are much greater. They
ignore the interdependence of an orderly growth in the money supply
and stability in the balance of payments on the one hand, and the
structural transformations required by development on the other.
Ethiopia's monetary policy was always extremely conservative under
the Emperor, and the recent inflation can, to a large extent, be
explained by such external factors as petrol price increases and
the increased attractiveness of exporting grain to neighbouring
Arab states. Secondly, transformation theories represent a rebellion
against the conventional development theories that grew out of a
neo-classical utilitarian economics. Like all utilitarian thought,
these theories have evaded the problems inherent in comparing the
values and needs of individuals and groups - as do most legal theories.
Thirdly, it follows that the economy cannot be severed from its
underlying political and social systems. Theories of a structural
transformation attempt to operate upon the loci of power in all their
interrelated dimensions, thereby linking development constraints and
choices to the processes of social stratification (see Chapter One)•
The preoccupation of transformation theories with past processes-
and dependence encourages a cult of uniqueness x^ hich limits theoretical 
27generality, but then every country possesses a unique combination 
of constraints and choices, and theories must be modified accordingly.
C. Development Theories and Contemporary Ethiopia
One such modification concerns the Ethiopian events of 197^ that
amount .to a revolution, both in law and from other social science
perspectives. These events determine, to a.large extent, the range of
future development constraints and choices, yet conventional development
theories contain an anti-revolutionary bias:
The developmental differs radically from the cataclysmic, with 
the latter's delusive appeals to violent action. Development is 
gradual but it is not a gradualness that lends itself as an 
excuse for inaction. It means growth, but it must be growth 
cultivated by unequivocal and constant witness to justice, 
liberty and compassion. 28
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It is difficult to quarrel with so strong a statement, except to argue 
that "justice, liberty and compassion" have always been in short 
supply in Ethiopia, that Haile Selassie’s "gradualness11 bore a strong 
resemblance to inaction (even in the face of starvation) and that 
nonviolent action left traditional elites either unmoved or able to 
evolve new and better modes of exploitation*
Development must be regarded as a discontinuous process, in 
which "violent eruptions represent a different, but equally elemen­
tary, and under certain circumstances, inevitable, type of moderni- 
29zation. • • ." Under certain circumstances, a revolution such as
Ethiopia’s can fuel a "big push" roughly analogous to the-one espoused
by many growth theorists* Keith Griffen argues that:
The government administration cannot be improved unless the 
educational system is altered; educational reform is contingent 
upon increased tax revenues; tax reform is impossible unless 
the political power of the wealthy is reduced and this, in turn, 
requires a land reform. The outcome of such a series of reforms 
is little short of a revolution. 30
This is another oversimplified vicious cycle, but one in which those
who mount a socialist revolution can intervene decisively at every
juncture, as they have both the means and the incentive to do so,
provided problems of political instability can be overcome. The
course of revolution never did run smooth, however, and we will
therefore focus upon that which lies behind Ethiopian phenomena of
epic proportions: the bright and the exciting followed by the hurtful,
the displacement of hope and innocence by fear, despair and cyn- 
. . 31lcism. Needless to say, a revolution’does not, of itself, alter 
modes of production, social strata or the manner in which the goals 
of elites are pursued (see Part II).
Under Haile Selassie, the pursuit of wealth and power was seen 
as a zero-sum game within a closed system, in which winners would 
profit only, at the expense of the losers (see infra). This is 
the antithesis of development as we .have described it; in the long- 
run, the sum of political power can be expanded and the germ of truth 
in growth theories is that capital formation cannot be neglected.
The importance of this process has been recognised since the time of 
Adam Smith, but it is understood only imperfectly. Under Haile 
Selassie’s regime,capital formation was neglected and after the 
“Revolution it has been ignored or deferred because of pressing needs
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for political stability and economic maintenance, as well as for 
ideological reasons. Confiscations, pricing policies and the pro­
jected mobilisation of investible surpluses (see Chapters Six and 
Seven) mean that upper- and middle-income groups will bear most of 
the costs of attempts at Ethiopian development. These policies have 
not had too disastrous an effect on incentives: the wealthiest
Ethiopians were, for the most part, economically unproductive,
while their political productivity within traditional systems was
32not conducive to development.
After the Revolution, steps have been taken to transform the 
structure of the Ethiopian economy, although much remains to be done.
An important threshold question concerns the relationship between 
the efficiency of an evolving economic system and the degree of 
control to be exercised by the State - through, for example,
Habermas’s steering functions. In theory,' the goal is to achieve 
either a given output with a minimum of inputs or to maximise output 
from given inputs. In pursuing these goals, a purely market economy 
tends towards efficiency in a micro rather than a macro sense and a 
command (thorough-planned) economy reverses these efficiencies.
The reality of Third World economies is often otherwise, however. 
Traditional production systems retain considerable vitality, markets 
are fragmented? commands often reflect poor policy choices, political 
priorities frequently override economic ones and, while economic 
activities are thrust upon (often reluctant) states by the paucity 
of resources in the private sector, these states lack the adminis­
trative competence to collectivise large sectors of the economy 
effectively. Of necessity, therefore, most countries have mixed or, 
more realistically in the Third World? pluralistic economies. To. say 
this is not to argue for a theory of ’convergence’ in development 
policies; revolutionary regimes continue to opt for programmatic 
goals which are largely socio-political, and Western-oriented 
Third World governments emphasise economic growth. The former have,
however, encountered serious economic difficulties while the latter
. . .  33 ■experience socio-political upheaval. In Ethiopia, the extent of a
centralised political control over the economy has been augmented under
powers asserted after the Revolution, although the traditional
economics of subsistence continues to hold sway in the rural areas
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(see Chapter Six) and the private sector shows no signs of disappear­
ing (see Chapter Seven). Difficult legal problems relating to planning, 
the management of economic institutions and the interrelation of 
private and public economic laws are described throughout this study.
The new regime proposes to follow a distinctly Ethiopian version 
of Marxism, and there is some evidence which suggests that the develop­
ment experiences of other socialist countries have been consulted, 
although allegations by some journalists that either a strictly 
Maoist or Soviet line is being taken are clearly erroneous. A 
Chinese model of development does, in fact, have a great relevance in 
Ethiopia, although much in China’s experience is unique and imper­
fectly understood - in the West as well as in Ethiopia. A Chinese 
model could be based on Mao’s Ten Great Relations, which include: 
emphasising light industry and agriculture rather than heavy industry; 
a localised use of surplus labour; low profit margins on widely- 
available basic consumer goods; capital accumulation through tax­
ation gather than price controls; capital mobilisation through creat­
ing an effective demand for it; exploring socialist alternatives 
to a bureaucratic direction of the economy and to circumvent the 
bureaucracy generally; and providing a few economic incentives through 
the market mechanism. As we shall see in Part III, most of these 
policy prescriptions are being applied by the Derg, albeit erratically. 
Although the new regime wisely emphasises the dignity of labour, for 
example, in an attempt to overcome traditional attitudes, few 
economic incentives are offered in the urban areas, and differences 
between Chinese and Ethiopian social attitudes and discipline make it
unlikely that Ethiopians would willingly contribute the huge ’’labour
3^investments” prevalent in China.-
For a time, rumours and media reports suggested that a Yugo­
slavian-type of industrial management by workers’ committees would 
be adopted in the recently-nationalised industries of Ethiopia, but, 
in the end,the Derg opted for a tight central control like that used 
in the Soviet Union during- the 1930s (see Chapter Seven). Despite 
similarities between pre-revolutionary Russia and Ethiopia which are 
mentioned throughout this .study, the Soviet development model is of 
little relevance, owing to Ethiopia's smaller size,her slender 
supplies of resources which can be mobilised, and comparatively lower 
levels of political stability, power and compulsion* The high rates
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of savings and investment presupposed by a Soviet model cannot be 
maintained in Ethiopia; and integrated and highly-specialised 
plants with high fixed costs are therefore impossible to construct 
without foreign aid. The most fundamental difference, however, is 
that a humane socialism requires, initially at least, the pursuit of 
basic economic maintenance in Ethiopia, rather than an unbalanced 
growth favouring heavy industry. The levels of food production 
necessary to feed urban dwellers and to maintain rural health and 
morale are still to be realised in Ethiopia, and the primacy of a 
broadly based agricultural development must be emphasised, lest prod­
uction increases in the urban areas serve to freeze traditional
7C
agricultural production techniques.
Agricultural development can release labour for industrial­
isation, is economical in the use of‘capital inputs, and requires 
relatively modest quantities of social overhead capital, Western- 
style entrepreneurship and foreign exchange. It can effect an 
expansion of exports while reducing the reliance on imported 
foodstuffs. The obstacles to an Ethiopian agricultural development 
are numerous and interrelated, however, and only a wide-ranging 
structural transformation, combined with an integrated approach to 
rural development (explored in Chapter Six) offers strong prospects 
for success. Food accounts for two-thirds or more of Ethiopian ■ 
consumption, compared to well below two-fifths in the West, and many 
urgent demands for food go unmet. Expanding agricultural outputs and 
incomes depend upon: favourable conditions for production, such as
good nutrition, health, training, roads, and irrigation; direct 
inputs such as fertilizers, seeds and extension advice; steady incomes, 
incentive goods and the 'correct1 work attitudes; facilitative and 
secure land tenures; and accessible credit and marketing organi­
sations. The crucial variables seized upon by knowledgeable students 
of contemporary Ethiopia concern the. pricing and marketing of agri­
cultural products in the urban areas. Current policies provide 
fairly high price incentives for farmers, but it remains to be seen 
whether the measure of urban solidarity with the peasants, estab­
lished during the Revolution, will extend to an urban willingness to 
bear most of the costs of rural development (see Chapters Six and 
Seven)® At the end of the day, the revolutionary slogan Ethiopia 
Tikdem (Ethiopia F^rst or Forward - see Chapter Four) can only mean
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Agriculture First or Forward - even though resource allocation
36
decisions are made in the urban areas by urban elites.
II. Law
The impression that emerges irresistably from the last Section 
is one of acute theoretical fragmentation; only part-solutions
can'be derived from part-theories, which must necessarily be used in
37 .
an eclectic fashion. This perception is the result of an inabil­
ity to generalise the cultural differences and the social stratifi­
cations observed throughout the Third World, as well as disagreements 
concerning value judgements about the nature of the development- 
process. The desirability, in the context of development, of integrat­
ing localised societies in a meaningful fashion implies the desirabil­
ity of an integration of theoretical insights, and one of our purposes 
is to assess the extent to which a legal perspective can be used to 
promote a greater degree of integration, both in theory and among 
Ethiopian societies.
Development concepts and legal theories are piecemeal and chaotic, 
and any combination of them doubly so, since fundamentally different 
analyses are applied to different problems or to the same problem 
judged from radically different viewpoints. A great amount of 
theoretical reformulation is therefore desirable, yet such an 
endeavour is complicated by the fact that, like development theory,
’’law likes to frame its rules, wherever possible, as if they were
homely truths; or even as statements of fact about the physical 
38world.” The ways in which lav/ has been analysed and deployed under 
Western and socialist (communist party-state)legal theories serves 
unduly to limit its role in Third World development processes.
A brief restatement of these shortcomings in this Section is therefore 
appropriate. As all descriptions and theoretical constructs nec­
essarily contain a plethora of value judgements which are seldom 
39made explicit, the manner in which values are dealt with in law 
and in other social sciences is surveyed in the next Section.
Theoretical speculations about the potential inherent in law, 
the fields of jurisprudence, comparative law and sociology of law, 
have resulted in the same dissensus concerning meanings, techniques 
and goals that characterises other areas of philosophy. While embodying
/I
90
progressive insights, legal Philosophy is best defined as "a chaos
4o
of approaches, to a chaos of topics, chaotically delimited"; our
purpose is to attempt to introduce a degree of order - in relation
to specific development problems. One of the merits of a legal
perspective is that it can be used to pose valuable philosophical
questions concerning development processes and theories- As
E.S.C. Northrup notes,
whenever any facts arise in any subject which bring its trad­
itional theory or methods into question, at that moment its 
problems become philosophical- 4l
Development is fundamentally a process through which beginnings that 
are undesirable to someone, usually a politician, are transformed 
into desired end-products. Extent theories and techniques have not 
furthered this process markedly, yet philosophical inquiries are 
neglected and, as we saw in the last Section, critical theories 
of development have not yet influenced events decisively in most 
countries- Criticisms of legal and developmental concepts presuppose 
better^and worse notions of law and development, the choice among 
them being determined, in practice, by the relevant data, the theor­
ists purpose and the kinds of choices particular politicians are 
likely to make. A jurisprudence specifically relevant to the 
Third World and the problems of development has yet to be formulated, 
although several important steps have been taken. Such a juris­
prudence would pay interesting dividends in the West as well: as
discovery begins with the awareness of anomaly, legal theories which 
purport to be universal would have to be reconsidered in light of 
events in the Third World which violate the exoectations created by
kktraditional theories.
Remembering that definitions are inevitably imperfect and an
aid to,' rather than a substitute for analysis, a useful introductory
definition of law would be of those "acts and institutions the respect
for which is enforced by socially recognized organs in order to
AS
safeguard social cohesion and to develop society". The definition 
emphasises law in action in society, law's primary role in maintaining 
order and its developmental potential. It also circumvents some 
of the vexing questions concerning the status of customary laws, 
which are termed customs or mores by some ethnocentric theorists 
(see Chapter Seven) , many of whom are anthropologists. The precise 
meaning of social cohesion and development are not explained, however, 
and the definition also ignores several important factors: an elite
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can use 1aw as a weapon against other elites and to oppress the 
powerless, as in Ethiopia; descriptions found in law are necessarily 
imperfect predictions of actual behaviour; and some judges and law 
teachers, in Ethiopia and elsewhere, analyse and apply lav/ solely as 
a system of formal rules divorced from social reality.
The latter approach is largely irrelevant to our purposes, 
while an analysis of rules (norms) in their social context can be 
a profitable examination of the raw materials of social control, 
through which demands and pressures are crystallised and harvested 
and resource allocation and distribution schemes are implemented.
The three major approaches used by various legal theorists- - norm­
ative, institutional and structural - are different ways of looking 
at the same social phenomena and should be employed simultaneously 
to achieve the best result: "The concept of norms tends to exaggerate
the consciousness of thought as the concept of structure exaggerates
kGthe regularity of action", while the institutional approach tends 
to the purely descriptive. The injection of political power into 
legal analyses then leads to a view of law as "a halfway thing - part 
principle and part power", with legal and other structures and 
institutions mediating.
A. Jurisprudence
While many social scientists take a highly relativistic view of
values and ethnical principles and neglect normative approaches to
social phenomena, legal positivists and natural law theorists regard
such an approach as so important as to justify the .abstraction of
systems of rules from their social context. These theories merit
study, for they condition (together with Marxism and sociology of
law) the v/ays in which lawyers think about law in the West and in
the Third World. A.M. Honors visualises two v/arring camps engaged in
protracted and inconclusive disputation: positivists, arguing that
legal theory merely delineates the conditions needed to produce law
and the formal characteristics of laws, and natural lawyers, advocat-
•^8ing political or moral ideas within the framework of a legal theory.
In practical terms, however, this contest is an extremely uneven 
one: the positivists have carried the field in the Bar, on the Bench
and especially within those agencies charged with the preparation, 
implementation and enforcement of rules of public (constitutional, 
administrative and penal) lav/. Positivism’s success goes beyond the 
bounds of a mere theory, to give rise to what may be termed the idedU)gy
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of legalism (discussed in the next Section),
. Positivism analyses the laws actually found, positum, and aims,
out of a love of order, to clarify rules and present them in an
orderly fashion. John Austin presented an idealised construct of
l|.g
such a legal system an the nineteenth century, and offered the now 
classic definition of law as the command of the sovereign, subsequently 
described as "orders backed by threats" or "the gunman situation 
writ large." ' This simple definition contains the germ of the operative 
legal theory utilised by politicians, administrators, judges and 
legal practitioners alike in all countries except, perhaps, China. 
Unless rights are both embodied in law and backed by political com­
mitment, the individual is left with the scant comfort that those 
who enforce the laws will not in fact intervene in his course of 
action, that the relevant command is too imprecise to be applied, 
or that his violation of a command will remain undetected.-
To a large extent, such a theory of lav; is inevitable: it oper­
ates to the convenience of those who wield power and meets the needs 
for regularity and certainty, which presuppose hierarchies of auth­
ority culminating in an 'ultimate' authority. Beyond this,positivism 
(like all general theories) offers an imperfect description of real­
ity, although "orders backed by threats" is a strikingly accurate 
picture of the Ethiopian peasants' attitude towards the coercive 
character of central Government's rules. 'This is not to say that 
the peasant feels helpless, however. Since he does not subscribe to 
theoretical assumptions of the supreme power of the State and its 
virtually unlimited capacity to make law, he often feels free simply 
tp ignore state-sanctioned law - and usually succeeds in doing so.
If this fails, the fact that Ethiopian law is personalised, rather 
than the abstract command of a remote sovereign, can be turned to 
advantage: an official can be influenced, bribed or even assassin­
ated, with armed rebellion as a last, resort. Government's expec­
tations of an overall obedience amount to little more than a pious 
hope in Ethiopia, where we see Gunnar Myrdal's "soft state" in action.
There are other defects in positivist theory as well. Basing 
an analysis of an entire legal system on what amounts to an ideal­
ised model of the criminal law has its drawbacks: many aspects of
private lav/, such as contracts and the formation of corporations,
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facilitate and only tangentially regulate relationships between 
individuals rather than commanding that these relationships be 
created (see Chapter Seven). Command is not the only attribute of 
law, which deals with many fact situations merely by qualifying 
them, providing a point of reference, or placing them in a chain of 
cause and effect. Formal legal sanctions are often not used or 
needed; if such non-legal factors as individual socialisation, peer 
group pressure and public opinion do not secure the everyday con­
formity to rules, the coercive resources employed through the legal
50order are soon dissipated. Like much of development theory,
Western positivism contains an anti-revolutionary bias. The limp 
snapshots of a legal system before and after a revolution that are 
offered by, for example, Hans Kelsen, correlate poorly with polit­
ical realities (see Chapter Five).
Analytical jurisprudence, an outgrowth of positivism, makes 
theoretical assumptions which are wholly unrealistic if applied in 
Ethiopia. A fully coherent system in which each part relates con­
sistently to all other parts simply does not exist; there are at 
least four levels of Ethiopian law, and they possess little internal 
coherence (see Chapter One). The equilibrium posited by analytical 
jurists is no more realistic than the one assumed by economic growth 
theorists or others who posit a societal consensus. The notion that 
new legal situations can only be met through deductions '.from old 
premises is an unhappy viewpoint for an analysis of development and
an inaccurate pictiire of a revolutionary regime in the process of
51changing the old premises.
If Ethiopian legal integration, certainty and predictability
could some day be secured along the lines presupposed by analytical
jurisprudence, the resulting law would be "no more human than a
molecular structure” , with "no nationality, no mind and no ends
52
proper to its nature." Law, like development, concerns people, and 
the sterility of positivism and analytical jurisprudence (analytical 
positivism) stems from the attempt to erect barriers between law and 
policy, a refusal to deal with unanalytic "pseudo-concepts” such as 
values and ethics - with what the law ought to be as well, as what the 
law is. The theoretical orientation of analytical positivism is 
based on and continues to draw strength from Hume's brilliant demon­
stration of the fallacy of deriving an 'ought' (a normative statement)
9^
from the 'is' (a purely factual one), which has been bolstered by 
Wittgenstein's distinctions between the normative and factual usage 
of language. Hume's fallacy has been debated over the centuries 
(and is discussed in the next Section), and we should seek to circum­
vent its effect. As development is not, by definition, a present 
fact in the Third World, it can only be an 'ought'; the 'is' of 
underdevelopment certainly exists as a series of empirical facts, 
and the process termed development involves the progressive deri­
vation of an 'ought' from this 'is.' Arguably, then, positivist social 
science theories of development are a contradiction in terms (see
infra)• . __
A final word on the seductive nature of legal positivism ought to 
be recorded before moving on to theories of natural law. Consider
the view of Thurmond Arnold, who was hardly a positivist: i"law is
3b
. . .  a great reservoir of emotionally important social symbols." .
It is perhaps an attractive idea, that Ethiopian and other societies 
can be studied through concrete data found in their legal systems, 
but one which implies an unquestioning faith in law and a high degree 
of social consensus - the legacies of nineteenth century positivism*
To whom are these legal symbols supposedly important? A tiny elite, 
competing with other tiny elites and largely ignoring or even exploit­
ing the rest of the population, as in Ethiopia? While jurisprudence 
generally considers whose interests are embodied in law, an inquiry 
into whose demands are not so represented is even more important 
where underdevelopment coexists with a high degree of social strat­
ification and a low level of political participation.
Echoing the Deontological Jurisprudence of Jeremy Bentham,
William Harvey provides us with another enticing prospect:
The most pressing task which confronts jurisprudence today is 
the development of a viable basis for criticising, evaluating, 
guiding, using, accepting, or ultimately rejecting the positive 
law. 55
Can the 'ought' of development be employed as a critique of the 'is'
of Ethiopian law? How could this be done? We read on:
law is a tool, a technique,, It can be deemed good or bad by 
this amoral test of utility, or appropriateness to whatever end 
may be postulated, to which the law is merely a means. 5&
Law is thus, pure and neutral, a series of empty vessels waiting for
the right policy to come along. Harvey's second statement might find
wide acceptance among Western jurists, but his positivist critique
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of positive law leaves unresolved the issue raised in his first 
statement - the manner in which a critical theory of law could be 
' created. While law operates at the point at which the means and 
ends blend into one another r Harvey purports to distinguish them 
clearly, assuming that the ends are none of his business. There can, 
for example, be no such thing as an unjust law in Harvey's analysis; 
the problem of justice is a moral inquiry barred by his amoral 
criteria, which have been variously termed efficiency, efficacy, 
simplicity and convenience. Like other utilitarians, Harvey ignores 
the difficulties inherent in deriving a general utility from incom­
patible desires, in making the inter-personal comparisons..of desires 
and needs that are necessary preconditions to the achievement of 
socio-economic justice - at least in the eyes of the structural 
transformationists. Harvey's approach thus dovetails nicely with 
those of the economic growth theorists: it says something important,
but only after those ends which are related to development have been
decided upon - ultimately through ruthless competitions for power
57among persons and groups with a multiplicity of goals.
How, then, ought law to be used in order to promote Ethiopian
development? It is, unfortunately, the abundance of answers to this
question which can be derived from natural law theories rather than
their paucity that limits the relevance of the natural lawyer's ideas
to our enquiries. Diverse speculations coexist under this generic
label; natural law has been used as a justification for revolution and
more often, as a bulwark of the status quo, particularly in defense
of existing property distributions. The unifying thread is that all
theorists attempt to discover the ultimate measure of right and wrong,
the pattern of the good life and the permanent underpinnings of law
and its relation to justice. In De Legibus, Cicero echoed Aristotle
by arguing that legal rules were but one aspect of a universal
justice founded on the natural reason possessed by all. Aquinas
also emphasised that the sense of justice is shared by all men;
Grotius saw natural reason as the origin of rules accepted by all
legal systems; Locke and Rousseau found the basis of natural rights
58m  hypothetical social contracts.
Admittedly, natural lav/ continues to influence positive laws 
through the Roman Law, the medieval incornoratxons reflected in, for 
example, canon law and the growth of international law from the
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eighteenth century onwards. Nevertheless, by the middle of the
nineteenth century, an ongoing process of inquiry into legal values
was swamped by positivism, although a modest revival has occurred
in this century as a result of the kinds of motives that led to the
adoption of, for example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
declining socio-economic stability, the expansion of governmental
activity and a growing awareness of the limitations inherent in the
empirical tradition of the social sciences. Most modern theories,
such as H.L.A. Hart’s "minimum content” of natural law and Lon
Fuller’s ’’internal morality” of the legal system, are really attempts
to patch up analytical jurisprudence rather than to create.,the type of
critical legal theory required for a study of social problems such as
development. Many sociological theories of law, and especially
Roscoe Pound's, are grounded in pre-established canons of values in
59the natural law tradition, but the emphasis upon a high degree of 
societal consensus concerning ethnocentric values makes the broad 
application of these theories difficult, particularly in the Third 
World•
It would be much easier to ascertain the potential role of law 
in development if those values associated with development - describ­
ed .in the last Section and infra - could simply be incorporated into 
a definition of the good life or the enduring purpose of law and 
justice, thereby effecting an automatic transformation of the Ethiopian 
legal system. For a variety of reasons, this kind of approach is not 
feasible. There is no agreement concerning the values of development, 
either among Ethiopians or social scientists, just as no comprehen­
sive moral code has ever gained wide acceptance among natural lawyers, 
politicians or judges. Even if such a set of values could somehow be 
established, they might be so vague and subject to qualification ' 
as to be useless, from the standpoint of policy specification.
Natural law analyses produce an uneasy combination of absolutisms 
and theological fiat with fuzzy and even mystical ideas - precisely 
what is found in many development theories. The historical record 
has been all but indifferent to the efforts both of natural lawyers 
and development theorists.t This is largely because even the 
most sensible of policy recommendations are not applied and enforced 
unless it is in the citizen’s, administrator’s and politician's 
perceived interest to do so. For example, Sir Frederick. Pollock
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argues that the "capricious orders of a crazy despot may be laws 
according to Austin’s definition until they are revoked, but if so, 
it is the worse for the definition.Perhaps,  but what practical 
effect does Pollock's confident assertion have; why ought the despot 
to mend his ways (as a criterion of legal validity), so long as he 
gets what he wants? Furthermore and with such partial exceptions 
as Amin and Bokassa, despots are not consistently crazy in Pollock's 
sense: they necessarily permit broad areas of individual freedom and
cloak their capriciousness in regularised forms of law and adminis­
tration. We might wish to agree with Aquinas that law is "an ordnance
of reason for the common good, made and promulgated by him'who has
6l
care of the community” , but the ruler envisaged by Aquinas is 
not of this world but of the next.
Unrealistic as the theories of natural law may be, there is a
manifest need to lessen the grip of analytical positivism on social-
science thinking, to complement formalistic legal criteria with
broader, approaches which take account of development choices and
constraints. Positivism sacrifices the ’ought' to the 'is' and
natural law the 'is' to the 'ought'; a central problem of legal (and
political) philosophy is to discover the means whereby both 'is* and
62'ought' can find practical expression.
Perhaps Marxism can provide solutions to this problem. Marx 
has been claimed and castigated by positivists and natural lawyers 
alike; despite a long creative lifespan and a keen interest in legal 
questions, however, Marx's approach to law was ambiguous in the 
extreme. This ambiguity is reflected by the deep tensions in social­
ist doctrine - and, arguably, within the revolutionary Ethiopian 
regime - concerning the appropriate function of law. If law and 
politics form part of a superstructure dependent upon an economic 
substructure, claims of an independent and impartial law and 
a state existing above and apart from the law are illusory. State 
and law are wholly congruent with bourgeois class interests in 
capitalist society, where rights and duties are nothing other than 
factual relations of political and economic pov/er. After the 
triumph of communism, one criterion of socio-economic development 
becomes the progressive replacement of bourgeois law by a.n "admin­
istration of things", which apparently does not involve the formal use 
63of law.1” Thus far, we have a theory which correlates vrith a
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simplistic Marxian single-barrier theory of development, in which law 
is irrelevant* Socialist jurisprudence is much more complex than 
this, however* In addition to nourishing what became known as the 
doctrine of the "withering away" of law and state, Engels - Marx’s 
intellectual inferior - warned that, as the economic base was only the 
\iltimate determinant of historical struggles, the legal superstructure 
could have a significant influence on the content of that base* After 
the Russian Revolution, Lenin saw the need for administrative contin­
uity and the active use of an elaborate system of alternate rules 
which fostered social change and a political legitimacy and stability* 
The polar extremes found in socialist jurisprudence can be Illustrated 
by the ideas of Pashukanis and Stalin, although contemporary theories 
do not take such extreme views* Adopting a narrow definition of law, 
Pashukanis argued a Marxist orthodoxy: morality, law and state are
necessarily bourgeois forms, which are incapable of renewal under 
socialism because all juridical relations are devoted solely to 
the acquisition of wealth in a capitalist society* Stalin, on the 
other hand, argued that he was merely extending Lenin1 s activist use 
of law to "smash the bourgeois machine" and to strengthen the state, 
as an inescapable precondition to its withering away and as a means of 
minimising the impact of capitalist encirclement and destroying 
capitalist economic activity, lifestyle and consciousness in the 
Soviet Union.^
These theories are obviously irreconcilable; Pashukanis fell 
victim to one of the Stalinist purges of the 1930s» and his ideas 
died with him. While relatively little formal law is utilised in 
China, where unique institutions perform the social control functions 
usually associated with law, other socialist countries now pursue 
what is basically a Leninist policy with regard to the use of law*
This approach is exemplified by a definition offered by Ioffe and 
Shargorodskii:
law is the state will of the politically dominant class 
expressed in the totality of norms protected by the state 
as the class regulator of social relationships* 65
There is a paradox here: although Western economists and lawyers
seemingly adopt Marx’s assumption that economic advances have a
strong and immediate impact on attitudes and institutions located in
the superstructure, their socialist counterparts have not relied
i
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upon this optimistic hypothesis and have used law and the state
66actively, to reshape society and'the mode of production*
A theory of the role of law in development, based on the models 
offered by communist party-states (excluding China) could be con­
structed in the following manner* After a communist party comes to 
power, draconian measures must be adopted to safeguard the crucial 
directive rule of the party; formal law competes with party pro­
nouncements and with the provisos of development plans* Material 
rights will be progressively granted to those who work for a living, 
and thfese rights are guaranteed by the higher productivity of a 
planned economy and by the socialisation of property and production. 
Legal rules will be periodically reformulated to take account of the 
progress made. A H  of law is considered to be public law, a re­
flection of the interest of the state in all social and economic 
activities. Administrative law and the (public) law of contracts 
are the crucial controls used to ensure the fulfilment of planning 
targets. The educative function of law is emphasised and, compared 
to Western legal systems, there is a greater tolerance towards legal 
contradiction and change. Criminal laws and informal tribunals are 
used actively to aim beyond ensuring a mere conformity to law, to 
create the Mnew socialist mantT. This model thus postulates a 
conscious and purposeful involvement of law with politics, economics
and social organisation in a manner far removed from the positivist
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traditions applied in social democracies or welfare states.
Thus,
the present is justified as both a means to the achievement of 
the future and as a process of liberation whose characteristics 
already foreshadow those of the coming order. 68
The schema we outline presupposes a committed socialist regime, 
and would have been inconceivable in Ethiopia prior to the Revol­
ution. As some of the stated goals of communist party-states are 
broadly consistent with the values of development we have discussed, 
a socialist model of law and development, when fully elaborated, 
offers some guidance as to what the law ought to be. If we also 
incorporate the ideas of Karl Renner, Marxist jurisprudence offers a 
thoroughgoing critique of the role of law in capitalist society; 
critical theories concerning the part law plays in socialism as it is 
actually practiced are much less well-developed, however* Other
1
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serious issues remain to be considered# Are the ’oughts9 posed by 
this model the appropriate ones in the context of Ethiopian develop­
ment? Can a military regime introduce the political presuppositions 
of the model? Could the necessary laws ever be promulgated, communi­
cated, propagandised, implemented and enforced? Could the whole 
mechanism bf .a socialist development model ever be made to work in 
Ethiopia?
B# Comparative Law
The last two questions bring us into the realm of comparative 
law, which concerns itself with some of the difficulties- inherent in 
transplanting legal models, rules and values from one society to ano­
ther. Comparative law is a method of study rather than a theory. 
Whenever we analyse legal systems which are not our own, we neces­
sarily pursue them comparatively; the unknown can only be assimilated 
through comparisons with the known. Ethiopians are necessarily 
comparativists, since much of the legal system is not theirs - in 
the sense that it has been recently imported from abroad or embodies 
values of Ethiopian cultural groups to which the observer does not 
belong. Thus, the dream of some comparativists, the unification of 
law among states, has yet to be achieved within the Ethiopian state: 
diverse customary laws, traditional state-sanctioned laws, Western 
imports and recent, socialist-influenced proclamations continue to 
coexist (see Chapter One).
. Comparative law can be defined as tfa composite of social
knowledge of positive law91, occupying an intermediate position between
the knowledge of particular laws and institutions and the universal
knowledge that jurisprudence and sociology of law claim to provide.
The comparative approach is therefore a potentially useful aid in' the
elaboration of the middle-range theories we are seeking. In practice,
comparativists are not attempting to devise a new natural law or .jus
gentium, but a .jus inter gentes, a common language and meeting ground
among jurists and an improved but necessarily imperfect understanding
69of the common good*
This is not to suggest that much arid conceptualism cannot be 
found in comparative law writings, and the defects found in much of 
development theory - a questionable scientism and unwarranted 
generalisations from Western experience - are also present. Many
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comparative lawyers are seemingly unaware of the fact that rules and 
institutions with the same names often perform different social, as distinct 
from legal functions, and those with different names can perform iden­
tical functions. Some comparativists have concluded that: "Like must
be compared with like; the concepts, rules or institutions under comparison
must relate to the same stage of legal, political and economic develop- 
70ment.” Adopting this approach, we would be forced to admit that it
is impossible to analyse, in a comparative fashion, the impact of Western
or socialist laws on Third World development processes.
The tools employed and conclusions reached by comparative lawyers
are often outdated, however, and they serve to conceal rather than
illuminate similarities and differences relevant to development theorists
and other social scientists. Since Montesquieu‘wrote of the difficulty
of making comparisons, industrialisation, urbanisation and improved....
communications have resulted in the partial harmonisation of socio- \
economic lifestyles in the West that has, however, been accompanied by
processes of political differentiation. While the capitalisms of various
Western states seem to function equally well under rules and institutions
which differ considerably from a juridical point of view, such widely
differing countries as France and Haiti are deemed to be closely related
within a ’family* of law, derived from comparativist taxonomies resembling
those used to study plants or languages. Elaborations of legal families
make the questionable assumption that lawyer’s law i3 easily adaptable
to different cultures and levels of development, just as language adapts
71itself to discourse on any topic.
Much of the law in the Third World has been recently transplanted, 
voluntarily by tiny elites in Ethiopia (and in such countries as Turkey, 
Thailand and Japan) , and a3 a result of European colonialism in many 
other countries. Apart from the promptings of colonial rule, these 
transplantations were motivated by a desire for elegant status symbols or 
by an irrational hope that a country will become Westernised or socialist 
by adopting a new set of laws; there is little meaningful modification of 
rules to take account' of local conditions, since a ’’national” culture - 
and language and legal culture in particular - is expected to adapt itself 
to ’fit* the imported product. That such adaptations are resisted can 
only be expected, and the result is a yawning gap between the law-in-action 
and the law-in-the-books. Western and socialist laws are also laws of
England or France, or Russia or Yugoslavia, functioning in social force-fields
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which differ markedly from each other and from those found in the Third
World. It is only by chance that a legal rule (or political philosophy)
will perform the same function in two different societies. For example,
Bertrand Russell argues that the warm reception of Locke’s ideas when
they were transplanted to France shows that
a philosophy developed in a politically and economically advanced 
country, which is, in its birthplace, little more than a clarifi­
cation and systematization of prevalent opinion, may become elsewhere 
a-source of revolutionary ardour. . . .  In the advanced countries, 
practice inspires theory; in the others, theory inspires practice.?2
The emerging challenge for comparativists is to analyse the anomalies
that occur when Third World governments attempt to implement socialist
and non-Western policies through adaptations of inherited legal systems,
which are Western and positivist. Many avowedly socialist states, including
EgypitT*Somalia and Nkrumah’s Ghana, have largely ignored-uommunist party- —
state 'theories of law, 'planning" and policy' formulationOne reason for'
this i3 that many socialist analyses are properly deemed irrelevant,
devoted as they are to pragmatic and a posteriori justifications of
political struggles and economic decisions in the U.S.S.R. After a few
initial mistakes, it became clear to most Third World leaders that they
could not hope to aim for a simple replication of typical capitalist
73or socialist paths to development. This awareness had led to the emer­
gence of a legal syncretism, a process which will test Western and socialist 
legal theories alike. We therefore argue that comparisons between the 
fruit borne by transplantations into alien environments and the produce 
of the parent stock are extremely valuable for the light they shed on the 
nature of First and Second World legal systems, as well as those of the 
Third World.
A major problem which besets any coraparativist willing to undertake 
such a study i3 that he can only understand a legal system by comparing 
it with the ones he already knows, yet he must avoid transplanting his own 
legal and social values into the system he studies. An American who 
attempted to study Soviet attitudes towards Chinese Law, Harold 
Berman, warns that we lack an intuitive knowledge of Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’a ’’inarticulate major premises'’ in a foreign legal system, and 
that this failing is too often compounded by substituting personal, 
legal and social assumptions. Western comparativists tend to take 
nineteenth century assumptions for granted, viewing law as national, 
rational, and individualist - a positivist view
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of laws, which exist to enable individuals to calculate the conse­
quences of their conduct. These are obviously not the inarticulate 
major premises of the Chinese (or Ethiopian) legal system, and Berman 
may have become aware of this trap only after falling into it some 
years earlier, when ha argued for a union of basic principles in
Soviet and Western law and reduced the differences between systems to
7^questions of technique. What constitutes a "basic principle"
is, of course, open to argument, but our analyses suggest that there
are few similarities among Soviet and Western legal systems, beyond a
practical acceptance of the gross generalisation of law as the command
of the sovereign. The same kinds of problems plague other social
scientists, too:
When we economists, working within ewr tenacious but flexible 
tradition of preconceptions that admittedly are not too badly 
fitted to_our own conditions, suddenly turn to countries with 
radically different conditions, the risk of fundamental error is 
exceedingly great. 75
It is clear that differences among inarticulate major premises con­
stitute a major constraint on the promotion of development through 
the transplantation of laws or social science theories.
To expand on the last point, consider Willard Hurst’s character­
isation of the American legal system:
Because we confided to law the measure of the legitimacy of 
secular power of all sorts and were ready to use law to muster 
and dispose of large resources for fashioning the frame of 
economic and social behaviour, the law held out great prizes for 
men’s strivings. 76
Paradoxically, and in support of Berman’s assertion, this active
use of law find3 numerous parallels in the Soviet Union while in
Britain, for example, the glittering prizes are not primarily allocated
through the legal system or conferred upon those who manipulate law.
In contrast to these three countries, Ethiopia is not a law-ridden
society; state-sanctioned law has not yet cannibalised other social
institutions. A significant dialectic of traditional socio-economic
structures, customs and customary laws on the one hand and state-
sanctioned laws and centralised political power on the other continues.
As in Brazil, for example, a slow organic growth of state-sanctioned
laws remains impossible in Ethiopia, so long as the institutional
transformations and procedural and methodological changes required
to extend this law into the vast ’outback’ are not forthcoming.
Further, the urgency of demands for development does not permit legal
systems to evolve in a leisurely fashion, as they did in the West*
Development is not taking place under existing Ethiopian laws and
institutions, and they must therefore he transformed and new ones 
77created a prion*
C* Sociology of Law
The last paragraph has brought us to a consideration of the 
contribution sociology of law and the concept of social engineering 
can make to an analysis of development processes* Predictably, the 
brief answer is that traditional theories make only a modest con­
tribution, despite the fact that they represent attempts to bridge 
the ideal and the pesitive elements of law - the * ought1 and the 
'is*. We shall therefore pause only to extract those few elements 
which are relevant to a study of law and development in Ethiopia,
relegating a more general discussion.of:sociology of law to the 
78footnote. Dias has termed sociology of law the worst kind of mental
X •
training, consisting as it does of much loose talk leading to platit­
udinous generalisations* All grand social theories of law are 
circulars social forces are used to establish the existence of 
particular forms of law which, in turn, are the primary evidence of 
what the social forces must have been. Developed in America to 
explain American socio-legal problems and utilising a methodology 
borrowed from such fields as criminology and penology, conventional 
theories are culture-bound, imprisoned in the concepts they create 
and have little to say to the Third World* Here i*s but one example, 
from an otherwise careful theorist: "At the most general level, the
function^of the legal system is to distribute and maintain an 
allocation of values that society feels to be right." This function 
is then re-defined as the pursuit of an ethically-determined 
justice, the least obnoxious distribution of deserts to the deserving* 
Only a positivist might quarrel with the assertion that law helps to 
maintain and distribute values, but there is no necessary requirement 
that this distribution be considered just by society as a whole, 
absent such inarticulate major premises as high levels of social 
consensus and political participation* There are many societies, 
such as Ethiopia's, in which underdevelopment coexists with an 
extreme inequality in the distribution of wealth and power. Setting
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aside the thorny problems posed by Marxian "false consciousness11, 
such a situation exists because, inter alia, small and wealthy or 
otherwise powerful elites are able to formulate laws in their own 
interests without having to secure a general consent*
Much of sociology of law concerns social control, although the 
purpose of this activity is usually not stated or deemed to be the 
achievement of a general social equilibrium, which is not evaluated 
critically* Social control receives a fuller treatment in the footnote, 
and typically concerns the application of rewards and punishments - 
sanctions - in order to influence the behaviour of individuals and 
groups* If, as welhave argued, the manner in which people behave in 
highly-stratified societies is a fundamental cause of underdevelopment, 
behaviour must obviously change in certain patterned ways if develop­
ment is to take place* The use of sanctions to influence behaviour 
is thus a prime concern of a law and development study, yet sociology 
of law gives us little practical and detailed advice as to how such a 
process could be made to work* A great deal of socio-legal research is 
therefore needed, and an agenda for research ini:the Ethiopian context 
is explored in the concluding chapter* At present, there is little 
interpenetration of central Government’s laws and other social
systems, and meaningful social control through law is largely impos-
, 81 sible.
Admitting all these defects,the perspective adopted by some
theorists is nevertheless valuables "social action is the primer
datum, • • • the necessary point of validation of the relevant know- 
82ledge" about law* Conscious social forces create rules which are 
made more concrete by socio-legal institutions,but not on a word-for- 
word basis and subject to the intervention of choice, chance and 
structural variations in societies and organisations* It is therefore 
essential to study the interrelation <of law with such other aspects 
of social life as socialisation, control and compulsion, stratification, 
the division of labour, forms of social integration and disinte­
gration i and the reinterpretation and transformation of norms that
results from changes in the allocations of power and prestige and in
83the value hierarchies reflected by the legal system* As we shall 
see, reliable and detailed information concerning these and other 
social variables are often lacking, in Ethiopia in particular and in 
the Third World generally.
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’ The concept of social engineering, first concretely formulated 
by Roscoe Pound, represents a fusion of the techniques of jurispru­
dence and sociology of law* Pound’s jurisprudence focuses on the 
interests of individuals, society and thesbate, ignoring intermed­
iate groups such as companies and trade unions. His. social engin­
eering seeks to satisfy as many of these interests as possible through 
law, consistent with the least sacrifice of other interests. Con­
flicts of interest are resolved under "commonly accepted” value premises 
termed jural postulates, and "justice” is achieved by determining the 
order in which de facto interests - discovered by a ’Ministry of 
Justice1 utilising social science research techniques - are to be 
•recognised. Pound forgets that conflicts of interest receive favour­
able treatment only if they occur among groups who either fall within 
the regime's "ideological bias" or are Essential to its political 
stability; in the absence of a broad social consensus suad political 
participation, these groups are usually extremely small. The most 
that can be said for Pound's jurisprudence of interests is that it 
would work in certain historical periods and in particular areas of 
life - when and where certain values are shared widely, and certainly not 
in Ethiopia. Social engineering also has a control function, which 
is clearly evidenced in, for example, Britain's Welfare State. Us 
Karl Llewellyn notes;
The energy available for social regulation at any given time and 
place is limited. The community must eat, sleep and reproduce; 
it cannot use up all its energies on government. Because of 
this fact, control by law takes on the aspect of engineering.
We rqquire to study the behaviour of the subject-matter of 
control, men in groups], and to invent such machinery as, with 
least waste, least cost, and least unwanted by-product, will 
give most nearly the result desired. 84
This-is, of course, fairly close to the position taken by William
Harvey, supra, and it correlates well with the model of economic
efficiency discussed in the last Section.
Pound has not wanted for critics. Although Harold Laski, for
example, admitted that the business of law was to make the postulates
of society work, he viewed the jural postulates devised by Pound a3
the ethnocentric thoughts of a Nebraska farm boy made good. Most
critics find that social engineering is used as a technology rather
than as a social science or a conceptualisation of rights and duties;
10?
all complex social issues are reduced to questions of efficiency 
and the pursuit of justice obtains little practical recognition.
Many would-be social engineers do not seem to realise that their craft 
differs from mechanical engineering, for example, in that the object 
is not given, but is precisely what must be discussed. Practical 
applications of the theory have met with a decidedly mixed reception 
in the West:
The history of scientific and institutional approaches to con- 
'trolling behaviour gives us little .comfort about the future of 
scientific behaviour control. In many ways we have been better 
served by happenstance than social design. One need only look' 
at the state of our designed institutions today - our prisons, our 
mental institutions and our schools - to question the wisdom of 
social science in social engineering* 85
This argument is similar to those of F.A. Hayek, who contends that 
social engineering, among other factors, gradually converts a self- 
generating or spontaneous order - kosrncs, Adam Smith’s Great Society, 
Popper’s Open Society, the ’’ideal of organised liberty” - into a tot­
alitarian system in the service of some coalition of organised 
interests which manipulates rather than expresses a general 
consent*^ There is a great deal of force to this argument, even 
if we doubt the existence or merits of particular spontaneous orders: 
men have become little more than curable or manipulable objects to 
the social engineer and, if law is regarded as a purely instrumental 
means to consensual social ends (Harvey’s approach), there is little 
reason not to''use it. Society then loses the (admittedly slender) 
protections against the naked play of interests found in the trad­
itional legitimation theories of natural lawyers and political 
philosophers; law abdicates in favour of administration because the 
complexity of government’s welfare responsibilities is deemed to require 
vague and open-ended standards. In this way, political expedience 
and Harvey’s utilitarianism replace the idea of right. Many economy 
ists favour this approach, viewing social problems as indicators of 
the need for a bit of social engineering here and there - as mere 
appendages to the more important processes of economic growth# The 
paucity of genuinely interdisciplinary approaches to development is 
therefore matched by a conceptualisation,of social engineers as
’’moral cretins” making *’autonomous” technical decisions in an isolated
87and subsidiary social science, relevant to little more than the design 
of prisons and schools.
io8
We have nearly come full circle, for all of the criticisms of 
social engineering presented in the last paragraph can be applied, with 
only minor modifications, to the socialist model of law and develop­
ment and to the views of William Harvey. Some theorists have gone so 
far as to argue that, given the partial displacement of positivism 
by social engineering in welfare or social democratic states, the 
manner in which law is used in .these states and in socialist states 
is virtually identical. Both socialist jurisprudence and social 
engineering do attempt to change economic substructures through the 
use of legal institutions backed by state power, yet there are 
important differences between the theories. Social engineers assume 
a high level of societal consensus and utilise tools designed to
introduce incremental changes only, in order largely to maintain a
88'status quo equilibrium. Socialist theorists, on the other hand, 
assume the ubiquity of conflict and direct their efforts towards 
stimulating change in order to advance programatically the aims of a 
state, which represents the proletariat or an alliance of workers and 
peasants and suppresses the interests of the bourgeoisie. As we 
saw in the previous Chapter, however, consensus and conflict coexist 
in Ethiopia (and elsewhere); it is the political predilections of 
the revolutionary military regime that make a Marxist model more 
relevant to Ethiopia, although contributions from Western theorists 
cannot be ignored. Hayek’s criticism remains relevant despite the 
fact that the "ideal of organized liberty" was never embraced by 
an Ethiopian government and that starving peasants, remote from 
central power, are unlikely to attach much importance to such an 
ideal.
 The humanistic values associated with socialist development, and
found in the writings of such leaders as Nyerere and Kaunda,stress
89that men are the ends and not the means of development, and 
that development involves what you do, rather than what is done for 
you. A legal perspective can be used to spell out the tenets of 
a humanistic socialism, by focusing on the inherent contradiction 
between the achievement of individual .political rights and the prog- 
ramatic pursuit of individual and group material rights through the 
development process - a contradiction ignored by most development
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theorists. Since politicians often claim to be pursuing both sets 
of-rights simultaneously, another advantage of a law-in-action approach 
is that it focuses on what politicians actually do, rather than on 
what they say or what social scientists say politicians do.
D. Theories of Legal Modernisation
Both socialist theorists and social engineers assume highly- 
centralised and effective political and bureaucratic systems, advanced 
technology and communications, and.the conscious control of social 
arrangements through a legal system which is differentiated from 
other forms of social control. That these conditions do not obtain 
in Ethiopia makes the application of these theories extremely 
impractical, and many observers have concluded that the fault must 
lie in legal systems like Ethiopia’s rather than in the theories. 
Ethiopia does not have a ’modern* legal system they reason, and a 
legal modernisation must occur so that law can play its proper role 
in development. As we 3hall see, criticisms levied against the 
theories of modernisation in the development process, discussed in 
the previous Section, can also be applied to notions of legal modern­
isation. Imbued with the ideology of legalism discussed in the next 
Section, lawyers assume the type of legal system found in Western, 
urban, industrialised and democratic societies to be the necessary 
endpoint of Third World modernisation; processes. In Chapter Seven 
we argue that the tacit assumptions made by many modernisation theorists 
cannot be applied to Ethiopian law: traditional laws still serve to
negate many state-sanctioned laws, and 'modern' private law 
transplants have not been imposed from above successfully and they did 
not stimulate the business activities they were designed to facilitate. 
There is little firm evidence to support the assumption that a
’highly developed* law, in the Western lawyerly sense, has anything
90to do with development. Capitalist legal systems differ widely 
among themselves and economically developed socialist systems are 
deemed primitive under many of the criteria of legal modernisation 
that we will discuss. Karl Renner’s interesting but largely unsuc­
cessful attempt to prove the irrelevance of lawyer's law to socio-
91economic change is dxscussed m  the footnote.
I
The easiest theories to dismiss are those which see law as
evolving from one state to another; they amount to oversimplified
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ideological constructs analogous to W^W. Rostov’s ’’stages of economic 
growth”. In l86l, Sir Henry Maine held that, in '^ progressive” 
societies, legal modernisation has hitherto involved a movement from 
status to contract, from individual capacities and incapacities 
ascribed by law to a free bargaining over legal relations. A few 
anthropologists have expanded Maine’s assertion into a Third World 
modernisation criterion, forgetting that the rights and duties of, 
for example, wives, shareholders and supplementary benefit recipients 
are determined by their ascribed statuses within Western legal systems, 
and that much of Western law reaches beyond facilitating the bargains 
of individuals to aim at societal welfare and state intervention in 
the economy. Another anthropological perspective, now discredited, 
sees the movement from a "primitive communism” to private property a3 
the stimulus for the creation of Westernised legal rules. Mixtures 
of public and private property exist in all societies, and differences 
in the mix do not correlate with levels of development, however.
Also, what constitutes "property” is also far from clear (see infra 
and Chapter Seven); Margaret Mead, for example, argues that all 
societies recognise a private property inbthe rights to your own name 
and to privacy. Emile Durkheim13 version of a legal evolution is 
from a primitive "mechanical solidarity” to a complex "organic 
solidarity" with a division of labour and the replacement of repressive 
sanctions with restitutive ones. In reality, restitution and repression 
coexist in all societies, independent of the level of economic devel­
opment, although it is possible to argue, under some theories, that 
the extensive use of repression is inconsistent with high levels of 
political development (see Part II). One of the more popular evol­
utionary theories is that of Max Weber, for whom the development of
a formal legal rationality is the basis of the modern state and a
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precondition of capitalism. Weber’s ideas and the implications they 
bear for Ethiopian administrative law are discussed in Chapter Five.
The general defect in all of these evolutionary theories is 
that, even if a rough correlation between development and a few 
overly abstract features of legal change can be found, development 
may be the cause or the effect of legal change, or the correlation 
may even be spurious. The only useful, culture-neutral generalisation 
concerning modernisation is that it encompasses a recognition by
Ill
society and government that law can he made intentionally rather 
than merely found; imperative rules can be uncoupled from the dogmat­
ism of tradition and consciously formulated to serve social ends*
Once tradition no longer serves to legitimate laws, they must be 
produced and justified in accordance with generally-accepted prin­
ciples before they are regarded as legitimate. This change cannot 
be completed in Ethiopia while customary laws continue to hdLd sway in 
the rural areas and Government’s ability to influence rural behaviour 
through law is constrained substantially*
Long lists of legal modernisation criteria have been proposed 
by various Western lawyers, who stress changes in legal institutions 
or concepts, or both**. Geoffrey Sawer’s criteria, for example, envisage 
the establishment of regular and specialised institutions having wide 
authority to make and amend legal rules (legislatures), deciding 
disputes by reference to rules (and courts), ensuring the observance 
of law and the enforcement of court decisions (police and court 
officials), and offering legal advice and conducting cases (a legal
Q-2
profession)* Division of labour tends to be positively correlated 
with development, and we could naively conclude that Ethiopia has a 
"rnddern” legal system, as all of these specialised roles are to be 
found, least in the urban areas. Sawer fails to mention other 
relevant roles, 3uch as those executives and administrators who are 
not directly involved in enforcement. His notion of institutional 
specialisation and differentiation also resembles a Western separation 
of powers, which is viewed as hindering the rapid and effective 
implementation!of policy in socialist countries*
Marc Galanter expressly mentions a separation of powers in his 
more extensive list of modernisation criteria. Agreeing the 
importance of a legislature and a legal profession, Galanter includes 
some modernising concepts among his criteria? uniform and unvarying, 
rather than personalised results which are based on the transactions 
rather than the status of the participants (shades of Maine); 
an orientation towards the universal rather than intuition and the 
unique; consciously purposeful legal rules that can be learned without 
mystical gifts; a monopoly of law within the political system; and, 
a final institutional factor, hierarchical and impersonal legal bureau­
cracies possessing written rules and records which permit reviews of
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decisions. Ethiopia’s legal system is obviously not very ’modern'
if judged under these criteria, but are they the appropriate ones,
from the standpoint of development? Robert Seidman is only half
joking when he says;
Suppose that he ^ Galanter/ had discovered that England, France, 
Germany, the United States and the Soviet Union used a decimal 
system in numbering the sections of their Codes. Would that 
have resulted in his listing £ another? • • * characteristic 
of a modern legal system? 9^
Like some development theorists, Galanter constructs a mythology
i
of modernisation which ignores criteria that fall outside his speciality,
and he transplants conceptual and institutional stereotypes which
represent a reduction of 'modern' legal systems to their lowest
common denominator. The relevance of this kind of reductionism to
development studies is doubtful at best:
The proliferation of societies that share a commitment to 
industrialism, but differ in all other respects, makes one 
wonder whether the idea of modernity has any real substance at 
, all. For it suggests that there never was any necessary link 
among the elements of post-Renaissance European civilisation* 95
We can restate the sound elements found in Sawer's and Galanter's 
theories by arguing that the minimal juridical requirements for a 
progressively modernising legal system are predictability and flex­
ibility, formal or informal - requirements which are not impossible to 
fulfil in Ethiopia in the medium term, at least in the urban areas.
A coherent legal system requires that rules be created, enforced and 
amended in accordance with widely-followed rules or conventions.
Such a process has the effect of de-personalising the legal system 
by increasing its rigidity. Isolated individuals can then do 
little to alter the effect of personally-unfavourable rules or 
decisions, and Myrdal's "soft state" would begin to disappear. Rules 
must become specific in content yet applicable generally, in order 
to guide behaviour, limit discretion and demarcate areas of individual 
and group security and freedom. Both abstract and concrete rules are 
needed, and they must be structured in a meaningful way through some 
logical system of hierarchical concepts or else legal systems lake 
Ethiopia's are swamped by a mass of diffuse and contradictory 
information. It is in pursuit of this goal of systemalisation that 
the techniques of those jurists who are preoccupied with the analysis 
of concepts - and whose services cannot be dispensed with even in 
socialist states - must be utilised. In order to prevent a return 
to an Ethiopian legal analysis which amounted to little more than
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"technical exercises vdthin a normative tradition" (see Chapter Seven) ,
emphasis ought to be placed upon achieving a balance and sense of
proportion among the new regime’s enumerated goals, a step which would
96also improve the predictability of decision making*
From this starting point, it would then be possible to cut
through the thick undergrowth that is Ethiopian statutory law and to
begin; ito transform the institutions that apply and enforce this law
along specifically Ethiopian" lines, remembering the difficulties that
attend any process of legal transplantation* As^the present Ethiopian
legal system is often ignored and produces few predictable results,
changes in rules and institutions would not result in a sudden growth
of instability or unpredictability* In the Ethiopia of 1967,
Robert Sedler remarked that "the fundamental questions of what the
law will be and what institutions administer it remain to be deter- 
97mined*" This statement is, if anything, more true today: the
Revolution >has cast a long shadow over the laws created and applied 
underGHaile Selassie.
IH. Bridging the Gap
Weifhave seen that many of the criticisms that are posed in 
relation to development theories can also be applied to theoretical 
speculations about law, although there are few points of contact - 
among theories about development or law, or between the two groups 
of theories. Different issues are deemed relevant and different 
approaches utilised, and no theorist has much to say that is of inter­
est to the others. To a great extent, this state of affairs is the 
legacy of the manner in which disciplines have 'developed* in univer­
sities since the eighteenth century; colleagues from different 
departments and even within the same department are today unable to 
converse except on a superficial and sociable level. This is silly: 
the boundaries of problems rather than disciplines ought to determine 
the universe of academic discourse.
A. Interdisciplinary Studies
Our brief review of theories of development and law shows that 
a plea for interdisciplinary studies of development prohLems is 
no simple restatement of the obvious: political scientists still
write about political development, geographers about the spatial 
diffusion of innovations, lawyers - if they care at all — tend to
I l k
examine strictly legal criteria, and so forth* The barriers to
genuinely interdisciplinary study are formidable:
Either you penetrate deeply enough * . . into each subject to 
prove reasonable familiarity and competence, or over part of 
the field you simply assert conclusions and apply them to the 
other parts* The former course will be condemned as pedantic 
and prolix, the second as exhibiting ignorance or contempt for 
the alternatives rejected* So the divorce among the experts 
continues, and the ordinary man who wants to integrate his ideas 
is left to fend for himself * Here perhaps is the opportunity, as 
well a3 the excuse, for an amateur with no professional repu­
tation at stake* 98
The last sentence touches the crux of the matter: reputations ~ a
cardinal academic concern - can rarely be established through inter­
disciplinary studies, as knowledge which does not fall into estab­
lished categories can only be the concern of amateurs* Lip-service 
is paid to all social sciences as "repositories of truth as it is 
given to man to know it11, none of them are regularly consigned to
99Bertrand Russell’s ash heap of "enterprises of methodical guessing", 
yet mine is better than yours.
Clearly,£all of human knowledge is imperfect, and each discipline 
thus contains its characteristic truths as well as the imperfections 
inherent in its purposes and methodologies* Once these strengths 
and weaknesses are understood, the strengths of one discipline can 
be used to criticise and to remedy the weaknesses of other disciplines* 
Knowledge about law and development - in isolation or considered 
together - is currently so dispersed as to seem smaller than it 
actually is* It can only be recombined meaningfully through a critical 
interdisciplinary approach,such as the one we are outlining* There 
is no need form Idealist Weltanschauung of development, merely a 
social science inter gentes which parallels the goals of many com­
parative lawyers.
Respite the existence of a few studies indicating that a legal 
perspective has a valuable contribution to make to the solution of 
development problems, most social scientists treat law as a given or 
an exogenous factor - ceteri3 inoognitis rather than ceteris paribus - 
or dismiss it as a development constraint with an irredeemably un­
savoury impact. There are too many lawyers in developing states, 
one such argument runs and, as a consequence, a formalistic legal 
thinking which is antithetical to political and economic development
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tends to dominate both government and the private sector. Many
social scientists believe that this formalistic reasoning is grounded
in an intuition which generates sentimentality, dilettantism and
cynicism - the kind3 of tendencies an ’objective’ social science has
101been trying to expunge since the nineteenth century* Orthodox 
Marxists tend to ignore law, viewing it as a class ideology - the 
world outlook of bourgeois societies which replaced the equally 
despised religious outlook of feudal societies (a change which has 
not yet taken place in Ethiopia). Other, less radical theorists, 
while according law some creative role in the maintenance of order, 
view law as a bulwark of the status quo, a restraint upon-those 
attitudes of effervescence or innovation associated with a "development 
orientation"* This preoccupation with law’s static functions is 
excusable if it reflects a reading of the timeless body of abstract 
principles postulated by most Western legal textbooks,, but it ignores 
the possibility that social control and dispute regulation can be 
made 'to serve dynamic ends, that law can be used actively to promote 
behaviour changes related to development. Social scientists tend 
to be rule-sceptics, but then so do many lawyers, and this scepticism 
is particularly justified by analyses of Third World legal systems.
Collaboration between lawyers and economists is limited, even 
in the Wests
Social sin in the economic sciences consists of imposing rules 
to sort out complicated situations. Social sin in the legal 
sciences consists in failing to work out logically a complicated 
set of rules. 102
One result of this lack of collaboration is that the economist often 
abjures action while the lawyer attempts to ’make do* with instit­
utions which are antiquated from the economist’s viewpoint. Legal 
institutions penetrate the very foundations of economics, providing 
the means by which prices and wages are agreed, business organisations 
formed and the economy directed and controlled. Law also provides 
the core of political data, lending precision to such amorphous 
concepts as power, influence and decision making. Nevertheless, law 
is held in contempt by many philosophers and political scientists, 
the latter believing that law fulfils very few of the objectives
claimed for it, and the former seeing law as a humble, worldly
103obstacle to ascertaining a higher truth. These views can be
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maintained only at the price of having little effect upon the real
world, a situation ifhich would spell anathema for lawyers, impotence
for development theorists, but a quite congenial state of affairs for
some social scientists. We have discussed many potential meeting
points between law and philosophy in the previous Section and will
consider vital interrelations of law and politics in Part II.
It is the sociologists who most often pause to criticise law
and legal theory. This is surprising, since most sociologists (and •
anthropologists) have enthusiastically adopted distinctions and
techniques like those found in analytical jurisprudence - the ones
some lawyers have been trying to circumvent for the last hundred
years, in order to analyse law within its social context. In
Western and socialist countries, statutes and codes are brilliant,
but formal and idealised analyses of human relationships; they are
thus as illuminating as the best of sociology. The fact that Third
World statutes are at best imperfect predictors of behaviour ought
to make them even more interesting to sociologists: the growth of
law-in-action is inextricably linked with the rationalisation of
man’s understanding of social life that is at the core of develop- 
. 10kment.
Prior to the Ethiopian Revolution, analyses of stratified and
fragmented legal systems could have told us much more about Ethiopian
societies than those social scientists who served as Court historians,
described an Ethiopian "ethnic museum", or stressed the "orality"
(as opposed to an anal fixation) of the Amhara as a major determinant 
105of social action. Significant but fairly narrow legal changes
occurring after the Revolution exemplify a transitional period in
which some, but by no means all, of the traditional elites have been
neutralised (or liquidated) and new directions are being tried, while
stratification and fragmentation persist. Once again, the law-in-action
is a record of what groups of people are actually doing, which is far
106more accurate than any amount of journalistic hand-wringing.
B. Legalism and its Remedies
Sociologists make some lawyers restive when they stereotype 
legal aims and methods, client-oriented behaviour and lawyers’ values. 
Like all stereotypes, these have gained credence because they are • 
founded on facts (and common perceptions of ’fact’ among sociologists)
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concerning what may he termed the ideology of legalism. (The inter-
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relation of law and ideology is discussed in the footnote)
Legalism has been transplanted, together with legal rules and as a 
part of legal education, to the Third World* Like other transplants, 
this one has been, fortunately, assimilated imperfectly: legalism is
forced to compete with other indigenous and imported ideologies in the 
Third World to a much greater extent than in the West* There, legal 
positivism and analytical jurisprudence (discussed supra) place 
lawyers in a technocratic role and achieve those legal certainties 
required by a nineteenth century capitalism, in pursuit of Weber’s 
formal and logical rationality* Augmenting the influence of analyt­
ical positivism, legalism has supplied the dominant (but by no means 
exclusive) attitudes and beliefs associated with the practice of 
law in the West* Under it, social relations are seen largely to 
consist of rights and duties determined by the rules and standards 
of legal institutions* Many lawyers regard these institutions as 
differentiated from the rest of the social order: rules, standards
and ideals are constructed and elaborated in a serai-autonomous 
fashion, through rttechnical exercises within a normative tradition11 
as well as in reaction to social pressures*^^
Law does not,of course, exist independent of the real world 
of financial and political support and control; the point is that it 
is a subculture perceived by insiders as possessing its own rules, 
values, 1 science*, history, constraints and politics* Most judges 
and lawyers proclaim loudly that their actions are non-political, 
yet the characterisation and attempted resolution of an issue as a 
legal rather than a political or social problem is an intensely 
political act* They equate the absence of law with a Hobbesian 
anarchy: law is regarded as rational and inherently desirable,
without enquiring too deeply into the socio-economic interests 
embedded in its rules* Like other cults of professionalism, 
legalism reduces all of life to technical problems or administrative 
exercises which can be dealt with on a case-by-case basis* The 
dislike of vague generalities and the analysis of hitman relations 
in terms of rights generating claims and counterclaims lead to an 
intense distrust of such notions as political expedience, the public 
interest and the social good as cloaks for arbitrary action and 
incompetence. To be fair, the acts of governments, groups and
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individuals provide abundant justification for these suspicions*
This cult of professionalism leads ultimately to a vietv of law as
fragmented, complex, changing, detailed and factual, and these
perceptions have, in turn, been cited as examples of C* Wright Mills’s
109"safe, colorless, multiple factor view of causation". While we 
agree that these attitudes hinder legal change and social action 
through law, it should be made clear that they are also a recognition 
of reality: an accurate reflection of the ways in which actors in
legal systems fulfil their roles and an example of the ways in which 
any social system resists the theoretical reduction necessary to fit 
it into a tidy model. Legal systems are pushing in many directions 
at once, a fact which must be dealt with if the interrelations of 
law and development -are to be ^ analysed.
To a great extent, attitudes associated with legal profession­
alism are grounded in the courts' domination of the legal system, as 
it is viewed by the analytical positivists. Learning law from 
decided cases and judicial principles is like a Linnaeus studying 
botany by examining cut flowers only. Law is seen as litigation 
rather than as a programme for living together, and fact-finding, 
administration, the exercise of discretion and the role of custom are 
neglected. Judges, and thus lawyers, are compelled by the rules of 
the game to prove that an essentially irrational legal world displays 
successively better approximations of an ideal rationality. Naked 
judicial expedience has no legitimacy and is therefore replaced by 
the image of an administration of a unified legal system, in which 
judicial interpretations link each decision to the others through 
the fictions of the historical continuity of the common law, the 
unlimited pliability of civil law concepts, or the ability to derive 
concrete legal rules from the writings of Marx, Mao or Muhammad.
So long as good new law is seen to be derived from existing principles 
in a closed system, law, like language, must be essentially conser­
vative, assimilating what happens with that which has already happened* 
This tendency is reinforced by the fact that many lawyers sell their 
services to the highest bidder, thereby serving those with the 
greatest interest in preserving the status quo. Legal systems are 
never entirely closed, however: legislation and administration are
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not only allowed into court, but often deferred to. If a genuine
political force majeure occurs, such as a revolution, lawyers are
often among the first to adapt; new statutes are important parts of
the law positum and the rest of the legal system is transformed as
110effectively as it had hitherto been preserved*
This is precisely what is happening in Ethiopia, where practit­
ioners or legal academics have taken leading military or civilian 
roles in the Revolution. Imported and freshly-created socialist 
orientations are more relevant determinants of their actions than the 
legalism we have described, which i3 but shallowly rooted in their 
legal culture and in Ethiopian cultures generally* We are therefore 
reluctant to reject a legal perspective on Ethiopian problems merely 
because Western social scientists, including lawyers, are preoccupied 
with the ideology of legalism. Certainly the "instant explanations
1]
for all occasions", produced and purveyed by many social scientists,
are no better than those of the legal profession; a rejection of all
of law because of legalism is like a rejection of economics as an
uncritical celebration of private enterprise, of sociology as a tool
for the oppression of the poor, or of political science as conducive
towards the maintenance in power of corrupt elites. Indeed, law
and other social sciences have often played these roles in the past
in Ethiopia, reflecting little credit on anyone.
Having said this, we ought immediately to acknowledge some of
the many ways in which legal studies can benefit from the application
of knowledge derived through the social sciences. Law cannot do
without general views of social structures and particular groups:
constitutional law depends on some theory of the relations 
between government and governed, family law on some theory of 
domestic relations; even so abstract a legal concept as property 
derives much of its content at a particular time from 
^"some qf7^e social values of that time. 112
While the validity of this proposition can be established on the 
basis of our analyses of Ethiopia's legal systems (see Chapters 
Three and Five through Seven) , it emerges even more clearly at a 
historical distance: from examinations of Babylonian,Jewish and
classical Roman legal systems,for example.
A major defect in much of sociology of law is that it works out­
wards, from legal problems towards social science analyses rather
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than placing the two on an even footing. As a result, the substantial 
limitations on the use of law are not properly understood and alter­
natives to law are insufficiently explored. Theories which emphasise 
social stratification and the ubiquity of conflict and change are 
useful antidotes to these conventional theories. Once the image of 
a wholly consensual society is rejected, the pursuit of individual 
self-interest through law is not necessarily in the interests of 
society as a whole, and the 'public interest' becomes an elusive 
creature. Thei: successful settlement of isolated disputes becomes a 
hopeful attempt to regulate ongoing conflict processes. In such a 
society, few legal solutions are permanent and the legal system is 
changing all the time, by the addition and subtraction of rules.
The analytical jurist's image of a legal system as a set of valid 
rules of interdependent normative meanings is replaced by a sequence 
of sets, like those concerned with other social norms and roles. 
Sociolinguistics demonstrates the fallacy of the "ambiguous middle" 
that bedevils jurisprudence and social thought generally. The use 
of the same symbol word in two different senses leads to the false 
identification of, for example, moral 'right' with legal 'right', or 
social 'justice' with legal 'justice'. Useful analogies between law 
and language can be developed, provided they are not pushed too far. 
For example,
one can say an indefinite number of things in one language 
precisely because its rules are definite and its fund of sounds, 
words, and syntax is limited. Indeed, the normative order of 
society represents in a very real sense the language of its 
social relations. 11**
Both Western and Marxist jurisprudence fail to deal effectively 
with practical politics (especially violent politics), the inter­
relation of law, politics and development, and the definitions of 
and conflicts between human rights. Comparative politics can be 
combined usefully with comparative law in an attempt to supply 
these omissions. Progress is not guaranteed by merely choosing the 
'correct' development theories for Ethiopia; it also depends on 
particular decisions and actions taken by real people, and critical 
development theories are thus necessarily rooted in the history 
and social contexts of particular states.
Because legal norms and organisational structures cross-cut 
virtually all other social institutions, they provide fruitful bases
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for holistic studies of development. Law is a reasoning process, 
as are all other social sciences, but it also embraces social mech­
anisms concerned with making decisions \*hich have an immediate pract­
ical effect and with regulating concrete, non-postponable disputes 
arising out of everyday life. Other social scientists could create 
effective decision-making institutions but have never done so, and there 
is no reason why they cannot use law's, provided all of the parties 
understand and sympathise with each other's methods and purposes*
The lawyer's qualifications for interdisciplinary decision-making 
are excellent: he has been trained to function as a generalist, to
peep over the partitions of specialists. For example, Peter Self 
argues that economists ought to play a leading role in the appraisal 
of administrative performance, as their training promotes sensitivity 
towards the interrelatedness of things and counteracts the administrator's 
feeling for the separateness of bureaucratic structures. This training 
can also be alhandicap, Self admits, for if the economist converts 
all bureaucratic outcomes into the common denominators of loss and 
gain, his assessments are too crude and arbitrary to provide 
meaningful public policy guidance. An administrator who receives 
policy advice from an economist must disentangle the economist's 
predictions, which are subject to wide margins of error, from the 
values implicitly assigned to possible outcomes. An individual's 
theoretical predilections are likely to affect the balance of his 
judgment concerning tradeoffs, such as the one that allegedly
liq
exists between unemployment and inflation. Although Self /praises 
economists, we are also left with some pretty strong arguments for 
narrowing their policy-making role. We argue that lawyers can 
perform many of these tasks as well or better, based on their extensive 
experience with the interrelatedness of things, the flexible appli­
cation of standards and, above all, with value judgements.
C. Value Judgements and Development
Given the explicitly value-laden orientation of normative 
approaches to problems, such as law's, those social scientists who 
believe their work to be value-neutral or even value-free criticise 
or, more typically, ignore normative contributions. Their analyses 
presuppose the rigid separation of fact and value, the easy and 
reassuring formula of our intellectual youth that arises'from the need
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to be taught that what we like may not be the same as what we have 
« and that what we have is not always worse than what we think we 
want* True, David Hume and a subsequent empiricist tradition raised 
the cleavage of fact and value to a first principle, but this approach 
is incompatible with critical theories of society and development 
and cannot withstand careful scrutiny from a social science perspective* 
Whether true or false, Hume's scepticism arguably represents the 
bankruptcy of eighteenth century "reasonableness11; in any event, 
he cheerfully ignored it while writing about social problems like 
any other enlightened moralist of his time. At the very-least, 
values such as honesty, integrity, judiciousness, caution and con­
scientiousness are a necessary part of any worthwhile scientific 
or social science inquiry. Rigid distinctions cannot be maintained, 
even in the natural sciences, where values determine what is studied, 
how scientific resources are allocated and the kinds of ideas that 
attract the commitment of the scientific community. The fallacy of 
the "ambiguous middle", discussed supra, encouraged empiricists to 
identify social Science* with natural 'science1* Clearly, however, 
social life is too complex and too vulnerable to human and environ­
mental forces for analyses to be as precise as those of the natural 
sciences;
to eliminate value judgments from the subject-matter of social 
science is to eliminate the subject itself, for since it concerns 
human behaviour it must be concerned with the value judgments 
people made. 116
Black people know that racism is cruel and unjust and the unemployed 
realise that the economic system is harsh and arbitrary; this knowledge 
affects their actions and the thoughts and actions of others. Ideas 
and ideals move people, and there is thus no way to avoid incorpor­
ating knowledge of them into social science analyses. The only
danger is that this knowledge will substitute for rather than comple-
117ment careful observations of what actually happens. Utilitarian 
analyses such as Harvey's can tell us if a particular result is 
economically efficient but not if it is good or just. To determine 
this, albeit in an imprecise, ’unscientific* fashion, we need to 
operate a normative system like law, which takes account of an accept­
ance of the ideals to be approximated (racial tolerance and full
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employment, in our examples) , at least by the political'ly-signifleant 
sections of the community. In this way,law can be used to destroy the 
'ought* and 'is* dichotomy "because the value and the factuality of 
law coalesce in the specified ongoing condition as it moves toward 
its goal." Whether society stops short of or deflects from a goal 
depends upon the strength of the pull of the ought ’. against the
* i *1 Q
inertia of the fact - the 'is', as well as on the outcomes of conflicts 
between the 'ought' under consideration and the other facts and 
'oughts1•
The idea of development is very much the pull of an 'ought'
against the inertia of the fact3 of underdevelopment. Once we
recognise that the growth of real per capita GNP i3 a simplistic
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criterion upon which to judge complex development processes,
we need to find other criteria* These criteria are necessarily
value-laden,as they postulate oughts - varieties of social, economic
and political justice - which are deemed more desirable than
both the 'is' of underdevelopment and other possible 'oughts'.
Conventional social scientists disguise the values they associate
with development as facts, as rationalisations, a3 beliefs about
reality or even as the choice of subject-matter for research, yet
most Third World politicians have no difficulty in penetrating these
disguises^ They treat social scientists as though the latter are
120saying "I prefer" rather than "I know". If they are to have any 
impact, these preferences must be justified persuasively - to politicians 
businessmen and peasants, rather than to academics or foreign 
'experts*.
A spirited advocacy of that which one feels to be right is, 
unfortunately, rare in most social scientists, whose dispassionate 
approaches are frequently mistaken for, and occasionally U3ed to 
conceal, a lack of interest in the practical implications of their 
scholarship. Law approaches the hubject-matter dealt with by other 
social sciences from a different direction. Despite the nonsense 
that has been written about a legal science, law does not purport to 
be scientific; its techniques are the deductive ones of a Euclid 
rather than the experimental empiricism of a Galileo that is only of 
limited usefulness to the social sciences. Law is more flexible 
than science and must therefore be used v/ith care: a lawyer can
choose the material to be considered and from among competing
12k
analogies, while scientists are expected to account for all relevant
materials and are prohibited from using analogies; changes in science
are the result of changes in perceived facts, while law also changes
in response to moral and policy considerations; and legal principles
are induced to decide 'cases’, while scientific cases are part of
the material out of which the principle is drawn or tested. Thomas
COwan has analysed other differences between law and science:
I believe that law contains an immense mass of feeling judgment's 
and I invite the social scientist to study them empirically*
I think that when feeling conflicts with fact the former pre­
vails in the law* The law is thus one of the great counterparts 
of science, since in science the conflict is supposed to be 
resolved the other way* » • • Law is a system for organizing 
and systematizing feeling judgments. * . . It has a whole host 
of techniques for settling disputes on moral bases. It is a 
low-level morality. • • • 121
While philosophers are debating values and manipulating them to
arrive at value/feeling judgments which are often thin and jejeune, \
the legal system implements systems and values and uses them to deal
with the often mundane or messy conflicts of everyday life, rather
than dealing in the scientific and pseudo-scientific generalities
pronounded by other social sciences. Like all of us,lawyers
sometimes use archaic or contradictory techniques, treat circular
statements as though they reveal important truths, and jump to
conclusions which others would not accept, but they also try to
determine the 'better or worse' in a social situation and to justify
their value judgements rationally, in an attempt to legitimate them.
Viewed in this light, the methods employed by natural lawyers are an
intimate part of all legal systems - the search for bridges between
fact and value or, more specifically, between certum (authority) and
verum (reason) • There are strong arguments for complementing -
social science approaches to development with analyses drawn from
law, a flourishing concern with a long history of the more or less
successful and purposeful regulation of behaviour, and an extensive
experience in analysing the precision of concepts, the internal
consistency of models and policies, and the likely consequences of
122policy implementation.
Having stressed the importance of values in social science 
analyses and having detailed some of the means by which they can be 
incorporated expressly, we will conclude this section by setting out at
125
some length those values which ought to constitute the basis of any 
study of Ethiopian development. Our conclusion is that few improve­
ments can be made on the excellent value analyses found in Gurinar 
Myrdal*s Asian Drama, and parallels will be drawn between the problems 
of Ethiopian and South Asian underdevelopment throughout this study.
We shall describe what is essentially an Ethiopian Drama, the mounting 
of economic, social and political tensions, and a .sense of individual, 
group and governmental actions speeding towards a climax which can, 
however, be perceived but dimly. Those values which Myrdal terms 
"modernization ideals" amount to an ideology of development, which 
he variously describes as "almost a national religion", a powerful 
strand of the new nationalism, and the declared goal of development 
planning. Economic development can therefore be redefined as the 
progressive supplanting of traditional values, which are independent 
of or contradict the demands of development, by valuations which are 
instrumental in achieving the end-products of development. This 
definition poses the problem, once again, of the inherent conflict 
between Western individual political rights and economic develop­
ment. Adopting Myrdal*s terminology, these political rights are 
partly independent and partly instrumental and, even if direct 
political repression is avoided, It is inevitable that a growing 
sphere of instrumental values will impinge upon these political 
rights in a manner roughly analogous to what is happening in 
social democratic or welfare states.
Eleven of Myrdal*s modernisation ideals will be reformulated 
slightly in order to increase their relevance to Ethiopia.
1. Rationality must become the cardinal assumption of policy formu­
lation, implementation and enforcement.
2. Flowing from the first ideal are perceptions of the need for an 
effective and overarching development planning.
3. Modernisers expect development planning to secure long-term 
increases in per capita productivity - the prime concern of con­
ventional economists.
4. Levels of living must rise from their present appallingly low 
levels, such as the Ethiopian ones described in the previous Chapter. 
Although many economists believe that this goal must be postponed in 
order to realise the levels of capital accumulation necessary to 
increase productivity, improved living standards are preconditions to 
higher levels of labour efficiency and availability, and to changes in 
skills and attitudes - all of which promote productivity increases.
5. Greater equality in status, opportunities, wealth, incomes and 
living levels must be secured by altering existing patterns of 
stratification* Some economists argue that such an equalisation would
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hinder productivity increases, but the opposite can be argued 
more convincingly, especially in Ethiopia .(see Chapter One) 0 
6* Certain institutions and attitudes must be changed in order to 
raise- productivity and labour efficiency and mobility, to stimulate 
entrepreneurial abilities and equality of opportunity, and to 
promote development generally.
7* A genuine national consolidation must take place. This is an 
especially important goal in Ethiopia, given the numerous fissi- 
parous tendencies that were discussed in the previous Chapter.
8. The achievement of a meaningful national independence is the 
goal emphasised by most Third World governments. In the previous 
Chapter, we analysed the high degree of Ethiopian military 
dependence that makes a mockery of legal notions of sovereignty.
On the basis of analyses presented supra, we argue that the fourth 
through eighth of Myrdal*s modernisation ideals - congruent with 
the primary goals of the structural transformationists - are, if 
anything, more important to an Ethiopian development than they are in 
South Asia.
9. Myrdal offers (a presumably Western-style, political democracy as 
his next modernisation ideal. While this ambition was declared in 
the constitutions and electoral process of both the South Asian 
states and Ethiopia, it has never taken root in Ethiopia (see 
Chapter Three) and those members of the modernising elite who advocated 
it have, been circumvented, isolated or forced into rebellion. There 
is, in fact, little evidence of the zealous pursuit of Western 
democratic values in the Third World, except in a few countries 
located largely in South Asia. Likewise, another of Myrdal*s 
ideals, grassroots democracy, must be altered to be made relevant
to Ethiopia. We therefore formulate a ninth development value as 
the pursuit of an administrative decentralisation, combined with 
the essential (but fairly minimal) degree of local public partici­
pation that is necessitated by policies aimed at promoting a "develop­
ment from below**. These kinds of policies would augment the meagre 
resources available for development activities.
10. Following a socialist model, it is necessary to raise the 
level of social discipline in order to hasten the disappearance of 
the "soft state1' and to stimulate economic activity.
11. Finally, Myrdal mentions value premises derived from his other 
ideals, including a preference for non-discretionary economic con­
trols over discretionary ones. We will follow Myrdal*s practice and 
analyse these valuj^remises as they emerge from discussions of more 
specific problems.
Existing outside of these ideals is a multitude of valuations 
which put them into perspective: some support development and
others are neutral or ambiguous; some inhibit governmental action 
and others are obstacles to development when translated into the 
behaviour of non-participants in the development process.12^ While 
it is significant that he mentions these values when so many others 
have neglected them, Myrdal*s analysis underestimates the strength 
of the desire for political power among certain individuals and 
groups. Those who have power v/ork to keep it and those without
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power pursue it avidly, and where short-run political desires and 
long-term development policies conflict, the former almost always 
prevail. To that extent, political activity is a development 
constraint, but the picture is not so simple. A minimum of political 
stability ;Ls a vital precondition to development, and improved 
levels of living are often (but by no means always) conducive to 
the maintenance of an elite’s political power. Political development 
is instrumental to other forms of development and can only occur as - - 
a result of repetitive political activity. Further discussion of 
these complex issues is postponed to Part Two.
Do Myrdal*s value analyses represent a substantial advance over 
the ideas of the modernisation theorists, discussed supra? We 
would argue that they do. He was one of the first social scientists 
to express personal viewpoints as values rather than as facts.
They are presented in sufficient detail to enable the reader to 
accept or reject them intelligently, having considered persuasive 
justifications. Uncontrolled biases or the "fortuitous and narrow 
political or strategic interests of one country or one bloc" have 
been rejected in favour of what Myrdal accurately terms "the univer­
sal and timeless values that are our legacy from the Englightenment."
He recognises that, in choosing these values, "we are, in a sense, 
taking these nations at their word", and that we are examining what
are, for the most part, the values of the educated and politically
126articulate portion of the population. We could, in facti derive 
these same ideals by distilling many of the voluminous pronounce­
ments made by the Ethiopian military regime under the banner of 
Ethiopia Tikdem (see Chapter Four), although the first and second 
ideals - rationality and planning - are given less recognition than 
they perhaps deserve. The importance of such an ideology of develop­
ment lies in the fact that knowledge of the cruel and unjust conditions 
of underdevelopment moves people. The extent to which this knowledge 
is diffused through ideological or other means determines, to a 
greater extent than is often realised, the nature and degree of 
commitment to - and hence the chances for success of - development
programmes. Knowledge and values belong to individuals rather than 
127to institutions but, once individual choices which promote 
development are made, institutional resources can be used to bolster
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these choices* Myrdal1 s modernisation values come to life when 
applied in policy formulation and implementation and when the public 
begins to demand that government adhere to its professed ideology*
IV. A Tentative Formulation
Having outlined the interdisciplinary approach utilised in this
study, we will proceed to assemble some of the relevant elements of
a law and development analysis. As economics is the progenitor of
development studies, our starting point is a quotation from Paul
Samuelson's popular economics textbook:
Economics is the study of how men and society choose, with or 
without the use of money, to employ scarce productive resources 
to produce various commodities over time and distribute them 
for consumption* now and in the future, among various people and 
groups in societies, 128
Samuelson emphasises the key variables of what is needed - an
129"integrated social science of public choice" - for, as Fredrick
Barth notes, the
most simple and general model (of man in society) is one of 
an aggregate of people exercising choice while influenced by 
certain constraints and incentives , • • • Our central problem 
becomes what are the constraints and incentives that canaliae 
choice, 130
In the context of development, the incentives are the expectations 
of personal, group and governmental benefits arising from a multi­
tude of devel©pment::processes7^an&“theT'cohstraihts consist-largely of 
resource scarcities. The concept of scarcity utilised by economists 
has received inadequate attention from other social scientists. Law, 
for example, rests on the "stubborn facts enforcing scarcity of 
life satisfactions"; a scarcity of resources means that the important 
issues concerning social relations revolve around those institutions 
v/hich allocate them: markets, governmental, social and religious
n *2*1
organisations, and the family. By definition, various social, 
political and economic resources are scarce in relation to the 
material and non-material wants existing within all societies, and 
it is only through a study of relative scarcities that we can draw 
distinctions among underdeveloped and more developed states. In a 
country like Ethiopia, resources are extremely scarce, both in 
relation to those of the more developed states and to the magnitude 
of the problems Ethiopia faces.
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A. Development Resources
Barth's general formulation enables us to visualise various 
types of resources - which are better viewed as flows rather than 
stocks - as interchangeable to a much greater extent than most 
economists,., political scientists and sociologists would have us 
believe. A government can impose wage settlements favourable to 
politically powerful trade unions, upon wealthy but less powerful indus­
trialists, and politically discontented young elites can be bought off 
with relatively well-paid bureaucratic posts. This list could be 
multiplied endlessly,but the point is that levels of political, 
economic or social development vary widely among particular social 
groups, as these levels depend upon the amounts of particular 
resources available and the efficiency with which they are used. 
Deficiencies in one area can be compensated for by transferring 
resources from another, in accordance with perceived (usually 
political) priorities; an economic crisis can be transferred to 
a political arena and vice versa.
These and other transfers are made in the expectation ^of gain 
from exchanges in what may be defined as broad ’markets'* Trad­
itionally, production is seen to be governed by economic markets while 
political markets are preoccupied with matters of distribution. This 
distinction has broken down, however, and the two markets are 
separable_for analytical purpose3 only, lying as they both do at 
the nexus of structure and power. If we define economic resources 
(factors of production) as land, labour, capital, technology and 
entrepreneurship, it is obvious that the state could supply any or 
all of these resources, as in the Adola goldfields which wore mined 
by Haile Selassie's convict labour. The predominantly political
resources are coercion, administrative capacities, legitimacy,
132communication, ideology and penetration* As,,these resources 
may be less familiar than the economic ones, they are discussed in 
greater detail infra* Most individuals and groups in society take 
part in both production and distribution, having incomes and the 
capacity to grant or withhold political participation and loyalty at 
their disposal.
Thus far, we have done little more than flesh out Habermas's 
schema, discussed supras ideally,political steering functions are
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exchanged for revenue from the economic system, while social welfare 
and. related political and material rights, including the right to be 
left alone in some circumstances, are granted by elites in return for 
revenue and public loyalty.Wealth and power - the capacity to achieve 
desired results - stem from the conttol over predominantly economic or 
predominantly political resources respectively; both confer a measure 
of control over the behaviour of others and can be defined in law as 
‘property1 (see infra). In the short run, the pursuit of wealth and 
power seems to be a zero-sum game, in which winners can profit only at 
the expense of losers (see infra) . In outline, we argue that, if 
development - a raising, of the game stakes - is to take place, a 
structural transformation of subsistence and small-scale markets is 
required* Much of the essence of such a process is encompassed by 
what some theorists have termed politicisation: the altering of
exchange relations in economic and social markets, and the penetration 
of rural political and economic markets by national institutions 
established or transformed under law. It would include: social mobil­
isation; the growth of literacy, urbanisation and occupational mobility; 
the channelling of demands through national political institutions; 
expanding productivity through a government-sponsored equalising of 
imbalances in the distribution of factors of production; and the 
monetisation of the economy through a national network of markets* 
Development is the outcome of more numerous and mutually-profitably 
exchanges in broadened markets, which generate a cumulative expansion, 
in the volume of resources. For example, the process of capital 
absorption becomes more fruitful, in terms of promoting development, 
if it takes place within a larger network of interlinked communities,
with differing levels of natural resources and rates of capital accum—  
13*fulation • If this happens, the commercial profitability of invest­
ments can be aligned more firmly with their social profitability, and 
capital can be mobilised in rural areas and channelled away from the 
types of urban investments that confer few social benefits*
The pursuit of wealth and power in the long run is therefore far 
from a zero-sum game, and those who already control resources can,
1 TC
ceteris paribus, expect to acquire new ones. We cannot, however, 
assume that these positive-sum possibilities are apparent to all of 
the players, who are not necessarily resource maximisers. A radical
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growth in resources also means more controllers, and the relative 
positions of the wealthy and the powerful are eroded. If they are 
satisfied with their present positions, they may use their resources 
to staunch the growth of the resources of others or to ensure that 
such growth as takes place will remain firmly under their control.
The effect of these market restrictions on development is obvious 
and, In a highly-stratified society, the poor and powerless can do 
little to alter the manner in which resources are allocated. If 
the wealthy and powerful are willing and able to prevent a progressive 
reallocation of resources, others - often frustrated middle-level 
elites - will attempt to destroy the ceteris paribus conditions of 
production and distribution. Highly-stratified societies are thus 
antithetical to development, if elites can forestall the necessary 
reallocations of resources and the structural transformations of 
small-scale markets. Such transformations and reallocations would, of 
course, reduce the degree of stratification.
B. Law as a Resource
What does law have to do with all of this? The short answer is
that it is a device used by the players for resource allocation and
for communication, education, implementation, legitimation and social
integration. Just as market mechanisms allocate resources within an
idealised capitalist economy, so law allocates social, political and
economic resources in mixed and thorough-planned economies, but in a
far less mechanical way. This interrelatedness of law and economics
has been approached from a different perspective by F.A. Hayek:
the rules of just conduct which the lawyer studies serve a kind 
of order the character of which the lawyer is largely ignorant; 
and . . .  this order is studied chiefly by the economist who in 
turn is similarly ignorant of the character of the rules of 
conduct on which the order that he studies rests. 136
The key feature of resource allocation within economic markets
and through law is that resource use can be severed from resource
control. In law, use is governed by ‘contract* and control by
‘property’, concepts we define broadly in order to encompass
relevant rules of public, as well as private law. Economic, systems
differrlargely in the legal institutions through which they operate,
and in the relationships established among varying mixtures of
137private, group and public property. Particular mixtures are
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basically the result of political choices, canalized by ideologies 
and Social values, between the private or' public coercion that steins 
from control over resources - with an intermediate category of 
organised interest groups which control resources and thus influence 
governmental action. All governments have, with varying degrees of 
enthusiasm, taken up economic activities, and political functionaries 
have been recognised as controllers of entrepreneurial energies and 
capital. ‘Political1 events thus have wide-ranging socio-economic 
effects, and law is increasingly used to fortify the regime in 
power, whose claim upon public obedience is strengthened by the 
growth of political control over resources. Whether thi3 is conducive 
to development depends, of course, on the way in which the resources 
are used; under Haile Selassie, there was no desire to use this firm 
political control over many significant resources to develop the 
economy broadly (see Chapter Three).
Discarding the excesses embodied in the ideology of legalism 
(see supra), development requires that individual, group and state 
actions be both predictable and flexible. Predictability, in a 
dynamic modernising situation, requires that power (property - control 
over resources) be exercised pursuant to a communicated and compre­
hended rule - legality - so that politically-defined policies move 
towards predetermined but programmatic goals (see Chapter Five). This 
process, in turn, presupposes logical sets of rational rule3 which 
reflect a balance and sense of proportion among political goals 
(see supra). Once legality is established in relation to these 
goals, other limitations on governmental power may prove unnecessary 
and even serve as stumbling-blocks to development and to rapid 
policy formulation - with narrow and complex exceptions in the areas 
of human rights; and the control of bureaucratic venality and incom­
petence (see Chapters Five and Eight)? Since policies and priorities 
are going to be politically determined anyway, development cannot 
proceed in the absence of the large reserves of political^power 
needed to implement these policies. Political power is thus a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for an overall development, 
as we shall see in Chapters Six and Seven.
Despite the absence of meaningful legal limitations on the 
exercise of political power in Ethiopia, power was merely conserved
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in a aero-snm game rather than allowed to grow* The fullest exer­
cise 'of centralised and organised political power in the interests 
of development would have infringed the ability of powerful indiv­
iduals to control resources and people, and existing political systems 
could not have managed the conflicts that would have resulted (see 
Chapter Three) • There v/as thus no felt need for a flexible, pre­
dictable and logically structured legal system among traditional 
politicians.
We have argued that the control over resources by the wealthy 
and powerful in a highly-stratified society is antithetical to
development. Much of the Western lip-service towards, and constit-
(
utional protection of, private control over resources must therefore 
be dispensed with in the interests of development in the many Third 
World states that display a high degree of social stratification.
A combination of predictability, flexibility and legality (as we 
define it) could, in any event, provide a measure of individual and 
group protection which is roughly analogous to that found in contem­
porary Britain under an unwritten Constitution. But what of more 
expansive guarantees of political rights and of socialist-inspired 
material rights? In all countries where strong limitations on 
governmental power are absent, including Ethiopia, these rights are 
transgressed or never allowed to emerge in the first place. Inherent 
conflicts among these rights and their relationship to political 
development and development generally are the most difficult issues 
dealt with in this study, and a fuller consideration of them is 
therefore postponed to 'subsequent chapters. For the present, we 
argue that the content of public and private laws and the manner in 
which they are applied (or ignored) accurately reflect the relation­
ships among individuals, groups and the component parts of government. 
These relationships tend to be unequal, as demands which are con­
trary to the political goals of small elites are seldom accorded an 
effective recognition. Law and politics are not severable in 
reality, and politicians have the power to curb the autonomy of the
legal system politically, financially and through recruitment 
and socialisation policies,1 ideology and plain terror. The costs
of such actions, in terms of the loss of governmental legitimacy, are
smaller than most lawyers would like to admit. It therefore makes
13**
little sense to analyse law as an autonomous system, save as a
sounding board for an assertion of individual and group demands.
Although long-run solutions to development problems require the
progressive accumulation of the resources we have mentioned,
individuals, groups and governments must in the short run apply an
optimum allocation of available resources to competing development
policies. As existing allocations can always be improved upon, the
pursuit of wealth and power is never a zero-sum game, even in the
short run. In Ethiopia and elsewhere in the Third World, efficient
allocations have not been achieved by a wholesale importation of
foreign laws and a careless use of public law institutions* If
law is used to promote development in an ineffective manner, both
law and development policies:may become suspect, thereby eroding
governmental legitimacy. Resource allocation through law must ensure
that all available resources are mobilised and concentrated within
those narrowly-determined areas which most constrain development.
Much of the balance of this study constitutes an elaboration of this
argument. Unless social scientists- can ascertain development
constraints and policy alternatives precisely, politicians cannot
make informed choices and lawyers are unable to design effective 
138laws. The lawyer*s role is not a purely technocratic one 
however, as many middle-level policy decisions fall to them by 
default. The role of law in relation to the social sciences is to 
translate macro-policy proposals into detailed working rules. The 
lawyer's concern with individuals and their rights is a useful 
antidote to macro-level social science aggregations of behaviour, in 
which the interests of individuals and groups tend to be submerged 
in a mass of data. Useful definitions of the public interest in 
particular areas can be assembled after striking a balance between 
social science and legal approaches, and these definitions can then 
be persuasively justified to the relevant politicians.
C* Policy Formulation and Implementation
Despite the frailities and fictions we have described, law is
unmatched by other social institutions in its ability to force men to
139define ends and means clearly. The contrast between the explicit
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analysis of values and the technical requirements of law and legal 
drafting on the one hand, and the informal, wishful, fuzzy and some­
times deliberately misleading thinking of businessmen , politicians 
and, alas, many development theorists on the other, suggests that 
law ought to be the focal point for public policy studies and decis­
ion-making. The process of preparing legislation or regulations 
exposes ruthlessly the express and inherent conflicts among competing 
policies and their supporters, and provides an opportunity for 
determining what need not be done, as well as what must be done and 
what can be done. Under conditions of acute resource scarcity, 
it is somewhat comforting to know that, since priorities in the 
elimination of many obstacles, especially attitudes and personality
characteristics deemed inconsistent with development processes, can 
l*+0be postponed. Ideally,by forcing all policies to compete for
resources within one coherent legal process, the essential can be 
separated from the merely desirable. Meaningful cost-benefit 
analyses can only be undertaken if all factors are considered, 
including the consistency of new policies with choices already made 
and embodied in rules. Difficulties in developing and administering 
particular laws often reflect careless policy choices or unresolved 
value conflicts. If an otherwise sensible policy is not or cannot 
be embodied in law, it m s  the risk of being ignored and should be 
reformulated.
It is at the stage of policy implementation where law most
obviously parts company from the other social sciences for, as Portia
noted: "if to do were as easy as to know what were good to do,
chapels had been churches and poor men's cottages prince's pal­
let!aces". Law focuses on doing as well as knowing and, while law . 
cannot impose an entire social order, it can confirm or support, for 
good or ill, both the status quo or a projected new social order. 
Law's role in allocation and implementation is conventionally termed 
social control (see supra), a concept which immediately raises the 
questions: control of whom? for whom? by whom? For example,
legal definitions of private, public and group property help to 
answer the question of \*ho gets what in society. These questions are 
also answered by the development planning process that is based 
upon the state's (often theoretical) command over all of property.
13 6
Social control through planning involves both the allocation of 
resources and the distribution of rewards flowing from resource 
use - a grand attempt at a social contract* By focusing on the prob­
lems of implementation, law forces government to concentrate on 
reality at the plan preparation stage by insisting upon a full spec­
ification of plan targets and necessary resources* Private economic 
activity can also be made a firm part of the planning process through 
legal controls and the design of a facilitative framework of private 
laws which serve to implement long-term development goals. Careful 
choices must be made between less controllable development strategies 
working from the bottom up, including the regulations and incentives 
embodied in private law, and those operating from the top down 
through public law and administration* The former strategy asks 
much of the unorganised and underendowed, but it also tends to confer
legitimacy on.the regime and its policies and to decrease the amount
lV3of coercion needed to maintain political stability. ^ Some mixture 
of these strategies is inevitable as neither, taken alone, can 
obtain the fullest benefit from development processes* (The mixture 
chosen by Ethiopia's military regime is evaluated in Part III). Inherent 
conflicts between the ways in which public and private laws are 
used (discussed in Chapters Five and Seven) amount to significant 
development constraints, in Ethiopia and elsewhere. The situation 
is complicated further when, as in Ethiopia, customary laws which 
are largely beyond governmental control continue to have a sub­
stantial impact - in the area of family law, for example.
It is at the implementation stage that most development plans 
fail. The "economics of development are not very complicated; the 
secret of successful planning lies more in sensible politics and 
good administration*" A major reason for implementation failures 
is the existence of Myrdal’s "soft state";
policies decided on are often not enforced, if they are enacted 
at all and* • • the authorities, even when framing policies, 
are reluctant to place obligations on people . . . .
£ The/ success of planning for development requires a 
readiness to place obligations on people in all social strata 
rigorous enforcement of obligations in which-compulsion 
plays, a:strategic role.’ 1^5
We can add that as resources of compulsion are extremely limited,
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the strategy for their use must he devised with particular care, and 
that law has a major role to play in the elimination of the "soft 
state"*
Ethiopia's experiences with planning mirror the views of
Myrdal, Although experts can debate the fine points of the various
Five Year Plans, the Plans were basically sensible, given the fact
that structural transformation was impossible under Haile Selassie's
regime* Many problems relating to Plan preparation could have been
1A6
dealt with effectively through law, although this was never done*'
The major problem was, however, that Plans were virtually forgotten 
by the bureaucracy as soon as they were published. If a bureaucracy 
is to participate meaningfully in development, its activities must 
be structured around sensible targets and projects specified by 
^orough^development .plans. This, in turn, entails a major admin­
istrative law reform., and the low levels of bureaucratic commitment, 
honesty and competence found in much of the Third World must be dealt 
with creatively. These issues 1/111 be analysed in Chapters Five 
through Seven.
D. Law and Other Political Hesources
It is difficult concretely to describe, the role of law in promoting 
integration, as social science thinking in this area is particularly 
fuzzy. Integration connotes an important extension of the capacity 
of social. systems which results from the broadening of subsistence and 
small-scale political and economic markets - the building of links 
between the centres and the peripheries and among rural areas (see 
Part III) • Media of exchange guaranteed by law - monetisation in 
rural economies, credit, channels of communication, political part­
icipation, access to education and jobs on the basis of merit, trade, 
simple and enforceable contracts, voluntary, cooperative and business 
associations - are needed to encourage the smooth flow of resources 
necessary for development. Unfortunately, in Ethiopia and in many 
other Third World states, a high degree of ethnic, religious and 
linguistic heterogeneity and gross inequalities in the distribution 
of control over resources constrain governmental attempts to promote 
social integration and narrowly restricts the availability of other, 
development-related policy choices* Strong disintegrative forces 
exist in most societies, but Ethiopia is non-integrated even in
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comparison with most other Third World states; internal armed combat 
has been a constant feature in recent years (see Chapter One)* Trad­
itional integrative devices such as conquest, the charismatic auth­
ority of an Emperor, and the progressive Araharisation of‘ an Ethiopian 
national culture and legal system re not designed to promote 
development and failed to secure a high degree of national unity - 
the ultimate prise of social integration* When compared to schools, 
economic systems and so forth, law is a particularly useful integrative 
device: uniformity, a socio-economic equalisation, education, per­
suasion, sanctions, protections and legitimation can be built into 
the same legal rule* A large-scale society necessarily requires 
wide-scale (or uniform) law, yet the stratification and ethnic 
fragmentation of Ethiopian societies find expression in a plurality 
of customary laws and in disparate applications of national laws*
While, for the most part, a homogenous society constitutes law, it is 
possible for law to constitute a new society where pluralism1 is
endemic - where the state exists prior to a national society which
1^7may or may not emerge* A strong state could actively promote 
laws which cut across community differences and offer incentives which 
advance the cause of integration* A national culture and legal system 
could evolve simultaneously, so as to reinforce each other.
Contrary to the assumptions of some analytical positivists, the 
mere-existence of a legal system does not necessarily lead. to public 
acceptance of it or of the regime that promulgates it. If lawmakers 
lack authority in the eyes of the people, as in many colonial 
states, in the China of 1900 to 1930 and in many parts of Ethiopia today, 
the mere existence of law generates instability as well as stability, 
or it is simply ignored. Authority can be defined as legitimated 
power: the ability to make people think that a claim to obedience is
self-evident, which is possessed by businessmen,priests, army 
officers, etc*, as well as politicians* Legitimacy amounts to a 
faith or trust in organisations and procedures, and is thus a 
resource in its own right: fewer resources of other kinds are needed
to secure compliance with directives regarded as legitimate. The Latin 
origin of the term connotes legality or a conformity with law.
Coercion and legitimacy are often used together or as substitutes 
for each other; might makes right and right makes might. This
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dialectic of effectiveness and validity has been a central concern of
1A8modem Western political philosophy, and we have described these 
inquiries as one of the links between an 'is’ of power and an
'ought' of right (see supra). ........
A major distinguishing characteristic of underdeveloped countries 
and a fundamental cause of political instability is the relative 
scarcity both of coercion and legitimacy. Third World politicians 
have relatively little long-term bargaining power, for they have 
little to exchange for mass loyalty. Legitimacy tends to be the 
property of individuals rather than more permanent institutions, and 
it is frequently dissipated by policies which stimulate public 
feelings of governmental injustice and incompetence, or by the 
periodic advent of new regimes with radically different formulae 
of political rule. Many revolutionary regimes, like Ethiopia's, 
squander initial funds of goodwill by failing to implement sensible
policies quickly. These recurrent legitimation crises are manifes­
tations -of the worldwide collapse of traditional legitimation 
devices, such as colonialism and the divine right of kings that is still 
accepted in some parts of Ethiopia today. Once it becomes a rebuttable
presumption, legitimacy can only be fostered and conserved through
. 1^9pragmatic politics and discursive justifications - government by
consent and/or manipulation.
To what extent does the legitimacy of political processes rest
upon the legitimacy of legal systems? Consider the position taken
by many analytical positivists, exemplified by Hans Kelsen:
even from a sociological point of view, only a domination 
considered to be 'legitimate' can be conceived of as a 'State'
• » • • The domination is legitimate only if it takes place in 
accordance with a legal order whose validity is presupposed by 
the acting individuals. 150
Kelsen'a assertions contrast sharply with political realities: 
there are many extra-legal sources of legitimacy, such as revolution, 
ideology, coercion, the politics of charisma or mobilisation, and the 
wise exercise of an administrative discretion unfettered by law. In 
the real world, portions of a legal order can serve to legitimate 
government's actions while other parts stimulate opposition, and 
extra-legal institutions may both be regarded as legitimate and 
make the predictable and flexible decisions necessary for develop­
ment. Kelsen's arguments only become relevant after all of a country’s 
laws have become "positivised":
ik o
when the legitimacy of pure legality is recognised, that is, 
when law is respected because it is made by responsible decision 
in accordance with definite rules, 151
These conditions do not obtain in the Third World or even in many 
sectors of Modern* legal systems, but the advantages , in terms of 
fostering governmental legitimacy, are obvious.
It is easier to deify a legal system than a flesh-and-blood ruler*
A fully elaborated and widely accepted code of laws encourages the 
public to think that their affairs are being handled in a mechanical, 
precise and objective fashion, and to present their demands within 
frameworks established by law. The mere existence of a law then . 
shifts the balance of power considerably against those whose behaviour 
is regulated or prohibited. Individuals and groups may grumble about 
particular outcomes, but they will take care to avoid endangering an 
institutional stability seen to be, on balance, serving their interests. 
A positivised legal system - the progeny of legal positivists — 
therefore postulates the replacement of rule by the few with the 
general will,' mediated through the rule of law rather than a Rous- 
seauian utopia - and positive law acquires the charaeter of a natural 
law. Such a system combines positivism with heavy doses of legalism 
and other Western ideologies (see Chapter Five); it can be main­
tained in a highly-stratified society only if considerable deception 
and self-deception are practised. The positivist’s focus on the 
entire legal order is misplaced: although ah institution which is
not acting in the perceived best interests of politically-significant 
segments of the public loses its legitimacy quickly, there is little 
evidence to suggest that thi3 loss has much of an adverse effect on 
other institutions. Individuals and groups tend to balance
rationally the (sometimes irrationally perceived) advantages and
152disadvantages of each institution. In the context of develop­
ment, particular institutions and demands can be legitimated through 
the careful use of law in resource allocation and policy implemen­
tation (discussed supra) • A legitimating legal system could thus be 
constructed brick by brick, on an a priori basis, if sufficient 
attention is devoted to the*overall structure which will result.
We have already mentioned the partial interchangeability of 
legitimacy and coercion, which involves the use of violence sanctioned
I k l
by the control over other resources (including legitimacy) defined in 
law as property. Although the state may have a monopoly of legitimate 
force, it does not monopolise the other forms of effective coercion 
and inducement that by and large dictate the ways in which legitimate 
force must be used and the effectiveness of its applications. The 
level of effectiveness of governmental coercion is lower than most 
theorists assume, given the relatively small share of total produc­
tivity that even the most repressive of regimes can harness. Coercion 
is not necessarily productive since the losses of all the parties may 
be greater than their gains, especially if long-term political costs 
are taken into account. Coercion does not create law, but It may 
establish an order out of which law emerges - as in Ethiopia (see 
Chapter Five)• Coercion is expensive to organise, chokes the energies 
of those who use it and stems the supply of the information necessary 
to decision making. There is, of course, an inverse relation between
the application vof coercion and the voluntariness of exchanges which
153promote development, yet there is a strong case for using coercion 
strategically and in small doses to overcome major development 
bottlenecks and to raise the levels of social discipline. The 
idea of using coercion to promote development shocks many Western 
theorists, but a reluctance to use it when necessary contributes to 
the perpetuation of Myrdal1 s soft state. Public law is notoriously 
weak when it comes, to limiting and allocating.coercive resources 
and regulating relations between the ’haves1 and the ’have nots’
(see Chapter Five) •
In present-day Ethiopia, it cannot be assumed that the military 
Government possesses a monopoly of legitimate force. Localised 
rebellions and separatist movements often possess a localised legit­
imacy which Government lacks. Armed opposition to the continuance 
of military rule by elements in the modernising elite has at least 
the passive support of most middle-income groups, including organised 
labour (see Chapters One and Four). An inflationary spiral of violence 
and coercion can be the only result of struggles among desperate
men who possess weapons and the determination to use them, in the
15*fabsence of negotiated settlements. Governments are interested 
primarily in their oivn survival, and few coercive resources will
remain to meet the denands of Ethiopian development once the demands of
internal order and of defence against Somalia and Sudan are met* The
continued use of force must inevitably postpone further effective
reforms, as the ’profits’ derived from exploiting a position of power
are consumed by the ’costs’ of higher levels of coercion* Successive
Ethiopian governments have relied heavily on selective doses of coercion,
primarily because central government policies have failed to penetrate
the rural areas effectively. The daily lives of the eight out of ten
Ethiopians who live at least one full day's walk from the nearest road
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have remained unaffected by governmental policies, and the effects of 
coercion have almost always been temporary.
Penetration may be defined as the ability of a government (or other 
organisation such as a multinational company) to extend its authority 
evenly throughout its domain. Politicians seek to accomplish this task, 
in order to make the accomplishment of their goals easier, by employing 
devices such as tax collection, transportation and communication networks, 
state-sanctioned dispute regulation and punishment of criminals, the 
maintenance of order and the general enforcement of laws. The reach of 
government's claims to obedience determines the extent to which a central­
ised legal system can be said to exist and, ultimately, the state's 
territorial boundaries. In underdeveloped countries, the high levels of 
coercion and political and administrative capacity needed to achieve 
that minimum of penetration deemed sufficient to ensure the survival of 
the government greatly limit the range of feasible policy choices 
related to development. Few resources remain which can be used to 
implement rural development programmes and to mobilise people. For 
example, the almost irresistable inducements and penalties which have
been used so effectively in China are simply not available to an Ethiopian
156regime m  the foreseeable future. -
The long-run solution to the problems resulting from low levels of 
penetration involves the accumulation of additional political, adminis­
trative and coercive resources - an ongoing process in which constitution­
al and administrative law can play a major role. The probability that 
bureaucrats will carry out government policies in the rural areas can be 
increased radically through more sensible rules of administrative law and 
political controls over the bureaucracy. Effective resource allocation
1^3
and policy implementation through law v/ill increase the degree of pene­
tration of government policies, both in the short and long run.
Ethiopian governments have made little attempt to communicate state- 
sanctioned norms of private law to peasants and, as a result, the Codes 
promulgated during the 1960s have had virtually no effect in rural areas. 
Even if they had been communicated and comprehended, they would not have 
been used widely. These laws were designed to be facilitative rather than 
mandatory for the most part, and they are not utilised because they fail 
to respond to the needs and desires of Ethiopians - see Chapter Seven.
In contrast to this manifest lack of interest in private laws,
Ethiopia is, like many Third World states, devoting many resources to an 
attempt to extend the.geographical influence of public law. The payoff 
has been very small, however, for at least two reasons. It is difficult 
to implement effectively the chaotic and .unconnected body of laws that 
results from a rough-and-ready formulation of rules conferring broad 
and uncontrolled grants of discretion (see Chapters Three and Five).
These lnws permit bureaucratic inaction or corruption to be substituted 
for vague governmental policies. Existing bureaucratic resources are 
thus used ineffectively,both at the centre and in the rural areas. It is 
much easier for a government to communicate with its bureaucrats than 
with the public, however, and this is one of the main reasons that 
"development from above" policies are preferred by governments with low 
levels of penetration. So far as the public is concerned, government is 
a two-way street: penetration is fostered by participation. If effect­
ive channels of communication - of decision making, political socialisation 
and reasoned propaganda - and participation in the decision-making 
process do not exist or are ineffective, participation takes the form of
ignoring or subverting legal policies and programmes: "Governments
158propose but the masses dispose".
It is not our purpose to suggest that a non-democratic Ethiopia cannot 
develop satisfactorily. In any event, politicians display a marked 
ability to vitiate the democratic aspects of the most carefully-designed 
systems of elections, parties and political rights where a commitment to 
maintaining these institutions is lacking - as in Ethiopia. The military 
regime's stated aim of decreasing the degree of social stratification 
makes meaningful participation at the national level possible for the 
first time, yet the manner in which Ethiopian politics are conducted
1 M
reraains virtually unchanged (see Part II), V/hat is needed are formal or 
informal ’feedback1 channels, through which broad ranges of demands can 
be^pressed and government can ascertain the success or failure of its 
policies, The problem'is that meaningful participation requires the 
ability to exercise control over a modicum of resources, while such 
control is difficult for most to obtain in the absence of meaningful 
participation. Participation can at least broaden the access to in­
formation - one of the bases of power - while an informed public approval 
legitimates both policy decisions and the participation process itself, 
although frustrations and delays are inevitable. A continuum of part­
icipation might includes citizen control - delegated power or partner­
ship with government; degrees of tokenism - public opinion surveys, 
placation, consultation, or merely informing the public of actions 
taken; degrees of non-participation - therapy or manipulation; and ^
public protest - apathy, grumbling, petitions, demonstrations, strikes, \
159subversion and armed revolts. Almost all of the steps taken by 
successive Ethiopian regimes fall towards the bottom of this scale.
Although most politicians in Ethiopia and elsewhere feel themselves 
unable to; tolerate dissent from chosen values and policies, it is in their 
long-term best interest to guarantee, legally and politically, the highest 
level of participation they can possibly bear. Penetration will not - 
advance far without effective channels of communication which run both 
ways between government and the governed, in the absence of unattainably 
high levels of coercion and legitimacy - which would soon be dissipated 
by attempts to counteract apathy and revolts anyway. The goal ought to 
be one of matching the demands for governmental action with supplies of 
sensible programmes which also 3erve to implement the ruling elites 
political goals. If participation is combined with an administrative 
decentralisation and accountability, and with public mobilisation and 
education, a broader consensus ought to emerge to make meaningful contri­
butions to development and political stability, thereby decreasing the 
need for Government to rely on coercion.
★ * * * * *
Mouzelis suggests that:
The study of any social phenomena requires a choice of those of its 
concrete aspects which are most relevant to the problem under 
consideration. This choice, which in a way isolates a part of social 
reality in order to reduce its complexities of observation, determines
\h5
the analytical or conceptual frame of theory: that is, . . .
it discriminates between relevant and irrelevant.properties 
..... 161
V/e have shown that many development, jurisprudence, comparative law, 
sociology of law and legal modernisation theories offer inadequate 
explanations of Ethiopian underdevelopment processes and inadequate 
guidance in the selection of approaches to development problems* V/e 
selected structural transformation theories, portions of growth and 
modernisation theories, and the valuations applied to South Asian problems 
by Myrdal, as offering valuable insights into potential Ethiopian develop­
ment processes. Like law, development has been described as self-conscious, 
goal-oriented and dependent for its precise content on the constraints 
found, and choices made in particular countries. An examination of 
particular historical processes (as in Chapters One and Three) forms 
the basis for critical theories of law and development: national
differences constitute a major constraint on the transplantation of 
theories and laws.
Development is also described as a broadening of subsistence and 
small-scale markets, effecting a cumulative growth in resources.
The concept of property has been defined more broadly than is usual in 
order to analyse the manner in which law attempts to facilitate and to 
regulate control over resources and people, and to stress the large measure 
of interchangeability among resources. Fairly concrete interrelations 
of law, resource allocation and policy implementation are posited, and 
more speculative - but also potentially more interesting - relationships
V
among law, integration, legitimation, coercion,penetration and parti­
cipation are traced. As law is properly identified with power and cupid­
ity rather than with- right reason, its. usefulness in the development - • 
process is limited by the extent to which particular policies can be 
justified pragmatically to the powerful. Our analyses do not add up to 
a general theory, but serve as middle-range hypotheses which tie together 
the rest of this study. The potential effect of law on Ethiopian human 
rights issues, social tensions, conflict and change, and a viable devel­
opment administration will be discussed in future chapters, in order to 
construct alternatives to Governments present reliance on control and 
coercion. This Section is designed to contrast with the preoccupations 
of most developmental economists, social engineers, socialist jurists and,
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in -particular, analytical positivists. In surp, it stresses the relevance 
of law within an interdisciplinary approach to development.
Finally, development is a process of choice - largely of political 
choice - within existing constraints. An important function of law is 
to help to delineate these constraints, and to uarticulate the criteria 
for choice, and to expose them to reasoning, deliberation and, ultimately, 
the test of useu.^^
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Part II: Law* Politics and Administration
Kwame Nkrumah, the Black Star of a resurgent Africa, advised his 
fellows in the struggle for independence to "seek ye first the political 
kingdom . . This aphorism was adopted eagerly, summarising as it does 
the practical philosophy of most politicians. The search for one * s pol­
itical kingdom precedes the developmental one worldwide: while power can
be put to numerous uses, elites most often use it in political competitions -
for fomenting or suppressing instability rather than alleviating poverty
1and social injustice. The effects of exercising this preference are 
made all the more painfully obvious in the Third World by the particularly 
harsh material conditions that are so often blatantly ignored by polit­
icians. To the extent that generalisation is possible, Third World 
leaders may be more cynical, more forthright in pursuing personal ambitions, 
or less skilled in justifying self-serving interpretations of the public 
interest than their Western counterparts. Haile Selassie was certainly 
cynical and ambitious, but he was also pre-eminently skilled in political 
manipulation.
Nkrumah1s dictum could have served as a motto for Haile Selassie,
but the Emperor came into his political-kingdom while Nkrumah-was
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still a schoolboy m  the Gold Coast. The Emperor acted as though he 
perceived few of the political benefits arising from a broadly-based 
development that are stressed by many development theorists. While 
Ethiopia's military government (the Derg) claims to be seeking the polit­
ical kingdom last, if at all, and is attempting to implement many 
development-oriented policies, political processes have not yet changed 
fundamentally. The context of political struggles has changed, but 
primacy is still accorded to the political kingdom: many groups have now
seemingly adopted Mao’s injunction to "fight first the political fight". 
Radical policy changes advocated by non-traditional (but equally small) 
elites are opposed by new alignments of increasingly militant groups.
The style of politics in Ethiopia - the ways in which competing political 
kingdoms are sought - has not changed greatly, however, grounded as it is 
in the preconceptions of competing elites, traditional social structures 
and ethnic antagonisms, the prevalence of patron-client relations, 
the growth of enclaves and a dependence on external supplies of weaponry.
Like many other military regimes and Haile Selassie before it, the Derg 
is trying to practice a politics which excludes Westem-style politicians
and political institutions. Harsh and often transitory political acts 
provoke violent reactions; political power has not been institutionalised 
in Ethiopia and there is thus little incentive for individuals and groups 
to balance up the gains and losses arising out of political processes*
The political benefits that some theorists associate with development 
often do not materialise, and politicians often fail to perceive such 
benefits as accrue Or to regard them as important. Rulers are overthrown 
for reasons other than a failure to promote public welfare, and a polit­
ical career can terminate in spite of, or even as a result of successful 
development policies. We have seen that development is a many-faceted 
and medium- to long-term process , in sharp contrast to the ..often narrow, 
personal and short-term goals of those who are preoccupied with day-to- 
day politics - and with maintaining an often tenuous hold on the levers 
of power. Development goals are by no means fully congruent with the 
political interests of various elites; governments will, therefore, 
actively promote development only to the extent that, and in those areas 
where, it coincides with the interests of ruling elites. This truism is 
often ignored by development theorists, yet it is crucial to an under­
standing of Ethiopian development prospects: as we saw in Chapters One 
and Two, an Ethiopian development can only be realised through the fir£n 
implementation of rational and interrelated policies by an activist 
government. Economic policies are needed which convey politics sensibly 
to the economy and which relax traditional strictures on economic 
activity. In the absence of an Ethiopian consensus, these policy
decisions can only be taken and implemented after rather ruthless
5
competitions for power.
Political interests are therefore both the major engine of and 
constraint upon'Ethiopian development processes and, before other topics 
can be discussed meaningfully, the interrelation of political development 
and development in general must be explored. In Chapter Three, the 
political and public law setting of underdevelopment during Haile 
Selassie*s reign is examined; as Ethiopian.law and politics retain much of 
their pre-Revolutionary flavour, this Chapter is of more than historical 
interest. The background to the Revolution, the ways in which it unfolded 
and the policies and strategies of Ethiopian elites are detailed in 
Chapter Four. Then, in Chapter Five, we examine the impact of the 
Revolution on legal processes and the prospects for political development*^
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As in many other countries, politics in Haile Selassie’s Ethiopia
revolved around the creation and manipulation of a minimal consensus
7
within a group strong enough to ensure personal political survival*
John Bruce has identified Haile Selassie’s "core constituency" as con­
sisting of landlords in the southern "freehold" areas of Ethiopia (see 
Chapter- Six), but other elites who displayed at least temporary and
partial loyalties to the political formula of a Solomonic rule by Shoan
8Amhara were co-opted wherever possible. It was virtually certain that
even the most modest of reforms would have offended this reactionary core
constituency. Few genuine reforms were therefore attempted, and even
fewer succeeded to any observable extent, Ethiopia was, and to a large
extent still is, an extremely small and subsistence political society in
which locally self-sufficient elites bargained on a personal basis behind
a smokescreen of rumour. Nevertheless, Ethiopian societies are intensely
politicalf in the sense that elites attempt to wield a specifically pol-
9ifcical power in all social relations and organisations,
V/hile destroying the power of Haile Selassie’s constituency, the 
Derg is attempting to mobilise a broader power base among peasants and 
the urban poor and has, in principle at least, recognised^some of their 
demands* For the first time, something other than a minimal State inter­
ested solely in its own survival and in the wealth and power of 
a narrow social spectrum has become possible in Ethiopia, It is by no 
-means certain, however, that- political and economic development will be 
secured or that the threat of national dismemberment will even permit 
the pursuit of these ’luxuries'. One thing is clear, however: dominant
-Western social science perspectives on politics are largely irrelevant 
to-what is going - on in Ethiopia today.- Instead of merely symbolising a 
"political breakdown", military regimes are the ’normal’ mode of government 
in many states, and they may even provide the most effective responses 
to the challenges posed by underdevelopment. Governments need not gravitate 
towards the poles of liberal democracy or communist party-state; new 
political configurations may emerge, in Ethiopia and elsewhere, which are 
analogous to Harold Lasswell's "garrison state".^ In particular, 
political parties need not be the sine qua non of participation, mobil­
isation, control and/or repression, and bureaucracies are not always the 
apolitical tools of politicians that can be made more efficient through 
purely technical reforms (see Chapter Five)„
l
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It is, however, an anti-authoritarian thread which runs through
Western social science that most hinders an understanding of political
processes in countries like Ethiopia. For elites in power in the Third
World, development and change are at best subsidiary goals: theirs is
a politics pre-eminently in search of order under conditions of strife,
turmoil and political instability. Nation-building under colonialism
is an obvious contradiction in terms, whether that colonialism is of the
European, the neo-colonial or the internal and feudal Ethiopian variety.
The Derg faces - simultaneously and for the first time - most of the
nation-building problems associated with independence elsewhere in the
Third World. J.K. Galbraith’s characterisation of India as-a. "functioning 
11anarchy" applies with an even greater force to Ethiopia. It is easy to see 
why order and stability are not immediately forthcoming, particularly in 
light .of the collapse of many traditional forms of authority and the 
inexperience of new politicians; the mystery is, rather, how Ethiopian 
societies can continue to function at all. The primary goal of political 
development - in the eyes of politicians in Ethiopia and elsewhere - is 
not to nurture democracy or to liberate the innovativeness of people, 
but to create the preconditions to the effective exercise of authority by 
particular elites.
To some extent, the interests of those in power and the requisites 
of development coincide, since a reasonably stable environment of law and
politics is essential to development planning and to rational economic
12 ...... . .
decisions m  the private sector. The consistent applicaticn of almost
any set of development policies produces better results than the disruption
caused by rapid-fire changes in ruling elites who are venal and/or
more interested in dismantling the policies of their predecessors
than in implementing new ones. For rulers whose sole interest is a
personal political survival - Haile Selassie, for example - political
development begins and ends with acquiring the means of maintaining a
modicum of order, political stability and bureaucratic control. Their
goals are not too different from those pursued by politicians in more
’developed1 states who adopt the policies of a "law-and-order socialism"
or a "conservativism with a social conscience": minimising the rate of
political change for example., rather than maximising production and the
13utilisation of resources. At best, these governments do little to 
hinder economic growth in the private sector, and they may make modest 
attempts to further selected aspects of development - as in Kenya or Sing­
apore, for example.
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The Derg, on the other hand, wishes to sponsor broad socio-economic 
changes and to build a long-term power base, in addition to ensuring a 
short-term political survival. If the Derg hopes to overcome opposition 
to many of its policy choices - particularly those concerning defense 
and internal security, rural and urban land reforms, the nationalisation 
of businesses and a more purposive control over labour relations and 
education - it will have to construct a stronger state. New institutions 
and values will have to be created and old ones adapted or destroyed, 
rather than the mere continuation of centralising tendencies and bureau­
cratic control along the traditional lines that motivated Haile Selassie’s 
policies. A successful transfer of political power from . traditional 
elites, ethnic groups, separatists, urban activists and the Church to 
the nation-state must be effected and a monopoly of force (which is 
recognised as legitimate by a substantial majority) will have to be
lif
acquired. Even while order and political stability continue to elude \
the Derg, it seeks much mores order and stability are regarded as
necessary but not sufficient conditions of political development and
development in general by all modernising Ethiopian elites. Unfortunately,
there is little agreement as to how these aims should be pursued.
Which, if any, of the multitude of political development goals
devised by Western academics are relevant to Ethiopia’s present circumstance?
While a few theorists deny the existence of a strictly political under- 
- 15 ■development or refuse to enumerate the variables of a’ political 
16development, other political scientists postulate the gradual evolution 
of an individualistic and democratic consensus state, which would then
apply social engineering techniques to the gradual amelioration of poverty
I ? .  . . . . . .
and injustice.- To adopt such a view m  this study would only foster
misunderstandings of Ethiopian political processes. These notions about 
political modernisation are variations on themes elaborated within Western 
theories of social change and thus suffer from many of the defects 
we described in previous Chapters. New Ethiopian political institutions 
must, for example, be capable of much more than passively absorbing 
changes which accrue during a "natural" transition from traditional to 
"modern" social processes. Institutions must also have the capacity 
actively to manage and generate the kinds of changes Intended by the 
Derg, to forestall a counter-revolution, and even to maintain an ideo­
logical purity and consistency. Such .a revolutionary transformation of
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most forms of social organisation under the aegis of a stable polity —
the restructuring and institutionalising of conflicts in politically-
acceptable ways through radical redistributions of wealth and power - is
. . 18difficult to achieve under even the most favourable of conditions. 
Nevertheless, this difficult path towards political development is also 
the most likely one for Ethiopia, emerging as it does from, a series of 
policy choices made by the Derg since 197^* Politically, the problem is 
where to make tradeoffs between political survival in the short run and 
in the long run - between, on the one hand, placating powerful enemies 
or eliminating them by fair means or foul and, on the other, by creating 
a new political base to counter the power of dissidents and winning 
general support for good government. A politically-acceptable balance 
between these policies of stability and change might be conducive to 
economic development in Ethiopia, depending on who gains and loses what, 
and how.
Another significant dimension of an Ethiopian political development 
is, in the words of David Apter, "the improvement of the conditions of
19choice and the selection of the most satisfactory mechanisms of choice". 
That group of institutions burdened with promoting change, stability and 
control must follow rational procedures to take a wide variety of rational 
decisions at the right time, and then mobilise the resources j(including 
public support and participation) needed for effective implementation.
While both are important, substantive rationality is to be preferred 
over a procedural rationality because it is instrumental to a broad 
range of development goals and because an appropriate decision can be 
persuasively justified to bureaucrats, political opponents or the public 
irrespective of who made it and how. A fair amount of institutional 
specialisation is required to bring order to complex processes of decision 
and implementation and, in view of the ’irrationality’ displayed by 
Haile Selassie's bureaucracy, new political and administrative institutions 
must be created and the old ones radically modified or destroyed. This 
theme will be discussed in Chapters Five through Seven but, to give one 
general example, institutions performing economic functions ought to be 
structured around the six governmental roles of planner, regulator, 
entrepreneur, change initiator, provider and umpire. These economic 
functions would inevitably be deployed in ways which further a variety of 
political interests, and planners in particular could communicate these 
interests efficiently if they come to acquire the power to dominate .
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and coordinate the activities of others. Low levels of social discipline
and political and administrative efficiency and integrity must be improved
20along the lines suggested by Myrdal, in order to achieve both political 
and developmental goals. Other aspects of political development 
which were sketched at the end of Chapter Two receive additional dis­
cussion throughout this study.
The potential usefulness of law in the clarification of policy 
choices, the marshalling and allocation of political and economic re­
sources and the implementation of policies was also touched upon in 
Chapter Two. What other kinds of links between law and Ethiopian political 
processes can be postulated? In the broadest sense, all of-law and 
adjudication represents a series of political choices, including choices 
in favour of the status quo where the authorities have the power to 
intervene but fail to do so. It is only because of legalism and the nature 
of public opinion in the West that there is any doubt in the matter.
Law cannot be viewed realistically as "perched over a void" if it is a 
basic tool of power exercised in public, concerned with maintaining 
control over individuals and groups and regulating their relations. The 
best means of distinguishing a purely parental, religious, military or 
commercial authority from political authority is the impact of the latter 
on the general public and the fact that political authority could (not
must) be expressed through legal forms: legislation, administrative
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regulations or judicial decisions.
If a businessman or army officer orders a subordinate to do something, 
noncompliance may call forth sanctions and it may even have remote pol­
itical implications. But such an order does not, of itself, affect power 
relations within society and cannot therefore assume.a legal form. If, 
on the other hand, the Derg orders merchants in Addis Ababa to reduce the 
selling price of the grain teff, relations between buyers and sellers are 
altered and the order acquires the force of law, even though it lacks 
the formalities Western jurists might expect. As some type of law is 
involved in all Ethiopian social relations concerned with the distribution 
of wealth and power however (see Chapter One), specifically political 
institutions can only be distinguished on the basis of their powers 
broadly to tax, to spend or to regulate disputes in society. Despite 
its being the most compulsory, comprehensive and formidable association 
in Ethiopia, central Government does not monopolise the sources of power
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and authority (legitimated power) that constitute the basis for exercising
these functions. It merely provides a framework for many - but by no
means all - of the significant competitions for power. This absence
of a monopoly constitutes a distinct limitation on the Derg's political
capabilities and on its use of law to further political interests and
development goals (and on the applicability of Western legal theories).
An equally serious limitation on law’s usefulness in Ethiopia is the fact
that power is often exercised in private. Power is still the personal
'fief’ of its holder and subject to his direct control, rather than,
in many instances, an indirect control through laws made by the powerful
(species of public ’property’ and 'contract' law - see Chapter Two)*
As public law purports to govern access to privileges, and as access to
privilege through Government is the chief bone of contention in contemporary
2<Ethiopia, rapid and radical changes in many public laws are to be expected.
An able analysis of the complex interrelation of law and politics
in the U.K. as a whole concludes that law is both complementary to and
23
a limitation upon political action, in roughly equal measures. While a
study of law in contemporary Northern Ireland inevitably places greater
emphasis on law as an instrument of political, economic and military
domination during periods of disruption, it also encourages the reader to
identify other areas of social life in which the power structure remains
2kin the background and law serves to implement broadly-shared values.
Similarly, there is little overtly political intervention by central
Government in many aspects of Ethiopian social life because politicians
lack the power and/or the interest. Where political intervention cbes
occur, the role of Ethiopian law both before and after the Revolution has
typically been complementary to, rather than a limitation upon politics.
In a few, narrowly-defined areas the exercise of power at the centre has
become subject to fixed rules but, as we shall see, the freedom to harm
others is subject to few restraints under the Derg, provided it is
25exercised m  pursuit of an ill-defmed ’’revolutionary justice”.
The largely complementary relationship of law to politics in Ethiopia
illustrates what S.E. Finer terms ’’the ubiquity of political behaviour
and the paradoxical omnipotence and frailty of the effort to channel and 
• 2 & - •
domesticate it”. Like the Emperor’s political formula or the Derg's 
new ideology (see Chapter Four) , law is a means of political regulation: 
it is theoretically omnipotent, but bound to bend or break under the 
weight of divergent political demands and to change in accordance with 
shifts in the political balance of power. In all societies, legal control
*
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and regulation can only be achieved with a fair degree of success in 
politically-stable areas of social life, but this does not mean that law 
does not serve as a weapon in the battle for stability in a conflict- 
prone society. Law can be used to create, for the first time in modern 
Ethiopia, what J.M. Lee terms the basis of order; "the presence of 
institutions and procedures in which the political community expresses
27sufficient faith, so that there are recognised means of reducing tension".
In theory, the public law institutions that form the basis of the
Ethiopian legal order can be viewed els parts of a continuous process of
inputs, decision making, outputs and feedbacks; constitutional laws
serve as blueprints for goal-oriented and self-legitimating structures of
government while administrative laws fill in the details. Although
constitutional and administrative laws can be pointed to in Ethiopia
before and after the Revolution, they often do not correspond to the
28realities of the exercise of power, and there are a number of gaps and 
weak points (see Chapter Five). These lacunae sire both a cause and 
effect of a paucity of governmental resources and low levels of 
political and administrative purposefulness, rationality and efficiency. 
With regard to decision making, for example, a fair amount of institutional 
specialisation exists on paper, but many Ethiopians view the delegation of 
authority as entailing a loss of power and prestige. Even fairly minor 
decisions were taken by the Emperor and are now made by the Derg. The 
.few devices that permitted the articulation and aggregation of .interests, 
prior to 197** - such els Parliament - were monuments to formalism and had 
little actual influence (see Chapter Three). The Berg is taking steps to 
create institutions which could perform these functions (such as peasant 
and urban associations - see Chapters Six and Seven) , but their effect­
iveness remains to be demonstrated* Although there is a traditional 
right to petition for the redress of grievances in Ethiopia, there is no 
enforceable right to a remedy, which depends upon politically-coloured 
views of the 'equities’ of the situation. The kinds , of demands that will 
be recognised, priorities among those demands, the conditions under which 
groups can organise and the ways in which they can press their demands are 
not clearly specified in law (contrary to the assumptions made by Soscoe 
Pound - see Chapter Two). Haile Selassie strongly discouraged group 
expressions of anything other than adulation and, while an official
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ideology is evolving and acts of terrorism sanctioned by the Derg are 
widespread, only a foolhardy group would expect legal protection.
There is no meaningful public participation in government at the national 
level and channels of communication from the bottom upwards are non­
existent or ineffective. Invaluable feedbacks, which tell government 
how its policies are being received, are therefore lacking - apart from 
private intelligence networks and armed revolts. The reader may have noted
that our brief discussion parallels some of the political development
29criteria described by Gabriel Almond and the input-output analyses of
30legal systems adopted by Robert Seidman; more extensive analyses are
presented at the end of Chapter Five. .
Although descriptions of the formal structures of Ethiopian governments 
provide a backdrop for discussions of politics and development, our inquiry 
cannot stop there. These structures dissolve before our eyes - both before 
and after the Revolution. We shall therefore emphasise overall political 
processes and particular roles performed within and without formal '
institutions, in addition to examinations of a major nexus of ends and
31means in Ethiopia - the point at which politics is transformed into law*
It is virtually impossible to make the conventional Western distinctions 
between policy making (politics) and implementation (administration) in 
Ethiopia. The relevant question in each instance is who commands which 
resources and for what purposes. Of particular importance in this regard is 
the changing nature of power relations between traditional and modernising 
elites and among modernising elites. These questions are explored in 
Chapter Four.
Finally, the ways in which law Is actually used represent what politicians 
do, rather than what they say or what social scientists say politicians
do. In many Western countries, the political values expressed through 
law (and ideology) can be grouped under the headings of order, justice, 
liberty and a large subsidiary category of instrumental or utilitarian 
values. These kinds of values are also reflected in Ethiopian laws, albeit 
in different proportions and with different cultural referents. The 
maintenance of order throtigh the positivist’s 11 orders backed by threats" 
is the primary value associated with law, in Ethiopia and elsewhere; 
differences arise when questions of order for whom and by whom are 
considered.^
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Crude formulations of the concept of law and order are little more
than 'a bulwark for the privileged - including those with small privileges
under Haile Selassie, It is, on the other hand, all too easy for the
Derg to continue to mtionalise repression and tyranny as the only means
by which order can be maintained in a rapidly-changing society, especially
if the Derg is careless of its long-term legitimacy. The balance between
order and change is struck, not by social scientists but by Ethiopians,
This balance has changed radically and rapidly during the last few years;
it is likely that, in the future, it will be based on what people will
put up with. Given the cultural diversities we surveyed, Ethiopians
share a sense of injustice rather than a sense of justice. Injustice,
the recurrence of painful experiences without justification - or a sense
of the means being grossly disproportionate to the ends achieved - is
the motivating force behind dissent and rebellion, the ultimate restraints
on tyranny. Arguments about justice and injustice decisively mould the
face of politics, even in the absence of rival parties or ideologies.
As Barrington Moore, Jr, argues: "The experience of living in society
produces in human beings a distinction between legitimate and illegit- 
33imate authority", John Farrar adds that it -"is easier to condemn 
particular practices as unjust than to produce an articulate and
•xZl
convincing conception of the just". We shall bravely attempt the latter -
in an Ethiopian context - in Chapters Five and Eight, The relatively
short-term values associated with order, compete- for attention in Ethiopia
with the longer-term ideals of justice and liberty that are themselves
difficult to reconcile. Throughout this study, discussions of the legal
means that confer the maximum benefit at the minimum cost will be offered,
but they are subordinated to wider examination of order, justice and




Chapter 3* Haile Selassie's Regime
The long reign of Haile Selassie has been documented and analysed
thoroughly by Richard Greenfield, Christopher Clapham, John Markakis,
1and Patrick Gilkes , and there is no need to replicate many of their
analyses here# These and other political studies
concentrated on the effects of autocracy and patron-client relation­
ships, the rise of the centralised bureaucracy, the gradual elimin­
ation of powerful regional lords, the emergence of central elites 
supportive of Haile Selassie’s imperial government, problems of 
local administration and their relation to development issues, and 
the development of Ethiopia’s rather superficially imposed 
modern legal system. 2
V/e touched on these matters at various points in Chapter One; prior to 
the Revolution, academic analyses were often used to assemble portraits 
of a traditional political system successfully perpetuating and adapting 
itself. Most Ethiopianists neglected the accumulation of political 
liabilities that is inherent in an attempt by a feudal monarchy - fused 
to stratified and fragmented societies and a traditional Church - to 
maintain a grip on political processes late in the twentieth century*
While an appealing analogy can be drawn between Haile Selassie and 
Peter the Great, they obviously ruled in different historical contexts. 
Unlike the Tsar, Haile Selassie took the trouble to create a democratic 
facades a genuine constitutional monarchy could never have come into being 
under the monarchical Constitutions of 1931 and 1955* Democratic instit­
utions,-procedures and safeguards were formally guaranteed by law . in the 
1955 Constitution, but they were so manipulated and violated in practice 
that a traditional oligarchy was able to maintain its power, with the 
support of an increasingly well-educated bureaucracy. The very real 
limitations on. the exercise of a despotic power in Ethiopia were therefore 
almost entirely unrelated to the innovations introduced by these 
Constitutions. In I960, Syoum noted that ’’government organs are not al­
ways what they are intended or supposed to be. • ; ’’essences differ
from form, and m  no uniform way1-’*
Although a passion for centralisation comes naturally to a monarch 
v/ho aspires to absolutism, a virile provincialism has survived in Ethiopia 
to this day, ‘as have the low levels of penetration and legitimacy that 
were discussed in Chapter Two. Haile Selassie’s power stemmed from a 
firm personal control over those valuables which lay within the gift of
the State: land grantst offices, honours and titles, and commercial
concessions. While he fell heir to historical patterns of social 
stratification among the Amhara-Tigre, the Emperor managed to fill many 
of the niches in the upper strata with favoured appointees by allo­
cating State resources in accordance with his personal priorities.
Rivals to Imperial power were then managed by encouraging the powerful to 
control each other, through extensive surveillance and intelligence 
networks and policies of divide et imperia and shum-shir - the rapid- 
fire and unpredictable appointments, demotions., transfers and placing 
of enemies in adjacent positions that hindered the formation of cliques.
The politics of manipulation also have their disadvantages.
In particular cases, powerful nobles could outbid Haile Selassie to secure 
the loyalties of local peasants and lower-level elites. While an element 
of self-interest inheres in all bureaucratic power struggles, the Emperor's 
policies, which actively encouraged administrators to seek to limit each 
other*s power, were not conducive to the establishment of a strong state: 
the pursuit of personal power all but completely displaced the imple­
mentation of Imperial policies. For example, tax revenues are the life­
blood of the strong state Haile Selassie desired, yet the Ethiopian bureau­
cracy collected only,a small proportion of the revenue potentially 
available. Most members of the landed gentry simply refused to pay and 
went unchallenged by administrators, and the money that was extracted 
. from the less affluent was subject, to * deductions' at each level of the 
bureaucracy.
Haile Selassie was extremely intolerant of all types of organi­
sations or attempts at a popular mobilisation, fearing that they would be 
eventually uaed against the Throne. Where authority is completely person-* 
alised, demands which go beyond immediate self-gratification are viewed 
as demands for a change of rulers, and are therefore suppressed or mani­
pulated rather than passively regulated* Except in Eritrea, the political 
parties and agitation associated with independence movements elsewhere in the 
Third World did not emerge in Ethiopia until the mid-1970s. (The struggle 
against the Italian invaders took the form of an Ethiopian-style.guerrilla 
war.) This is not to say that politics did not exist in Ethiopia.; 
they were (and still are),rather, the politics of faction, manoeuvre 
and personalism. They were also totally divorced from pressing develop­
ment issues or a need to appeal to the interests of the peasants. The
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fear of intrigue and betrayal reduced the possibility of permanent pol­
itical cooperation or the exercise of collective responsibility to the 
6vanishing point*
As John Markakis suggests, "Haile Selassie turned the father-child
7relationship into a basic moral justification for his system of rule’1*
The children were not to question what was best for them and State 
institutions did not merely act in loco parentis; they were direct mani­
festations of the parent’s will. This kind of paternalism forms an 
intimate part of what Daniel Levinson terns an "autocratic ideology": 
emperors have long utilised the ethnocentrism, the strident nationalism, 
the anti-intellectualism and the political formula of Solomonic rule 
that are a part of the Amhara-Tigre heritage, and combined them with a 
cynical appeal to what might be termed man's baser motivations, A 
widely-shared political desire to maximise status and power gradations 
within hierrxchic social .structures perpetuated the policies of divide et 
imperia, thereby forestalling an evolution towards the uniform and monistic 
organisations associated with the so-called totalitarian regimes.
As might be expected from a worldly politician subscribing to so 
conservative an ideology, Haile Selassie seldom attempted to acquire new 
powers at the risk of jeopardising a position sanctified by tradition.
Such modernisation as took place during his reign was overwhelmingly 
defensive in character. The absence of a lengthy period of European 
colonialism retarded and blunted the impact of Westernisation on trad- 
tional Ethiopian institutions and, as in countries such as Thailand,. . 
(North) Yemen and Iran, the historic basis of a traditional state sur­
vived intact into the 1970s. Haile Selassie was virtually ‘the only person 
with sufficient authority to introduce innovations, yet he used the 
Solomonic myth as an excuse for inflexibility and inaction, arguing 
that all changes must be rooted firmly in the traditional values of 
Amhara culture. Although tiny modernising elites pressed for substantial 
changes, there was little evidence that peasant rebellions, usually
orchestrated, by provincial elites, embodied demands for modernisation or 
9
development. While many of these rebellions were attempts to force the 
Emperor to revert to traditional practices, others challenged the Emperor's 
right to rule (see Chapter One) •
It was inevitable that some degree of political modernisation should 
come to Ethiopia, and a useful starting point for our discussions is the
l1
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year 1908, when Menelik II began to create the European-style ministries 
that were supposed to perform some of the tasks previously assigned to 
unspecialised courtiers. When Haile Selassie came to the Throne, he 
tried to make an impact on world affairs; he reduced the extent of slav­
ery and some of the excesses of mourning, arrest and penal punishments; 
he established moderate levels of Western-style education and the formal 
concept of an elected parliament; he encouraged the expansion of trans­
port and communications networks and other types of infrastructures 
(which, remain primitive, even by Third World standards); and, most sig-: 
nificantly, he Amharicised, modernised and centralised the military and, 
to a lesser extent, the bureaucracy. The Emperor also fostered changes 
indirectly, by making 'recommendations’, encouraging Imitation of royal 
examples, attempting to use educated elites as -conduits for new ideas 
which he favoured, and treating change-resistant provinces with fore- 
bearance - since he could hardly do otherwise. Most of these reforms 
were virtually complete by the mid-1950s, however, and reflected a
vv
desire for an increased personal control over events rather than a 
quest for a broadly-based national development. As Haile Selassie 
reigned for so long a time without markedly changing the ways in which he 
pursued political power, policies which were premature when he introduced 
them in the 1920s had become, by the 1970s, one long series of ana­
chronisms.^
We have characterised Haile Selassie's modernisations as defensive 
because they constituted the minimum of response or adaptation that would 
permit a traditional elite to survive relatively unscathed. As in the 
political strategy adopted by the Kuomintang, there was a ritual avoidance 
of socio-economic problems and reforms stopped far short of altering the 
traditional elites' control over local affairs. Haile Selassie acted as 
though he believed that, if order was to be maintained, the daily lives 
and traditional aspirationsoof peasants had to be preserved Intact. His 
few reforms were therefore oriented towards an increasingly urbanised 
Throne and the major urban areas that,prior to the successes of Mao Tse 
Tung at least, were widely regarded as the ultimate locus of political 
stability. Changes which did not further the Emperor’s personal control 
were blocked, retarded, drained of their substance and/or given over to 
traditional elites for implementation. By granting Constitutions of 
his own. free will and broaching the minimal land reforms that are discussed
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infra and in Chapter Six, he avoided the necessity of acceding to
strident demands for more sweeping reforms a few years later. In this
way, he was fairly successful in defusing the criticisms of his educated
11elite or of foreign aid donors.
The proof of the success of the Emperor's politics is found in a 
lengthy but far from eventful reign* A few Ethiopianists had, however, 
begun to perceive cracks in the political system prior to the creeping 
coup of 197^» After an abortive coup in i960, both the poverty and the 
development potential of Ethiopia became increasingly apparent, and the 
Emperor was seen to follow rather than to direct the processes of a minimal 
modernisation. He found himself caught between the forces of tradition 
and the modernising elites he had nurtured, and he increasingly permitted 
others to assert powers hitherto reserved- to the Throne. When the 197^ 
coup came, the full extent to which the legitimacy of traditional auth­
ority had been eroded became apparent. It was also obvious that trad­
itional political processes had prevented the legitimation of the Western-
N,
style institutions brought into a precarious existence under Ethiopia's 
12Constitutions. The Derg has stepped into the vacuum that resulted 
when the Emperor was deposed, but the urgent need for new sources of 
legitimacy remains unfulfilled (see Chapters Four and Five).
I. Constitutional Laws 
While many lawyers and political scientists are preoccupied with
• • • 2.3
broad analyses of constitutions and constitutional theory,-- ^ our focus- is 
a narrower one: an assessment of the contribution that public laws have
made to Ethiopian political development, and the extent to which the 
constitutional law-in-action reveals Ethiopian attitudes towards the 
functions and purposes of law. In contrast to the strenuous efforts to 
save the constitution, or to pretend to retain it, that commonly attend 
the collapse of constitutional government in other countries, few 
Ethiopians mourned the passing of the Constitution in 197^• The Con­
stitution was only "suspended" initially and a modified Draft Constitution 
did make a brief appearance (see Chapter Five) , but these events were
straws in the wind of political change that swept the country and its
Ik
shallow-rooted, Westem-style political institutions.
A . The 1931 Constitution
Menelik’s widow, Empress Zawditu, apparently rejected a constitution 
drafted by one of Haile Selassie's officials, fearing that it would
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diminish her authority and dignity* After her death, Ethiopia’s first
non-traditional Constitution was promulgated in 1931* It was based on the
1889 Japanese (Meiji) Constitution that had, in turn, been influenced
heavily by the 1871 German Constitution* Arguably, the appeal of
this Constitution for the Emperors of Ethiopia and Japan lies in the
fact that, despite allusions to a Hechtsstaat, the overall emphasis was
one of the glorification of Imperial power* When compared to provisos in
the Meiji Constitution, the powers of the Ethiopian Emperor were simplified
and expanded, a firmer base for an increasingly complex administrative
machinery was established, and an advisory Parliament was introduced.
The Constitution made little difference to the actual conduct of Government
business except that, tinder it, provincial elites were gradually excluded
15from many of the state-sanctioned offices controlled by the Throne.
• It is worth noting some of Haile Selassie’s attitudes-towards law, •• 
as reflected in his interpretations of the 1931 Constitution, since 
Imperial pronouncements concerning law subsequently grew more veiled and 
ambiguous. In 1931 he said that, while the backwardness of Ethiopians 
had previously
justified their sovereigns in ruling over them as a good father 
guides his children. . . >/~the7 moment had come for them to collaborate 
in the heavy task which up to the present their sovereigns have 
accomplished alone. 16
Paternalism was never repudiated however, and any collaboration was
extremely one-sided. In his autobiography, the Emperor states that
~ ^^hile the interests of the individual' shall net be abandoned /jtiRdeir • 
the Constitution^^ the strength of the united community shall be para­
mount. Without sacrificing the benefits due to individuals or 
oneself, one is not to seek divisive private interests. 17
This statement could almost have been issued by the Derg in 197*N hut
an Ethiopian socialism formed no part of the Emperor’s policies. Since
feudalism had disappeared elsewhere in the world, he reasoned, it should
not be reaffirmed in Ethiopia. He therefore directed that the following
clause be inserted in the Constitution:
The Empsrorjnay assign hereditary land-rights/rest/ &rd land held 
a3 a fief / gult 7 either to nobles or to other servants of the 
realm. . • and in future things are to be arranged as required, 
having regard to their services. 18
Notwithstanding Haile Selassie’s reasoning, this is nothing less than a
constitutional sanction of feudalism (see Chapter One). Finally, Tekle
Hawaryat, the Finance Minister and the reputed draftsman of the Constitution,
I6*f
explained what might he termed the Grundnorm for 1951!
The principle laws, by virtue of being based on the Emperor’s know­
ledge, shall remain permanently valid* Laws concerning matters of 
detail are to be considered by Parliament. . * *19
B. The 1955 "Revised” Constitution
A' new Constitution, proclaimed to mark the Silver Jubilee of Haile ■ ’
Selassie’s reign as Emperor, made it appear as though laws no longer 
sprang from the Emperor’s brow. Few changes occurred, however. Like 
its predecessor, the 1955 Constitution is typical of the laws of trans­
itional societies: it purported to infuse a more formal and Westernised
element of authority into a system of traditional law and politics. It 
also furthered the centralisation and rationalisation of bureaucratic 
power, chiefly by providing more specifically and-precisely for its 
aggregation, allocation and delegation. Both Constitutions affirmed the 
values of a Solomonic rule and sought to impress domestic and international 
audiences, in order to legitimate Haile Selassie’s reign. While the 
1951 Constitution (and the nominal abolition of slavery) had the specific 
end-in-view of furthering an application to join the League of Nations, 
the 1955 Constitution (and Articles 1 and 26 in particular) was an attempt
to forestall international criticisms of the absorption of a federated
20Eritrea into a unitary Empire (see Chapter One).
The Revised Constitution follows the pattern laid down by many 
contemporary constitutions.: It contains <an emotional political- 
manifesto by way of a Preamble, an organisational chart of government 
(Articles 1-36, 66-121), a list of the political rights of individuals 
which is quite impressive on a first reading (Articles 37-65)» and assertions 
that the constitution is the political centre of gravity, the supreme law, 
and the formal basis of all subsequent law, possessing a special per­
manence and sanctity (Articles 122, 131). The ibrmal structure of 
Government is based not on tha Westminster Model that was exported 
fully-blown to the ’’new” Commonwealth states, but on historical English 
patterns of a gradual devolution of authority from monarchs to Parliaments 
and ministers. In theory, the 1955 Constitution envisages a two-way 
communication between Emperor and Parliament, with the Prime Minister 
acting as middleman. Many of the overarching concepts in the Constitution, 
and the civil rights provisions in particular, draw their inspiration from 
the American experience and, to a lesser extent, from the Universal
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Declaration of Human Rights, As in French public law, the resolution
of sensitive matters (the order of succession to the Throne and the
independence of the judiciary) is postponed, pending the enactment of the
’organic laws' called for in Articles 5 and 111 of the Constitution*
Although the Constitution is a lengthy one, it is far from complete and
many provisos are of prospective significance only,. depending as they
21did on further initiatives from the'top* The jurisprudence of. a particular 
country has never been adopted^in Ethiopia, but the influence of American 
professors at the University encouraged students to adopt American views 
of their Constitutional law. They did so eagerly, reporting that they had 
grave difficulties in thinking about law in Amharic, the official language 
of the law*
Like many Third World constitutions, Ethiopia’s embodies irreconcilable
contradictions between American*separation .of powers, concepts and English
notions of a concentration of powers. Ethiopian legal education has,
however, tended to suppress English constitutional theories* Thi.3 was
unfortunate for, as Christopher Clapham argued, the
Ethiopian ’Constitution’ , like the English, lies not so much in 
wirtten powers as in a gradually developing body of usage. The 
laws and the Constitution.-., have themselves been so moulded by 
the conditions of government that they have had to fit themselves 
into the existing scheme before they could much affect developments*22
It is this growing ’’body of usage” which we shall use to evaluate the
impact of public law on Ethiopian politics.
. In-Ethiopia - as in India,, where a traditional and’ religious order
based on caste has been subjected to an overlay of Western-style legal
education and constitutionalism - a basic conflict among ideologies has
been built into the fabric of the legal system. For Ethiopia, this
conflict gave rise to acute legal (but not political) controversies,
anomalous results, and a wide-ranging discretion in the choice of rules
and policies (see Chapter One)• Ethiopian governmental processes mirrored
the inbuilt constitutional conficts between: three traditional jural
23postulates (working principles) - Imperial aspirations to absolutism, 
the mutuality of support between the Church and the Throne, and the 
continued Amharisation of politics; and five nineteenth century liberal 
jural postulates - the modernisation and accountability of administration, 
the widening of political participation through a Parliament, the estab­
lishment of an independent judiciary committed to the Rule of Law,
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somewhat confused concepts of separation of powers, and a catalogue of 
individual political rights. As we saw in Chapter Two, these Western 
postulates are not necessarily the hallmarks of legal modernisation.
Economic development was not one of the Ethiopian jural postulates: 
while tie Preamble looks forward to "laying a solid basis for . . .  
happiness arid prosperity", the text of the Constitution' successfully 
avoids any direct reference to*development issues.. Over time, and in the . 
absence of effective means of implementing them, the Western postulates 
were neutralised or circumvented in the pursuit of power by traditional 
means. For example, provincial elites acquired no functions under the 
Constitution which were consistent with their ascribed statuses, yet they 
managed to neturalise many nominally modernising policies by intervening in 
the implementation or enforcement of these policies.
C • Traditional Jural Postulates
Exercising only a bit of conjecture, it is possible to reconstruct a \ 
traditiqnal Ethiopian jurisprudence from scanty source materials. After 
the emergence of Islam on all sides of the Amhara-Tigre Empire, the 
political order was concerned almost exclusively with defense and the 
maintenance of order, chiefly to enable the faithful to occupy themselves 
with salvation. The Amharic agara negus means both the country of a king 
and a tranquil land: an emperor is seen as a necessary precondition to
peace. While Emperors were both spiritual and temporal rulers - God’s 
representative on earth - they were tied to the cooperation* of the 
nobility and the Church - ’estates’ in a Standestaat. The legal order of 
the Empire, and particular laws and Imperial acts, derived their validity 
from the fact that the Emperor's will was incontestable, so long as he 
acquired and retained the Throne by right. As a result, the potestas came 
to Ethiopia - the Roman law concept that markedly influenced the public 
laws of civilian jurisdictions and can be dimly perceived in the Ser’ata 
Mangest and more clearly in the Fetha Negast (see Chapter One). Under 
this concept, the basis of all law, acts and physical coercion is the 
public personality of the emperor, a concept which is recognised in 
Tkele Hawaryat's comment, supra. The emperor is above all law, fbr law 
is itself the commands of the sovereign. Ethiopian jurisprudence thus 
parallels many of the ideas of St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, William of 
Occam (1280-13^9) and Jean Bodin (1530-96) and, indeed, much of Ethiopian
philosophy revolves around 1 medieval' Christian speculations concerning
2k
the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle.
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The political power base through which these Ethiopian (and medieval 
European) ideas were realised rested on a tripod of emperor, feudal troop 
levies furnished by provincial elites, and the Church. It was, perhaps, 
a fatal defect in the 1955 Constitution that, while the power of the 
Church was recognised, the military was assigned no positive role in 
Government. The continuity of the concept of Ethiopian kingship belied 
the fact that it was little more than an empty vessel, standing ready for 
a family with enough military support to climb into it. The consent of 
the Church, symbolised by the anointing which formally conferred kingship, 
was the other precondition to emperorship, and the Church could absolve 
the faithful from their oath of fealty by excommunicating a recalcitrant 
emperor. It was, in fact, the excommunication cJf lyassu, Menelik's 
brief successor, that propelled Haile Selassie to power as Regent in 1917* 
Despite the omnipotence of an Ethiopian sovereign in legal theory,he was 
forced t>-make give-and-take or live-and-let-live arrangements with his
\
partners in'power. Further, an emperor could only exercise power firmly
25in those-areas under his direct surveillance. Haile Selassie had a 
clear sense of the physical limitations on the close supervision of 
political actors, and did not dissipate his authority by intervening in 
situations where his personal interests were not directly affected - 
such as those involving a broadly based economic or political development.
It is obvious that the democratic and communitarian traditions found 
in many other African societies - what Tanzania’s Nyerere, for example,
sees as the foundations, of an African Socialism - form no part of the _
traditions of the Amhara-Tigre Empire (see Chapter Four) • Monarchy is 
not, on the other hand, totally unknown elsewhere in modern black 
Africa: apart from Siaka Stevens, no present chief executive came to
power through a change in civilian government, other than by way of 
succession to a deceased incumbent. Many of the powers of an Ethiopian 
sovereign exist, da facto, in other Third World states. The proprietary 
theory of the state was derived initially from Roman law, and many 
contemporary rulers have adopted it eagerly for the purpose of personal 
aggrandisement; Ethiopian shum-shir, divide et imperia and the political 
allocation of offices, land and commercial concessions find their parallels 
worldwide and are reflected'in the law-in-action. Diamond sees this 
eminent domain over persons and property as the hallmark of a ’’census- 
tax-conscription” state. In such a state, the ways in which lav/ is used 
reflect a spontaneous opportunism in augmenting the power of bureaucracy
168
and sovereign, rather than the application of abstract principles, such as
26an impartial justice* Diamond's characterisation fits the aspirations 
of Ethiopian emperors nicely, but it is also applicable to many other Third 
V/orld states.
An Ethiopian emperor did not have to articulate, aggregate and 
communicate his interests to himself, and he tended to pacify rather than 
to adjudicate serious-disputes. Much of the 1955 Constitution seemed, 
therefore, to introduce significant political changes. Provisos re­
ferring specifically to Imperial power did, however, simply restate the 
traditional position of the
CONQUERING LION OF THE TRIBE OF JUDAH. . ./"andJ  ELECT OF GOD (Preamble) .
By virtue of his Imperial Blood, as well as by the anointing £  by the 
Church^ . * • , His power /is/ indisputable (Article *+) *
The Imperial dignity shall remain perpetually attached to the line of 
Haile Selassie I, descendent of • • • the Queen of Sheba, and King 
Solomon of Jerusalem (Article 2).
. . . Sovereignty . . .  is vested in the Emperor and the supreme 
authority over all of the affairs of the Empire is exercised by 
Him. . in the manner provided for in the present Constitution 
(Article 26)•
Were it not for the subordinate clause in Article 26, the balance of 
the Constitution would have been totally superfluous. We shall see that 
this clause was in turn subordinated to a pragmatic exercise of the 
Imperial power that was, of course, indisputable only so long as the 
powerful chose not to challenge it. Under the Constitution,the Emperor's 
powers encompassed: the organisation of and appointments within Minis­
tries, public agencies, local government and the military; conferring 
honours and titles; commanding the Armed Forces; directing foreign relations
tr~x
and trade; convening andPdissolving Parliament and promulgating laws
27while it was not in session; and "maintaining justice" through the courts.
28Although the establishment of the Central Personnel Agency in 1961 
marked a slight erosion of the Emperor's control over lower-level admin­
istrative appointments, he was nevertheless able to continue to counter­
balance the power of provincial elites by appointing many officials who 
lacked a power base independent of the Throne. The grant of constitutional 
authority to the Emperor is extraordinarily broad, even when compared 
to the executive authority exercised under many other Third V/orld con­
stitutions* Imperial power is further expanded by the mysterious 
Article 36 of the 1955 Constitution, which confers wide residual powers 
on the Emperor that were apparently immune from formal constitutional 
restraint. A German jurist cites Article 36 as an example of the fact that
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the Constitution is lex imperfecta: few enforceable duties are imposed
29as correlates of broad Imperial rights.
While the growing Amhara domination of Ethiopian politics was only
briefly reflected upon in Article 129, which makes Amharic the official
language, the Orthodox or Coptic Church (discussed in the footnote)
was \tfell-remembered:
it is the Established Church of the Empire and is, as such^ supported 
by the State# The'Emperor shall always profess the Ethiopian Orthodox 
faith (Art. 126).
. . .  The Emperor has the right to promulgate the decrees, edicts and 
public regulations of the Church, except those concerning monastic 
life and other spiritual /as opposed to "secular^ administrations 
(Art. 12?).
As Article 127 suggests, Haile Selassie had managed to assert a measure of 
political control over the Church by_1955, but, since it exercised the 
sanction of conferring or withdrawing Imperial legitimacy de facto, its 
authority was ultimately untouchable by secular authority prior to the 
Revolution. It was, in any event,, difficult to distinguish the secular 
from the sacred under Hebraic notions of statism; biblical standards were 
translated into Ethiopian administrative practices and emperors were the 
prime movers of undifferentiated Church and state affairs. Like the 
Russians, the Amhara-Tigre saw their Church as the natural successor to 
the Byzantine Empire. Resistance to the will of emperor or tsar was 
regarded as a sin as well as a crime. Until recently, emperors were 
continually at war while the Ethiopian Church provided an element of 
continuity, possessed a monopoly of educated officials, and held the 
"power of the keys". Also, by virtue of the Church*s landholdings, 
tax exemptions, tax and rent collections, localised judicial functions and 
influence on administration, it constituted a diffuse state within a 
stated
The Church suffered a relative diminution of its power in the twentieth 
century because: it neglected the extension of its influence southward; 
it continued to follow Egyptian traditions of a decentralised ecclesiastical 
administration; and its higher officials became thoroughly discredited 
in the eyes of other Ethiopian elites. The Church was, however, instru­
mental in creating the Eritrean Unionist Party that pressed for absorption 
into a unitary Ethiopia. It is likely that Haile Selassie and other 
politicians continued to fear the Church as an institution, rather than 
the influence of particular Churchmen. Local priests were expected to 
give a diffuse ideological support in return for the continued protection
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of their privileges* The Church is still the main basis of Amhara-Tigre
32
ethnic identity and cultural affiliation and, like the religious
institutions of South Asia, the Church can be described as the "emotional
container" of a whole way of life and work, which is rendered more rigid
and resistant to change by religious sanction. As Canon J.A. Douglas
notes, Coptic and Syrian Christianity "remained as static as anything on
33earth can remain static", and the Ethiopian Church practised a ritual 
avoidance of issues related to development, although it was willing to 
feed beggars individually.
Although the traditional laws that preceded the 1931 1935
Constitutions are no longer implemented and enforced actively (except 
through rebellion), they continued to generate the mutual expectations of 
the Emperor and his Amhara-Tigre subjects. The Constitution merely re­
stated or consolidated existing powers; precious little was relinquished in 
return for desired gains in legitimacy, and the changes that were intro­
duced lacked the political and military preconditions to effectiveness. 
Legal sovereignty continued to reside in the political formula of Solomon­
ic rule, with the Throne as the guardian and exponent of Ethiopian civil- 
isation. The historical depth of these traditional jural postulates 
contrasts sharply with the superficiality of Western ones - in Ethiopia 
and in many other Third World states.
D. Westem-style Political Institutions
Haile Selassie’s continued monopoly of bureaucratic appointments and 
rewards meant that most bureaucrats’were'still’courtiers,‘performing 
traditional political functions in largely traditional ways, in order to 
procure the traditional rewards. Under the 1955 Constitution, ministers 
\irere appointed by the Emperor and were individually responsible to him.
A minister's slender power depended chiefly upon the influence he could 
exert during an Aquabe Sa'at - his weekly confidential audience with the 
Emperor - and upon the number of his clients a minister could place in 
various government offices. The Constitution provided that ministers 
must answer Parliamentary questions and that they were individually 
responsible to "the State", but ministers treated Parliament with 
disdain. Prime Ministers consistently violated the Constitution because 
they deemed it beneath their dignity to answer Parliamentary questions.
The collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers was stipulated 
in the Constitution, but it never emerged. The Council was restricted to
i
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advisory and coordinating rather than policy-making roles, and its
position was often undermined by an ad hoc Crown Council. It is clear
that Haile Selassie stood above and apart from his ’cabinet', although he
occasionally deigned to arbitrate 1 executive-legislative1 disputes where
35his personal interests were not directly affected.
The Ethiopian Constitution was not without its mercies: a troublesome
member of the local elite could always be sent off to Parliament in Addis 
Ababa where, with any luck, the joys of urban life would discourage a 
return to his rural area. High property qualifications and the 'costs' 
of elections meant that most Parliamentary candidates came from the upper 
social strata, yet elections were contested hotly while voter participation 
remained at about 1096. Legislative initiatives usually came from foreign 
experts, and the total output of legislation from 19^2 to 1969 wsus 
roughly equal to that produced by an American state legislature in one 
year. Few proposed laws were rejected outright, and amendments by Parl­
iament were relatively rare and usually served only to disrupt the (often 
minimal) - internal coherence of legislation* The essence of the power of 
this (and other) Parliaments consisted of asking ministers embarrassing 
questions and delaying enactments through debate. These tactics did not 
fetter the Emperor, however: he removed MPs from office if they made
"political statements", and denied benefits to recalcitrant MBs and 
their 'constituents'. He could also dissolve Parliament, decree the laws 
he desired, and force incumbent MPs to bear the costs of the bribes and 
the extravagant feasts associated with elections. Nevertheless, Parlia­
ment injected an element of the consent of some social groups into Ethiopian 
politics. While there were a few radical MPs, Parliament as a whole saw
itself as defending traditional virtues against a liberal Emperor and 
36bureaucracy.
Despite constitutional provisions designed to suggest a European-style 
monarch exercising his authority on the advice of a democratically- 
selected Parliament and Cabinet, Ethiopian constitutional realities were 
otherwise. MPs possessed no power bases independent of the Throne in 
Ethiopia’s "no-party” state. Together with a lack of technical expertise, 
such as the one associated with the growth of specialised legislative 
committees in the United States, this powerlessness meant that Parliament 
was unable to develop independent ideologies, programmes, development 
plans, budgets or legislative initiatives. These kinds of political
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conditions lead Rene Dumont to conclude that, as parliamentary democracy 
is only successful in Nordic or Protestant states, too much time and 
money is lost in other countries through a caricature democracy which
37enables a privileged class to profit from an illusion of mass power*
There is much to be said for Dumont’s assertions, but he goes too far.
The strictly legislative functions of parliaments in what Dumont sees as 
successful democracies have been eroded, although these parliaments still 
recruit political leadership, exert some control over administrators, 
and serve as forums for policy discussion* Ethiopia’s Parliament began 
to play these roles in a rudimentary fashion, much like the Parliaments 
of Tudor England. These Parliaments, and Ethiopia’s, generated little 
popular enthusiasm for increased taxes and special interest legislation. 
Where a monarch over-stepped inherited and instinctive feelings, popular 
protest took the form of riot and rebellion rather than Parliamentary 
speeches or votes of censure. Rebellion was all but expressly incor-
70
porated into these traditional constitutions and, given time, Ethiopia’s 
Parliament might have evolved, like England's, into an alternative to 
rebellion. Time is, however, a scarce commodity in twentieth century 
politics.
E. Separation of Powers and the Judiciary
Theories of a constitutional separation of powers are extremely 
diffuse, and attempts to embody them in contemporary constitutions have, 
resulted in diverse institutions. The core idea underlying* these theories 
includes the isolation, immunity or independence of legislative, exec­
utive and judicial functions, with checks and balances between the branches 
of government. Although divisiveness and conflict often results from such 
a separation, a political integration is nevertheless achieved through 
a commitment to consensus values. As we saw in Chapter One, consensus does 
not characterise Ethiopian politics ~ or the politics of most other 
Third World states. It was therefore inevitable that felt need3 for order 
and unity would cause the separation of powers provisions in Articles 66 
through 112 of the 1935 Constitution to be overridden. Inherent conflicts 
between these Articles and provisions licensing the overarching inter­
vention of the Emperor in all levels of government could only, in Ethiopia, 
be resolved through the application of traditional political power. Nominal 
rights of Westem-style institutions that were enumerated in the Constit­
ution found no corollary in the minimal duties of the Emperor - an 
intentional lex imnerfecta. A fair measure of division of labour did,
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however, emerge in those few areas inhere the Emperor did not choose to 
intervene consistently and directly. Ministerial responsibility to Par­
liament is one of the (imperfect) checks on an undue concentration of 
power in, for example, Britain; in Ethiopia this control never evolved 
and would have been largely irrelevant in any event, since ministers were 
powerless in comparison with the Throne, and Parliament also lacked an 
independent power base.
The overall failure of an Ethiopian separation of powers is best 
illustrated by the position of the judiciary under Haile Selassie.
Judicial authority under the Constitution was vested in "courts 
established by law" and exercised in the name of the Emperor (Article 
108) • It is unclear whether Article 35 conferred an inherent juris­
diction to intervene in court proceedings: "The Emperor has the right and
duty to maintain justice through the courts." Haile Selassie did, however, 
intervene indirectly through an unfettered control over judicial appoint­
ments and directly through the traditional Chilot, a tribunal somewhat like 
the Star Chamber, which was bound only by the Emperor’s notions of fairness 
and expedience. Despite the assurance in Article 110 that judges "shall 
submit to no other authority than that of the law", courts were operated, 
particularly at the lower levels, as appendages of the bureaucracy by the 
Ministries of Justice and Interior. The formal hierarchy of Supreme,
High, Awraja (sub-province) , Woreda (district) and Atbia Dagnia (local)
Courts, and the separate system of Muslim courts are discussed in the foot-
39note.
Invariably, courts are intensely political institutions, and their 
greatest weakness as a check on governmental power is that they are 
ultimately helpless in the face of ruthless political opposition. Judges 
place themselves in a difficult position if, as sometimes happened in 
Ethiopia, they took seriously a rule which the executive promulgated for 
symbolic or propaganda purposes only. The legal position of Ethiopian 
judges is particularly untenable. Under traditional law, they were treated 
as fonctionnaires, and lacked the independence of a French administrative 
court that is guaranteed through tradition and attitudes of a legal 
professionalism. The British military authorities that occupied Ethiopia 
after the defeat of the Italians exerted their influence on behalf of a 
court system in the common law tradition. The new courts were left to fend 
for themselves, lacking both a traditional prestige and independent
17^
administrative resources; .judges were unable to establish a convincing
L\0independence from Government when left to fend for themselves#
In any event, it is unlikely that Ethiopian judges, who are members 
of the ruling elites, would have wished consistently to challenge Imper­
ial authority. Like other officials, many judges sought out influential 
patrons and knew that they had to favour northerners over southerners and 
rich against poor. In many court cases, the true 1ratio decidendi* was a 
bribe. As in Japan, case decisions favoured the status quo or faits 
accomplis and judges attempted to rationalise these results on the basis 
of suspect legal premisses. The public did not respect judges, and there 
were numerous appeals. Judges, in turn, often lacked self-confidence and 
more than a minimal education, and they were poorly-paid; a Woreda Court 
judge earned less than a primary school teacher or a'policeman. 
Paradoxically, litigation was extremely popular in Ethiopia. There is one 
judge for every 20,000 Ethiopians (excluding atbia dagnia or local judges
and members of customary tribunals), compared to 1:50,000 in the litigious
hi
United States and to a ratio of doctors in Ethiopia of 1:50,000.
It can be convincingly argued that, prior to the Revolution, judges in 
the higher courts had come to display a judicial independence and a high 
standard of competence in private law matters (see Chapter Seven).
-^n 1 obiter dicta1, Ethiopian courts asserted that Article 122, which 
stated that the Constitution was supreme and that inconsistent laws were 
void, accorded them powers of an American-style judicial review. The 
courts failed to establish their point for three reasons. Judicial 
review is derived from closely-related principles of a separation of 
powers and due process, and the fact that these principles were not 
firmly embedded in the 1955 Constitution was reflected in the uncertainties 
surrounding judicial review. Secondly, all countries which permit a 
judicial review after the promulgation of legislation adhere to the 
doctrine of stare decisis and/or establish a special constitutional 
court. No such court was created in Ethiopia, judicial review, was often 
restricted or barred by statute, and only an extremely attenuated form of 
stare decisis entered Ethiopian legal thinking. The most important 
constraint was, however, that the kinds of political conditions and psy­
chological attitudes that existed when, for example, Chief Justice Marshall 
decided Marbnry v. Madison are lacking in Ethiopia. A civil law expert,
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George Krzeczunowicz, concludes that an Ethiopian judicial review would be
. . hzpointless and inconsistent with prevailing systems of law and politics* 
Civil Rights
The limitations imposed on judicial review in Ethiopia became 
.apparent on those rare occasions xvhen an individual challenged Govern­
ment's actions under the individual political rights provisions found in 
Articles 37 through 6.5 of the 1955 Constitution. Seven of these cases are 
summarised below, and they show the performance of Ethiopia's courts to 
have been exceedingly uneven. Most of these and other civil rights cases 
involved judicial interpretations of Article **3 which, in the English 
version, states that: "No one within the Empire may be deprived of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law". "Due process" has no 
inherent meaning, existing apart from the extensive judicial gloss it has 
received in America and elsewhere, and it is not surprising that this 
complex concept could not be translated adequately into Araharic. A 
literal translation of the official Amharic version of Article k3 reads 
" . . .  except in accordance with the law". In most of the cases brought 
under Article k3, the courts refused to challenge Government's authority 
where they could find some kind of statutory justification for it 
(e.g., Aryaya, Mebratu - infra) • "In accordance with the law" was inter­
preted as a mere admonition to follow the law, a construction which has 
been adopted by the courts of, for example, India and Burma. In a 
few cases (e.g., X* Savadjian, Sherif), however, the Ethiopian courts 
attempted to invalidate governmental acts, and cited due process concepts 
and, in a few instances, American cases. Indian courts have also followed
if.it
this practice. The Ethiopian courts often declared their independence 
and their commitment to following the law fearlessly (e.g., Savadjian, 
Woube, Sherif), but cases in which a court was simply ignored by Government 
were all too common.
In Lij Aryaya Abebe v. Imperial Board of Telecommunications,
2 J. Ethiopian Law (JEL) 303 (196*0, the High Court held that the felling 
of Aryaya's trees by the Board, under authority of a Proclamation, did 
not constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of property under Article 
**3» even though the Proclamation did not provide for compensation. The 
enactment of the Proclamation itself satisfied the requirements of 
Article *+3» In a similar case, Highway Authority v. Mebratu Fisseha,
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2 JEL 37 (196*0 , the Supreme Court reasoned that, since the purpose of 
the Proclamation in question was to benefit society, the interests of 
the individual may be sacrificed.
In the case of X v. Ministry of Posts, 2 JEL 332 (196*0 the High 
Court enjoined a Ministry from making further deductions from an employee’s 
salary.;for,.purposes .of .satisfydng^ils claim..against • hijn. The *£actr that..: »
the Ministry was party, judge and executor in one and the same case was 
held to violate due process of lav/.
In Ministry of Finance v. Avedis Savadjian, Su. Ct. Civ. Ap.
720/50 (1958)j Savadjian appealed an Inland Revenue Department tax- 
assessment to the Tax Appeal Committee and, ultimately, to the High and 
Supreme Courts. The Department moved to dismiss his statement of claim on, 
inter alia, the ground that the Court lacked jurisdiction, since the 
Transaction Tax Decree did not expressly authorise a court appeal with 
regard to Departmental assessments. The Supreme Court held thab Art.
110 of the Constitution required that the courts follow and interpret 
the law and that it ensured a judicial independence. In the absence of
an appeal provision in the Decree, a person aggrieved by the decision of
an administrative official must have a legal remedy,or else a denial of 
due process under Article k3 would result. The High Court has held, 
however, that a Proclamation provision allowing appeals to a court on 
questions of law only bars judicial review of findings of fact, in Mayhob 
Syid Razik v.Internal Revenue Dept., Civ. Ap. **16/56 (196*1-).
In Graz. Woube W. Selassie v. Dej. Kefelew W.Tsadik, 2 JEL 5**- 
(1962), an- awraja governor ordered an awraja judge to settle a land case 
by transferring the land to one of the parties. This was declared by the 
High Court to be a void executive interference with the judicial inde­
pendence guaranteed by Article 110 of the Constitution. Matters were 
not so simple, however, in Tewfik Sherif v. Public Security Dept., H.
Ct. Order File 22/58 (1965). Tewfik's advocate sought 'habeas corpus', 
contending an unlawful detention. The. Security Department repeatedly 
refused to produce the prisoner, causing the High Court to observe that:
The order of the court must under no condition be violated since 
according to Art. 108 of the Constitution judicial power is exercised 
by the courts in accordance with the law and in the name of. the 
Emperor. /The Court has the power7 to examine whether the relevant 
provisions of the Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Code have 
been observed. . . .
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The accused was a member of the Enlightened Few, a "modernising 
Hindu organization" formed in India, in Public Prosecutor v. Sutra Porlal, 
Addis Ababa Woreda Court Cr. Case 201/58 (19&5)• He addressed an advertised 
meeting, advocating the modernisation of religious practices such as 
those relating to cattle, and deeply offended five Hindus in attendance.
He was convicted of a "blasphemous or grossly offensive utterance" under 
the 1957 Penal Codie, Article 7?1» The Court reasoned that he was engaging 
in reform rather than the religious "rites" protected under Constitution 
Article *f0, and that his freedom of speech was legitimately abridged 
"in accordance with law" (Art* *fl) by Penal Code Article 771* The Court 
held that, by inserting this phrase, the Constitution's draftsmen-"retained 
the power in the ordinary legislative authority to limit the freedom of 
speech in cases where such limitation seemed appropriate."
Major rights catalogued in the Constitution other than 'freedom' of 
speech - assembly, association, property ownership, religion, travel and 
occupation-were also restricted by phrases like "in accordance with law", 
even in the English version. Diligent research has failed to uncover a 
successful challenge to Government under these provisions, which were 
qualified still further by Article 65: "the requirements of public order
and the general welfare shall alone justify any limitations on the rights 
guaranteed. • • ." "Public order" and "general welfare" are so broad as
kSto justify most limitations on rights; this is the position taken by, 
among others, the European Commission on Human Rights.
Reviewing Ethiopian enactments from 19**2 to 1969, Wi?.liam Ewing 
concludes that
there is a general lack of legislation dealing with the relative 
powers and duties of citizens and the government and of various 
private power groups within the population, for example, landlords 
and tenants. /Many/ relationships, often including that between 
government officials and private citizens, continue to be governed 
by traditional master-servant norms. **7
Minimal rights were declared in the Constitution without providing the
means to secure their enjoyment, although the traditional rights of
the Amhara - privacy, private property, a wife's control over her own
property, petitioning officials and the Emperor, and access to the courts -
received considerable recognition in practice. The guarantism of
constitutional government - what civilian lawyers regard as distinguishing
democracy from autocracy - was lacking in Ethiopia; the application of
public (and, to a lesser extent, private) laws did little more than
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passively reflect the political style of the Emperor. Contemporary
Third World constitutions are scarcely complete without a reference 
Zf8
to due process,. and how convenient it was that a foreign audience could 
not read Amharic and that most Ethiopians did not understand this alien 
concept.
G. A Symbolic Constitution
That the 1955 Constitution was little more than a monument to formal­
ism - an elegant status symbol - is exemplified by numerous lex imperfecta 
provisions, escape clauses such as "in accordance with law1', and the 
’organic* law techniques that were used. V/e can characterise this 
Constitution as nominal, semantic, inauthentic and alienating: some
provisions were ignored while others froze political processes in the 
interests of Emperor and his 'modernising* nobility; added together, these 
provisions created a Westernised veneer of political responsiveness 
which fuelled the growing alienation of modernising elites during the 
1960s and 1970s that lead up to the Revolution. New Constitutional 
institutions and safeguards were not publicised or widely understood 
within Ethiopia, and there was no question of their being broadly incor­
porated into the social fabric. Westem-style institutions had little 
reality beyond a mere physical existence. The symbolic functions of 
Ethiopian Constitutions (and Haile Selassie's land 'reforms’ and private 
law Codes - see Part III :) were grasped as early as 1931* Many of the 
yawning gaps between law and practice in Ethiopia can be explained by the 
fact that there was little political interest in the implementation and 
enforcement.of. rules that were, intended to have no practical effect, ..
The 1931 and 1955 Constitutions did not embody the essence of a 
Western-style constitutional government: they failed to counterbalance
the politics of force and manipulation with a government by consent.
They were paternalistic gifts, of dubious benefit to the recipients; 
consent \/as. neither sought nor could it have been obtained, even within 
the Emperor's core constituency - large-scale landlords in the South.
Since these Constitutions were not political acts of the people, Govern­
ment was not obliged to treat them as the supreme law and they evoked 
little public pride: as the traditional basis of the State had survived, a
constitution was not the precondition to and symbol of independence.
A Western consensual constitutionalism - the jural analogue of Talcott
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Parsons's notion of an equilibriating social system, which was discussed 
in Chapter One - could not emerge in the absence of public consent.
The effects of clever draftsmanship v/ere that no aspect of the Emperor's 
power was proscribed, the real powerholders were accountable only to 
themselves and to the Throne, and decision-making procedures were not 
prescribed in any concrete fashion. The essence of a Western liberalism, 
a legitimate opposition with an authority tochallenge authority, was 
neither guaranteed by law nor countenanced under traditional politics.
The Western-style provisions in the 1955 Constitution were inherently 
ill-suited to Ethiopia for, as Nyerere argues, a Third World state should 
not import a constitution which fosters dissensus c once ruing*- the funda­
mentals of national policy. In any event, the absence of an Ethiopian 
political consensus meant that the Constitutions could not serve as 
neutral umpires of power struggles in the Western mould. They were,
rather, weapons wielded by one man in these struggles and could not
50survive his political eclipse.
A Marxist jurist would not register surprise on hearing this assertion,
and several of Marx's criticisms of Louis Bonaparte's Constitution
51parallel the arguments we have developed. We have, nevertheless, 
chosen to assess the Ethiopian Constitutions on the basis of Western 
legal criteria because the structures of the new institutions created, 
the phraseology adopted, and public statements by various officials invite 
such an evaluation. The continuation of politics by force and the mani­
pulation of superficial Western-style institutions prevented the emergence 
of political predictability and orderliness - indicia of political develop­
ment for some theorists - through new institutions. The fundamental 
problems of centralised governments - succession to high office and the 
institutionalisation of disagreements - were not solved through Ethiopia's 
Constitution and continue to plague her today.^
V/hen the Derg began to move against Haile Selassie, most of the 
Western-style institutions collapsed quickly (see Chapter Four). Two 
major non-constitutional restraints on the exercise of Imperial power - 
provincial elites and the Church - were effectively neutralised through 
political rather than legal means, although some kind of accommodation 
must have been reached with .the Church, since the Derg and the Church do 
not regularly attack each other, despite manifest conflicts of interest.
New restraints on absolutism, such as increasingly militant urban opposition
l8o
parties and rural separatist groups, are now making themselves felt, however. 
A largely undifferentiated military committee, increasingly dominated by 
one man, is attempting to perform most of the functions of both traditional 
and Western-style institutions. Despite a great deal of motion, little 
political development has been recorded in twentieth century Ethiopia, 
and nation-building through institution-building and structural trans­
formation remains a critical priority.
II. Courtiers and Bureaucrats
In 197^» the Derg fell heir to a government consisting of concentric 
circles of personalities and institutions surrounding a throne. This 
administrative apparatus did not usually function in the manner anticipated 
by the 1955 Constitution, and was in the midst of a transition from a 
series of personal cliques towards the executive arm of a modern state.
For Manelik. and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Haile Selassie, few matters 
lacked political significance or were too small to attract attention and 
supervision, if not direct control. Traditionally, no distinction was 
made between politics and administration; in the absence of industry and 
large-scale commerce, political power rather than economic productivity 
served to generate wealth through an 'office1, preferably one which was 
state-sanctioned. Officials behaved like traders, manipulating inter­
stices in the political order for the benefit of themselves and others.
To a very large extent, bureaucratic and military power stemmed from bonds 
of obligation based1 on the patron-client relations that aie discussed in 
Chapter One: each power holder drew strength from below and acquired
authority (legitimated power) from above. Most transactions between 
administrators and peasants were conducted through a local nobleman.
Peasants assumed that power would be abused, and they we re suspicious of
the rare official who did not try to use coercion to implement his 
53desires.
A. The Growth of Administration
From the eighteenth century onwards, Ethiopian officialdom consisted 
of personal retainers dependent on their master for remuneration as well 
as feudal allies bound by an oath of fealty. Political recruitment was 
therefore only partly ascriptive, although officials continually attempted 
to convert personal power into family privilege and prominent Shoan families
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realised major benefits from a close affiliation with the families of 
Menelik and Haile Selassie. Menelik's Ghibbi (literally, palace) 
provided an extensive administration, but a division and separation of 
administrative functions only began to take shape when nine European-style 
ministers were appointed in 1908-9- These ministers had little political 
stature and almost no notion of their responsibilities, and the Council 
of Ministers was initially little more than a fresh focal point for feudal 
intrigues. Permanent administrative headquarters, foreign advisors and 
European-style regulations did not begin to emerge until the 1920s, under 
Haile Selassie. He used the new ministries gradually to transfer power 
away from those provincial elites whose only claim to office lay in 
the military achievements of their families. The pace of administrative 
change-wats- slow: by the-time of the Italian invasion, serious reforms -
had only extended to the military and police, customs administration and 
the few district governments that had fallen under the influence of the 
Western-educated "Red Ras" (radical Prince) Imru Michael.^
The Italians were partly successful in imposing a centralised admin­
istration on Ethiopia by force, backed by new transport and communications 
networks and a systematic dismantling or co-opting of local political 
institutions. Haile Selassie followed up on this windfall from the 19^ *03 
onwards, particularly with regard to internal security, finance and a 
partial homogenisation of local administration. While the techniques of 
modern government do require a certain amount of centralisation, Haile 
Selassiefs policies went much further to satisfy an inordinate desire for 
prestige, power and control. While central Government continued to have 
almost no effect on the daily lives of peasants (owing to the' lack of 
penetration we discussed in Chapter Two), the financial and control arms 
of the State became overcentralised, in the sense that local initiatives 
were stifled, minor disputes were referred to the top, and constant, 
high-level administrative conflicts were generated. Provincial elites 
tried to go their own way, remarking that "centralisation is for those at 
the centre". With the exception of the Ministry of Education, there were 
few attempts to centralise the activities of service and development- 
oriented agencies - a reflection of their lowly status within traditional 
political processes. These agencies were created more recently, promoted 
feebly and achieved fewer political successes, when compared to the older 
agencies of finance and control. ^
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The service agencies lost almost all of the few battles they waged 
for social change through administration, largely because they failed to 
develop networks of political power which could have rivalled those of 
the finance and control agencies* The overall tendency was for new 
agencies to become as subservient to the demands of traditional politics 
as the older ones, and to lapse into traditional administrative habits: 
the entrenchment of personal power; a disdain for peasants and for develop­
ment activities; acting as buffers rather than as channels of communi­
cation; and resorting to force because of an inability to persuade the 
public. In other words, administration in Ethiopia followed many of the 
practices adopted by other colonial regimes in the Third WoriLd, although 
at a lower level of efficiency. As under European colonialism, policies 
related to a broadly-based development received only a tardy and half-hearted
recognition, since they formed no vital part of the political interests
56operating m  the 'metropole'.
Broadly speaking, administration in Ethiopia thus encompassed two
divergent groups who cut across institutional boundaries and were held
together by the Emperor: traditional politicians who completely dominated
finance and control agencies and often held positions of power in the
service agencies; and educated modernisers, who chafed in subordinate
technical positions in the finance and control agencies and tried to
exert their influence through the service agencies. While the forces of
tradition seemed firmly in command on tte eve of the Revolution, the
modernisers had, in fact, acquired political muscle and, on occasion
during the 1960s, successfully asserted their interests. The main
distinguishing characteristic of these modernisers is their Western-style
education: the bureaucracy partially displaced the Church and military
as a channel of upward social mobility, and education became the passport
to an administrative job for the young. As in many other Third World
countries, graduates strongly prefer government posts to business jobs,
and the educational system was geared towards producing clerks and
57generalists rather than scientific or technical staff.
Ethiopia's political system was not, however, designed to deal with 
demands from ever-larger numbers of educated people. Haile Selassie 
therefore felt it necessary to curb the influence of the modernisers by 
using elderly politicians who were jealous of their potential to supervise 
them and by utilising their technical skills while suppressing their
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attempts to assert a political power and advocate innovations* The
Emperor rarely sided with the modernisers in their numerous and inevit-
able conflicts with tradition-reared officials. As might be expected, most
of the bureaucratic modernisers became deeply alienated and withdrawn,
although, in the end, many adapted to the requirements of traditional
politics and were rewarded accordingly. It should be noted that the
infusion of educated officials did not result in a diminution of (the
largely Shoan) Amhara control over politics at the centre: most schools
were located in A^dis Ababa or the 'traditional’ Amhara provinces, and
most places at domestic and foreign schools were obtained by Amhara from
58the upper social strata.
B. Defects and Weaknesses
The administrative practices that attracted the most universal 
condemnation by Ethiopian modernisers revolved around nepotism and 
corruption* The varying forms of Imperial favour could be regarded 
as clear-cut species of nepotism and corruption, save that, traditionally, 
no formal authorisation of privilege was required other than the word 
of an emperor. Governmental funds could only be pried out of the Ministry 
of Finance on Haile Selassie's order after an official audience.
Funds were then dealt with haphazardly, and often found their way into 
an official's personal account. In 19&3* for example, the Auditor 
General reported to Parliament that Eth. 130.5 millions of governmental 
funds could not be accounted for (Eth. $2.08 = U.S. $1). A large per­
centage of tax receipts fell into private hands and bribes were the 
ordinary means of doing business with government. As in Indonesia, for 
example: the Penal Code contained stern injunctions against corruption
yet those who demonstrated political loyalty were never prosecuted; 
Government's attempts to improve accounting procedures, so as to stem 
low-level leakages, were all but futile; and the public never roused itself 
to demand an honest administration, which formed no part of traditional 
politics. While maintaining an aura of personal sanctity, the Emperor 
manipulated the corruption opportunities of others to his own advantage.
Losses resulting from corruption were huge, yet they paled in comparison
59with wastage due to sheer inaction, inefficiency or incompetence.
Ethiopia is not alone in facing problems associated with corruption 
and, indeed, she suffers from many of the other administrative defects 
and weaknesses commonly ascribed to Third World governments, although they
l8*f
are found, in varying degrees, in all bureaucracies. Zyg Plater arguea 
that
Ethiopia lias bureacratic failings in common with the rest of the 
world. The list is long and depressing: inefficiency; corruption;
lack of coordination between agencies, between capital city and the 
field, between government and subjects; restricted program capabil­
ities; low responsiveness to immediate issues; low program coor­
dination over time and so forth. . . .  To the universal dysfunctional 
elements of political and economic pressures, avarice and bureau­
cratic concern with job preservation rather than goal achievement, 
African societies /[including Ethiopia's^ often add tribalism /?7, 
a tradition of gift-giving within authority structures, and a lack of 
public service tradition. . . .60
These defects add up to one of the four crises Jurgen Habermas ascribes
to advanced capitalist countries: "the administrative system does not
6lproduce the requisite quantity of rational decisions. . . As in
so many other states, reasonably secure political underpinnings for the
implementation of decisions are lacking in Ethiopia. Much time is wasted
in the superfluous processing of papers, endless cups of coffee and
committee meetings and senseless policy shifts. Much of thi3 time-wasting
62results from attempts to shift work onto the shoulders of others.
Under Haile Selassie, the bureaucracy was firmly in the grip of the 
personal machines of the powerful: bureaucrats were expected to advance
the schemes of their patron and frustrate the designs of his enemies, 
rather than to put Government's policies into effect. In 3uch an atmos­
phere, there can be no place for a reasoned criticism of a superior's 
proposals (short of outright rebellion), and conspicuous success, as well 
as failure, attracted unwanted attentions from above. It is therefore 
unsurprising that Haile Selassie's cynical realism.was echoed throughout , 
the bureaucracy and that inaction or 'interpreting' the policies of your 
opponents out of existence, rather than an extremely hazardous entrepren­
eurial risk-taking, were the canons of Ethiopian bureaucracy. A civil 
service composed of retainers employs too many people, most of them 
unqualified, exerts a constant inflationary pressure on the economy and 
fuels natural bureaucratic tendencies toward intrigue and secrecy. Where 
decisions are made under conditions of utmost secrecy - as In Ethiopia - 
crucial procedures are not reduced to writing, decision makers cannot 
acquire all or even most of the relevant information, and the 'facts' 
themselves must be treated with suspicion. Under such circumstances, the 
safest course is to take no action, in the hope that the matter will cease
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to concern you personally before action is inescapably demanded by a 
superior. Asking for advice or opinions is an admission of weakness and 
a threat to your own authority, as is a delegation of authority where 
power is regarded as personal and indivisible rather than institutional­
ised. From the Emperor downwards, it is felt that to delegate is to 
deprive yourself of power and dignity, as the subordinate then becomes 
the social equal of his superior. In such an atmosphere, concrete 
decisions are rare favours to particular individuals rather than a matter 
of administrative routine governed by law. If a policy succeeded,the 
Emperor took the credit; if it went wrong, therrelevant administrators
became convenient scapegoats - another reason for secrecy and inaction,
63in the absence of sustained pressure from the Throne. •
C. Law and Administration
As we shal3. see in Chapter Five, many of these features of Ethiopian 
bureaucracy survive more or less intact under the Derg, and law has done 
little to alter traditional administrative practices. Prior to 1909, 
Ethiopian administration was all but unregulated by law. There are at 
least three reasons for this state of affairs: individual commands in
particular situations were seldom supplemented by general rules (presumably 
because such rules would have conferred a more open-ended authority); 
under a proprietary theory of the state, traditional laws made few hard- 
and-fast distinctions between a politician’s personal interest and what 
might be termed the public interest; and rapid socio-economic changes and 
a sustained growth in state power, which are associated with the evolution 
of administrative law in industrialised states, were absent in Ethiopia. 
Emperors found that particularised commands and more general penal pro­
hibitions sufficed for their purposes, that there was no need for more 
flexible rules which encourage and regulate wholesome activities or which 
attempt to promote sensible policy-making.
While the extensive and precise analytical distinctions that are 
made between public and private law by continental jurists tend to break 
down in twentieth century Ethiopia (and elsewhere), there are other grounds 
on which to distinguish the bodies of lav/ promulgated under Haile Selassie. 
While private laws were imported virtually wholesale (see Chapter Seven), 
public law, and particularly administrative law, are more ’home-grown1 
products. The predominant tendency in the area of public lav/ (prior to 197^)
i
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was to adapt Western institutional models, cast them in Ethiopian legal
moulds, and then let chance determine whether these institutions acquired
65 . . .significant functions. Legal "forms impose a slight discipline m
66 . . the performance of Ethiopian administration"; indigenous administrative
67
traditions are "barely obscured by an overlay of modern vocabulary" , 
which was often provided by Anglo-American ’experts' in administration 
and law.
Anglo-American models are ill-adapted to Ethiopian circumstances because
they focus on a politically-irrelevant issue: reconciling the necessary
exercise of governmental power with the protection of individuals and
68groups against its abuse. In practice, notions of natural rights.or
the implementation of non-governmental interests obtained precious little
recognition in Ethiopia. As in Anglophonic Africa, and subject to a few
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exceptions (discussed in the foonote) where governmental acts were
declared 1 ultra vires’,Ethiopian judges do not serve as humane and im- \
partial guardians of a public interest,as they sometimes (but by no means
always) do in the West. Although a remedy against a government tort-
70feasor is, xn theory, possible under the Ethiopian Civil Code, 
bureaucrats are not accountable to the public in any meaningful sense 
(see Chapter Five).
The commands embodied in Ethiopian administrative law are seldom 
precise and there are no enforceable guarantees against the abuse of 
power; the law means no more than what administrators choose to do with 
it. Usually, law was simply ignored, used as a pretext for inaction, 
delay and oppression, or as a vehicle for personal power. This was 
relatively easy to do in a "soft state", and practices found in most 
systems of administrative lav/ v/ere utilised widely: reluctant ministers
delayed in bringing enacted legislation into force or simply refused to 
do so, and the power to promulgate essential subsidiary rules was often 
neglected or exercised in a manner which negated the (usually vague) 
policies found in the statutes. Like Ethiopian constitutional law, 
statutes relating to administration were largely symbolic: the actual
duties of officials had little to do with titles, job descriptions or 
enumerated powers and duties. The essential criterion was the traditional 
one of an ability to control subordinates and the public, who were 
expected to do whatever was required of them. Many units of government, 
and local administration in particular, retained a substantial autonomy,
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despite Haile Selassie Is centralising rules. There was little coordination
in the initiating of administrative legislation, despite the existence of
a Legislation Committee under the Chairmanship of the Justice Minister.
Administrative laws and regulations piled up as an amorphous mass of
esoteric standards. This was one of the reasons for the lack of coherent
policies and of a united.impetus throughout government; in any event,
71crucial decisions were not implemented principally through law.
On the eve of the Revolution, there were eighteen ministries plus 
a confusing jumble of "autonomous" agencies - public corporations, some 
of the Emperor’s private businesses, institutions performing specialised 
tasks for a particular ministry, and agencies designed to coordinate the 
activities of several ministries. Although minor changes in the juris­
dictions of ministries and agencies occurred from time to time, the overall 
effect of the growth of administration under Haile Selassie is one of new 
institutions superimposed on existing structures, without a thoroughgoing 
reform. The resulting structure served to further Haile Selassie’s 
policies, of divide et imperia, of institutionalising the capacity 
of one organisation to forestall the designs of another. Administrative
jurisdictions were ill-defined and overlapping, functions and duties were
72fragmented and there was.much duplication of effort (see infra).
Ministers were "directly responsible" to a Prime Minister and,
73"above him", to the Emperor and "the State". In practice, this meant 
that Ministers served as a personal staff for Haile Selassie, for whom 
1’Etat, c’est moi. The coordination of administrative policies that is 
associated with the principle of collective ministerial responsibility 
was clearly absent. Ministers were appointed by the Emperor, and the 
duration of appointments averaged four to six years, or longer than those 
in the U.K. in some instances. The structural arrangements of adminis­
tration varied from ministry to ministry and even within a ministry, but 
the common organisational pattern, from the top downward, encompassed 
departments, divisions and, generally, sections. A department was run by
an assistant minister, aided by a departmental director who was responsible
7;+to his minister^and one or two vice ministers. In theory, bureaucrats 
from the rank of assistant minister downwards are appointed by the 
nominally independent Central Personnel Agency^under the merit principle and 
other criteria which are fairly uniform. In practice, the Emperor intervened 
in all but the very lowest levels of appointment in central Government.
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The legislation that created this Agency also purported to spell out the 
rights and duties of bureaucrats, but these provisions were accorded 
little practical recognition. (Related issues are discussed in the 
footnote).
III. Selected Aspects of Ethiopian Administration
Much of the balance of this study is devoted to an analysis of the 
legal regimes underlying particular administrative activities and the 
impact that legal and administrative reforms could have on Ethiopia’s 
development potential. Brief ’case studies’ concerning planning, public 
finance, rural administration, and the 1972-73 famine in Wol'lo Province 
are introduced at this juncture because they highlight problems which are 
found, in varying degrees, throughout Ethiopian administration.
A* Planning
In Chapter Two we discussed the importance of planning in relation 
to development and argued that Ethiopia was a ’’soft state” because of, 
inter alia, a persistent unwillingness and inability to implement devel­
opment plans. Successful development planning requires that the state 
take a decisive role in the economy, organising all of its activities to 
take account of the framework of a plan - conditions which did not obtain 
in Ethiopia. As development is, among other things, a process of ration­
alisation - the application of techniques promoting efficiency for the 
public benefit - a development plan must be rationalist in approach, aiming 
at the elimination of contradictions and sporadic activity, and conveying 
a clear picture of how resources which are actually available should be 
used. Given the irrationalities of the Ethiopian administrative 
structures and laws that we have discussed, rational plan implementation 
would have been impossible, despite there being a strong desire for it*
Such a desire was not, however, widely shared within a bureaucracy 
preoccupied with traditional power struggles. Ethiopia engaged in symbolic 
or pSBudo-planning, and planners were restricted to forecasting occurrences 
over which they had little or no control, in an attempt to stimulate the 
growth of Western-style marketing arrangements. The combination of feudal 
traditions and low levels of social discipline encouraged the adoption of 
narrowly economic planning models. These models served as convenient 
rationales for existing production functions and the social status quo,
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deflecting the possibility of attacks on the underlying conditions of
underdevelopment. Like her Codes of private lav/, Ethiopia's five year
plans were designed to give a reforming face to the regime rather than
actually to change the way things worked. Plans reflected Ethiopia's
almost infinite needs rather than her resources and capacities, amounting
to little more than shopping lists for foreign aid and invitations to
77
treat with multinational companies. ■ The "real planning problem" of
"how to squeeze and twist consumption in such a way as to speed up
78development" was never considered. To have done so would have threatened 
the lifestyles of traditional elites.
Ethiopia's First Five Year Plan emphasised the creation of various 
types of infrastructure; the Second Plan stressed directly productive investments in 
industry and mining; and the Third Five Year Plan (TFYP, 1968-73) 
focused on commercial agriculture and education. These shifts in priorities 
were only partially consistent with Ethiopia's needs (objectively consid­
ered) at the time, as these priorities were filtered through the perceptions 
of traditional politics. Despite the proclaimed aims of development, 
planning priorities aimed at an unbalanced economic grov/th which would 
benefit the upper social strata among the Amhara and, to a lesser extent, 
foreign businessmen. Peasant agriculture was starved for funds, although 
this imbalance would have been redressed somewhat in the Fourth Plan that 
was overtaken by the Revolution. The goals announced in the Plans were, 
for the most part, wildly optimistic. For example, the annual growth rate ■ 
of 6% projected in the TFYP would have required an annual net investment 
of 18-2^ of GNP (assuming an incremental capital-output ratio of 3 or 
k) • When y/o of GNP for depreciation of existing capital and 11-12$ 
for recurrent government expenditures are added to this figure, only 
59-66$ of national income was left over for private consumption - in a 
country perpetually on the verge of starvation! Further, Ethiopian 
national income statistics were more reliable than most in Africa, but 
they were subject to a margin of error of plus or minus 15-17$ and the 
reliability of planning targets suffered accordingly. For administrators,
plans were little more than budgetary exercises, although administrative
79reforms received some attention in the TFYP.
Ethiopian planning suffered from a lack of coordination, poor timing, 
beliefs that plans are self-executing, a failure to involve local govern­
ment or voluntary associations, and a failure to specify manpower, equipment
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and the full measure of financial needs. Although recurrent expenditures
on planned projects were inadequate and the mobilisation of domestic
resources was neglected, capital outlays were generally satisfactory,
subsidised as they were by foreign aid donors* Physical capital formation
was, however, handicapped by a serious bottleneck that remains to this
day: the small size of Ethiopia's construction industry.
A review of the institutional frames through which Ethiopians
engaged in planning points up some of the reasons for the failures we
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noted. A Council of the National Economy was created in 195^» but
seems to have done very little in comparison with the Yugoslavs who were
primarily responsible for drafting Ethiopia's first two Plans. In 1966,
planning arrangements seemingly acquired a higher status under a new
Ministry of Planning and Development. This Ministry was, however, often
unable to secure the release of development funds from the Ministry of
Finance; it lacked the authority to enforce the implementation of plan
provisos; and it failed to evaluate critically the projects submitted by
other ministries and to coordinate the deployment of foreign aid and
technical assistance. Most of these defects were perpetuated when the
Ministry was replaced by the Planning Commission in 1970, although the
coordination of planning activities with those of the Central Statistical
Office and the Technical Agency was improved, in theory, by placing all of
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these activities under the "direct authority" of the Prime Minister.
We have, however, noted that the Prime Minister lacked power bases 
independent of the Throne, and he was unable, and usually unwilling, to 
compel the cooperation of the other ministries in planning activities.
For example, the Commission lacked the statutory power to compel the 
production of statistics or even project proposals from other ministries, 
and planning proceeded in an atmosphere of extreme secrecy.
Ministers regularly circumvented this Commission in an attempt to 
win direct approval of their proposals from the Emperor. Planning was 
deemed to be his prerogative under Articles 27 and 36 of the 1955 Constit­
ution, and Haile Selassie displayed little interest in the regularisation 
of planning procedures that would have diminished his control over the 
ministers. As the composition of the Commission largely duplicated that of 
the Council of Ministers, the same group met twice to consider the same 
proposals, under the Emperor's watchful eye. Beyond the foreign loan 
agreements and annual budgets that required Parliamentary approval, the
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decisions of the Council/Commission (including the Five Year Plans) 
lacked- the force of law and were not examined meaningfully by Parliament. 
There was little coordination between planning priorities, on the one 
hand, and business licensing or the income tax and tariff relief granted
83
to foreign companies under the Investment Proclamation, on the other 
(see Chapter Seven).
B. Public Finance
The connection between development planning and budgeting - creating 
the financial statements of government’s plans and expectations - is an 
obvious one, yet the connection was by no means always evident in Haile 
Selassie’s Ethiopia. There, budgets reflected the exigencies of the 
moment and the relative positions of traditional politicians, rather than 
a coherent formulation of purposes closely tied to development priorities. 
There was no uniformity in the classification of accounts for the public 
sector as a whole, and the annual budget was nothing more than an aggre­
gation of the temporary victories of ministries and agencies. Ethiopian 
budgets failed to perform the classic function of balancing anticipated 
revenues against expenditures, and budgetary inefficiency and incompetence 
hindered the creation of a coherent fiscal policy. As in many Third 
World states, the requirements of administration, defense, ’development* 
projects and the leakages represented by various forms of corruption 
quickly outpaced the modest increases in revenue that were perennially 
overestimated. From 1956 to I966, for example, Governmental expenditures
trebled, and the gap between domestic revenue and expenditure averaged
8k
Eth. $33 millions per year from 1968 to 1973*
To some extent, this gap was filled by foreign aid, but the strong 
desire to return the budget to some kind of a balance always necessitated 
ad hoc cutbacks in expenditure. The Minister of Finance would refuse to 
release budgeted sums without authorisation from the Emperor, whose 
decisions were based on his personal political needs at the time. These 
budgetary interventions almost always entailed maintaining expenditures 
on salaries and weaponry while cutting back on some mixture of social 
services, building construction, the acquisition of equipment, and projects 
conducive to economic growth. The implementation of Five Year Plans was 
thus constantly stalled or disrupted by a lack of funds. Successive 
Ministers of Finance sought to exercise power while avoiding responsibility,
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at least with regard to the larger budgetary appropriations. There were 
no legal or political prohibitions on their doing so: Parliament's
attempts to intervene in the budgetary process were almost always un­
successful. Below .the Minister .of Finance, however, there, is a high 
degree of functional specialisation and educated administrators were
able to exercise a technical expertise free from many of the frustrations
85that arise in other ministries.
The potential for the mobilisation of financial resources in Ethiopia,
represented by the excess of consumption over that minimum essential to a
decent.life, is ..quite small: many peasants fall below any standard.of
a decent minimum. In any event, much of this potential was never tapped
through taxation under Haile Selassie. While the ratio of governmental
revenue to GDP 'ought1 to have been 17 to 19$, Ethiopia managed only about
8$ and ranked 71st out of 72 countries in a "tax effort" survey by Lotz 
86and Morse. There are many reasons for this,but the main one is that 
the way in which the tax laws were drafted, combined with corruption and 
the ease-of tax evasion for the wealthy, meant that the tax system exacer­
bated inequalities in income distribution. When compared to the situation 
in neighbouring states, lower social strata in Ethiopia bore a larger 
.share of the tax burden, received less by way of a return in the form of 
social welfare payments or programmes, and regularly displayed an intense 
hostility towards so inequitable a system (see- Chapters One and Six).
No attempt was made to tax those economic privileges- such as conspicuous 
consumption - that perform no positive social function and do not serve 
as production incentives. In sura, Ethiopian taxation and budgetary processes 
clearly failed to advance any of the four partly-conflicting objectives 
emphasised by an Ethiopian economist, Eshetu Chole: revenue maximisation,
economic stabilisation, capital formation, and a tempering of gross 
economic inequalities.^
The Ethiopian tax system has always been used by emperors to control 
their officials: shum-shir (promote-demote-transfer) had its analogue in 
the enlargement, diminution, confiscation and reallocation of state- 
sanctioned rights to raise revenue. These rights often amounted to little 
more than species of ransom, tribute or baksh-eesh. While there were 
significant changes in this tax system under Haile Selassie, they took 
the form of increasing the burden on traditional revenue sources for the 
most part, little attention being paid to the overall tax structure. In
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Chapter One, we noted the excessive reliance Ethiopia placed on indirect 
(customs, excise and sales) taxes, which are regressive and less yield- 
elastic (less stabilising economically and less likely to counter infla­
tionary pressures) than direct forms of taxation. Indirect taxes are, 
however, more easily collected by an inefficient, incompetent and corrupt 
bureaucracy such as Ethiopia's. Import and export tariffs have long been 
used in Ethiopia; they came to be based on extremely complicated schedules 
which were out of step with international nomenclature (this was corrected 
in 1976) and which provided abundant opportunities for the suborning of 
customs officials. As most tariffs were assessed ad valorem, revenues from 
exports fluctuated wildly in parallel with international price trends.
The imposition of export tariffs also damaged Ethiopia's international 
competitiveness. Policies of import-substitution imposed a constraint 
on the realisation of revenues through import tariffs, and excise taxes 
on sugar, cotton yarn, textile fabrics, alcohol and petroleum products \
were designed to recapture some of the revenue that was lost. Trans­
action taxes included: an additional 15$ tax on imports and 2% on exports,
5$ on domestically manufactured goods, 2% on each sale of goods, and 2$ 
on the value of construction work. The amount of revenue realised from 
these taxes was extremely small, owing to the small size of the commercial 
sector of the economy and the virtual absence of the bookkeeping practices 
that would have facilitated the collection of sales and construction
taxes. As the sales tax was applied to articles of mass consumption, the
88burden of this tax fell primarily on the urban poor.
When, as in Ethiopia, the economy consists of many small producers 
who, for the most part, fall outside the monetised sector and employ few 
people, little revenue can be realised from direct forms of taxation.
The only kinds of direct taxes used in Ethiopia, prior to the Revolution, 
concerned personal, business and agricultural income, and the ownership of 
land and cattle. While income taxes are, in theory, based more on the 
ability to pay than are indirect taxes, a highly sophisticated administrative 
apparatus is needed to insure that all income is reported and that 
exemptions are not misused. The P.A.Y.E.-type of tax under schedule A 
of the Income Tax Proclamation was, in practice, far from self-enforcing, 
it applied to relatively few people and the rate of taxation was much 
lower than in, for example, Tanzania, Uganda or Kenya. Rental income,
taxed under Schedule B, was seldom reported to Ministry officials, who 
found it difficult to estimate the value of rents paid In kind. In 
any event, the rate of tax. on rental incomes was lower than that on wages 
and salaries: e.g., 10$ on Eth. $10,000 and 20$ on Eth. $30»000*
Similar rates were payable, under Schedule C, on the business incomes 
that were systematically understated by businessmen, who were unwilling 
or unable to adhere to bookkeeping practices. Business tax assessments 
were thus capricious in the extreme, and were often inflated in an attempt 
to solicit a bribe. It was impossible for businessmen to predict their 
tax liability i n ‘advance*, and this increased'the-uncertainties of-doing 
business in Ethiopia. Capital gains were impossible to trace or estimate:
the Ethiopian Stock Exchange was disorganised and all but unregulated, and
89many transactions did not pass through the Exchange.
The history of land and cattle taxes and of agricultural income tax­
ation under Schedule D is extremely interesting. Traditional land tenures 
and taxing arrangemeits held absolute sway in rural Ethiopia until 19^, 
when thevneed for additional revenue, to pay the army salaries that had 
just been instituted and to maintain the infrastructure created by the 
Italians, was keenly felt. In that year, a Land Tax Proclamation de­
creased the costs of tax collection and simplified an agrarian tax struc­
ture, which had consisted largely of divergent feudal tributes (tithes).
The resulting taxes were regressive, generated only 3$ of ordinary revenue,
/ 90and captured only 0.7% of total agricultural value added. Tax evasion
was widespread and'whole provinces refused to pay taxes'for several years
at a time. This state of affairs was unacceptable to educated modernisers
in the Ministry of Finance, and the Agricultural Income Tax Proclamation
of 1967 was promulgated to subject income from agricultural activities to
a more equitable tax which did not, however, penalise those who neglected
to use their land. This intended instrument of land reform and expansion
of the monetised sector - the wisdom of which was debatable - became
little more than another poorly implemented tax.
Parliament, overwhelmingly composed of large-scale landlords defend­
ing "traditional" virtues, roused itself and cleverly watered down the 
Proclamation, by enabling local landlords to assess their own tax liabil­
ity. Administrative overwork, corruption, and the occasional assassin­
ation of a zealous tax official completed the picture of non-implemen­
tation. In 1968, the Gojjamis rebelled against this Proclamation which, 
they felt, would destroy their rist system of landholding (see Chapter Six).
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After assassinations, spontaneous riots and retaliatory bombings and Army
operations, all tax liability was forgiven. These events, so typical of
the gap between written and applied law in rural Ethiopia,
verified again that if enforcement is demanded by government, 
overriding traditional attitudes, the forces of the latter will 
take whatever steps necessary to halt government action. 91
Neither the land tax nor the agricultural income tax reached the 
wealth of the landed aristocracy, who could simply shift such minimal 
tax burdens as were actually imposed onto the shoulders,of their usually 
impoverished tenants. The cattle tax was more of a symbolic tribute 
than a revenue device: the amount of revenue realised from it was neg­
ligible (at, e.g., Eth. $0.25 per cow per year), as the nomads against
. 92whom it was directed simply ignored it.
In sum, the laws that constituted Ethiopia’s tax system were poorly 
drafted and poorly administered. Taxes overlapped and provisions 
contradicted each other and fostered inequities, while the chosen revenue 
- base continued to be extremely narrow. The time and manner of payment and 
the amount to be paid were far from clear, plain and nondiscriminatory* 
Collection procedures had never been rationalised: it was almost- - 
impossible to ascertain tax liability easily and.fairly, and enforcement 
mechanisms and diecks on corruption v/ere clear failures.
C• Rural Administration .
Events surrounding the implementation of the agricultural, income tax
typify many of the defects found in Ethiopian local administration prior
to the Revolution. A ’’restrictive, self-seeking, narrowly responsive”
9 k
Ethiopian local administration reflected the direct impact that social 
stratification had on politics: traditional.provincial elites, whose
politics focused on narrow, local and personal issues had an all but 
absolute control over administration at the local level; and they also 
occupied many strategic posts at the centre, particularly within the 
Ministry of Interior. The bureaucratisation of Ethiopian life (in the 
Weberian sense - see Chapter Five) had not proceeded to the point where 
the services of these elites and their proteges could be dispensed with, 
owing to, among other factors, the unevenness associated with a personal­
ised administration, poor communications and standards of literacy within
the bureaucracy, inadequate budgets and staffing, and the ethnic variations
* * • 95 •and conflicts we discussed m  Chapter One. ' The primary function of
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local administration was, and largely still is, the organisation of
loyalty to the regime; central Government tolerated
a high level of local autonomy and variability /in structures, the 
functional performance of similar units and power relationships 
among officials/, provided order and security are maintained. 96
Haile Selassie was even forced to tolerate large leakages from badly-
needed tax revenues, and such simple functions as record-keeping often
went.by the board. :. .
With significant exceptions, such as some of the projects of the
Governor of Tigre Province, Pas Menegesha Seyoum (see Chapter One),
locally-administered development programmes existed in name only:
funds either were used to construct administration buildings or found
their way into the pockets of officials. At the local level, development
became little more than an excuse for additional demands for taxes and
compulsory labour. These tendencies fostered public apathy towards, or
rebellion against any form of development advocated by Government.
Ethiopian rural administration proceeded on the basis of an Indirect Rule,
in the sense that quasi-autonomous and tradition-oriented structures
were interposed between Emperor and people, filtering.out what little
positive influence each might, have had on the other. The system served,
rather, to maximise what might be termed negative influences: taxes and
orders were often (but by no means always) enforced brutally by police
and the army, provoking riot and rebellion - the means by which the people
exerted their influence.
Officials at every level could be described as general handy-men,
exercising an undemarcated residue of whatever governmental authority was
left over to them by their superiors. John Markakis notes, that, until
recently,
the authority of officials was limited neither by law nor by trad­
ition; it extended over every phase of the people’s lives, and they 
ruled their fiefs like petty autocrats. . . .  They administered 
justice personally - a function which they turned to profit. • • .98
This situation prevailed until Haile Selassie was deposed: apart from
vague provisos concerning tax collection and the maintenance of order,
the scope of, or limitations on, power were not demarcated. Officials
were not compelled through law to show results or to assume responsibility
99for specific policies or projects.
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At the top, the Emperor continued to define his authority as all- 
embracing, yet local elites knew that this assertion seldom accorded with 
reality. With few exceptions, provincial governors exacted what they 
could from the Emperor and the people, giving as little as possible in 
return. The boundaries of a province usually corresponded with those of 
a petty kingship under a ras (roughly, prince) , and an incumbent ras often 
retained power sufficient to force haile Selassie to appoint him as a
provincial governor. ..Even though .governors lost, the automatic rights to...
keep a private army and to appoint all of their own subordinates in 19^2, 
they continued to x^ ield a fair measure of power - usually through direct 
action in their province rather than by influencing decisions at the 
centre. The same can be said of an awraja (sub-province) governor, who 
was often appointed because he had been a ’vassal’ of the provincial ras. 
Governors tended to have a traditional Church education, and this was 
regarded as an advantage in what was termed the reconciliation of modern 
administrative techniques with tradition. Other traditional officials 
varied widely in their titles, duties and manner of appointment, but can 
generally be termed woreda (district) governors, ballabats and, under them, 
the chlka shums (roughly, village headmen)- who were responsible for 
local tax collections and executing communal decisions. The opportunities 
for corruption under Haile Selassie are illustrated by the fact that, 
while a woreda governor's salary was only Eth. $100 per month, people would 
pay as much as $10,000 for such a governorship in a fertile area*^^
Some of the confusions and anomalies that resulted when a Ministry 
of Interior was superimposed- upon these traditional arrangements will be 
familiar to students of Indirect Rule in Anglophonic Africa* The Ministry 
o.f Interior, begun under .Menelik in. 1909,-was reorganised..In-19^ 2.*. .
Its activities then remained virtually unchanged until 1973* Following a 
French and Italian pattern, Interior has retained public order and security 
powers while losing many of the welfare and technical functions that are 
associated with the police power in America, eighteenth century Prussia 
and, to a large extent, contemporary Germany, nevertheless, many of the 
Ministry's functions continue to overlap with those of the more service- 
oriented ministries and agencies, and the Ministry was therefore able 
to exercise a conservative - or, more accurately, reactionary - influence 
on Government's policies with regard to the rural areas. Young and educated
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administrators were considered unsuitable for employment by the Ministry
of Interior and innovations were not required from its officials, who
regarded established traditions as justifying any action they might wish 
101to take,
A variety of local councils were promulgated, In theory, they were 
designed to introduce a small measure of coordination and"popular part— 
icipation into local administration. Overwhelmingly, they failed to do 
'so: local development committees (lemats) , for example - had only a formal •
existence and were used only occasionally-- and then as an additional
instrument of compulsion - contra an unpublished 19&3 Directive from the
102 ■ ‘Ministry* The interactions of local councils, traditional administrative
arrangements, the Ministry of Interior hierarchy andthe other ministries and 
agencies active in the rural areas added up to an Italian-style unin­
tegrated prefectural system of rural administration* In theory, field 
agents from service ministries are to receive administrative directives 
from the local governor and technical directives from their own ministry, 
activities being coordinated by a bewildering variety of councils* Xn 
practice, there were never-ending quibbles over what constituted an 
.11 administrative'1 or ’’technical11 directive; die Id agents preferred to 
follow the orders of the ministry that paid and promoted them as well as 
preferring the lifestyle of the towns, and they failed to penetrate either 
the countryside or the bureaucratic muddle surrounding them; and, from top 
to bottom, there was no meaningful coordination of government’s rural 
activities* If development-oriented projects were proposed by field 
agents, they were seldom adopted: there was an inbuilt conflict of -
policy goals between suspicious, conservative and authoritarian local 
officials and potential agents of- change sent out from the centre* - Owing- 
to vague and overlapping territorial and administrative boundaries, peas­
ants were often unable to ascertain which tax area, court jurisdiction, 
ballabat, etc. they were subject to. Unofficial channels of communication
became the official ones over time, as bureaucratic confusion fostered
103opportunities for bribes and power struggles. There was, therefore,
little pressure for reform from within the rural bureaucracy. Further, 
as John Cohen and Peter Koehn note, the Emperor and his ministers 
benefitted
from encouraging such conflicts and divisions, because they reduce 
the likelihood that groups in outlying areas will present unified
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demands upon central government institutions and they serve to 
protect central autocratic power from encroachment by strong pro­
vincial rivals. 10^ f
It is against this background that foreign ’experts’ and the Ethiopian 
intelligentsia urged the adoption of non-ascriptive appointment policies, a 
rationalisation of the Ministry of Interior’s structure, and a substantial 
decentralisation of administrative authority. In response to these 
pressures, a fairly radical Local Self-Administration Order was put into 
effect in -1966-, .whiahrauthorised awraja (sub-provincial) councils to 
raise taxes, approve expenditures and dismiss their governors. Displaying 
rare activity, Parliament subsequently rejected the Order but, in what was 
arguably an unconstitutional step, Haile Selassie promulgated a much 
watered-down version of the Order in 1967* The main innovation intro­
duced was the use of councils to supervise the health, public works, 
water and agricultural services supplied by field agents, although the 
lines of accountability were not particularly clear. There matters 
stood until 1973; while the Order was applied experimentally in a few 
awrajas, the budgetary allocations required to make it broadly effective 
were never presented to Parliament. Parliament did, however, have the 
opportunity to reject an Awraja Internal Administration Tax Proclamation,
which would have permitted the councils to collect and allocate the
105minor health and education tscces.
In 1973* growing urban dissatisfaction with Haile Selassie's 
regime - and with maladministration during the Wollo Famine (infra) in 
particular - encouraged the Emperor to promise that funds would be made
available for awraja self-administration and to promulgate the Teklay-
—  106 Gizat provincial/ Administration Order. Under this Order, the order
maintenance-and-record-keeping-powers of the . administrative head of. a 
province, the enderasye, are defined with a greater specificity and 
disaster relief measures are emphasised, as is a limited grant of power 
concerning Ethiopian foreign relations - a tacit recognition of the 
remoteness of the border areas from Addis Ababa. Jurisdictional con­
flicts were bound to arise as a result of expansions in the enderasye’s 
powers over the provincial police and Territorial Army (infra)• Parallel, 
responsibilities were imposed on awraja and woreda chief administrators 
under the 1973 Order. Provincial councils, weighted heavily in favour of 
bureaucrats, were to make recommendations to the enderasye. While this 
Order offered a marked improvement, in terms of specifically defining the
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tasks of high-level officials and in the coordination of Government’s 
rural activities, many crucial provisions were extremely vague. In any 
event, the new style of decentralised administration envisaged by the Derg 
makes the Order largely irrelevant (see Chapter Six).
D. Famine in Wollo
This tragedy, which showed-the depths to which Ethiopian adminis­
tration could sink, was mentioned to Chapter One and. is ably, documented 
in Jack Shepherd's Politics of Starvation. In 1972,a reliable Ministry 
of Agriculture report forecast serious crop failures in Wollo and Tigre 
Provinces. These and other warnings went unheeded by administrators, 
primarily because they came from junior officials. The public first began 
to learn of the crisis when, in February 1973, 1500 starving Wollo 
peasants marched to Addis Ababa and camped in front of the Parliament 
building (and my house). The Governor of Wollo opined that there was 
’’some problem of drought”, but that this was little cause for concern.
An official inspection team was despatched in an attempt to defuse 
Parliamentary and other criticisms; it helpfully concluded, that the 
marchers had been "affected by a shortage of food”. Reports on the 
situation were disseminated through the Ethiopian ’underground’, yet 
Haile Selassie professed to be surprised and "greatly saddened" by 
conditions when he toured Wollo in November. He reportedly issued several 
decrees, including one which would permit starving peasants to regain 
their lands upon repayment of the paltry sums they received from distress
sales. These decrees were not, to ray knowledge, published and they were
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certainly never implemented.
This was all an elaborate smokescreen: when the Director of the
United Nations Development Programme for Ethiopia presented the facts 
concerning the famine to Haile Selassie in the beginning of 1973, he 
found the Emperor surprisingly well-informed. The Emperor’s attitude seemed 
to be that peasants always starve, nothing can be done about it and, in
lo 8any case, it is not the Shoan Amhara who are dying. Wollo peasants had 
eamed his enmity when they spat at him in 1936 for abandoning Ethiopia to 
the Italian invaders; Haile Selassie had a long memory and administrators 
knew it* Since the War, Wollo had been a disfavoured province,in terms 
of the numbers of roads, schools and hospitals that had been built, and it 
had been bound over as the fief of Haile Selassie’s pathetically incompetent
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son, Asfa Wossen. When the National Emergency Relief Committee was re­
activated in April 1973, most of its activities were directed towards
attacking press reports of the famine* Protests in Wollo were met with 
109gunfire.
Reacting to a July 1973 UNICEF report on the situation, the Ethiopian
Vice-Minister of Planning stated:
if we have to describe the situation the way you have in your report 
in order to generate international assistance, then we don't want 
that assistance. The embarrassment to the government. isn* t worth 
it. Is that perfectly clear? 110
Eventually, an uncoordinated international relief effort was mounted, no 
thanks to Ethiopian administrators or workers. The unloading of-grain 
was a priority matter at Ethiopia's ports, but the workers were on 
strike for up to a month at a time, as were railway employees. There 
was a shortage of rolling stock, as many wagons were being used for 
storage purposes. Lorry drivers were engaged in a dispute with Govern­
ment concerning transport fees and refused to haul the grain unless 
they were paid a premium by the foreign donors. In the past, Government 
had acted swiftly to suppress these kinds of expressions of militancy, but 
Haile Selassie's regime had virtually ceased to function as a government.
Troops which could have transported the grain were used to maintain order
ill
among the starving peasants.
In any event, Government officials only allowed relief grains to 
trickle onto the market; as landlords, they did not wish to depress a 
rising grain market. Of the 11,500 tons received In Addis Ababa-in 
November 1973, for example, only 5,800 tons v/as distributed immediately. 
The 20-30,000 tons of grain in commercial warehouses and the 17,000 tons 
held by the Ethiopian Grain Corporation were not commandeered by Govern­
ment; presumably for" the same reason. There v/as also an attempt to have 
much of the relief grain declared unfit for human consumption, so that it 
could be fed to the livestock of- large landowners. Once the grain arrived 
in the rural areas, local administrators would distribute it only if 
their jobs were threatened, and the helicopters provided by aid donors 
were used primarily for joyriding ("inspection tours"). Officials sold 
relief grains locally for treble the price originally paid by the donors, 
often exchanging grain for the peasants' land, valued at as little as 
Eth. $2.50 per acre. Since few people could afford to buy grain locally, 
it was often rebagged by administrators, sent back to a po.rt and exported,
chiefly to Yemen. From 1972 to 197^ ” the height of the famine - Ethiopian
112grain exporis quadrupled.
Many small refugee camps were established in remote areas to keep
starving peasants out of sight. Local administrators refused to permit
these camps to expand, in the hope that they would not become burdened
with additional refugees. As a result, unsanitary campgrounds sprang
up around the perimeter of official camps, and overcrowding created ideal
conditions for the spread of diseases - smallpox, meningitis, dysentery,
pneumonia, typhus, measles (killing children) and cholera. The Ministry
of Health labelled cholera "gastro-enteritis C", because Government
feared that exports would be quarantined and tourism would decline if the
existence of cholera was admitted. . The employees of international agencies
were threatened with deportation if they mentioned cholera and, as a
result, the necessary supplies, particularly intravenous fluids, were
115unavailable locally.
Drought and disease affected Sudan, Kenya and Somalia as well as 
Ethiopia, and only Somalia made no attempt to conceal the disaster. 
Presumably, a desire not to be seen as 'another Sahel* was at work: 
governments reacted to perceived political aspects of the disaster rather 
than to its effects on the people, and relief efforts were virtually 
poisoned by becoming so thoroughly politicised. What distinguished 
Ethiopia from Kenya and Sudan was the magnitude of bureaucratic incom­
petence, callousness, corruption and exploitation, and the failure even
to attempt, to devise an overall plan for the deployment of drought
liZf
relief. The conclusion that "drought, famine and coverup. . .
shattered the Ethiopian people and altered their living patterns as
115surely as any revolution" should be supplemented -by the observation 
that drought became an intimate part of the larger Revolution that un­
folded during and after it (see Chapter Four).
E. What These Analyses Show
Many Ethiopianists have* stressed" that’Haile Selassie inherited a 
system of administration which he lacked the power fundamentally to
change. This proposition must be regarded as dubious at best; our 
analyses have at least demonstrated that it was in the Emperor's political 
best interests to change most administrative arrangements as little as 
possible. In all of our 'case studies', there was a complete absence of
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administrative accountability to the general public: most of the rare and
minor'Parliamentary interventions were by and on behalf of traditional 
elites. Traditional notions of administrative secrecy prevailed in develop­
ment planning activities, the area v/here secrecy is least desirable. The 
formulation of economic policies v/as not guided sensibly through law, 
by modernised institutions backed with a political commitment. Tax 
policies and the relationship between the Ministry of Interior and pro­
vincial elites represent an extension of traditional arrangements, little 
attention having been devoted to the shape of the overall system. The 
surveys of planning, public finance and rural administration illustrate 
the lack of uniformity and coordination in governmental processes, and the 
institutional gaps at the centre and between central, provincial and local
levels of administration. In the area of rural administration in particular
116authority is "blurred, divided, confused, variable, and shifting."
Once traditional political considerations are taken into account, however,
these anarchical practices acquire a certain logic, that of maximising the
opportunities for power struggles and corruption within an overall system
of divide et imperia.
As a result, there could be little administrative development or
development through administration - the rationalisation and expansion
of administrative services for the public benefit. Experiments with
institutional forms, such as took place with regard to planning, the
agricultural income tax and awraja "self-administration", did little to
remedy underlying problems or to forestall a lapse into traditional
practices. John Markakis's evaluation of the..Central- Personnel Agency
can be taken as referring to all of Ethiopia's administrative 'reforms':
. . Designed by experts-from developed countries., it was. conceived.on ‘ 
the most advanced and, consequently, the least compatible level in 
the context of a traditional society. This approach, which often 
works well in the realm of technology, turns out to be an exercise 
in formalism . . . .  In the short-run, the innovation simply fails 
to v/ork, and is commonly regarded with levity by those Involved in 
it. In the longer run, the initial attitude of circumventing . . .  
an unworkable arrangement may become ingrained and thwart meaningful 
reform in the future. 117
Clearly, the experts failed the Ethiopian people although they helped
tradition-reared politicians to help themselves. In Chapter Five, we
register an extreme scepticism towards many of the theories of development
administration, particularly those which advocate the creation of an open
20k
1"LSframework within which administrators will be free to innovate. ‘ The 
Wollo Famine illustrates some of the innovations Ethiopian administrators 
are prepared to introduce where lav/ and political circumstance provide 
such an "open framework". While Wollo probably reflects the outer 
limits of bureaucratic inefficiency, incompetence, corruption and just 
plain cruelty, it is also the kind of situation that ought to have prompted 
such humanitarian sentiments as exist within the bureaucracy.
Anticipating our arguments in Chapter Five, Ethiopian administrative 
law defines a rigid bureaucratic hierarchy which is irrelevant in practice, 
without either imposing legally-obligatory tasks or conferring the power 
necessary to perform them. The law does not tell a bureaucrat what, 
precisely, he is expected to do and then firmly require him to do it on a ■ 
pass/fail basis. The problem is one of creating the balance between
119initiative and obedience (or control) that is appropriate for Ethiopia, 
assuming that appropriate techniques of bureaucratic recruitment and 
socialisation can also be created and supported by a substantial degree 
of political commitment.
From Spear-Throwers to Tanks in the Desert
For many societies, military institutions are an excellent starting
point to an understanding of society as a whole: in ancient Greece,
Rome and feudal Europe for example, military obligations and organisations
strongly influenced politics and relations between strata generally.
This is particularly true in Ethiopia, where chronic internecine warfare
served to foster prominent military skills, virtues and ambitions.
Christian and Muslim alike are vicarious participants in 1300 years of
struggle, and the eventual success of their cause breeds an enormous
self-confidence among the Christian's. Most important government posts
have a-military origin - especially in rural areas - and military culture
permeates Amhara-Tigre social structures: force is seen to generate its
own legitimacy, so long as government maintains large reserves of force
•and does not attempt te -impose * -positive -responsibilities * on -peasants-; *• *
and, military (and Church) occupations have long been regarded as the least
impeded channels of upward social mobility. These attitudes may be
changing, however. In a 1958 survey in Addis Ababa, for example,
soldiers ranked below doctors, engineers, teachers and mechanics in terms
of occupational status, but they were nevertheless ranked above such occu-
120national groups as lawyers, policemen, farmers and clergymen.
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Historically, a relatively small and permanent palace guard was 
supplemented by feudal levies during wartime. These armies, raised by 
provincial governors, would despoil the countryside to conserve supplies 
and, if they lost, the people would take their revenge as individuals 
retreated in disarray. These "spear-chuckers" were organised quickly, 
performed erratically and were dissolved in an instant. Defections and 
desertions were chronic, as a result of shortages in supplies, the death 
of a leader, rumours of crop failures or epidemics, and shifts in alle­
giance during what amounted to civil wars. From Menelik’s time onwards, 
reliable supplies of modern arms became essential to the maintenance of 
military superiority .end, in the. early 1920s, Haile Selassie argued that 
prohibitions on the export of arms to Ethiopia had markedly increased
.the number of "worthless idlers" (presumably a euphemism for shifta or
121bandits)in the provinces.
Haile Selassie was the first emperor successfully to reform trad­
itional notions of military administration (and, to a lesser extent, 
closely related structures of local administration). After World War II, 
a national army was organised as a counterweight to the power of provincial 
elites, and the close connection between governing and military services 
eroded gradually. Localised police forces, nominally controlled from 
the centre, also supplanted some of the personal retainers of provincial 
governors. After I960, however, the Emperor tried to use th<& Territorial 
Army, based in the provinces, to counterbalance the growing assertiveness 
of his regular Army. The attempted coup of i960, which illustrated the 
growing influence and independence of a military which almost succeeded
in taking power, was an attempt "to re-enact the classic praetorian
122play" rather than a revolution. Traditional and modernising elites 
alike lost many of their key members, and Haile Selassie’s subsequent 
policies encouraged a further fragmentation within the military, through 
an accelerated shum-shir and by utilising many different foreign sources
of-weaponry and-training'(see-Chapters One’ and Four) ■ ’• --
The role of the military during Haile Selassie’s reign typifies
Samuel Huntington's "king's dilemma": policies which foster short-term
125successes also served to endanger the monarch's long-term survival. 
Prestige, the maintenance of internal order and deterring Somali am­
bitions required a technological and organisational modernisation of the 
military which, in turn, created a power base potentially rivalling that of
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the Throne* Huge amounts of scarce resources were devoted to military 
modernisation: one of the largest and most efficient African military 
establishments v/as created by devoting 20.95& of the national budget to 
"defense" from .1964 to 1969* This expenditure looms large when compared to 
Ethiopian health and education expenditures of 17-3 1^ and a twelve-state 
African average of S.7% of budgetary expenditures on defense and 21.0?£ 
on health and education* Ethiopia also received a great deal of military 
aid from a variety of donors, the largest of which, the United States, 
contributed half of its African military aid to Ethiopia - $200 
millions. from 1955 to 1975* Ethiopia received 12% o f the. military aid
that went to Africa as a whole. (Other comnarative statistics are
■ ■ 1124' " •  '■ * ■ ■
presented xn the footnote.)
On the eve of the Revolution, Ethiopia’s Ground Forces were organised 
in four Divisions of three battalions each* The First Division (the 
Imperial Bodyguard - trained by White Russians from 1919 to 1930) in 
Addis Ababa, then under the command of Lt. General Abebe Guemeda, comprised
7,000 men and has very modem equipment but little heavy armour. The 
Second Division in Asmara, led by Major General Seyoum Guedle Giorgis and 
comprising 15,000 men, has been concerned primarily with dispiriting 
attempts to control Erirean separatist movements. The Third Division, 
under Major General Nega Tegegne, the husband of one of the Emperor’s 
granddaughters, consisted of 12,000 men and is stationed in the Ogaden 
Desert, near the border with Somalia. The Fourth Division brought 
the Army up to its pre-Revolationary strength of 40,000 and has its 
headquarters in Addis Ababa, in addition to other centres throughout the 
country. It was under the command of Brigadier General Mulatu Yifru. '
Each Division had its own commando and airborne units and a heavy mortar 
company,-while the services of tank, armoured car and engineering bat­
talions and several artillery batallions were allocated as needed. Much of 
the weaponry was outdated (immediately post-World War II) and obtained
from the- -U.S.,. Britain, and Italy. - Most of - the. twelve medium -and 50.....
light tanks (American MoOs and M4ls) and 100 armoured personnel carriers 
were deployed along the Somali border. A Territorial Army of some 5i000 
men under General Belete Abebe v/as composed of young men who gave two 
months ’ active service each year in return for land grants (see Chapter 
Six) • This successor to the feudal levies of provincial elites was under 
the (sometimes tenuous) control of the Minister of Interior and functioned
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as a skeletal paramilitary force designed to supplement the police and
12 r5
keep the regular army m  check.
The 2,000-man Ethiopian Navy v/as re-established after many centuries 
in 1955i when Ethiopia regained access to the Eritrean coastline. It 
consisted of a converted seaplane tender, patrol and torpedo boats and 
landing craft, and v/as commanded by Iskender Desta, a grandson of the 
Emperor who fled to Djibouti during the early stages of the Revolution.
The Air Force, based near Addis Ababa in Debre Zeit, is also small - some
3,000 men - but played a significant role in the i960 coup attempt, the 
1974 Revolution aiid the 1977-78 Somali War. In 1974, it consisted of some 
,37. reliable combat aircraft and was composed of seven squadrons of:, nine 
American supersonic (F-5A) fighters, U.S. fighter-bombers,.British light 
(Canberra) bombers, Swedish prop-driven ground attack craft, American 
prop-driven and jet trainers converted for reconnaissance, British and 
U.S. prop-driven transports, and French jet helicopters. There was a 
certain amount of elitism within the Air Force (and the Imperial Bodyguard) 
and many officers became sympathetic towards student radicalism while
*| g ^
attending University courses.
Ethiopia’s national police force, organised in 1942 and re-organised
when it was separated from the Ministry of Interior in 1970, totals about
30,000, plus a 10,000-strong paramilitary and extremely mobile carabinieri.
Police in the major towns are fairly efficient, but most provincial
policemen perform their functions in a traditional fashion. Most of them
are, for example, unable to read and write and thus keep few records.
The lines of police command are extremely blurred, particularly as
governors regularly tried to augment their vague powers over the police
within their locality. The police took little part in the 1974 Revolution.
They have a lowly status because they are regarded as arbitrary and venal
censors of behaviour who are not involved in the important task of 
127national 'defense'. - — ----- . - —  - - ----- ' ■
■ For purposes of a-brief comparison,--Somalians -armed’ forces totalled’- 
some 25,000 in July 1977* They were armed v/ith 175 ancient Russian T-34 
heavy tanks and about 100 modern T-54/5 medium tanks, 310 armoured personnel 
carriers, 14 Soviet torpedo boats, 44 MiG 15s and 17s and 12 MiG ^iSa 
This gross imbalance in weaponry was more than redressed during the 
course of the Ethio-Somalia War: estimates of deliveries to Ethiopia from
the Soviet Union include a few T-60 tanks, 200 to 300 T54/5 tanks, 50 
T-34 tanks, 200 armoured cars, up to 60 MiG 21s and 20 of the advanced
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MiG 23s, 28 lorry-mounted "Stalin organ" multiple rocket launchers (used 
to great effect in Angola), and a variety of Sam anti-aircraft missies.
By the end of the War, Ethiopia had 100.000 men effectively under arms
and the Soviet Union had contributed U.S. $500 to 1,000 millions in
H.2 8military aid. Ethiopia’s is unquestionably the best-armed military 
in Black Africa.
Lefever argues that:
Acutely aware of the uncomfortably close historic tie between 
military power and political ambition, Haile Selassie sought 
assiduously to develop in the military service ;a recognition of their 
instrumental role and the habit of unquestioning obedience to the 
..... crown. .129 .. . . .  . • « ■
A tenuous loyalty was maintained by encouraging dissension in the ranks
and through land grants to and direct Imperial patronage for favoured
officers. Beginning in the early 1970s however, demands which were
immune to these traditional means of satisfaction and control were
130exerted by young and better-educated bureaucratic and military elites.
In 19731 Haile Selassie responded to these pressures by attempting to 
modernise and rationalise the law governing the military.
A. Law and Military Organisation
The Army Proclamation of 1944 and the Territorial Army Order of
1958 deal only vaguely with such matters as military organisation, powers
131of commanding officers, discipline and courts martial; the 1973 
legislation was designed to fill in the numerous gaps without signifi­
cantly truncating the Emperor's powers. The Defense Establishment
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Reorganization Order of 1973 created an explicit chain of command: 
Emperor, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, Chief of Staff and the 
Commanders of the Army, Air Force and Navy. Upv/ard channels of communi­
cation are also established in reverse order (Art. 6). This lengthy 
command structure is .the one that was theoretically utilised heretofore, 
except for. tbekinse.ptioh. .of .the. Prime Minister:.', this was presumably .an 
attempt to build, up the authority of that office and to discourage the 
traditional tendency to confer directly with the Emperor 011 all matters.
In the past, the Minister of Defense (usually a General) occasionally 
found Commanders and the Chief of Staff unresponsive to his commands, and 
Article 4 of the Order places these officers under the Minister's 
"authority, direction and control". The powers of Commanders and the
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Chief of S£aff are defined vaguely while the Minister’s enumerated, res­
ponsibilities are reduced to those of coordinating "Defense Establish­
ment" efforts and issuing regulations which "better implement" the Order. *^3 
These legal changes seem to have been an ambiguous response to the demands 
of senior officers for greater autonomy for the various branches of the 
military.
The Armed Forces Promotion, Obligatory Service and Dismissal Regul- 
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ations of 1973 clarify the equivalent ranks in the three services, 
specify the minimum time to-be spent in each-rank, -and create a Board 
composed of at least five senior officers which recommends promotions 
to the Emperor'for the senior ranks (Arts. 4-6', 9, 12). A’three-man 
Dismissal Board recommends the action to be taken in the event of sub­
stantial nonperformance of duty, moral or professional dereliction, or 
general unsuitability. The Board’s recommendation can, hov/ever, be 
ignored by the relevant commander, the Minister or the Emperor (Arts.
26, 31-3)• The Schedules to the Regulations establish a promotion points' 
system and state that promotions are to meet military needs and "to 
reward officers with appropriate and fair advancement according to their 
merits". The Police Force Administration Order and the Police Officers 
Promotion, Obligatory Service and Dismissal Regulations exactly parallel
the Order and Regulations governing the Military, and equivalent police-
135military ranks are established. These laws were obviously designed 
to counter the criticism*, that discriminatory promotion policies were 
pursued among branches of the •m-H-it-ary- and- that favoured persons rose 
rapidly without regard to their ability while other officers were, by 
Third World standards, promoted too slowly. The Regulations did nothing, 
however,, to alter the Emperor’s widely criticised traditional policy of 
shum-shir, which served to eliminate such military (and general adminis­
trative) efficiency as might have resulted from long job- experience- and 
. the. consistent application jof’ policy. This traditional practice - later*/.'. _ 
termed "divide and rule" by the Derg - was one of the major justifications 
cited for the deposing of Hail.e Selassie (see Chapter Five)-.
Emperors had heretofore utilised an ad hoc conscription in times of
136emergency. The National Military Service Proclamation Of 1973 ' v/as 
promulgated with modern manpower requirements in mind. Under the Proc­
lamation, all men are required to register after their nineteenth birth­
day, are subject to induction between the ages of 20 and 21, and may be 
required to serve for two years’ active duty, three years’ ready reserve 
and ordinary reserve duty up to age 45 (Arts. 4,7,10). The National
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Military Service Boards Order of 1973, designed to strengthen defense and 
to "direct and coordinate" the activities of young men, established 
Induction and Assignment Boards at the awraja, Teklay Gisat and national 
levels.157
Despite the elaborate nature of these statutory changes, they in
no way restricted the Emperor’s traditional powers: until the Revolution,
his personal supervision of the military continued to follow the patterns
found in such other monarchical-military states as Morocco, Iran, Jordan
and. Saudi Arabia. Article 29 of the 1955 Constitution was little more
than a restatement of the Emperor’s broad traditional military powers,
while the military was cast in the classic Western constitutional role of ‘
neutrality and isolation from political activity. It is interesting to
note that the Derg has not abrogated the 1973 statutes we have discussed.
Arguably, the vagueness of these statutory provisons allow free rein to
conflicts within the Derg and law could not, in any event, regulate an
essentially political process of reorienting the military after the
Revolution. Ethiopian military lav/, like that of many other African
states, thus fails clearl5r to define the role of the military and to
provide meaningful rules of discipline or the means by which new pro-
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cedures and institutions can be created.
B. The Military as Others Saw It
A review of academic thinking about the Ethiopian military from
1964 to 1970 reveals a swift politicisation within the military - as
well as the hazards attending attempts to predict political events in
the Third World. V/riting in 1970, Lefever finds that, within the Ethiopian
military, the "growing dedication to professionalism has increased
efficiency but has not led to uniformity in political outlook". He
concludes, however, that loyalty to Haile Selassie and its role in
promoting social.stability mean that the military is "more patriotic
than conspirational", "Keynesian rather than Marxist", and pragmatic and
experimental rather than ideological. Likewise in 1970, Van Den Berge
contended that the Ethiopian military is not an independent source of
power or policy, and that its role remains the historic one of supporting
139particular pretenders to the Throne during succession crises.
These kinds of conclusions are probably the result of analysing the 
predilections of senior officers; promotions based on ascriptive criteria
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engendered loyalty to the aristocracy, if not to the Emperor. Although 
aware of the education and generation gap between senior and junior 
officers, Lefever, like many Third 'world analysts before him, under­
estimated the junior officers' and NCOs’ capacity to mount a coup- The 
younger, more ambitious and better educated members of the Ethiopian 
military are recruited primarily from urban middie-income strata, have 
close links with the modernising bureaucratic elite, and rejected the 
anti-technological and feudal traditions espoused by their senior officers*
In the end* the Derg rejected the traditional politics of the privileged 
few, rather than the whole of Haile Selassie's authoritarian ethos* This 
rejection, was based on .the. strong patriotism .observed, by Lefever, with
the Ethiopian people and the enduring nation being exchanged for the
llOEmperor as the object of the Derg’s patriotism - a Pandora's Box which 
was, for example, opened in Korea by‘-General Douglas MacArthur.
In 1969i J.M. Lee argued that:
The Sudan and Ethiopia have a sufficiently distinctive political 
culture to enable them to find a satisfactory role for their 
security forces. Both, especially the latter, are vulnerable to a 
military revolution which claims to reconstruct the social system.
But neither has an army which is likely to behave as an autonomous 
organization. A breakdown in the structure of command is unlikely 
in countries which have such a high degree of homogeneity, and where 
the security forces are closely integrated into the political system, l^ fl
Although carefully hedged by qualifications, the thrust of Lee's argument
is defective in several particulars that are discernible even without
the benefit of hindsight. The "satisfactory role" of a military is,of
course, a matter of definition, and the definition of those with the
preponderance of power resources ultimately will be adopted. Given the
prominence of military culture in Ethiopian political life, it is control
over coercive capacities which will determine this issue (but not necessarily
others), and by a lengthy process, the Derg succeeded in wresting control
from Haile Selassie. The homogeneity and integration perceived by Lee
were, simply .non-existent.... There were' ■numerous>.and disparate'c.uAtur al. *.» .
groups represented in the lowest ranks of the military, who were mostly
peasants recently migrated to towns; senior Amhara (particularly Shoan
Amhara) officers found themselves increasingly unable to dictate the
course of military events, especially as junior officers were increasingly
recruited from other ethnic groups; there were marked divergences in
educational attainment, foreign military training, ideology and" age; and,
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because of the nature of shum-shir and patron-client relations, there
v/as an extremely low level of political integration, even when compared
to the military establishments of many other Third World states.
In the short run, these factors prevented members of the military
from claiming a political role but, once cooperation was secured on
matters of common interest such as salaries and conditions of service,
the Derg suddenly sensed the fulL measure of its power, realising that
it could perform its tasks for its own purposes rather than those of
Haile Selassie (see Chapter Four). As Claude Welch,. Jr. notes:
the 'disposition to intervene' is «, • . prompted by evidence of'
political weakness, but is ultimately acted upon as a result of
• slights upbii -the armed forces or- the'belief that -the country - -add ‘ 
its military - would be better served by direct military control. 142
Writing in 1968, Donald Levine found that the Ethiopian military was
interested In playing a political role, and is the only institution Hthat
is simultaneously traditional, modern and national". He felt, however,
143that its capabilities were so low as to preclude political involvement. 
Levine misjudged his subject: like the military in other African states,
Ethiopia's v/as already equipped, training, motivated and employed in an 
essentially internal security role, and cooperation between units created
both the political ability and the will to exercise this pre-existing
144capacity to rule. Whether this cooperation will continue, in view 
of the determined opposition faced by the Derg, is another matter. 
Arguably, the minimal unity that has been achieved within the military 
results from a recognition of the abyss into which civil war would plunge 
the country. This perception, fears of a brutal leadership and the con­
tinuing need to counter insurrections and invasions are likely to promote 
at least a minimal degree of unity in the foreseeable future (see Chapters 
Four and Five)•
Margery Perham offered a safer conclusion ’than Levine's: it is
impossible to predict" any future role for the Ethiopian' military-because
J'"the‘ fixturev of‘■ 'ail' armies Is* in question". *' Highest '"marks' for pf*e- ■"
science go .to Morris Janovitz who, after identifying the crucial weaknesse
of the Ethiopian military from the standpoint of political potential
as domination by subjective authority and a lack of group solidarity,
concluded in 1964 that:
the authoritarian-personal type of control, as in the case of 
Ethiopia, is a format which cannot produce the conditions for 
modernization and which seems certain to be swept aside by some form 
of collective leadership - civil or, more likely, military. 146
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While the divergence between academic opinion and the subsequent 
realities of the Ethiopian military's political role serves as a warning
not to venture too far into the thicket of theory and pseudo-theory
1^7concerning coups and revolutions, we shall nevertheless attempt to 
trace some of the causes and effects of the Ethiopian Revolution in the 
next Chapter# Ethiopian constitutional law failed to promote a primarily 
political development, largely because it failed to deal meaningfully 
with the emerging power of modernisers within the bureaucracy and the 
military# Like its constitutional law, Ethiopia’s administrative and - 
military, law was based on Western models which were irrelevant to 
Ethiopian political preoccupations. One effect of this irrelevance was 
that administrative law failed to foster a primarily economic develop** 
ment under state guidance, notwithstanding the ’reforms' that were 
adopted on the advice of Western ’experts’# Firm distinctions cannot 
be drawn between politics, administration and soldiering in Ethiopia; 
likewise, the prospects for political and for economic development 
are closely linked and dependent upon the new types of public law 
that have been adopted by the Derg since 197^»
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Chapter 4: The Emerging Military State
In this Chapter we shall explore the ways in which revolution came 
to Ethiopia, the ideas, policies and strategies of the groups involved, 
and the extent to which these events have changed Ethiopian politics as 
practised under Haile Selassie. At the beginning of 1974, the Crown of 
the Lion of Judah seemed to sit easily on the 82-year-old Emperor's head.
He was old but then, as Robert Seidman remarked in 1969, the second gener­
ation of Ethiopian students who were awaiting the Emperor's death had begun 
to attend American universities. Little change was foreseen after the 
Emperor's demise, even by Ethiopian Marxists. By the end of 1974, however, 
after "a series of piecemeal strokes,"^ it became apparent that an Ethiopian 
Revolution was in the making. The military's intentions went far beyond 
the replacement of elites that motivates many coups d ' etat; profound 
changes in the distribution of wealth and power proceeded under what is
arguably the most radical political programme to be implemented in Africa 
2
to date.
The events occurring since 1974 are hardly without precedent in 
Ethiopia: Europe first learned something of this troubled country's long
history of political assassinations, coups and “revolutions" from Father 
Jerome Lobo In 1659* Serious attempts were made to overthrow Haile Selassie 
in 1943, 1947, 1951 and 1967, and the abortive coup of i960 had come to 
within an ace of succeeding. The traumas of I960 very much coloured urban 
politics during the 1960s and early 1970s: a quietism prevailed, except
among students. There were other significant anti-regime groups - 'liberal' 
elements in the military, bureaucratic modernisers, frustrated midd1e-income 
groups (including much of organised labour), exploited unskilled workers 
and the unemployed - but they lacked leadership and the ability to cooper­
ate for a common purpose. There was widespread suspicion at large.among, 
groups and individuals, a.fear of manipulation in the interests of others,
'and an awareness thdt their Impact'on' trad i f tonal pol l tics had 'hi therto
3been confined to riots or general displays of unrest.
The omens were thus inauspicious for revolution in 1974, but only 
because the full extent to which the liabilities of Haile Selassie's regime 
had accumulated was not appreciated (see Chapter Three) . Government faced 
growing difficulties in accommodating the conflicting demands of different 
groups through the traditional means that had always worked before. In
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197^, through a policy drift that was, perhaps, literally fatal for Haile 
Selassie, some of the demands of groups opposed to the regime were met.
The result was an explosion of further demands which outstripped the 
ability to grant or to repress them within existing political arrangements. 
While the events of 197^ reflected deep-seated grievances produced by the 
processes of social stratification and ethnic fragmentation at work during 
the last eighty years (see Chapter One), they were sparked off more imme­
diately by the self-interest of the military, the catastrophe of rural 
famine (see Chapter Three) and the hardships caused by inflation in the 
urban areas. Economic and social crises were abruptly transferred to the 
political arena precisely because of the widespread indifference and in­
competence displayed by (largely undifferentiated) politicians and bureau­
crats. The poorest of city dwellers had little to lose and, seemingly, 
everything to gain by revolting, while the better-ofv saw a chance to 
improve their positions in relation to traditional elites.
5
I, The Creeping Coup
Haile Selassie's last chance to enjoy the role of an elder statesman 
came during the Tenth Anniversary of the Organisation of African Unity. 
During the feasting in Addis Ababa to mark this event at the end of 1973, 
and while the relatively well-fed residents of the city were watching 
(on television sets installed in the main squares) the proceedings at 
Africa Hall (the main entertainment being the clowning of Idi Amin - a 
sight hardly conducive to Pan-African feelings among Addis Ababans), an 
enormous number of people were starving to death as a result of drought 
and administrative neglect in northern and central Ethiopia. University 
teachers went to Wollo Province to investigate, and the news and photos 
they brought back - of unburied dead and children suckling dead mothers - 
-were g:i ven’ a. wi.de. but cl andes.t 1 he cl rcuTaf Ion fh ‘.the cl ty/- Njaf relief ' 'V' 
effoTtS; coul d be' prgants.ed because-Government.. conti nue.d. adamantly to deny 
the existence of the drought, until the teachers' efforts were publicised 
by foreign journalists-. These reports, by what Government termed "irre­
sponsible rumour-mongers", received physical confirmation when refugees 
began to reach Addis Ababa. City dwellers only clenched their fists at 
first, but they began to realise that significant segments of Government 
were not functioning in relation to the drought. Wollo came to mirror 
everything that was wrong with the State: "Arrogance, indifference,
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incompetence, and amour-propre. . .
Retail prices of food and drink in Addis Ababa had increased by 68% 
from 1963 to 1971 while incomes remained fairly static among the lower 
strata. The Wollo drought caused substantial further grain price increases, 
as less grain was harvested and nobles and middlemen hoarded their stocks 
in expectation of additional price increases, While "bread riots" in 
ancient Rome and medieval European cities had prompted governments vir­
tually to eliminate the role of middleman, Haile Selassie failed to do so 
and the Derg, learning from the events of 197*1, began to nationalise grain 
collection and distribution in 1975- The combination of famine and infla­
tion also caused a breakdown in the system under which the Emperor bought 
off elites through grants of land.^ Disloyalty began to look more attrac­
tive as the rewards for loyalty diminished.
A. February 197*+
Ministers and MPs had granted themselves substantial salary increases, 
but the public outcry that followed led to an announcement, on 1 February, 
that these "allowances" would be diverted to famine relief efforts.
Another storm erupted when the Ministry of Commerce announced a 50% in­
crease in the price of petrol. The public concluded that international 
developments surrounding the Arab oil embargo did not justify so large an 
increase (this was later confirmed by the Ministry), and taxidrivers went 
on strike on 18 February. They were joined by students and other city 
dwellers in the stoning of buses and large private cars - particularly 
those of ministers and the nobility. The city was effectively paralysed 
yet the police winked at the whole affair, recognising that more than the 
price of petrol was involved. The bus company was rumoured to belong 
(and this was later confirmed) to members of the royal family and other 
aristocrats, and attacking the buses was a way of showing the protestors 1 
■fee 14ngs’ about-■ tJYe&e“-peopKev ' ..Teachers bad, .freeh pn. s.tr i_kje<;a;nd, they ^ere: . 
joined by various wildcat strikers. In an attempt at placation, Govern­
ment offered to negotiate with the teachers, announced token anti-inflation­
ary measures and a nominal petrol price reduction, City dwellers were not 
mollified; they were beginning to see what seemed to be a once-in-a-1 Ifetime 
opportunity. The Revolution had begun, as many do, with unplanned dis­
orders which destroyed the stable expectations of the public a'nd the myth
o
of the regime's invincibility.
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In spite of the rising expectations of townspeople, Government 
continued to feel secure in its power to dictate to them. A clear illus­
tration of this political insensitivIty was the release of a World Bank- 
sponsored Education Sector Review during these unsettled times, on 22 
February. Parents (taking the part of their radicalized children, prob­
ably for the first time) joined with students and the striking teachers 
in denouncing the Review. Rejecting the official view that a termination 
of state-funded education at the primary school level would be more 
"relevant" to Ethiopians needs, these groups -convincingly argued that • 
such a policy would perpetuate the status quo for generations to come, 
depriving the urban poor of the slender chance they had to improve their 
socio-economic status. Taken aback by the depth of feeling that had been 
aroused, Government announced on 28 February that implementation of the
Q
Review had been "postponed".
In the meantime, the military had demanded, and received, a salary 
increase on 2k February, pledging their gratitude and loyalty to the 
Emperor on the following day. Privates and NCOs had become dissatisfied 
with salary rises received in 1973: Eth. $7 per month extra did not keep
pace with inflation, and officers had received $200-$300 (and ministers 
$700) per monthl^ The salary of a private rose another Eth. $18 to $100 
a month (Eth. $2.08 = U.S. $1), and civilians complained widely that the 
Emperor was bribing his way out of a coup, at the taxpayer's expense. It 
was learned a few days Inter that the Emperor had been placed in a diffi­
cult position: the Fourth Brigade of the Fourth Division (stationed...
along the Somali border and then accounting for^ sofrle 60% of the country's 
armour) had mutinied, arrested their officers and petitioned the Emperor 
for better living conditions in the barracks. Senior officers sent from 
Addts to investigate were also detained, and they became extremely ill 
when they were forced to share the troops' water and food,
;• The' pay . i'ncreas’e. did'*not sat j sfy the Secprtd DTvis ion i-h Asmara-, Where • 
officers were arrested, the city was taken over and the airport and public 
buildings were closed. Twenty-three'demands were cabled to the Emperor, 
concerned mainly with such parochial questions as military pay, clothing 
and food, and another high-ranking military delegation was dispatched and 
detained by the rebels on 26 February. A second pay increase was then 
granted four days after the first.
Under Haile Selassie, officials were often dismissed, but resignation
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was regarded as an act of disloyalty to the Throne. The resignation of 
the entire Cabinet of Prime Minister Aklilu Habte Wold on 26 February was 
therefore not only unprecedented but unthinkable. Both the times and the 
Emperor had changed, however, and he quietly accepted the resignations and 
invited the President of the Senate, General Abiye Abebe, to propose a new 
Cabinet. Owing to rumours - probably unfounded - that the Army favoured 
Lij Endalkatchew Mekonnen as Prime Minister, he was duly appointed on 
28 February and Abiye became Minister of Defense. Zewde Gebre Selassie, 
an historian resident at Oxford, took over the Interior Ministry and Imru 
Michael - the son of Haile Selassie's leftist contemporary, the "Red Ras"
- became Commerce Minister. These members of the nobility were extremely 
popular among the older educated Ethiopians. A cbuple of those chosen 
were reappointed from Aklilu's Cabinet, including the popular Foreign 
Minister, Dr. Minassie Haile.
B. March 197**
The balance of Aklilu's Cabinet was detained by the military, nomin­
ally because they had deserted the Emperor but probably in response to 
public demonstrations against their incompetence and venality. City 
dwellers were bewildered when representatives of the military handed the 
former ministers over to the Emperor on 1 March, Haile Selassie promised 
to deal with them and thanked the soldiers for their "unswerving loyalty",
treating their actions during February as traditional petitions to the
11 * - . ..
Throne. 'He also mentioned the receipt of statements oFToyalty from
every province and district. These same groups were to send similar messages
to the Derg in September.
Endalkatchew - young by previous standards, Oxford-educated, a noble­
man and son of a Prime Minister - addressed the nation and invoked the 
names., of the last four Emperors whi 1 e. arguing that Ethiopia had Ha sacred 
'Her i tage of-uni t/ Xo-* preserve*"1 The rtew.\Prime Minister bbta*in£d I httTe.' 
support from students and teachers however, and pamphlets were quickly 
distributed in Addis Ababa, accusing him of making education Inaccessible.* 
to the poor (as Minister of Education), of exploiting the poor (as one of 
the major landowners in Addis Ababa), and of unlawful self-enrichment (as 
Commerce Minister). Early in March, 3,000 people marched in Addis Ababa 
and demanded his dismissal. Endalkatchew reportedly convinced Haile 
Selassie that a new constitution was needed, one which reflected recent
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developments. On 5 March, the Emperor announced over the radio that a 
new constitution would be drafted, in order to make the Prime Minister 
directly responsible to Parliament and to "further guarantee" the rights 
of the people (see Chapter Five).
in spite of leaflets dropped by Army helicopters - which, people 
were heard to observe, could drop other things as well - calling for land 
reform, the establishment of political parties and freedom of the press 
and assembly, it was clear that the unrest in the military camps had sub­
sided. The hew Cab I net‘was immediately faced with a new civilian crises, 
however. The Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Unions (CELU - see Chapter 
Seven) backed up Its sixteen-point ultimatum with threats of a general 
strike. While work stoppages traditionally accompany pleas for "justice 
and mercy" in Ethiopia, a general strike was unheard of until March 7, 
when CELU's three-day ultimatum expired. Teachers and taxidrive*"s were 
still on strike, and townspeople began to feel the effects of the general 
strike as one commodity or service after another became unavailable. A 
settlement of sorts was reached with Government on 10 March, although 
teachers and telecommunications, civil aviation, Municipality and Finance 
Ministry employees remained on strike for a while longer,
Many peasants had migrated to Addis Ababa because of the famine and 
had a chance to observe the general strike. Finding only poverty and 
unemployment in the city, they returned to the countryside bearing tales 
of Haile Selassie's vacillations. The patterns of urban politics commonly 
found in other countries began to emerge in Addis Ababa: an organised
group - CELU - began pursuing its own interests - more jobs, minimum wages 
and lower food prices - within the existing framework and at the expense 
of others - the peasants. As virtually the only organised element in 
civilian society, CELU viewed the course of events as favouring them.
Its l.eader, Be.yene Solomon, told A.fr?ca magazine- that;.  ^ ~ v  .•
We dan hot say that'-the [Ethiopian] labour rnbveme'nt is-devoid of ‘ 
politics. But before now we had been busy organising our members.
1 think we have now reached a stage where we can have an influence 
on the way the country Is run. We hope that . . .  we may be able 
to form a political party.^
As we will see in Chapter Seven, things did not turn out as Byene expected.
Prior to the turn of the century, any sign that an emperor was losing
a firm grip on the reins of power was a sign for official rebellion (see
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Chapter One). Under a more centralised monarchy, however, a sign of weak­
ness (such as the onset of Menelik's illness in 1908) prompted more extreme 
forms of bureaucratic inertia, caused by official fears of retaliation by 
the Emperor or his successor. Further, most politicians had remained torpid 
and passive since the I960 coup, under the carrots and sticks wielded so 
adroitly by Haile Selassie. Endalkatchew's Cabinet was incapable of break­
ing out of these patterns to take decisive action; it could only vacillate 
between small concessions and tentative attempts at repression,. This lack 
of continuity in the Cabinet's policies is the most dangerous course a 
traditional (and colonial) polity can pursue: the hopes of moderates were
dashed, traditionalists were disconcerted and revolutionaries were able
13to project an image of a two-faced Government,
A few decisions were made, however: an austerity budget on 22 March,
the establishment on 26 March of an Enquiry Commission to investigate offi­
cial misdeeds (see Chapter Five) and, on 28 March, a salary increase for 
low-paid Government employees - but these measures were not taken seriously. 
On 21 March, Endalkatchew announced the appointees to the Constitutional 
Conference that, with a few worthy exceptions, consisted of feudal land­
lords and ex-Ministers. Observers immediately and correctly concluded 
that the new Constitution (see Chapter Five) would be a lukewarm attempt 
to pacify rather than to satisfy the people. An abortive coup reportedly 
occurred on 25 March.
C . April to September 197^
in view of what had been happening, April was a logical time for 
Haile Selassie to attempt to settle the perennial question of succession 
to the'Throne. Zara Yacob, an Oxford student and the eldest son of the 
incompetent and partially-paralysed Crown Prince^ was to succeed to the 
Thrqhe'if the P'Pinee "decfares his i nab TV ity of uhwi’l 1 ifTgness';- ; The''
Emperor's failure previously to spell out the succession had been cited 
as indicative of an attitude of "apres Moi, le deluge"; in 1973, a waggish 
novelist put it into Haile Selassie's mouth that "apres Moi, les soldats".
For the first time, Parliament began to try to act like a parliament 
(see Chapter Three): it refused to listen to the Prime Minister's set
pieces and, on 10 April, demanded answers to hard questions, the rights 
to choose the Cabinet and form political parties, and adequate guarantees
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of Parliamentary free speech. Eight M.P.s went too far, however, when they 
petitioned the soldiers for the release of the former Ministers (who had 
been detained again on 28 April) on 26 June. The indignant military re­
sponded by detaining the M.P.s and a number of other officials, ex-officials 
and members of the nobility. The number of detainees had now swollen con­
siderably beyond the initial twenty-five, and the military grew increasingly 
suspicious of Parliament.
April was a month of demonstrations: on the eleventh, some 10,000
Addis Ababans protested against their Mayor, who was dismissed that evening. 
When Muslims began a march in support of a genuine religious freedom and 
a separation of Church and State on 21 April, students and other residents 
of Addis Ababa swelled their numbers to an estimated 100,000 - the largest 
demonstration in the country's history. The spate of strikes and demonstra­
tions began to decline - many smaller ones than those mentioned had taken 
place - soon after the University was closed, for "academic" reasons, on 
25 April. Government began to feel strong enough to issue stern warnings 
against further strikes, backed by the mysterious Committee for National 
Security, within the Ministry of Defence, that threatened CELU with dis­
solution.
Addis Ababa began to quiet down and the military seemingly kept out 
of Government affairs: at the end of June the soldiers reiterated that
the pay increases had satisfied them. Early in March, the Second Division 
in Asmara had sent a message to all units stating that, as their demands 
had been fully met, they would not support the politically-motivated de­
mands of others. In retrospect, it can be seen that this period of 
apparent calm was being used by new leaders within the military to con­
solidate the support of their colleagues and the public, who flooded the 
ba.rracks with messages of%approval and support.
• By1;July, the mi t i-tary'felt-conf ident ehougV to H>egi h-to assert their " *
power and to communicate directly with the public. On the third, they sub­
mitted "proposals" to the Emperor "concerning the welfare of the nation."
These included: a large-scale political amnesty; permitting exiles to
return; speeding up the promulgation of the new Constitution; and allow­
ing an Armed Forced Coordinating Committee, which had become popularly 
known as the Derg - variously D i rg, Dergue and DIrgue, a hitherto 1ittle- 
used Amharic word meaning "committee"- to maintain contacts with Government 
officials. The Emperor accepted these proposals and acceded, on July 5th,
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to the Derg's request that Lieutenant General Aman Michael Andom replace 
General Abiye as Chief of Staff and Minister of Defense. It has been widely 
rumoured that Abiye was planning rightist putsch w? th Endalkatchew and, 
on 22 July, the Derg accused Endalkatchew of fostering dissent within the 
military, hindering reforms and sympathising with arrested ex-officials. 
Haile Selassie dismissed the Prime Minister and appointed Lij Michael Imru, 
who was considered to be much more radical, in his place, Endalkatchew 
and nine other officials were detained on August 1st,
- Now that the coup was definitely under way, the Derg took steps to 
protect itself from potential opposition. It also became unclear which 
policies came from the Cabinet and which emanated from the Derg - a con­
venient confusion In a coup situation. On July 31st, the Derg prohibited 
all public meetings, except for those convened for the sole purpose of 
supporting the new slogan of Ethiopia Tikdem or "Ethiopia First" (infra) . 
This motto had been announced as the basic guideline of the Military 
movement, although little elucidation of this esoteric phrase was provided 
at that time. A curfew was also established and the Derg announced the 
takeover of the public radio stations in order to better propagate its 
v i ews.
Subsequent events include the nomination and appointment of Prime 
Minister Michael's Cabinet on 3 August and the completion of the proposed 
Constitution, which was presented to the Prime Minister on August 6th and 
summarised in the nation's few newspapers (see Chapter Five), Over a 
short period of time, the balance of pol itical- forces and the expectations 
of city dwellers had changed so radically that the Draft Constitution be­
came obsolete. New demands were for fundamental change rather than patch­
work reforms. Urban indignation over a Constitution which reserved real 
power for the Emperor showed clearly that the Monarchy was being blamed 
-for 'the'crfses' faced 'By’"Ethiopiaf ■ The’1)raft. Consti fut ion hel ped Add i s 
Ababans to forfhulate their desiderata rfiore concretely,- thereby accel eratTng'' 
the pace of this on-and-off revolution once again. The Church, through 
its Abuna (Patriarch), announced its opposition to the "letter and spirit" 
of the Constitution on 17 August, particularly those provisions requiring 
a separation of Church and State,
On 16 August, the military began gradually to tighten Its grip - or, 
rather, to loosen the grip of^Haile Selassie - on the country,1 Jet fighters
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screamed overhead in Addis Ababa, with tanks, armoured cars and lorries 
filled with troops parading to the cheers of the people. Rumours of 
discord between the Air Force and the rest of the military were thus 
dispelled. The abolition of the Corwn Council and the Emperor's Chilot 
Court (see Chapter Three) and personal Ministry was announced, and all 
Imperial palaces were made public property. The institutions that had 
been proof of the grandeur and worldly success of the Emperor, his offi­
cials and others who made their fortunes by ingratiating themselves were 
now described' by the military as proof of the corruption and irremediable 
decadence of the regime.
Many companies belonging to aristocrats and Government officials 
were nationalised during August and September, in a move calculated to 
undermine their prestige and power. These nationalisations were not 
regularised under law until March 1975 (see Chapter Seven), On 5 September 
197** the Emperor was accused of embezzling public funds through the St. 
George's Brewery and the Haile Selassie I Prize Trust; both were promptly 
turned over the Ministry of Finance, Another scathing attack followed on 
September 11th, when it was alleged that the Emperor was hoarding gold 
bullion worth Eth, $3,000 millions in Swiss bank vaults; the Haile Selassie 
I Foundation was also nationalised, A carefully-orchestrated campaign 
culminated in a television programme on the evening of the .11th, in which 
pictures of peasants dying of starvation were juxtaposed with those of 
the Emperor and his guests lifting champagne glasses at lavish feasts.
While it was clear that Haile Selassie would never again be an abso­
lute monarch, few townspeople were prepared for a radio announcement the 
next day, September 12, that the Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah 
and Elect of God had been deposed. Proclamation No. 1 of 197*1 (a new 
beginning) was quickly issued to emphasise this fact, and to "suspend" 
the - 1955 Sonst rtutdbhj dT'Ssol ve-"'ParTfarrtent and’ sketdh -the* berg 's: "new-roles 
(see Chapter F i v e ) T h e  tmperor was driven away in a battered Volkswagen' 
to a comparatively-1uxurious detention. Searches of Jubilee Palace dis­
closed over $100,000 in small notes, presumably used to reward retainers 
and informants, stuffed into nooks and crannies. Little more was heard 
of Haile Selassie until 25 August 197*1, when his death, officially attri­
buted to the aftereffects of a prostate operation, was announced. It is 
impossible to determine what happened, and the Derg had littlfe to gain
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(or lose) by killing him at that stage. Circumstances were suspicious: 
none of the Emperor's three doctors was allowed to view the body, no post 
mortem was announced and the manner of disposing of the body was never 
public i sed.
Although Asfa Wossen (the Crown Prince) and some of the Emperor's 
grandchildren were living abroad, many members of the royal family were 
detained several months before he was deposed. Repeated rumours that they 
were to be executed prompted massive international protests, but have 
proved groundless to date (apart from those executed in November 197** - 
see infra). Amnesty International reports that they are living in over­
crowded and unsanitary conditions and lack adequate medical attention,
1 5although they are treated much better than the many other detainees,
D . An Interpretation
This was the way the. last of the world's absolute monarchies ended, 
not with a bang and hardly with a whimper. Many of the conditions commonly 
held to attend revolutionary coups were absent in Ethiopia, There were 
economic tensions but few of the disorientations associated with moderni­
sation, simply because little modernisation had taken place. The mere 
existence of the Ethiopian military could hardly constitute "a radical 
criticism of the existing policital system"^; many of the aspects of 
traditional Ethiopian politics that were examined in Chapter Three - poli­
cies of divide et imperia and shum-shir, domination by (quasi-) traditional 
elites, patron-cllent relations, secrecy, intrigue, nepotism and corruption, 
a disdain for peasants and, of course, a ready resot to coercion - were 
found, to a somewhat lesser extent, within the military, Nevertheless, 
the military was not only the most modern and effective but, paradoxically, 
the most democratic institution in Ethiopia. It was, therefore, a not 
altogether "heavy11 institution functioning in a "Ijght" society with low - -
levels of social discipline; the leisurely pace of the coup illuminated 
the strengths as well as the weaknesses of Haile Selassie's regime.
In Chapter Three, we discussed some of the myths about Haile Selassie's 
regime and his- military that were perpetuated by journalists and Ethiopians. 
Myth-making did not suddenly cease In 197**, and newspaper reports by 
Africanists such as Colin Legum and I.M, Lewis are fertile sources of new 
ones. Myths can even be found in the post-197** writings of so careful a 
scholar as Peter Koehn, John Cohen and Seleshi Sisaye have identified
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four such myths in Koehn's writings: the conditions leading up to the
"creeping coup" were wholly ?nternal to Ethiopia, intel1ectura1s had clear
and commonly-he 1d values and strategies, a un?fied student movement adopted
clever strategies, and the power of traditional elites had declined
18
markedly, leaving a vacuum that had to be filled.
The latter perception is- clearly erroneous: the disquiet within the
military, strikes and demonstrations would have brought down most other 
African regjmes ■ long before-Halle .Selassie's .fel 1 . .The power reserves that 
the Emperor could call upon, in contrast with those of the shallow-rooted 
elites that assumed power on the collapse of European colonialism in many 
countries, dictated a gradual relaxation of his very real authority. Many 
townspeople had begun to see the Emperor as remote, indifferent, avaricious 
and even timid, but almost no one wished to dispute with him directly.
The Revolution went forward because, in the early stages, the Derg con­
vinced even the cynics that it not only had no intention of taking power 
but also realised that it was an unmitigated lust for power which was 
causing the collapse of the old regime. Events were later to prove that 
a reluctance to take power lasted only as long as it took to construct a 
military consensus and demonstrate the Derg's mass urban support. Even 
then, the Derg fostered the impression that a monarch would be retained 
to legitimate the new Government. Ironically, an Ethiopian Herald editorial 
justifying the November 197** executions (infra) reiterated the commonly-
misquoted statement that "power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts 
19absolutely" , conveniently forgetting that the Derg had by then acquired 
an almost absolute power itself,
This power was not obtained unaided, however. Going against the re­
cent trend of events in the Third World, ordinary Ethiopian city dwellers 
wer.6' able-to;-play-sigh if i cant*, but/ul tdmateTy support i-ve rather'than. \ 
i rect i ve *pol i t i cal roles . .* Contra the theor ies of Freud and . Gustave 
Le Bon, these Ethiopian "mobs" did not feel absolved of responsibility 
while following a leader. There was often no apparent leadership and 
spontaneous groupings were, rather, consciously displaying a moral out­
rage and trying to assert responsibility for life's circumstances. These 
demonstrations and strikes served to paralyse urban society, but they 
provided no solutions to the problems of meeting regular needs, for food
and shelter. Leaders were.needed who knew what they wanted, were willing
20
to seize power and to use it ruthlessly to restore order.
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While individuals moved to take power, the Ethiopian military as a
whole was initially unwilling and unable to perform this role: "the
soldiers literally stumbled into a position of power for which they were 
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unprepared." Like most townspeople, the soldiers are intensely nation­
alistic while, in the junior ranks, displaying little attachment to the 
existing order. Encouraged by the passivity of traditional elites, the 
military eventually moved from behind the scenes, frustrated as they were 
by governmental paralysis and embittered by crude attempts to foster dis- 
sention in the ranks. They seemingly understood Richard Greenfield's 
analysis of the shortcomings of the I960 coup attempt. The overthrow of 
a regime dominated by one man requires, above all, that he be effectively 
neutralised, along with all military leaders not known to subscribe to 
the new aims being advanced. Propaganda designed to appeal to intellectuals 
amounted to preaching to the converted in I960; the repetition of Palace
scandals proved a more effective means of winning over ordinary towns- 
9?
people in 197**.
Can we generalise about the causes of the Ethiopian (revolutionary) 
coup, comparing it with others? Coups have long been outnumbered by 
scholarly efforts to explain them, and the circumstances under which they 
occur are so disparate that there seems to be a random patterning, reflect­
ing a chronic political instability in the Third World, There are "foolish 
contradictions" in most theories about coups, "the variables cannot be
stated with precision and the explanations conflict, overlap and confound 
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the generaliser." In recent years, the coup has become the modal form 
of governmental change in Africa, and earlier theories which stress its 
abnormality have thus been proved wrong.
Without pretending to an analytical elegance or to exhaust the sub­
ject, we can. note that £he . (relatively) wej ^ organised Eth.iopi.an mi 1 j.tary. 
was "presented wi th an" occas ion ( for pol itical actjon (provided by themselves’ 
and by Addis Ababans) and acquired an eventual disposition to intervene, 
Robert Dowse's statistical analyses disclose an inverse correlation be­
tween the likelihood of military intervention on'the one hand, and, on 
the other, the percentage of the nation's population living in cities of 
more than 20,000 inhabitants, the number of newspapers, radios, university
students and literate adults per 1,000 people, the level of per cap i ta
2k
incomes, and the degree of political mobilisation - a difficult variable 
to measure. While the Derg did stage a coup, and while Ethiopia ranks
Ill
extremely low with regard to the indicia he cites, any cause-and-effect 
relation we might postulate would be hazardous.
We can, with greater confidence, maintain that some, but by no means 
all, of the frequently-cited causes for Third World coups were present in 
the Ethiopia of 197^: their significance as causal factors can be 'proved*
by an examination of the laws that the Derg subsequently enacted, which 
are discussed in Chapters Five through Seven. These laws serve to contrast 
the Derg's and Haile Selassie's perception of the. public interest in the 
following areas: solutions to chronic economic problems such as inflation
and urban unemployment, devices designed to decrease inequalities in the 
distribution of land and other forms of wealth, and controls over discrim­
ination among ethnic groups, maladministration and corruption. These con­
trols, in turn, exemplify an ascetic revulsion towards conspicuous con­
sumption and a desire to moral regeneration under the banner of Eth top ia 
T i kdem. Like other military interventions, Ethiopia's has moved progress­
ively from strikes involving threatening demands on government and the 
testing of public opinion, through forcing politicians to resign, to 
political manifestos and a direct assumption of power. Typically, in the 
next stage, a struggle for stability ensued, with attempts to build popular 
support and a consensus within the military, Ethiopia has reached a third 
stage in the prototype coup situation in which pronounced splits within 
the military develop over a continuation of direct military rule, and
these disagreements reduce the effectiveness of a transition towards new
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forms of government.
The parallels between the 197^ coups in Ethiopia and Portugal are 
striking. Both states consist largely of an impoverished peasantry that 
had been ruled by traditional elites under constitutions (i.e., Salazar's 
of- 19>3);,wh-ich .refused to- countenance po W -t-ical part ies-. and-pps i ted a-, 
theoretical 11bera1ism. through.a symbolic. use of law. Similar events, 
occurred at roughly the same time during 197^ in Ethiopia and Portugal.
The military in both countries initially complained about low pay and 
protracted struggles against liberation movements. Both countries were 
later ruled by Armed Forced Coordinating Committees composed of young 
men from the lower ranks, with popular and frank elder generals (Annan 
and Spinola) fulfilling nominal leadership roles, While the first steps 
to power were popular and "civilised", with little violence and few
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detentions, it was felt that there was a need for public mobilisation and
indoctrination and, later, land reform, the nationalisation of businesses
and financial institutions, and the punishment of vague offenses against
the new movements. While both coups can be analysed as exampled of a
'new' type of political activity, the left-wing revolutionary coup, the
ways in which events have diverged radically in the two countries since 
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1975 serve as a warning of the fragility of political similes.
There is much in the 197^ Ethiopian coup that is unique. Owing to 
the Derg's anonymity that survives, to some extent, to this day, it is im­
possible to assess the idiosyncrat ic persona 1 factors that help to determine 
the pace and direction of coups in many other countries. The particular 
ambitions of specific individuals who mounted the Ethiopian coup remain 
unknown, with the possible exception of Colonel Mengistu (infra). For 
several years, the Derg resisted the common tendency to move quickly 
from a collegial council to a cabinet type of government, and the embry­
onic public personalities and leadership roles of General Aman and (the
then) Majors Mengistu and Atanafu were not allowed to develop, it is 
therefore likely that personal ambitions did not play a significant role 
in the coup and that it was indeed accomplished out of a genuinely collec­
tive concern for the people's plight.
As yet, the Derg has not sacrificed its vision of revolutionary
changes in Ethiopian social stratifications, property relationships, and 
ethnic relations to mere self-aggrandisement. While military governments 
usually express a commitment to development, they also tend- to dampen
consumerism and non-economic forms of modernisation and promote, instead,
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policies moving toward heavy industry and even heavy agriculture. As 
we shall see in Chapters Six and Seven, this is not the Derg's plan for 
Ethiopia, where more innovat ive ideas-are being tried, out,— . .
The revolutionary element in the Ethiopian coup looms large in our 
subsequent discussions, and it is therefore unfortunate that general 
analyses of revolutions are, if anything, less satisfactory than those 
concerning coups as such. The subjectivity, ambiguity and self-contradic­
tion of most theories is exposed ably by W.F. Wertheim, who argues, contra
Crane Brinton, that it is impossible to establish a fixed and stereotyped
28
sequence of revolutionary phases, We will therefore excuse the necessity 
for picking and choosing among theories on the basis that we are trying
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to explain an Ethiopian revolutionary coup, rather than attempting pri­
marily to compare it with others. Chalmers Johnson's ideas are praised 
by Wertheim, and they fit events in Ethiopia quite well, at a fairly high 
level of generality:
an 'intransigent elite', blocking avenues for gradual, evolu­
tionary emancipation, is as essential for a prerevolutionary 
situation [i.e., revolution is not guaranteed] as the existence 
of a group aspiring at social advance and determined to achieve
it.29
Ralf Dahrendorf adds that, in one type of revolutionary situation,
a common condition of deprivation on the part of one group is 
accompanied by mismanagement and growing self-doubt on the part 
of the other, with an internal or external crisis adding to 
the predicament.30
It was the impossibility of an Ethiopian political evolution under Haile
Selassie, given the slow pace of social change and the absence of broadly-
based development in a permanently-transitional state (see Chapter Three
and Part IM), that called forth demands for revolution.
This is what Marx had in mind when he argued that it was futile to
demand peaceful but meaningful reforms from a regime dominated by a Louis
Philippe or a Louis Napoleon,
a state which Is nothing but a police-guarded military despotism, 
embellished with Parliamentary forms, alloyed with a feudal 
admixture, already influenced by the bourgeoisie and bureau­
cratically carpentered, and then to assure this state into the 
bargain that one imagines one will be able to force such things 
upon it 'by legal means.'31
Marx's fairly detailed but convoluted assertion can be applied to Haile
Selassie's regime without doing violence to either, particularly as the
Western-sty1e institutions created under the laws discussed in Chapter
Three were either incomprehensible or discredited in the eyes of the
people. The paucity of legal discussion in this Section reflects the
fact that law was treated as irrelevant to.the Derg's initial seizure" of
powe r.
I I . The Derg
The nature and origin of the Derg is surrounded by rumour and specu­
lation, The most"piausible explanation is that a nascent committee was 
formed for another purpose, that of mediating disputes between graduates 
of Harar Military Academy and of the Guenet Military School in Holeta,
The latter was established before the Italian invasion and, more recently.
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recruits were prepared for short-servIce commissions and NCOs were trained 
to become officers by Israeli instructors. Its graduates seldom rose 
above the rank of captain and tend to be poorly educated, older and more 
conservative, although Mengistu graduated from Holeta. Harar, established 
In 1958, staffed by Indians and "more Sandhurst than Sandhurst", attracted 
the best of Ethiopia's secondary school students, sharing them with the 
law and medical schools. Harari graduates often acquired additional de­
grees at the University and rose rapidly through the ranks. In a recent
Survey, it was found that 70% of Harar's cadets come from landowning
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families, 58% were Amhara and 21% were of the aristocracy.
There was constant friction between Harari and Holeta graduates, the 
latter deriding formal education without experience and the former sneer­
ing at a lack of "scientific" training. An anonymous group of rather 
low-ranking officers realised that these disputes could develop into a 
full-scale melee and decided to try to reconcile the factions. This same 
group apparently gained additional experience in coordinating efforts 
toward the only goal that all military units had in common - the February 
197*1 pay increases. There were at least five other groupings within the 
military that were, however, narrowly committed to the interests of their 
own members: the group of elderly senior officers who followed the Emperor
into exile during the Italian War that was headed by General Abiye; ethnic 
groupings representing Gal las and Shoan Amhara; a younger group ready to
stage a coup and establish a liberal regime after the Emperor's death;
33and a committed leftist nucleus within the-Air Force, -
A. F? rst Steps
Except for the latter, these established groups saw no political role 
for younger officers and NCOs in Ethiopian politics and were outflanked 
during the event of 197^.-In May 197*+, a coordinating committee ensconced" 
itself in the Fourth Division Headquarters in Addis Ababa and began to 
issue a barrage of instructions, including a notice to all units to send 
representatives to join in designing a "Movement." There was a rapid re­
sponse to this call, as most units had begun to discuss recent events 
through "soviets" organised .by young and well-educated officers, Some 
representatives were apparently chosen at random or for trivial reasons, 
such as their being in Addis Ababa at the time or because their commanding 
officer wanted to get rid of them. After initial reshuff1esf however, the
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Committee's membership stabilised and became a power in the land. Apart 
from the "proposals" presented to the Emperor and the ordering of a few 
detentions, the aims of the Committee were decidedly murky - a reflection 
of disparate ages, ranks, educational backgrounds and political orientations. 
The difficulties inherent in forging a consensus within such a group is 
reflected by the on-and-off tactics initially employed and in contemporary 
Ethiopian law and administration.
The Derg is similar to the governing arrangements initially adopted
by the military in other countries: it was hastily created, with blurred
lines of authority and an ambivalent legitimacy. The potential for vio-
35lent conflict within such a group is, of course, at a maximum, especially 
as the participants have weapons at their disposal and know how to use 
them to good effect. The Derg is composed of some 120 representatives 
of the Army, Air Force, Navy, Police and Territorial Army, although its 
membership fluctuates from time to time as a result of purges and could 
conceivably be as low as sixty as of this writing - July 1978. By the 
end of 197^, subcommittees with specialised tasks (defense, security, 
politics and foreign relations, economics, information, legal, and admin­
istrative) began to emerge, the most important of which is a standing 
committee of some fifteen Derg members (see Chapter Five).
Little Is known of the day-to-day workings of the Derg, as policies 
of secrecy, anonymity, collective responsibility, shielding members against 
assassination by outsiders and, until 1977 at least, avoiding personality 
cults are rigorously pursued. Much information can, however, be gleaned 
from acquaintances who are reputed Derg members and inferred from the 
Derg's political impact, the kinds of laws it promulgates and the manner 
of their implementation. It is quite likely that the Derg is composed of 
roughly equal numbers of privates, NCOs and officers from low and middle 
ranks'. The" 1 atter group provi des the’'leadership and mdu'lds 'opinions,' 
standing near enough to both the soldiers and their commanders to evalu­
ate and guide politics within the military, While few members of the 
Derg are wholly committed Marxists, several of the opinion leaders have 
pronounced leftward leanings - another fertile source of conflict.
Senior officers have been excluded from the Derg on the ground that they 
would intimidate more junior members and/or lose their effectiveness as 
field commanders. Until the July 1977 Somali invasion, a conscious attempt 
was made to segregate the purely military activities of the Armed Forces
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36from the Derg's political activities.
Even less is known of the first head of the Derg, Colonel Alem Zewde
Tessema. While he took a leading role in the events of April and Hay 197A,
he was removed from office in June and executed in November (infra) for
allegedly attempting to rally Gojjamt aoldiers behind him and for plotting
with his cousin, Prime Minister Endalkatchew. A rotating chairmanship
was temporarily adopted and a serious split grew within the Derg over
whether. Haile Selass.ie ought to be deposed. After a time, a consensus
emerged, probably because uncommitted pragmatists within -the Derg were
persuaded of the need to remove him and that the anticipated armed uprisings
could be contained. This was not the end of the story however: a group
attempting a fresh coup in April 1975 demanded, inter alia, that the
Emperor be released and that a more moderate Derg be created, During the
period under discussion, the major policy conflicts revolved around the
timetable for a return to civilian government, whether policies of recon-
ciliation or repression should be adopted for Eritrea, the treatment of
traditional elites, and the nature of projected land reforms and changes
37in local administration.
B. The Rise and Fall of Aman
The fear that ambitions like those of Colonel Alem would be fueled 
by choosing a leader from within the Derg, combined with the need to find 
a public spokesman yet preserve the Derg's anonymity, led to the appoint­
ment of the Defense Minister, General Aman Michael Andom, as the Derg's 
Chairman on 12 September 197^. Peter Enahoro summarises the unwieldy 
channels of communication that evolved between the Derg and the skeletal 
remains, of Haile Selassie's regime:
[Aman's] position is, to say the least, confusing. He is not 
a member of the Provisional Military Council, but he is its 
Chairman. He fs'not a member of the Coordinating Committee
which is said to number about 30 and which acts as the stand­
ing committee of the Provisional Military Council, He is a
member of the Council of Ministers but although he acts as its
principal spokesman he is not officially designated Prime 
Minister [a post left vacant after Michael Imru became Minister 
of Information], He acts as Head of State on diplomatic occa­
sions, but the office of Head of State is collectively held by - ■
the 120 member Provisional Military Council,
[The] fact that the Provisional Military Council reversed, the 
appointments of two Generals made shortly before General Aman 
resigned as Chief of Staff strengthened the belief that even 
though he remains Minister of Defence, the Chairman of the 
Military Council is in fact a figurehead.38
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While Aman has long been considered progressive, he was not approached
by the plotters of the I960 coup because he was believed to be loyal to 
39the Emperor. They definitely fell out in 1965, Aman advocating an all- 
out preemptive strike on what was then a weak Somalaia and the Emperor 
favouring restraint, probably because he expected to receive a much-coveted 
Nobel Peace Prize. Aman was an Eritrean who belonged to the Mekane Yesus 
Chruch, an offshoot of Germano-Swedish Protestant missions. He compiled 
an excellent record at an English military academy, It was a mark of the 
changing times that someone other than an Orthodox Christian would be given 
such a post. Aman was popular with townspeople and temperamentally un­
suited to the role of a figurehead, and people began speaking openly of 
him as a future civilian 'President'. These views received a check on 
18 November 197**, when the appointment, from inside the Derg, of (then)
Major Mengistu Haile Mariam as First Vice-Chairman was announced. Specu­
lation ensued: had Mengistu become so powerful that he could impose his
will on the others and seek public popularity?
Some of these queries were answered a few days later, when the Derg's 
policies took a major new tack. Aman was dismissed from the Chairmanship 
of the Derg on 22 November: many reasons for this step were announced,
but the important ones seemed to be his growing public popularity and 
advocacy of a negotiated settlement with Eritrean separatists. His re­
moval was hardly surprising; Addis Ababans were, however, shocked by a 
Radio Ethiopia announcement on November 2Atb, A "political decision" had 
been taken and immediately carried out the previous evening. Sixty persons 
had been executed for crimes they had allegedly committed against the 
Ethiopian people: gross abuse of authority, the perpetuation of maladmin­
istration, and the injustices resulting from "a deliberate system of 
divide and rule along tribal and religious lines, unlawful enrichment, 
attempts to incite civil war and disrupt Ethiopia's popular Movement and 
attempts to create dissention among the various units of the Armed Forces,"
Among the victims of these summary executions were General Aman, 
former Prime Ministers Aklilu and Endalkatchew, other high officials and 
noblemen, Iskender Desta (a grandson of the Emperor who had commanded the 
Navy), and soldiers who had been members of the Derg. Although the response 
of Addis Ababans was that of shocked disbelief - excluding those few who 
celebrated - outward manifestations of disapproval were absent. Western 
newspapers were, however, outraged, and a number of countries expressed
their opposition to the purge. The General Assembly of the United Nations 
passed a Resolution condemning It and expressing grave concern for the 
well-being of those officials still under detention, particularly Haile 
Selassie, The Derg promised that the remaining officials would be 
brought before the Courts-Martial established for this purpose, A special 
Penal Code had also been proclaimed to be retroactively applicable in the 
trials of detained ex-officials. (These topics will be discussed in the 
next Chapter).
Upon being bombarded with adverse international opinions, the Derg 
felt it necessary to explain the motive behind their "political decision" 
in a statement issued on November 26. It was disclosed that General Aman 
was not formally executed, but killed in a shoot-out while "resisting 
arrest." "Repeated plots . . . that might engulf the country in a blood­
bath", and the imperative of.saving "the lives of innocent people that 
had suffered for so long in the past", were two of the reasons given for 
the execution of the 53 other ex-officials. This justification was ex­
panded upon by a reputed member of the Derg who was later executed, re­
portedly for granting an interview to Newsweek:
[Our purpose] is not to install a new set of people by removing 
the old set, but to have a movement that will benefit the people 
by bringing about fundamental changes. , . , Maybe only for a 
period of time . . . [we need] a cleansing phase, [W]e know 
that if there is chaos, it is the average man who will suffer 
most. Why should we create a fire that would consume the very 
people we say are suffering? ... . So.v/e are trying to protect 
the people from the aftermath of this thing, at least from the 
bloodshed. We use the minimum force possible to keep the move­
ment going.
The Derg sent a lengthy cable to United Nations Secretary-General Waldheim
which included the following statements:
[E]qual social and economic opportunities will be assured and
just ice•based on- the rul e of- law wt 1 1 prevails ...............
[E]vents taking place in Ethiopia purely fall within Chapter 
1 Article II of the United Nations Charter,
[T]he General Assembly's appeal has been somewhat speculative 
as far as future actions of the PMAC [Derg] are concerned, based 
as the appeal is on erroneous assumptions and false and malicious 
newspaper reports,
Many foreign correspondents disagreed with these assessments, argu­
ing that "violence on such a scale cannot easily be stopped from spreading" 
or that the executions were the result of the mystical belief of a "lunatic 
fringe" within the Derg that bloodshed was necessary in order to complete
235
3^the Revolution, These and related issues concerning an Ethiopian 
"revolutionary justice" will be analysed in the next Chapter, The only 
prominent Ethiopianist actively to support the Derg in this matter, Peter 
Schwab, argued in 1975 ~ correctly we think - that international outrage 
was due to the fact that elites rather than peasants had been executed.
The executions, he argued, were a "limited example" intended for those 
who "could be expected to try and destroy socialism at its very birth."
With the benefit of hindsight, we know that there are few limitations on 
politically-motivated executions or assassinations in Ethiopia; otherwise, 
there is something in what Schwab says, but as an explanation rather than 
a justification. Among the crimes with which the executed ex-officials 
were charged, the one most stressed was their hindering of the fair ad­
ministration of justice - that which they themselves were denied.
C . The Good Soldier Tefer?
On 28 November 197A, Brig. General Teferl Benti was named as the 
new Chairman of the Derg, and his second name was quickly changed to Bante 
to disguise his Gal la origins. The SB-year-old Teferi came from a humble 
background; a taciturn moderate and a lacklustre speaker, his military 
career had been wholly undistinguished, These facts may explain why he 
was chosen as Aman's successor and why he functioned almost exclusively 
as a public relations officer for the Derg, This means that his state­
ments, many of which are quoted infra, reflect the impression that the 
Derg as a whole wished to convey at the time, On 11 December, for example, 
he told disbelieving journalists that "peace and security prevails in all 
parts of the country and , . . the government is in full control of the 
situation." The actions of the Derg continued to dominate Ethiopian 
politics under Teferi although, during 197A and early 1975, it was really 
a Berg (I.e., committee) of Dergs which had to reach at least a minimal 
consensus, as no single group could muster decisive support. While the 
Cabinet remained nominally in civilian hands, its role was one of imple­
menting the Derg*s less important decisions - its main function today.
The Derg did order periodic Cabinet reshuffles, including major ones in
December 197A and February 1976, but these failed to stem the rising tide
A 5
of criticisms of military rule.
While the pace of political events quickened during Teferi's Chair­
manship, he failed to make any personal mark on policy changes, A zemecha
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programme, under which secondary school and university students were ex­
pected to assist in implementing new policies (see Chapters Six and Seven), 
was announced on 20 December 197A, Banks, insurance companies and 108 of 
Ethiopia's largest businesses were nationalised on 1 January and 3 February 
1975 (see Chapter Seven),• despite repeated assurances to the contrary by 
the Derg, All rural lands were nationalised on A March (see Chapter Six) 
and all urban lands on 26 July (see Chapter Seven),
A State of Emergency was declared in Addis Ababa on 30 September 1975 
and rescinded on 5 December, Some 1 , 6 0 0  people were detained, including 
former Prime Minister Michael Imru. Security forces were "empowered to 
take a final measure proportional to the situation created", in the event 
of strikes, slow-downs, absenteeism, opposition conspiracies, unlawful 
pamphleteering, speeches, demonstrations or assemblies, curfew violations,
A6
and disturbing public peace and order "in any manner".
This Declaration was in response to a variety of opposition activities 
in Addis ‘Ababa during September, An underground Marxist group, the 
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (Tnfra), had formally announced 
its existence at the beginning of the month. During official parades to 
mark the first anniversary of the deposing of Haile Selassie (on lA  September 
1 9 7 5 ) ,  vociferous demonstrations called for the establishment of civilian 
rule, the legalising of political parties and the release of detained 
students. Tighter security was adopted for subsequent demonstrations, 
when smaller crowds gave a rather muted support to the Derg, On 23 
September, representatives of 18A trades unions at a meeting of the 
Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Unions (CELU) passed numerous resolu­
tions calling for the establishment of democratic liberties, the right 
to strike and the release from detention of union leaders, teachers and 
students. CELU threatened to call a general strike at the end of October 
if the Derg failed to make substantial progress towards fulfilling these 
demands. Remembering that a general strike in February 197A helped to 
topple Haile Selassie's regime, the Derg acted swiftly. When an Ethiopian 
Airlines employee attempted to distribute the CELU resolutions at Bole 
Ariport outside Addis Ababa on 25 September 1975 ,  security forces tried
to arrest him. Other employees prevented the arrest and troops opened
A7
fire, killing seven and wounding about 25, The Labour Proclamation 
issued on 6 December (see Chapter Seven) represents another response to
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CELU * s political activities.
A few days before CELU announced its abortive resolutions, the
Ethiopian Teachers1 Association issued extensive and wide-ranging demands
of their own and threatened to strike. One of these demands was the
nationalisation of private schools, many of which had generated a tidy
profit by offering grossly inadequate education to children who were
unable to obtain a place at a State school. On 29 September, the Derg
nationalised private.primary schools and empowered the Minister of Education
to schedule the schools affected. Although it was stated that "foreign
A8
community" and "mission" schools would not be nationalised, the German
School was nationalised in 1977. While appearing to respond immediately
to a political demand, the Derg also forestalled a teacher's strike by
announcing that the reorganisation of the school system necessitated by
the nationalisation measures would delay the opening of all schools. The
Ministry of Education now manages each private school, with the cooperation
of its former owner, until it is handed over to a school committee composed
of elected representatives of kebel1es (urban cooperatives - discussed in
Chapter Seven) and parents. The Ministry will then retain a supervisory
1*9
role with regard to curriculum, staffing and general administration.
New public holidays were declared - May Day and the Prophet Mohammed's 
birthday - reflecting departures from the traditional orientations of 
Ethiopian politics. The Abuna (Patriarch) of the Orthodox Church was dis­
missed in March 1976 (i nfra), Early in July 1976, a "special military 
tribunal" (see Chapter Five) found that Brigadier General Getachew Nadew 
and eighteen other soldiers and officials had been involved in a "counter- 
Revolutionary plot"; they were executed immediately. General Getachew was 
not a Derg member, but he had governed Eritrea under martial law for the 
previous eighteen months, A second counter-coup attempt in July, by the 
26th Brigade stationed in Addis Ababa, was also announced, In October a 
Derg member, Lieutenant Colonel Alemayhou Asfaw, retired into the bush 
with 250 troops and resisted attempts to capture him. The closing months 
of 1976 saw a diminution of the rural revolts that were related to land 
reform (see Chapter Six) and an escalation of urban assassinations prompted 
by both the Derg and anti-Derg forces (infra),^
Only a few Derg members have acquired a public personality, and we 
will examine some of them briefly at this juncture. Since the death of 
Aman, Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam has clearly been at the
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centre of the amorphous structures of the Ethiopian State, Given the 
recurrent struggles within the Derg, rural rebellions, the Somali invasion 
and the preferences of Ethiopia's new Marxist allies, it is difficult to 
speak of him as Ethiopia's strongman, at least until 1978. Little is known 
of Mengistu's background, except that he is about 40, poorly educated and 
a Galla Christian who was trained at Holeta and, briefly, in the U.S. It 
is thought that he is the leader of a group of Gal las who are exerting 
a growing influence over Ethiopian politics, and that he has the support 
of the NCOs within the Derg. Mengistu has a reputation for ferocity and 
for a purist commitment to a collectivist ideology. There have been sev­
eral (and perhaps as many as nine) attempts to assassinate him, notably 
in September 1976 and in January 1978, when a bomb missed a car carrying 
Mengistu and Raul Castro, killing six Cubans and a Russian, A Fifth 
"Flame" Division of the Army was created In 1976 and trained for "anti­
terrorist" activities. It is said to be composed exclusively of illiterate
51Amhara who display a personal loyalty to Mengistu.
Even, less is known about (the. then) Major Atnafu Abate, who was made
Second Vice-Chairman of the Derg and, until his execution in November 
1977, was regarded as Mengistu's chief “rival for power, Atnafu was one . 
of the Derg's major theoreticians and an early leader of its radical wing, 
yet he seemed to have a more moderate and pragmatic turn of mind than 
Mengistu and proved a consistent supporter of the Church, While both of 
them were bent on dominating the Detg, Mengistu and Atnafu reportedly 
closed ranks on several occasions when the power they held jointly and 
severally was threatened by others, While the Derg succeeded in bringing 
them to heel in November 1975 and again in December 1976 (infra) , they 
reportedly concluded an agreement between themselves earlier in 1976, and 
affirmed it in February 1977 (see Chapter Five), under which Mengistu ran 
things at the centre while Atnafu operated in the field, Two other prom­
inent and popular Derg members ought to be mentioned: Major SIsaye Habte,
an American-educated computer engineer and chairman of the Derg's politi­
cal subcommittee, who reportedly masterminded the urban land and business 
nationalisations and was executed along with General Getachew (supra); 
and Captain Moges Wolde Michael, an economics graduate drawn from an air­
borne unit and chairman of the economics subcommittee, It perhaps reflects 
the Derg's priorities of the time that Sisaye and Moges were more influ­
ential than the chairmen of the defense and security subcommittees,
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Colone'is Tesfaye and Teka,
As is the case in many post-coup situations, initial policy differences
were transformed, during Teferi‘s tenure of office, into bitter personal
rivalries. Host conflicts concerned the questions of how power was to be
shared out within the Derg and how, when and if at all a .political party
or parties would be established. The power wielded by Hengistu and Atnafu
scared and embittered their supposed equals. There was growing frustration
over an inability to carry out far-reaching promises quickly and over the
tenacity of many traditional institutions, Channels of communication
between the Derg and its constituents - military units and, to a lesser
extent, the public - were often disrupted after Aman's death, and purges
and the jockeying for power within the Derg seemed irrelevant to outsiders.
As in the French and Russian Revolutions, factions began to accuse each
other of betraying the Revolution, A notable attempt, led by Captain
Moges, to "streamline" the Derg was enacted into law in December 1976
(see Chapter Five). Teferi's powers were expanded at the expense of
Atnafu's and those of Mengistu, who was made Head of the Council of Ministers
(without the title of Prime Minister) in an attempt to occupy him with
policy implementation and military-civilian relations rather than with 
53policy making.
This attempt at restraint soon came to naught whenr on 3 February 1977, 
Teferi, Moges and five other Derg members were killed in a battle at the 
Grand Palace, the Derg's Headquarters, just after the Derg had condemned 
them. Four supporters of Mengistu, only one of them a Derg member, were 
also killed, The apparently passive Teferi had been quietly organising 
opposition to Mengistu since September 1976, He and his colleagues were 
also charged (retroactively, in public) with being in contact with the 
Conservative Ethiopian Democratic Union (see Chapter One), with favouring 
negotiations with the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP, infra), 
and with delaying the "arming of the masses" (infra), Significantly,
Atnafu and several other Derg members were not in Addis Ababa at the time 
of this battle; the requirement in the law promulgated in December that 
such "revolutionary measures" be taken by the Derg as a whole had been 
c i rcumvented,
D. Mengistu's Regime
The next day, A February 1977, some 200,000 Addis Ababans demonstrated
2k0
their'support for Mengistu. On 12 February, he assumed all of the powers 
Teferi had gained in December, in addition to those previously held.
Mengistu thus became Chairman of all three of the Derg's major organs: 
a sixteen-man Standing Committee, a 32-member Central Committee and the 
Congress of all Derg members (see Chapter Five)-, In addition to acceler­
ating the deployment of the People's Militia (see Chapters One and Six), 
Mengistu's first steps after Teferi's death involved arming the kebel1es. 
Fifteen members from each of these 291 urban coops in Addis Ababa were 
armed so as to do battle with the EPRP at the neighbourhood level (see 
Infra and Chapter Seven), and kebelles in several other towns were armed
cc
as well. On 12 February, Mengistu stated that
- • arming the genuine progressive forces . , ., the workers and
the toiling masses, . . .  is continuing, [This] Revolutionary 
Flame will serve the suppressed and_attacked classes and the
revolutionary mother country, . . .
Later, Ethiopia's Charge d'Affaires in London, Mesmaku Asrat, contended
that the Derg trusts the people: "We have armed and trained civilians.
What other nation - at least in Africa - would do that?"57
Most of the significant political events of late 1977 and early 1978
concern an outright state of war between the Derg and its civilian opponents
on the streets of Addis Ababa, and discussions of these matters have been
deferred to Chapter Five and the end of this Chapter, After the death of
Teferi, "[a]nyone not directly connected with Mengistu was suddenly in
serious jeopardy and Ethiopians began to live, once again, in fear of their
leaders."^8
Around 12 November 1977, a "revolutionary step" was taken against 
Derg Vice-Chairman Atnafu. Roughly the same age as Mengistu, Atnafu's 
influence within the Derg was about equal to Mengistu's, who was less 
popular throughout the military as a whole, Atnafu had, however, been 
deeply involved in the organisation of the People's Militia that had per­
formed so poorly, At the time, Atnafu's assassination was justified on 
the basis that he put the welfare of Ethiopians above the correct appli­
cation of scientific socialism; he was, in other words, more of a nation­
alist than a leftist ideologue, a "military bourgeois" in Mengistu's eyes,
In July 1978, the Ethiopian News Agency stated that Atnafu had been im­
plicated in an attempted assassination of Mengistu, Like most of the
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Derg members killed to date, Atnafu was an Amhara, While this fact has 
been cited as evidence of a growing Gal la domination within the Derg, there
2k\
may be no particular significance in it: as Amhara constitute a large
proportion of Ethiopia's military elites, more of them are bound to be 
k f1 led.
The Somali invasion of July 1977 has retarded the growth of opposition 
to the Derg: an intense nationalism came to dominate political preferences,
and austerity programmes and repressions found a readier acceptance during 
wartime. Further, the Derg, has been buoyed up by the military, financial 
and diplomatic support of the Soviets and the Cubans that began in May 
1977- These new allies have strengthened the hand of the Marxists over 
the nationalists within the Derg, and vast quantities of weapons have 
revived the flagging military morale that was epitomised by a September 
1977-mutiny in Jijiga,*which permitted Soma 1i troops to penetrate far into 
the Qgaden. The morale of the troops has also suffered in Eritrea; the 
guerrillas' strategy is to force Government troops into garrisons and to 
then cut off water supplies and air and road links, Batches of officers 
and soldiers whom the Derg blame for defeats in Eritrea are executed, and 
a moderate number of soliders have surrendered to the separatists. Re­
peated forecasts of the impending collapse of the Ethiopian military as 
a fighting force have always proved false", however: while morale is not
high, it has never really been dangerously low either, The major complaints
among the soldiers concern the growing remoteness of the Derg and the 
■r 60rawness of new recruits,
Public criticism of and, under Menguistu's Chairmanship, armed oppo­
sition to the Derg have been major causes of the radically*leftward shift 
in the Derg's policies in 1975"6, which was accompanied by a growing 
conservativism with regard to its own power, Riven by faction, the Derg 
and the wider military are nevertheless kept together by sobering thoughts 
of the chaos that would result from military disunity or even, perhaps, 
a civilian government. Ethiopia's extensive experiences with anarchy in 
the past suggests, to Ethiopianists, soldiers and some civilians, that 
there would be very fewwi-nners and many losers if this were to happen, 
Ethiopia is presently a "functioning anarchy" - Galbraith's characterisa­
tion of India, which is superior to a journalist's description of Ethiopia 
as "frozen chaos",^ A slogan announced by the Derg late in 1977, concern­
ing the need to "combat white terror with red terror" (see infra and 
Chapter Five), constitutes an admission by the Derg of the fluid and 
highly unfinished nature of its Revolution, and that substantial chunks
2k2
of it are out of control.^
While there is no reason to look for a gravitation towards Western 
liberal democracy or a Communist party-state in Ethiopia, it is nevertheless 
apparent that little political development has occurred since 197^ through 
the Derg device. Order, stability and, to a lesser extent, bureaucratic 
control have eluded the Derg although, admittedly, it has faced extra­
ordinary pressures - some of which are of its own making. Other aspects 
of political development fully under the Derg's control have not been 
achieved either; as under Haile Selassie, little specialisation or exper­
tise has been brought to bear on problems, and there is little in the way 
of coherent policy formulation or implementation. We will return to these 
assertions at the end of the Chapter.
II I• Ethiopia Tikdem
The Derg and its supporters have been successively provided with a 
slogan, a "philosophy" and an ideology, all under the rubric of Ethiopia 
Tikdem. Over time, it became reasonably specific and comprehensive 
(although a degeneration into siogan-mongering is noted ?nfra) , so as to 
constitute an ideology in at least-five senses of that term; It represents 
a combination of interdependent facts and values (like law - see Chapter 
Two); it reflects the desire of an elite to establish its intellectual and 
moral leadership; it attempts a wholesale resocialisation of families, 
social groups, schools and the media; it has become a guiding, supporting 
and even a restraining factor in political behaviour, providing explana­
tions, justifications and, to a much lesser extent, a strategy for achiev­
ing 'the good life; and it has also helped to cloak shabby actions. The 
reasons for creating this new ideology are also fairly clear. A military, 
composed of specialists in violence, must acquire the facility to use 
symbols effectively if it is to exercise meaningful political power for 
more than short periods of time, With the eclipse of the Solomonic myth 
(see Chapters One and Three), a rationale for new patterns of obligations 
and reasons for obeying Government had to be found.
The continuous incorporation of new demands has meant that, like the 
initial forumulat ions of other ideologies, Ethiopia Tikdem is loosely- 
structured, shifting and vague, It is still at a stage where few would 
regard it as an example of sophisticated thinking, but It continues to 
crystallise - as a consensus is increasingly imposed among military elites
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and as theoreticians are given time to systematise Its tenets. Our 
reason for exploring the evolution and radica11y~1eftward shifts of Ethiopia 
Tikdem is that these trends are paralleled, step by step, in the Derg's 
laws that are discussed in the next three Chapters. Further, the motto 
constitutes the new Grundnorm (to adopt Kelsen's term, for want of a 
better one) of Ethiopian public law: each proclamation is promulgated
with reference to it, the stated objective of the Derg and any new con­
stitution is its implementation, and a major function of the new Special
6S
Courts-Martia 1 is to punish offenses against it,
At least three meanings can be attributed to this motto in Amharic, 
a language preoccupied with conveying many levels of meaning simultaneously, 
A literal rendition into English is "Ethiopia First" or "Forward": unity
in the face of ethnic, regional or religious divisiveness, a launching of 
Ethiopia on the path of radical change, or a chauvinistic desire to dom­
inate Africa. It is likely that all three meanings are intended, Ethiopia 
Tikdem used to appear on the masthead of a defunct newspaper, Ethiopian 
DImts (the Voice of Ethiopia) - a fact which may be unknown to the Derg.
It is more likely that the slogan was appropriated from Prime Minister 
Endalkatchew, who issued a manifesto in which the stated goal of his 
Cabinet was ensuring that "Ethiopia came first."
A. Initial Formulations
On 20 October 1974 a group of intellectuals - mostly University 
teachers - attempted an elaboration and explanation of Ethiopia Tikdem 
over the radio. The underlying concept, it was stated, is that the in­
terests of the many came before those of the individual; the slogan is to 
serve as a guiding principle of development-oriented policies, Particular 
emphasis was placed on equal access to education and medical care, on the 
prevention of "moral degeneration" and on the instituting of "a process 
of self-regeneration". Land was described as "a free gift of nature and 
. . . being the wealth of the people as a whole, land should be brought 
under effective governmental control so that , , t people can live and 
work together for the common good," A major political canon was to be 
Lincoln's government of, by and for the people. Social justice, "brother­
hood and mutual respect with the entire World community and particularly 
with neighbouring nations" were all stressed.
2hk
There was only a passing reference to tradition - Government's
awareness of "our cultural heritages" - and no mention of religion, an
•i-ntensely-fel t and divisive topic. Many Orthodox Chr i s t! ans found the
notion that land was "a free gift of nature" rather than God to be bizarre,
Many townspeople inferred a socialist drift in the Derg's thinking from
these statements regarding land, and this was confirmed on 21 December
197^, when Ethiopia was declared a socialist state:
. . . Ethiopia Tikdem means Ethiopian Socialism and socialism 
means equality, self-reliance, hard work for the overall inter­
est of the people and above all the supremacy of Ethiopian u n i t y .66
The "people's revolution" was said to be motivated by a sense of
sacrifice arising out of hardship, pride and patriotism, and spearheaded
by the Armed Forces; it was not accidental or without direction. It can
be encompassed by five fundamental precepts discussed at length in the
Ethiopian Herald during December 197^:
1. Discrimination on the basis of tribe, sex, language or 
religion will be abolished and'tcomplete equality, freedom 
and social justice" will prevail.
2. There will be a redress of past injustices and an eradi­
cation of poverty, "The limitless idolatry of private gain 
which has chained our people to poverty and which has so. 
humiliated our country in the eyes of the world will be abol­
ished, Henceforth, the interests of the community will be 
paramount.n
3. The right of popular participation in government is "re­
stored", but apparently restricted to the local government 
level. The concept of federalism is implicitly rejected- 
"the central government will be responsible for national or 
otherwise fundamental matters of state and give aid to com­
munities in those areas where they exercise sel f-administration,"
"Respect for labour and the dignity of the toiling masses" 
will be secured (an innovation in many Ethiopian societies) 
and "exploitation and parasitism will be socially condemned 
modes of 1i v i ng."
5- "Above all, the sacred unity of Ethiopia will be upheld."
This philosophy is no foreign import, but springs from the 
people's aspirations and from "Ethiopian culture"; it should 
bring Ethiopia closer to her progressive neighbours.67
While several ideas broached in October 197^ recur in this December
formulation, emphases and the general thrust of the propositions differ
significantly. This "political philosophy", as it was now termed, was
still extremely nebulous; the Amharic equivalent of Ethiopian Socialism
can be interpreted as anything from a pious humanism to a reference to
the community of the people. As can be imagined, these expositions gave
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rise to many discussions in Addis Ababa, The Derg's attitude towards these 
debates alternated between suppressing and encouraging criticisms depend­
ing, presumably, upon which group in the Derg achieved a temporary dominance. 
Freedom of the press flowered during the initial stages of the Revolution, 
until the Derg put a stop to it in August 1974, A brief revival of press 
freedom occurred in March 1976, when the Derg stated the need for critical 
debate "among prog res si ve el ements Positions markedly contrary to those
of the Derg and echoing those advocated by the Derg's new-found enemies - 
students and teachers - were vigorously maintained in Government-owned
newspapers: substantial provincial autonomy based on self-determination
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and an immediate settlement of the Eritrean conflict.
The Derg was probably canvassing support for policies it already had 
in mind; the National Democratic Revolution Programme, published in April 
1976, gives little indication that divergent civilian views were taken 
into account. The Programme is detailed but couched In an oblique language. 
Moves toward civilian rule and the establishment of political parties had 
been promised before by the Derg; in April 1976, it was stated that the 
transition to social ism, towards a "peoples' democratic republic", is to 
take place under "the vanguard of the revolution" - a working class party 
cooperating with peasants. The formation of a National Revolutionary 
Front is a precondition to the election of a Revolutionary Assembly, and 
Government assistance is promised to "all democratic parties who wish to 
carry on the struggle under the umbrella of , , , anti-feudal and anti­
imperialist objectives." A People's Organising Provisional Office (a 
regularisat ion of a pre-existing Politburo - see infra and Chapter Five) 
will spread socialism and help the people to organise the Revolutionary 
Front, The "right of any nationality , , , to self-determination" is 
mentioned, but made subject to the maintenance of territorial integrity 
"in accordance with the spirit of Socialism," In March 1978, Government's 
aims were reformulated slightly: all "nationalities" are to "live In
equality under the principle" of "diversity in unity", and "workable levels
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of regional autonomy" will be established,
When combined with the February 1975 Declaration of Economic Policy, 
the April 1976 Programme also furnishes the latest detailed outline of the 
Derg's economic policies. The major aim Is a more equalised distribution 
of incomes, educational opportunities and health services, particularly
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as this requires a transfer of resources from urban to rural areas. 
Agriculture will be the vehicle for Ethiopian development, along with 
smaller industries which meet.the consumption needs of the poorer strata.
A few heavy industries are, however, projected for the future, and the 
present need to reorganise nationalised businesses, insurance companies 
and banks is recognised. In both agriculture and industry, the focus is 
on generating employment opportunities and providing incentives for smaller 
producers. Two deep conflicts also emerge from an examination of these 
policies: between fostering cooperatives of smallholders and a large-
scale collectivised agriculture, and between the larger questions of 
development from the bottom up and a tight centralised planning. The 
ways,in which these conflicting economic policies have been implemented 
are examined in Chapters Six and Seven.
B . Subsequent Sloganeering
The^Derg has periodically used aggressive language to justify its
policies. In October 1975, for example, it declared:
It is impossible to hide from the revolution of the broad 
masses. [Those] who cannot see that the sun of truth has . 
begun to rise will be , . , dealt with. [They] will be ex­
posed by the light of Ethiopia Tikdem and eliminated by the
sword of Ethiopia T i k d e m . 70
The intensity of this kind of slogan-mongering and the number of repetitions
increased markedly after April 1976, however. Two slogans, utilised by
Mengistu in particular, have become especially prominent, The first, "let
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our revolution be transformed from a defensive to an offensive position",
was subsequently rephrased to announce "the need to fight white terror
with red terror" and is directed against a militant urban underground
opposition (see infra and Chapter Five). The precise content of a second
and more general slogan, "let imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic
n2.
capitalism be crushed"^ is even more uncertain,
The Derg's opposition to feudalism and imperialism is virtually self- 
explanatory, given its overall aims and the nature of Haile Selassie's 
regime, as analysed in Chapters One and Three, The Derg chooses to re­
place imperialism with, in the short run at least, a dependence on social­
ist states and the militarism that has been deemed necessary to create 
integrated communities since time immemorial, As Ethiopia Tikdem increas-
73
ingly becomes a "collective animus of intentions, aspirations and fears",
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the Derg assumes the right to use coercion to force recalcitrants "to be
free" by adhering to Ethiopia Tikdem.
The administration of the economy under Haile Selassie can be character­
ised as an example of bureaucratic capitalism only at the risk of consid­
erable oversimplification (see Chapters One and Three), The constant 
repetition of this bete no i re can, however, be taken as a realisation of 
the huge temptations towards a bureaucratic dictatorship - given low levels 
of literacy and colonial habits of administration - which would fail fully 
to achieve the Derg’s revolutionary aims. Several astute African leaders 
are aware of this danger, and the Derg probably is too: some of its
policies, and the creation of urban and rural coops in particular, cir­
cumvent or emasculate the bureaucracy, while other policies serve to 
strengthen the bureaucrats* hand. It is also likely that there is a 
Trotskyite element in the Derg’s thinking. He argued that the proletariat, 
supported by the peasantry, can take power early and directly before it
Ik
is in a numerical majority - under conditions of bureaucratic capitaliam.
In nineteenth century Russia, Trotsky contended, the nature of the 
state, and of capitalism as a child of the state rather than of individuals, 
meant that a "revolutionary bourgeois liberalism" (as reflected in, for 
example, the French Revolution) was stillborn. Middle strata were firmly 
on the side of autocracy and reaction. Under these conditions, he main­
tains, it Is possible to move directly from feudalism to socialism through 
"permanent revolution": urban revolutionaries carry socialism into the
countryside, overcoming opposition with the aid of the proletariat of 
other countries. While space litmiations have forced us to simplify the 
richness of Trotsky’s ideas, it is nevertheless possible to see that this 
would be a simplistic view to take of the Derg's Revolution; despite 
similarities between pre-revolutionary Russia and Ethiopia, an Ethiopian 
proletariat never came into existence (see Chapter One) and is therefore 
incapable of mounting its own revolution - even if the military serves 
as its proxy representative. In any event, numerous derogatory references 
to bureaucratic capitalism are hardly calculated tp endear the Derg to the 
Soviet Union or to Eastern European states (where, Marxists such as Marcuse 
and Mao allege, a bureaucracy continues to exercise governmental functions 
in a manner contrary to the interests of the proletar \ at), While the 
administration of nationalised businesses in Ethiopia suggests, at best, 
a state socialism in which changes in property relations do not necessarily
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change the ways in which bureaucrats perforin their functions (see Chapter
Seven), kebelies and peasant associations may represent moves towards a
75 ■ ■ . . . .
democratic socialism.
The chanting of slogans is also stimulating a patriotic fervour - 
“Revolutionary Motherland or death" - which is almost wholly displacing 
further elaborations of -Ethiopia Tikdem. We were about to write that at 
least some of the silliness that attends the development of other African 
ideologies had been avoided in Ethiopia when it was announced, in April 
1978, that several books had been banned as "contradictory to the ongoing 
revolution", including Hamlet, Dante's Divine Comedy and the-Gospel 
According to St. Mark.
C . An interpretation
Perhaps the best way of attempting to understand Ethiopia Tikdem is
first to consider what it is not. The links between the Derg’s ideology
and conventional formulations of an African Socialism are so tenuous as
to be non-existent. African Socialism as it is written and practised is,
in our view, so vague as to be all but meaningless anyway, Basil Davidson
has termed it an African middle-class solution, full of "oratorical flap- 
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doodle", with the state undertaking few responsibilities - through law 
or otherwise - for achieving socialism or a broadly-'based development,
In addition to metaphysical notions of an "African identity", it is com­
posed of vague longings for social justice, suspicions concerning the 
social role of private enterprise, a mass-membership political party, and 
a bit of social engineering in the pursuit of a political philosophy of 
economic growth. Consider the view of Senegal’s Senghor:
Socialism for us is nothing but the rational organisation of 
human society considered In its totality, according to the 
most scientific, the most modern, and the most efficient 
methods.78 . . .
The assertions of Senghor and other Pan-African ideologues often sound 
like those of European social democrats and serve as apologies for neo­
colonialism or a petty despotism; this is particularly evident in the 
ideas of the older Anglophonic African intellectuals who came under the 
influence of Harold Laski. *
Senghor adds: "More than the use of the most efficient techniques,
it [African Socialism] is the sense of community which is the return to 
79A f r i c a n - n e s s O t h e r  African romantics have perceived this traditional
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social-ism, with a communal ownership of land by egalitarian societies which
enforce an extensive network of social obligations, The evidence on this
score is, for most cultures, ambiguous and hence subject to self-serving 
8Q
interpretations.- It would be absolute nonsense to characterise most 
Ethiopian societies in this fashion (see Chapters One and Six), especially 
as Ethiopians have long felt themselves _i_n Africa but not o£ Africa. It 
is therefore impossible to base social mobilisation, effective development 
planning or even state stimulation of the economy on communitarian tradi­
tions in Ethiopia; longstanding stratifications and ethnic antagonisms 
must be dismantled before any kind of socialism can meaningfully take root. 
The Derg sees this process as one of class struggle and, while this is not 
• altogether accurate (see Chapter-.One) i t is far removed from the ideas 
of the older African Socialists. While we have characterised Ethiopia 
Tikdem as vague, it is far more concrete, socialist and less mystical - 
despite the visionary language often employed - than the initial variations 
on the tfreme of Socialism in Anglophonic and Francophonic Africa,
Perhaps the only truly valuable aspect of these older theories is a 
humanistic orientation - Nyerere! semphasis on socialism as an attitude of 
mind, on the need to avoid creating the lonely and ineffectual individuals 
found in more developed states, and on a refusal to reject all aspects of 
tradition out of hand, it is perhaps unfortunate that this kind of human­
ism finds no place in the Derg's thinking, a fact which can be explained 
without necessarily being justified. Like Russia's revolutionary regime, 
the Derg came to power without mass (peasant) support and is committed to 
retaining power and promoting rapid development in a hostile domestic and 
international environment. There has therefore been little opportunity 
for the 'luxury' of a socialist humanism to emerge, despite the strong 
humanistic strands in many of Ethiopia's cultures, Ethiopian Socialism 
resembles, rather, the more explicitly revolutionary ideologies evolving 
in Mozambique, Angola and, to a 1esser .extent, Somalia; these reflect a
stronger emphasis on Marxism and a firmer rejection of capitalism and of
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an economi c dependence on the West,
To what extent is Ethiopia Tikdem a. Marxist ideology? Although the 
question verges on the meaningless, the answer depending on the definition 
of Marxism adopted, a few observations are in order, Marxism provides 
scant guidance for practical decision making in Ethiopia, especially since 
the "bourgeoisie" and "proletariat"? if they exist at all, are small and
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Marx assumed the existence of a proletariat which would free the forces
of production in al.ready-devel oped societies, thereby curing the tils of
a too-rapid industrialisation. Theories of praxis (Gramsci's, Mao's,
etc.) are vague and largely irrelevant to the specific problems of Ethiopian
underdevelopment (see Chapter -Two and passim), Cultural differences from
country to country are so great that no uniform pattern of a Marxist
human liberation can be postulated. Too little attention is paid to the
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content of superstructures by Marxists - and to law in particular, a 
defect we analysed in Chapter Two. It is therefore logical to conclude 
that, even if Ethiopia Tikdem is a Marxist ideology, the Derg' and its 
supporters must of necessity invent much of its content themselves.
Many Western policy-makers, and U.S. State Department officials in 
particular, have gone further to argue that most members of the Derg, 
including Mengistu, are not Marxists at heart, Mengistu has fueled this 
kind of speculation by stating that Ethiopia remains non-aligned, although 
it must rely on the Soviet Union for military aid. The Foreign Minister, 
Colonel Feleke Wolde Giorgis, adds that Ethiopia hopes to become "a kind
go
of Yugoslavia in this region." Provided we adopt the dominant attitude 
among Western diplomats - that African Marxists are "bad men" whose success 
would threaten Western interests - their perceptions may well be correct.
It is difficult, however, to ignore the influence of Marxism on the 
Derg's thinking - particularly on the reduction of all Ethiopian antagon­
ism into class conflicts - in light of the rhetoric adopted and the huge 
floodlit pictures of Marx and Lenin in Addis Ababa (where they have acquired 
distinctly Ethiopian features), At least a formal non-alignment is, in 
any event, necessary to keep the strange bedfellows who are some of 
Ethiopia's current allies - North and South Korea, East and West Germany, 
Libya and Israel - together,
Ethiopia Tikdem is thus no simple variant of a foreign radical tradi­
tion. Its closest relatives are probably the military socialisms found 
in Libya and Algeria or the ideology formulated by Castro, These mobilisa­
tion systems are used to suppress Western forms of politics yet are only 
partially and belatedly communised, Two important keys to new forms of 
Ethiopian law and political behaviour are the in t e n s ely-nat ional5stic 
language of struggle employed (like that of Castro and Gaddafi), and a 
chiliastic rationalism. While the Derg may adapt some foreign ideas, it 
also has its own visions of a new Zion; most Ethiopians are free of the
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heavy-burdens of imitation and self-doubt found elsewhere in sub-Saharan
Africa. The Derg has combined th.e more theocratic .aspects of Marx with
a distinctly Ethiopian version of the Great Russian millenialism and a
military discipline, in an attempt to create monastic barracks dedicated
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to the religion of nationalism.
Given the difficulties inherent in maintaining Ethiopia's territorial
integrity in the twentieth century and ensuring peasant loyalty to central
Government, the Derg could hardly be other than intensely nationalistic,
and perceptions of these perennial problems serve as virtually the only
connection between its ideology and Ethiopia's past. Like those of Cuba,
the laws used to achieve the Derg's goals echo Emile Durkheim's concept
of "repressive law": they embody an organic model (of a socialist society)
and are punitive, severe, and humourless, embodying a new puritanism that
has progress as its faith and compulsory integration in the Ethiopian State
as its endpoint. In Ethiopian business life, public law and (under the
Derg) ideology, the tendency is to react to the stimulus of foreign models
while elaborating, and then rigidly preserving, distinctive Ethiopian 
85vers ions.
Wittingly or not, the Derg is using a dialectical approach to law, 
to ideology and to development generally. An attempt is made to transcend 
contradictions by forging a new synthesis rather than:to palljate conflicts 
through incremental adjustments, through the social engineering approach 
that is adopted in most Western and Third Word states (see Chapter Two). 
Both the Derg's laws and ideology run roughshod over tradition, They 
differ largely in that Ethiopia Tikdem is more flexible but less certain 
and, in theory at least, more amenable to public participation and under­
standing. Contemporary Ethiopian law is a major link between purpose, as 
revealed in the Derg's 3deology, and its programmes which, the Derg hopes, 
will serve to augment the popularity of the ideology, The problem with 
programmes such as rural and urban cooperatives (see Chapters Six and 
Seven) is that ideology is Immediately and directly embodied in Ethiopian 
laws without any of the pragmatism or empirical testing that is reflected 
in, for example, Chinese practices, Also, there is no detailed autborita-
tive text (Marx, Mao, the Koran, etc,) in regular use and from which rules
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can be derived to cover specific situations. Gaps in law and ideology 
are thus filled solely with the preconceptions and self-interest of the 
Individuals concerned, It is clear that the conflict rather than the
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consensus model (see Chapter One) provides a more realistic explanation 
of the evolution of Ethiopia Tikdem,- as well as of.politi.es within ±he 
Derg, and that temporary victors attempt to safeguard their position 
through reformulations of ideology and law,
Ethiopia Tikdem has both positive and negative implications for the 
country's development prospects. On the one hand, its dogmatism and dis­
regard of tradition hardly serve to further a national integration or 
even an urban consensus. The Derg's demands for unthinking obedience 
help to discourage the kinds of rational behaviour needed for development,
On the other hand, Ethiopia Tikdem is developmental in essence: like
Marxism, it postulates growth and a (limited and problematic) self- 
realisation over time, resisting the common Western tendency to reduce 
all of development to one dimension - economic growth. As an ideology, 
it has served to mobilise a fair number of people: through appeals to
patriotism, by counteracting some, but by no means all, traditional poli­
tical practices, and by providing an alternative to the social values
embedded in traditional family and community settings, The question of
g 7
"mobilisation for what" receives no precise answer, however; moving 
beyond a mere maintenance of loyalty to the Derg, how, if at all, are 
participation and political development generally - through peasant 
associations, urban cooperatives and trade unions - to be combined with 
the military's politics and ideology?
IV, Urban Politics Since 1974
The Derg has come to resemble other African juntas in several signifi­
cant respects. For example, Peter Enahoro argues that!
The military dictators in Africa think that you can shut people 
off politics at will and return them to participation as simply 
as you can turn a tap off and on, . , . They seem to think that 
it is healthy to exclude the people from political involvement 
and when they are ready simply to sound the bugle and political 
activity will resume once again, automatically throwing up new
leaders.^8
While frequently assuring the public that they are not seeking the politi­
cal kingdom, Derg members quarrel among themselves and seek to limit the 
power and influence of their: common opponents - sure signs of political 
activity. The Derg monotonously insists that it is paving the way for 
a "people's democratic government", but almost in the same breath it pro­
hibits any form of gathering which it feels unable to dominate completely 
and which even vaguely smacks of political activity. When (and if) elections
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are held, there is bound to be a dearth of able and popular leaders and
a complete absence . of civilians with an extensJ.ve experience of political
power who are not tainted by past associations with Haile Selassie.
Having experienced a brief renaissance during the creeping coup, public
attitudes towards Government have pretty much lapsed into cynicism and
apathy or irresponsibility, along with fear.
Taking these factors into account, a realistic political analysis
would stress that, in the words of a Financial Times correspondent,
it is extremely unlikely that any combination of civilian 
politicians could govern with sufficient authority to imple­
ment the hard decisions that must be taken [in Ethiopia],
The radical changes projected by the Derg require a high degree of order
to be successful, while the traditional stability of most Ethiopian
societies is so great that the forces seeking to disrupt them must be
very powerful. Any activist civilian regime would thus have to rely
so heavily on the military that, it can be argued, the soldiers might
as well rule directly. There are problems with such a view, however:
while the Derg initially displayed an ability to develop a political
autonomy and, to a lesser extent, to militarise the bureaucracy and urban
society, it has not proven particularly adept in subsequent manipulations
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of political resources (see Chapter Two),
Like the military in most other states, the Derg lacks a mass politi­
cal appeal, experience in or patience with bargaining with civilian groups, 
and the ability to plan or coordinate large-scale civilian activities. 
Political innovations are obviously called for, yet an appropriate model 
is hard to find. A conventional Communist party-state, in which the 
military is neutralised by a small civilian elite, is obviously irrelevant 
to contemporary Ethiopia, While a single mass party dominated by the 
military is obviously the direction in which Ethiopia is headed, this 
format has failed significantly to promote political development in such 
neighbouring countries as Egypt, Libya and, arguably, Sudan and Somalia.
As in France, Russia, Nasser's Egypt and much of Marxism in practice, 
a thoroughgoing revolution was deemed necessary to destroy the social 
basis of an authoritarian Ethiopian regime, only to lead to the intro­
duction of new forms of authoritarianism. Disorder and disintegration 
have resulted from significant segments of the population withdrawing 
allegiance to the anc i en regime without actively supporting or, in some 
cases, even acquiescing in the Derg's, These tendencies are probably
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inherent in the intial forging of any modernising state formerly dependent
91upon a single traditional rul.e for unity and' the maintenance of order. 
Compared with other Third World states, Ethiopia came late to (an inter­
nal) decolonisation, in an era when fissiparious tendencies have acquired 
a greater legitimacy. Mengistu's long march to a substantial power was, 
perhaps, a natural byproduct of these processes, but nothing in history 
is ever inevitable. ' *' ' ' ' ' ' ’
At first glance, events in Ethiopia bear out Aristide Zolberg's 
assertion that "political revolutions are unlikely to succeed because
they entail prerequisites which are absent from the syncretic societies
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of contemporary Africa. . . Laying aside the obvious criticism
that what amount to revolutionary prerequisites and successes is often
extremely uncle'ar, we would argue that ‘Ethiopia1 s Revolution has already
largely succeeded, on its own terms as defined by the Derg, The major
aim, which emerges clearly from the Derg's public statements, laws and
major policy decisions of 1974 and 1975, has been carried out to the
point where the Revolution - but not Ethiopia as a territorial entity -
would survive the Derg's collapse. The removal of the Emperor, business
and land nationalisations and, more brutally, the November 1975 executions
are linked together by an overriding desire to neutralise traditional
elites and eliminate their power base in the economy, including the
support they received from the Western-oriented business community. The
Derg has, all along, aimed at something more than a mere pol ifical survival:
repudiating the formula found successful by other African elites, It has
instituted genuine land reforms and refused to compromise with other elites.
The Revolution has at least shown that the primary cause of Ethiopian
underdevelopment was not the impossibility of change, but the absence of
93demands for change by the wealthy and powerful or their clients. Demands 
are now being asserted at such a rate that few regimes could ever manage 
to keep up with them. For this reason-, the Ethiopian Revolution is at 
least partly out of control all of the time.
A. Urban Opposition to the Derg
The Derg's rural opponents, enumerated in Chapters One and Six, 
confine their ambitions almost exclusively to separatism or to a localised 
agrarian anarchism, Student groups, trade unions and, to a lesser extent-, 
the Orthodox Church - the only organised civilian elements under Haile 
Selassie - have, however, directly challenged the Derg's proprietary
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right to the State in Its urban stronghold. The Derg was fairly success­
ful' in repressing the'demands of these groups, and urban threats to its 
authority from outside of its ranks have subsequently come from political 
"part i es" .whi ch only came to prominence after the Revolution. Beginning 
in 1976, many dissident students and union members went underground and 
joined one of these parties; many were later detained and/or shot. The 
Derg's attitude towards union activists is mirrored in the paternal 
language periodically directed towards students:
Those who shouted for the masses . . .  in the streets must now 
help the masses to organise themselves, [A] nation can neither 
be built nor destroyed by empty noise. . . .  A nation and its 
principles are not like a football game. . . . Some of them 
. [students] have been trying to imitate various foreign philoso­
phies, including foreign cultures, , , , These students who are 
tools of reactionaries cannot be allowed to continue with their 
joke. . . .
The Derg closed the University and scattered the students around the
provinces on the zemecha programme (see Chapter Six). A minor, but for
our purposes significant, effect of growing student radicalI sat ion was
that, according to James Paul, it exposed "contradictions in the whole
95program of the law school."
The Derg's relations with the Church hierarchy have been much more 
complex than those with students and unionists, and the Church is dealt 
with more gingerly. One of the crucial mistakes made by the plotters of 
the i960 coup lay in making no reference to God: loyalists relied on the
Church, which branded the rebels agents of the devil and threatened their
96 . 1
excommunication. By way of contrast, a purely secular coup in 197A 
encountered a supine Church; its mystical power had turned out to be a 
myth. Contrary to the expectations of many Derg members, the central Church 
hierarchy did not actively oppose Haile Selassie's removal. In return, 
the Derg initially squelched attempts by young priests to depose the Abuna 
(Patriarch) and introduce radical ecclesiastical reforms, while reprimand­
ing the Abuna for his criticisms of the Draft Constitution (see Chapter 
Five). The reactions of rural priests, who are largely beyond centralised 
Church control s, to the Derg's rural land reform have varied from tentative 
support to violent opposition. The land reform Proclamation was studiously 
ambiguous with regard to Church lands (see Chapter Six), In November 1975, 
Derg Chairman Teferi told a Russian Orthodox bishop that the Church Is
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allowed to carry on with its affairs with the support of society 
and without being.involved in politics.and that it will receive 
assistance from the Government until it can stand on its o w n . 37
The Derg's attitude towards the Church leadership changed fundamentally 
in February 1976, when the Abuna was arrested. Several hundred other 
people were arrested along with him, as a result of an alleged "reaction­
ary plot" led by a General and a former large landowner. Seasoned Ethiopia- 
watchers believe that the Abuna had nothing to do with the plot, but he 
was also charged with the murder of several priests, misappropriating 
famine relief funds, non-payment of taxes and the divers ion-of Church 
funds into private accounts. The last three charges could probably be 
substantiated, and it is a measure of the Church's influence that the 
Abuna remained in office so long. By 1978, some urban priests were coming 
to terms with Ethiopian Socialism and even with the Red Terror, partici­
pating (along with some Muslim leaders) in ideological conferences aimed 
at determining the "correct position" of religious organisations in
Revolutionary Ethiopia. One such "Seminar" in March 1978 was addressed
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by the new Abuna, Tekle Haimanot, and the Imam of the Anwar mosque.
As in many other states, the urban areas and Addis Ababa in particu­
lar are the arena for intense State politics, while the peripheries (or 
hinterlands) are the objects rather than the intiators of policies. While
Addis is thus "the wrong thermometer to take the temperature of Ethiopian 
99affairs", most cf the events that have shaped an urban-based revolution 
took place there. A brief survey of the Derg's activist urban opposition 
adds to our understanding of the Revolution, despite the fact that these 
groups are small numerically: like Soviet or Czech dissidents, they
press the kinds of demands that the existing system is not prepared to 
fulfill. The main bone of contention is the continuation of military 
rule, since most of the Derg's organised urban opponents would expand 
upon a "purified" version of Ethiopian Socialism, Beyond this, ideologi­
cal and tactical disputes and other reasons for assassinations among 
rival groups (usually carried out in the name of "revolutionary progress") 
are "difficult to follow even for those well versed in the matter,"
One thing is clear: many and probably most of-these assassinations are
called for and carried out by civilians rather than soldiers, As we have 
no independent sources of information on this topic, we are forced to
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rely entirely on the reports of others - which are exceedingly thin,
The .most accurate brief summary of Ethiopian pol [tics was offered
in December 1977 by Michael Kaufman:
There are . . . five clandestine but legally sanctioned Marxist 
groupings, two illegal groups, one of them Marxist , , ,, peasants 
and urban dwellers associations and the old ministerial bureau­
cracy - the nervous technocrats who once served the Emperor,
Each has its supporters, often armed. Alliances and enmitites 
run through the whole network,^
Except for the peasant associations, all of these factions are urban- 
based. Bureaucrats are not organised as such, and the threat of assassin­
ation has caused activists - including those who have lent support to the 
Derg from time to time - to organise themselves into clandestine parties, 
with tight cell-type structures which discourage infiltration. The five 
quasi-official parties - Meison (infra), Seded, Malered, Etchat and the 
Was league in July 1978 - attack each other over abstruse ideological \
matters and attempt to gain individual adherents within the Derg and to 
dominate the Revolutionary Front that continues to recede into the future. 
These parties are, however, more or less united in opposition to the 
Derg's rallying cry of "Revolutionary Motherland or Death", contending 
that ideological purity and the fate of the Revolution take precedence
i 102over national unity.
The Derg treats the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party (EPRP) as 
its most dangerous enemy - as a more significant threat to military rule 
than, for example, Eritrean separatists - even though the EPRP's active 
membership has reportedly averaged only 700 in Addis Ababa since the 
Revolution, The EPRP was formed by trade union militants and older 
students at the end of Haile Selassie's reign, although there was more 
noise than action initially, These groups formed the backbone of the 
organisation, along with bureaucratic and military "fel 1ow-travel 1ers", 
until the end of 1977. One result of the assassinations and detentions
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is that many of the remaining EPRP members are teenagers or even children, 
which makes the assassinations by both sides particularly horrific,
While the EPRP has reportedly attempted to operate through the Derg 
on occasion, it takes the conventional Marxist-Leninist view that social­
ism can never be achieved in a society dominated by the military, Members 
of the Derg are termed "prostitutors of revolutionary ideals", and the 
EPRP's vague programme consists largely of calls for an immediate "provisional
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people's government", to be achieved in stages if necessary. It has
asked unions, teachers and women's and student's organisations .to join
a united front under EPRP leadership, and it reportedly organised an
abortive strike in September 1976, From mid-1976 onwards, the EPRP moved
away from a pamphleteering and propaganda campaign towards a programme of
assassination. The Derg has also accused it of "economic sabotage" and
with joining the conservative ("remnant aristocrat") Ethiopian Democratic
Union (see Chapter One) In forming a "mercenary army",^^
The EPRP compiled and in some cases published lists of persons it
wished to assassinate. "Every day", noted David Ottaway in March 1977,
a top Government official, student, union leader or some pro- 
military figure is shot by professional assassins belonging 
either to the pro-Government Marxist A11-Ethiopian Socialist 
movement [infra] . . .  or the extreme Left-wing , . , EPRP. ,
. J05 ----
In September 1976 several hundred EPRP members were arrested. In October 
Fikre Merid, a personable law lecturer and one of a few individuals who 
might have eased a transition to civilian rule, was assassinated - alleged­
ly by the EPRP. Apart from the September arrests, the Government had 
taken little official action against the EPRP; Mengistu had demanded 
harsh counter-measures on three different occasions and the Derg had 
refused. Mengistu went ahead on his own in Ocotber 1976, and the EPRP 
responded by assassinating fifty of its opponents In November, By 
February 1977, anti-EPRP forces went on the offensive, killing twenty 
EPRP members - including three secondary school students. In March, 
the EPRP shot two kebelle officials and the leader of the new trade 
union association. A member of the Derg was killed by the EPRP in August 
and another in November, along with a policeman and the Mayor-elect of 
Addis Ababa. Government announced that 68 EPRP adherents had been arrested 
and "are to be tried." Stricter control measures were also adopted: new
identity papers (in addition to those issued by kebei1es) were issued 
sparingly by Government, and a witchhunt for those unable to produce the 
new documents began. Many innocent people were killed, and notes pinned 
to the bodies of some of the 300 persons shot in Addis Ababa during 
December 1977 admitted as much, or stated that "we are tired of burying 
our revolutionaries," Forty EPRP members were assassinated in January 
1978 and 600 were reportedly arrested. The ^7 people who confessed their 
membership in the EPRP at a public meeting in Addis Ababa were led away
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to be "rehabilitated." The Derg announced in March that the EPRP - various­
ly described as a "rightwing petty bourgeois", "the Trotskyite remnant"
and an "anarchist-fascist groups" - had been "wiped out" in Addis, and
1 06
that the Red Terror would therefore be transferred to other towns.
® ■ Other Responses from the Derg
A great deal of violence among urban guerrillas has produced incon­
clusive political results to date. Going back to 1975, executions and 
detentions had already alienated influential groups and called into being 
new opponents of the Derg. It became clear that the Derg lacked the 
political institutions needed to mobilise broad support, although subse­
quent appeals to patriotism under Ethiopia Tikdem partially made up for 
this deficiency. Additionally, the experiences of radica1s under the 
Emperor's 'no party' State led them to demand that parties be legalised, 
while "liberals" continued to fear that parties would serve as little 
more than fuel for separatist a m b i t i o n s , T h e  Derg's response to this 
variety of pressures have been halting and studiously ambiguous. The for­
mation of a new party was first pledged in April 1975 and, more firmly,
in September, but such a party has not materialised as of this writing.
In September, Derg Chairman Teferi said:
We believe that one strong party is the most useful for a 
country like Ethiopia to begin with, So we decided not to 
allow competitive political parties, which could hinder our 
development. . , , With luck, the preparations will be fin­
ished in a short time and civilians will take charge of 
Government. . , .^
His statements are not very enlightening, and it is difficult to under­
stand why the Derg countenanced - or was unable to forestall - the subset 
quent proliferation of quasi-official parties, unless they are viewed as 
a lesser evil than having people join the EPRP,
It was announced that "feasibility studies" concerning workers', 
peasants' and youth associations were completed in November 1975, The 
peasant and labour organ!sat ions which were set up differ significantly 
from those recommended (see Chapters Six and Seven) and no youth associa­
tion was ever created, presumably because no firm basis for loyalty to 
the Derg could be found among students, A committee of solIders, intel­
lectuals, students, peasants, workers and members of womens' organisations 
was broached in December 1975, to elaborate Ethiopia Tikdem and to "study"
the formation of a party. This Politburo, as it came to be called after 
the Derg W>. Jef twarc^ shift became i i#creas ingly apparent, \ms regularised +  
under the Proclamation creating the Provisional Office for Mass Organisation 
Affairs (POMOA) in July 1976 (see Chapter Five),^^
By November 1976, nine of the original fifteen senior Politburo members 
had been assassinated. The POMOA came to constitute an embryo "parallel 
structure" to those of the bureaucracy and the military. It is linked to 
the Derg through a Supreme Organising Committee and is said to direct some 
of the operations against the EPRP, Still predicting the immanence of a 
political party in March 1978, a POMOA spokesman argued that, owing to 
Ethiopia's historical experiences, there were no "revolutionary cadres"; 
the military was thus forced* to take power; a-nd opposition- to the Derg at 
this stage could only constitute an invitation to counterrevolution.
While there is some truth in these reasonably pragmatic statements, we 
would definitely part company with the POMOA spokesman when he extends 
these arguments to justify the Red Terror and contends that the "feudal 
bourgeois system" has not yet been dismantled. James MacManus saw the 
POMOA as wholly loyal to an "untutored" Mengistu, who was "without . , , 
a political thought in his head" prior to his rise to power. The "most 
likely" reason for this apparent anomaly is that the POMOA was betting 
on the strong, on those who would prosecute an "onwardgoing" Revolution,
Like the POMOA with which it shared some of its leaders, the Marxist ? 7
All Ethiopian Socialist Movement (MEISON) saw, until August 1977, a temporary 
civi1 ian/mi 1itary a 11iance as necessary. MEISON was an outgrowth of the • 
Politburo and seemed destined to serve as the nucleus of the Revolutionary 
Front. It took over the Yakatit Political School that has trained 5,000 
illiterate peasants and workers orally since 197^, it advocated and assisted 
in the arming of kebelle and peasant associations - a key Mengistu policy 
- and it came to dominate some kebelles and peasant associations. The 
chief ideologue of MEISON and Chairman of the POMOA, Haile Fide, was, 
like Fikre Merid and many other publicly-identified civilian activists, 
a French-educated Marxist. Haile was arrested when MEISON's break with 
the Derg came in August 1977, and Soviet pleas for his release have fallen 
on deaf ears. Underestimating the Derg's strength during the Somali in­
vasion, MEISON called for a return to civilian rule*. some 200 of its 
members managed'to get to ground and are attempting to unite other Marxist
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factions, but 70 fled the country, were killed or arrested. About orie- 
third of MEISON remained loyal to the Derg and is now termed.Seded 
(Revolutionary Flame). Allegedly more nationalistic and less rigidly 
Marxist than the parent organisation, this group favours improved re­
lations with the U.S. and has superintended the extension of the Red 
Terror to members of MEISON, Amnesty International was led to conclude 
that, by "mid-December 1977, any semblance to the rule of law had totally 
disappeared."^ This assertion and the impact of the Red Terror are 
evaluated in Chapters Five and Eight.
V. Old Wine In New Bottles?
Contemporary Addis Ababa is certainly a brutal and brutalising place,
but it would be a mistake to assume that a predisposition towards violence
has only emerged since the Revolution. A few Ethiopian!sts claim to have
found a high incidence of violent personality traits within dominant
ethnic groups, traits similar to those associated with a Latin American
machismo. We need not adopt their pseudo-psychology, but simply observe
that there were some nine million pistols and rifles in civilian hands
1 1 2
prior to the Revolution (300,000 in Addis Ababa) and many more today, 
given the arming of kebelles, peasant associations and separatist groups. 
Ethiopia is thus among the most heavily armed of countries on a per capita 
basis, and frequent recourse to gun-play was evident long before the 
Revolut ion.
A. The Politics of Violence
Profound changes in the distribution of wealth and power are seldom 
accepted voluntarily in any society, and they provided an additional 
motive for violence in Ethiopia, Like Soviet revolutionaries, the Derg 
found that a systematic neutralisation and/or liquidation of traditional 
elites did not automatically mobilise the people for its new aims; much 
of the public went into militant opposition and/or tried to safeguard a 
traditional secrecy and family solidarity. Needless provocations were 
also offered: like Stalin, Mengistu Is seemingly unaware of the fact
that non-antagonistic contradictions, wrongly handled, become antagonistic
11 3ones. Examples are offered in the footnote and infra . The Derg’s
"erratic and repressive stewardship" has created few friends for it in any
1 1 k i
strata, although its more passive urban enemies are coming increasingly
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to recognise that anarchy and territorial dismemberment are the only
a 1ternatives .to military rule in the.short run, So, while the Derg •
* *  *  * * * * • , '  * *
possesses little legitimacy, other groups have even less, This is one
form of Jurgen Habermas’s "Legitimation Crisis" (see Chapter Two), -in 
which attempts to overcome losses in legitimacy only result in a further 
erosion of the Derg's position, yet the Derg remains surprisingly effec­
tive in certain spheres of activity,
Coercion is justified, within narrow limits, by the extreme fragmen­
tation of, and low levels of discipline within many Ethiopian societies, 
the need to suppress marg1nal recalcitrants and vested interests opposed 
to a rural development beneficial to peasants, and the need to break 
through the economic stagnation that has caused so much suffering-and 
injustice. The point was soon reached, however, when repression and 
Ethiopia Tikdem are used primarily to retain a personalised power, a step 
justified to the public by the existence of handy "enemies", A reliance
on force blocks tenuous channels of communication running among peasants,
city dwellers, bureaucrats and the military and prevents new ones from 
developing. People are either afraid of, or see no point in,using them, 
The resulting lack of information fosters additional violence: competing
groups cannot accurately assess the dangers they face and overreact in 
safeguarding themselves. Demands escalate wildly and violence ultimately 
becomes the only way in which groups can communicate with each other. 
Coercion absorbs a disproportionate share of resources, especially of 
manpower, potential capital and imagination, and the hand of the military 
and police is strengthened while the bureaucracy's withers, The gap be­
tween ideological aspirations and the ability to implement them continue
to grow, and new rai sons d 1etre for a repressive regime must be invented.
It almost seems as though Nigel Young was thinking of Ethiopia when 
he wrote that the
organisation of violence is itself undemocratic and inegalitarian. 
Vanguard revolutionary parties and terrorist groups, based on 
orders and obedience, have no room for political debate. Armies 
. . . are amongst the least egalitarian of institutions, , , ,
The exploitation of popular acquiescence by minority power becomes 
the accepted pattern, . . . Once the ’seizure of power’ is achieved,
new outrages can be justified on behalf of whatever the new elite
defines as 'revolutionary1. Compulsion and uniformity become both 
means and ends,
. , , The removal of an elite by coup no more guarantees 
real chanoe . . . than the assassination of one member of that
elite; too often the methods of the opponent are imitated, , (
. The violent origins of any regime are reflected in its patterns
263
of administration and the lifestyle of its ruling class, 
especially their intolerance of opposition. This is es- 
‘pec'ially marked iir the:, use *of fnherited structures (i1. e v, * ‘ ' '
the bureaucracy, military elites, geopolitcal boundaries 
- even secret police - of the previous regime)
Our- view- Is that immense economic and social changes have occurred in
Ethiopia, but precious few specifically political changes - largely for
the reasons Young adduces. The Derg has unashamedly capitalised on the
nineteenth century conquests of the Emperor Menelik, but which government
voluntarily relinquishes territory where it is able and willing to fight
and has a ‘colourable title1?
B. Political Parties and ’Style*
Opposition and, more particularly, a political pluralism has been-
consistently frowned upon among Third World politicians and by "radicals
117and socialists from Robespierre to August. Bebel," While many Ethiopian
University students have argued ' (probably correctly) that a pluralistic
State would be stronger than a poorly-integrated one theoretically committed
to a single set of norms, the extent to which Ethiopian politicians stress
a monolithic national unity is directly proportional to their proximity
to power at the centre - both before and after the Revolution, Promises
of a one-party State are a logical outcome of these attitudes, yet delays
in implementing these promises are also logical, in that they benefit the
Derg. Recognising the need to displace localised political communities
oriented around traditional elites, the Derg recklessly pressed for a
rapid political mobilisation and succeeded in politicising city dwellers
and even some of the peasants. The Derg then drew back, recognising that
it would be difficult to control and impossible to assimilate the explo-
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sion of new demands that resulted,
Over time, the Derg has moved towards a Leninist view of its future 
party as the vanguard of class struggle. In theory, such a party leads 
the Revolution from above, aids the oppressed against their exploiters, 
mobilises youth for its purposes (a crucial Derg failing, as the EPRP and 
zemecha demonstrate) and provides tutelage in democratic practices through 
democratic centralism - the mode of decision-making adopted for the hier­
archies of Ethiopia’s kebelles (see Chapter Seven)„ While such a party 
in theory represents a good compromise between participation and the needs 
for mobilisation and leadership, participation is usually neglected In
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practice and mobilisation often proves extremely difficult, Integration
» - ■ ■ 
prodeecfs, ji.f.at'al 1., t.hroucjh class struggle,and contradiction’ a n e  1-u.s ive
goal in the absence of a pre-existing ethnic and cultural Integration,
Johrf Hazard’s study of Keita's Mal#i contain a useful moral for the Derg:
the effectiveness of a communist party-state can only be diluted by a
mass membership stemming from the desire to mobilise large numbers of
people; members lose their elitist benefits, party discipline falters and
the value of a vanguard disappears. The transplantation of other types
of parties in the Third World has, however, recorded few successes, to
date. For example, Nyerere's ideal of a "two-way al1-weather road by
11 9which government could reach the people" and vice versa, has not been 
attained in substance, in Tanzania or elsewhere, Partie's are slow to take 
root in local communities, they require a constant nurture and balancing 
of interests to survive - and the Derg has displayed little interest 
either in continuous supervision or political bargaining, The experiences 
of countries like Egypt and Libya demonstrate that little political develop 
ment is realised when a ruling council of soldiers is simply converted into 
a party central committee. A party would prove no political panacea for 
Ethiopia and such supposed military virtues as obedience, hierarchy and 
the preservation of order are the antithesis of participation and the 
questioning of authority,
A comparison of the descriptions found in this and the preceding 
Chapter shows that the policies pursued and some of the forms of govern­
ment under the Derg differ radically from those of Haile Selassie, Never­
theless, the ’style' of politics, the manner or method of policy-making, 
has remained largely the same. Many Ethiopian social structures - particu­
larly in central and northern Ethiopia (see Chapter Six) - have notyet 
changed fundamentally, as a result of the Revolution, and
the social structure generates the substantive issues of politics 
and colours the style in which they are disputed, [l]f the 
people are individualistic, intolerant and arrogant then it 
is likely that their politics will be those of coercion or 
regimentation; if they are . , . quietist or deferential then 
their politics are likely to be those of manipulation, And 
always it must be admitted that harsh material conditions [and] 
glaring disparities in the distribution of wealth or status may 
set mortally low limits to mutual forbearance, . , , And for­
bearance is a human quality in very short supply,'
It Is a measure of the complexity of Ethiopia’s politics and of its 
ethnic groups and social strata that all of these generalisations can be
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meaningfully applied, both before and after the Revolution, One elite
has succeeded another, with-the notion of elitism, the .spec i-al .cl.aims to 
govern asserted by 'enlightened' groups, being perpetuated by the military. 
Political relations remain intensely personalised in#a small and subsis­
tence political society, as in the feuds among Teferi, Atnafu and Mengistu. 
Despite a great deal of lip service - and a substantial measure of genuine 
.cpmiTjitme.nt - to egalitarianism, el.itism continues to characterise Ethiopian 
politics because elitism inheres in the social structures of dominant
Ethiopian ethnic groups and in the traditional proprietary theory of the
123 v 
state (see Chapters One and Three),
Like the Derg, Haile Selassie distrusted Western-sty1e political proc”
esses and adopted adrawn-out paternalistic tutelage as the means of marking
a lengthy transition between the charismatic leadership of previous
emperors and a future secular state. As in Russia, Ethiopian Socialism
arose in a backward country and in opposition to an autocratic regime,
leaving it with an autocratic taint, The continuation of censorship, the
repression of group expressions of anything other than adulation and the
absence of an effective machinery of criticism - such as provided by some
Parliaments - perpetuates an atmosphere of secrecy and intrigue (see
Chapter Three), One of the Derg's major criticisms of the Emperor that
he used "divide and rule tactics" (see Chapter three) - has also been
validly levelled against .Mengistu, who is clearly less adroit than the
Emperor. Factionalism under Haile Selassie is replicated under.the Derg:
only the political orientations of the groups have changed, and a pessimist
has even declared that the
chance that the educated .class of Ethiopia would mute its 
political differences and concentrate on the formidable job 
of developing the country has almost certainly g o n e , 124
It is clear that the Derg is eager to reverse the consequences of the
policies it has inherited. There is, however, abundant evidence that the
Derg and its supporters - urbanised elites for the most part, as were
those who manned the Emperor’s regime at the centre - have little direct
and realistic understanding of peasants and the ways in which they think
and live. This assertion is illustrated by the carelessness of the land
reforms that are discussed in Chapter Six, The Derg's unwillingness or
inability to respond to interests asserted under traditional laws, or to
convince people (particularly those in northern and central Ethiopia) of
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the existence of viable alternatives, may well be its Achilles Heel from 
the standpoint of long term political development, Likewise, the huge 
roundups in Addis Ababa that netted thousands of innocent people (some 
of whom were killed by mistake) indicate that the Derg> the POMOA and
l o r
(formerly) MEISON are out of touch with urban opposition politics.
As under Halle Selassie, channels of communication are weak and few 
in number, and there is a consequent tendency to rely on manipulation and 
coercion. The Aquabe Sa'at (traditional audience with the Emperor - see 
Chapter Three) survives virtually unaltered: military and bureaucratic
hierarchies are ignored by complainants and informers in an attempt to 
gain a hearing from a few Derg members. Ethiopian bureaucrats have be­
come only a little less arrogant and indifferent; the incompetence remains. 
There is still a lack of reliable political institutions to implement 
Government policies, although the constituencies on which such institu­
tions could be founded have, to a limited extent, been mobilised since 
1975. Local government, perceived as a barrier to attaining radical goals 
and as loyal to opposition groups, is being circumvented and emasculated 
through the kebelles and peasant associations, The devolution of some 
localised functions seems to be the practical extent to which ethnic 
diversities are going to be recognised, however. Like Haile Selassie
before it, the Derg argues in its April 1976 Programme that "the question
1 26
of nationalities in Ethiopia has always been an artificial one, , ,
The Derg's foreign affairs spokesman echoed Haile Selassie in June 1978;
"Since Ethiopia's unity and territorial integrity are not negotiable, the
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only alternative is to crush the treacherous secessionist movements,"
If much remains the same, much has also changed under the Derg, 
Consider the ways in which Kaplan et al. characterised the Emperor's regime 
in 1971:
Despite its involvement with the outside world, its formal 
adoption of modern governmental institutions, and its tenta­
tive approaches to economic development, the country retains 
its fundamental conservatism,^
In a couple of years, the Derg has moved towards autarchy (except for an
acute dependence on foreign weaponry) in what it sees as a hostile world?
repudiated superficial Western-sty1e institutions and created what are
termed transitional arrangements in an ad hoc fashion, displayed a deep
commitment to a socialist path of development, and forged what is arguably
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the most radically leftist regime in Africa. Virtually the only thing 
the Derg consciously seeks -to conserve is its own power (in this respect, 
all but suicidal regimes are conservative); similarities in political 
styles suggest, rather, that the Derg is as much the prisoner of Ethiopian 
history and its own military foundations as it is a free agent,
C. Addis Hi wet's Hypotheses
This i.s-the way Addis Hiwet described the Derg in 1975;
Born out of the crisis of a new democratic revolution, wishing to 
lead it but inherently iincapab-le of doing so; with its political 
domination uncertain and precarious, suspicious of the masses it 
. . . mobilises; completely incapable of differentiating between 
power based on bayonets and power based on the people [;] still 
rent by internal contradict ions and therefore devoid of a unified 
political identity, nonetheless the military dictatorship still 
wields effective political power. But the relative autonomy the 
Dergue has enjoyed so far is fast dissipating itself and its area 
of manoeuvre is shrinking.129
His description retains our interest today. While noting the Derg's
shortcomings, Addis avoids falling into what might be termed the Colin
Legum trap, of biweekly predictions of the Derg's immediate demise. If
the journalist's pen is indeed mightier than the sword? the Derg would
have collapsed long ago.
It is worthwhile pausing to analyse Addis's assertion that the Derg
was incapable of leading a "new democratic revolution" and subsequently
became a "military dictatorship", if only to illustrate the slipperyness
of these terms when applied to concrete situations in the Third World,
Some.years ago, Western political scientists were fascinated by a dichotomy
of democracy and dictatorship (or totalitarianism), but both the concepts
and the distinction they represent have been breaking down in recent
years - especially in the Third World. As Addis suggests, there was a
large measure of publ ic participation _i_n Addi s Ababa during the initial
stages of the "creeping coup" and all revolutionaries claim to be the
proxy representatives of their people, yet a "democratic revolution"
approaches a contradiction in terms. It is of course true that, under
definitions commonly applied in the West, Ethiopian politics is not and
has not been democratic: most of the people vitally interested in a
particular decision have no effective voice in it; there is not even a
modest degree of freedom to compete for public support; and the virtues
associated with moderation in the West - pragmatism and a willingness to
130
compromise - are absent. No one would therefore expect durable ■
i1
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constitutional norms, a meaningful separation of powers, procedural due 
process (or natural justice) or a general consent of the governed to emerge 
from our Ethiopian public law analyses in Chapters Three and Five.
Certain elements of totalitarianism « a concept more bankrupt than 
democracy -1 can be found In Ethiopia: a compulsory ideology, terrorists
functioning as political police, and a projected monolothlc party. Never­
theless, the Derg lacks the characteristic ability, formulated by Hanna 
Arendt, to dominate all spheres of each individual's life, especially in 
the rural areas. Limitations on the scope of Governmental power are 
largely the same as those faced by Haile Selassie (see Chapter Three),
In particular, the Derg has no monopoly of weapons, jobs or effective
. 1 3 1
channels of communication. The Derg thus exists somewhere on a complex
continuum between polar stereotypes of democratic and totalitarian regimes
- like most other governments, 1
If a Western political scientist were to construct a theoretical model
of political instability, it would bear a strong resemblance to post-
Revolutionary Ethiopia. While all of the Derg's policies are familiar to
students of comparative politics, the simultaneous pursuit of so many radi-
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cal changes at what seems to be a reckless pace is conducive to ever 
higher levels of instability. The Derg has nevertheless survived in the 
face of fierce opposition from all directions, and we would argue that it 
represents a novel form of parliamentary government. The novelty consists 
in the fact that the '.parliament' is not elected. Its duration is unknown 
and the qualifications of its members relate to*their abilityito 
handle firearms. The initial selection of Derg members by military units 
introduced a rudimentary democratic element when compared with Haile Selassie's 
regime, .where only selected sycophants exercised meaningful power at the 
centre (see Chapter Three). The Derg is perpetuating a tradition in a 
revolutionary fashion: a seventeenth century Ethiopian constitution Cthe
Ser'ata Mengest - see Chapter One) states that a new king is nominated by 
incumbent, with the consent of the army. As the traditional army included 
soldiers between the ages of twelve and sixty, its consent operated as a 
selective male plebiscite.
Today, the Derg could be regarded as purely oligarhic, save that it 
still represents an attempt to secure a minimal consensus among soldiers 
(many of whom are peasants in uniform), policemen and their immediate relatives.
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This "core constituency1* is much larger than Haile Selassie's (see Chapter 
Three), and about the same size as those found in many, reputedly more 
democratic African states. New and informal channels of communication 
- friendship and kinship networks running between the military and the 
urban public - enabled*policy justifications and exchanges of information 
and viewpoints, until these channels were largely destroyed by the White 
and Red Terror. There is, however, a largely unrealised potential for 
broader public participation through kebelles, peasant associations and, 
to a lesser extent, political parties and trade unions,
In sum and as a gross generalisation, the representativeness of the 
Derg has evolved about as far as it had in the Parliaments of Tudor England, 
whose francise was extremely restricted {see Chapter Three). Future 
developments in Ethiopia will, however, tend towards a Rousseauian direct 
democracy - with all of its attendant dangers ~ rather than a Western^style 
constitutionalism. As of this writing, Mengistu seems to dominate things 
but,.contra some newspaper reports, there is little evidence that his 
position is secure or that he has grasped anything like the combination 
of power and authority enjoyed by Haile Selassie. It seems, for example, 
that the Soviets and Cubans have extended aid and contort to Mengistu's 
enemies. Assertions of the collapse of the Derg as a collegial body 
during 1977 are thus premature.
, A politically-neutral military is unlikely in Ethiopia in the fore"
seeable- future: the military still feels that it best represents the
people's interest, and no civilian regime could either command military
confidence or survive without it. As Derg Chairman Teferi stated back
in September 1975,
the-troops, despite the problems that occur through the actions 
of certain selfish groups, will not return to their barracks 
until they have made Ethiopia one of socialism's promised 
lands. , . ,133
Dominant Western perceptions of military regimes as either a group
of apolitical technocrats or as a desirable model for maximsing both
modernisation and stability thus prove false when applied in Ethiopia,
Further, analyses in this Chapter and elsewhere in the study suggest that
it_is simply incorrect to argue, as John Spencer did in 1975, that for
the Derg "the goal of economic modernisation has been replaced by the
1 3^
menace of polItical.bankruptcy," One reason is that the fund of
i
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political capital held by any other potential ruling elite is much smaller
than the Derg's, Another Is that the Derg recognises the interdependence
of its political success and a broadly-based development, The Derg's
economic performance, while far from perfect, is much more impressive
than its politics - an assertion which will be expanded upon in greater
detail in Chapters Six and Seven. While the statistics are muddled and
incomplete, they indicate a real annual rate of growth in production of
] A %  since the Revolution, This is a fairly impressive achievement, given
that production has declined under revolutionary regimes which attempted
less radical reforms in other countries, Certain sectors of the economy
are definitely in a state of attrition and many aspects of underdevelopment
under Haile Selassie are proving resistant to change. Real urban wages
are decl inirig and urban unemployment is rising. On the brighter side,
the incomes of peasants - some 90% of the population are higher, they
have more to eat, although serious famines occur in some areas, and
Government devotes a higher proportion of its resources to the rural areas,
Ethiopia's international economic position actually improved, although
world coffee price trends were largely responsible for this improvement
up to 1977. The Derg's policies have staunched the flow of foreign
economic aid from former donors while attracting huge amounts of military
aid. Since the coup, the Ethiopian military has claimed an increasingly
large share of governmental revenue, although the exact figures are un"
available, The military is being expanded to fulfill greatly increased
combat commitments and, very likely, to satisfy aspirations towards pro"
motion, in an attegipt to forestall frustration, jealousy and subsequent
coups, Evidence from other Third World countries suggests, however, that
military growth need not be pursued at the expense of economic growth or
1 IS
welfare expenditures,
"Only one thing is certain: when the Emperor dies, all of Ethiopia's
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problems will live on." So wrote Robert Hess in 1970  ^ the sentiment
was updated by an Ethiopian poet in May 197^* "The dust has settled down,
137leaving more dust." Much has changed since then as a result of the 
Revolution, yet much remains the same, While Nigel Young’s general state" 
ments (supra) characterise events in Ethiopia with a fair degree of accuracy
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his is not the whole story. Pushing his arguments to their conclusion, 
he asserts that the
legacy of the twentieth century revolutions is ambiguous,
, . . The connection between , , . historical events and 
the egalitarian, libertarian and humanist ideas of classic 
cal socialist thought are tenuous indeed,!38
This kind of pessimism deepens in the writings of Barrington Moore, Jr.,
who finds that revolutions begun in comaraderie end in fratricide; the
brotherhood of man and the abolition of political deceit become a tyranny
directed against the "little people", in whose name the revolution was
begun. Maintaining yourself in power is not the criterion of a successful
revolution, which Moore equates with a lasting contribution to freedom -
adiminution of human misery. Revolution thus poses a more vehement form
of the fundamental contradiction between politics and morality, "the
effectiveness of immoral political methods" and the temptation to use
them before an unscrupulous enemy mounts a counterrevolution on the one
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hand and, on the other, "the necessity for morality in any social order,"
These and many other criticisms can be levelled against participants
in the Ethiopian Revolution, and some of them will be discussed in the
concluding Chapter. Particularly cogent is Graham Hancock’s fear that,
in Ethiopia and Somalia, "death has taken priority over life; hysterical
nationalism over individual survival and the hope of a better life for
1 4o
all the peoples of the Horn." We would nevertheless adopt the less 
pessimistic assessment of that most competent of Ethiopia watchers, David 
Ottaway: ...
Where all this . , , zig-zagging and bickering . . .  is taking 
the country , , . is uncertain, Ethiopia , , , seems , , t en-^  
tangled in a revolution as powerful as the Soviet and Chinese 
revolutions that saw years of confusion and civil war before a 
new order emerged.!^!
Our reason for adopting this as our main perspective from among so 
many others is that we take a longer view of Ethiopian history (see 
Chapter One) than many other of the Derg's critics. While a great deal 
has undeniably changed, much of contemporary Ethiopian politics also 
amounts to old wine in new bottles; there are strong threads of continuity 
running between the Derg and its predecessors. Consider, for example, 
the views advanced in Sven Rubenson's masterly study of nineteenth century 
Ethiopia's resourceful ness in defending her independence and maintaining
• a ,,tenuaus,:uni ty •'“a resourcefulness which may stand her in good stead'
today, In the middle of the nineteenth century, Emperor
Tewodros perceived , , , that the political anarchy, moral 
laxity, and the technological backwardness of his people 
threatened national survival,. The reforms he announced, 
the policies he tried to Implement, the very single-mindedness 
and perseverance with which he tackled the problems, indicate 
that he aimed at nothing less than a national revival combiiji^ 
with the transformation of his country into a modern state,
Tewodros failed, and failed spectacularly, The Derg has carried the process
begun by Tewodros some way forward, and it or its successors will see the
project completed, probably in a socialist fashion, Ethiopian laws will
bear a heavy burden If such a broadly-based development is to be achieved,
This is the subject-matter of the next three Chapters.
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; .Chapter 5: The Revolution in Public Law
The rigid distinctions between private and public law that are stressed 
in Continental legal systems caused grave conceptual and practical diffi­
culties when they were transplanted to Ethiopia (see Chapter Seven), Never­
theless, there were sound reasons for drawing these distinctions: private
laws were imported virtually wholesale In I960 by Haile Selassie, while 
public (constitutional, administratIve and penal) laws evolved more slowly 
as reflections of distinctly Ethiopian attitudes and practices, as well 
as adaptations of foreign models, The operative theory of Ethiopian public 
law, like that of many other states, is Austinlan: both before and after
the Revolution, .law is the command of the sovereign, sometimes described 
(in the West) as "orders backed by threats" or "the gunman situation writ 
large". In Ethiopia, these orders are bolstered by large measures of 
political manipulation and extra-legal coercion; notions of natural rights 
obtain little practical recognition; and the legal "command" is usually 
far from precise. Like the public law of many other countries, Ethiopia's 
thus gave,and continues to give, free rein to "the sheer naked power to 
rule for the benefit of one's self-aggrandisement and of one's group, 
in the previous Chapter, we argued that much of Haile Selassie's 
personal political style has been perpetuated by the Derg; here, we note 
similarities in the legal styles adopted by the two regimes. The rough- 
and-ready formulation of perfunctory rules conferring a broad discretion 
continues. These rules add up to chaotic body of laws which leaves un­
checked a traditional tendency towards incoherent and arbitrary decisidns. 
Actions are constantly demanded by an administrator*s superiors without 
a formal legal authorisation, and legally-mandated acts are often either
ignored_or prohibited politically, for reasons of political convenience
2
or administrative inertia. This type of public administration breeds 
cynicism and indifference towards law among politicians, bureaucrats and 
the publ ic;- many wo-u 1 d-doubt that a relevant law exists as* indeed, in 
practical terms, it does not.
While radically different political orientations have been introduced, 
the laws ofEmperior and Derg alike embody the demands of a small elite. 
Ethiopian politics did become more than a minority pursuit in Addis Ababa 
during the early days of the creeping coup, but most townspeople retired 
from political activity in the face of the White and Red Terror and the
27b ,
need’to seek a livelihood, The Derg's subsequent intransigence In re-1 
fusing to compromise with other elites has meant that the Derg's laws 
reflect - in substance but by no means always in application - only its 
own demands and perceptions. As under Haile Selassie, the interests sub­
scribed to by students, trade unionists, separatist groups, the Church 
and subsistence peasants find neither legal embodiment nor a legalised 
means of expression except, in a limited way, through kebelles and peasant 
associations(see Part III), New laws definitely benefit the poor at the 
expense of middle strata and traditional elites (and aim to^bolster the 
Derg's claim to a right to rule). But they serve to implement the way
in which a privileged military elite would react if they lived like
3 -
peasants, rather than the ways in which peasants themselves react,
Peasants do not always respond gratefully to the Derg1 s~ paternalism, .
Judges and, by and large, bureaucrats have been cowed into an acceptance 
of the Derg's new rules, but opposition groups are disputing most of them 
by extra-legal means. The persistent failure of Ethiopian laws to encom­
pass and regulate these conflicts is an important cause and effect of high 
levels of violence, both in urban and rural areas (see Chapters One, Four, 
Six and Seven) .
'• . ■ y
By 197^, the 1955 Constitution had outlived its usefulness, irrtermsof
enhancing the Emperor's international status and fostering modest increases
in administrative centralisation and rationalisation. The Derg's new laws
reject this Ethiopian constitutionalism and dispense with what amounted
to a pretense of Western-style political rights and institutions. The
substance, but not the form, of Haile Selassie's claim to broad traditional
powers has been grasped by the Derg, which now exercises no less discretion,
and probably no more, than the Emperor enjoyed. Public law passively re-
k
fleets the changes in the political facts of Ethiopian life but, as these 
changes are revolutionary, the content of the laws has been changed sub­
stantial ly. * ■
I, 'Constitutional' law
Despite assurances to the contrary and deceptive legal manoeuvres 
while the Emperor was being deposed, the groups that came to dominate the 
Derg aimed at the overthrow of the political order rather than any lesser 
blow at those in authority. By definition, a revolution is directed against 
the legal order and can, on this basis, be distinguished from a rebellion
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or coup d 1etat, where more limited aims allow the constitutional order to
survive more or less unscathed, in this vein, J.M. Finni s -argues that
a coup only affects the rules of succession to office, while a revolution
(such as Ethiopia's) also alters the powers and hierarchy of offices,
Bertrand Russell has the same idea in mind when he argues that the philoso”
phies of revolutionaries require changes greater than their own personal
success,"* Hans Kelsen seems also to have grasped at least this point when
he contended that, from
a juristic point of view, the decisive criterion of a revolution 
is that the order in force is overthrown and replaced by a new 
order in a way which the former had not itself anticipated,^
Jhis is what happened in Ethiopia, where Heinrich'Scholler characterises
7
the new legal order as a "non-'formal constitutional law,” This is an 
effective way to contrast Ethiopian laws with written Western constitutions, 
but it could be misleading if taken to suggest that an essentially new 
legal style had been adopted for Ethiopia, There was nothing particularly 
formal about the promulgation of the 1931 and 1955 Constitutions, which 
were simply published over the Emperor’s signature. While the Derg's 
enactments reflect an ad hoc experimentation, they also follow a formal" 
istic logic of their own, like that (at a fairly high level of generality) 
of the succession of statutes emanating from a sovereign U,K, Parliament,
A, The 197^ Draft Constitution
In Chapter Four, we noted that the Emperor convened a Constitutional
Conference in April 197^ at Prime Minister Endalkatchew's request, The
Conference supplied a Draft in August, and the Derg rejected it as in"
consistent with Ethiopia Tikdem a few days before it deposed the Emperor,
While the Draft merits a brief discussion, evaluations are difficult be"
cause: there was no opportunity to observe this law in action, the Con"
ference minutes were never made public, and there is no official English
8
text (the translation used here is by a research assistant). The major 
jural postulate of the Draft is somewhat confusing, referring both to 
constitutional monarchy and to the people as the source of all Governmental 
authority - see Articles 1 (? i) and 5(1).
Compared with the 1955 Constitution, the most striking feature of the 
Draft concerns the diminution of the Emperor's powers, While he is termed 
,:Head of State" and "symbol of the nation's unity and history" (Art, 7),
^:P,e,ffiiPeneesc.tOi an .Emp! re.-.,and * the Juda I c^ber-i tage -of the“(rmdn-archy‘“'aTe '’ded'eted 
and replaced by more prosaic and democratic sentiments. The Emperor's 
law-making functions become purely symbolic (Arts, 19~20, 61(b)), A sub^ 
stantial weakening of other tradittonal jural postulates (see Chapter 
Three) can also be noted. While Emperors must profess the Orthodox faith 
under the Draft (Art, 9), a separation of Church and State is implicitly 
adopted, Religious discriminations are prohibited and the largely Orthodox 
barriers to divorce are abolished (Arts. 22, 25(0 and 30(_ii)), A vague 
Article h was thought to forecast a lessening of Amhara domination over 
political life; Amharic remained the official language, but "this in no 
way affects other provisions concerning the languages of the country."
,A..genuine~sepa-ration of powers, with checks and b a l a n c e s i s  also
.O.rLtr&duced, The Emperor remains Commander-in-Chief of-the Armed Forces  ...
(Art, 20 - a provision which was heavily criticised) "but "his duties were 
to be limited by a future law. His other duties must be performed in 
accordance with the resolutions of the Council of Ministers (Art, 19(Ji))»
A bicameral National Assembly "shall have the final authority in all matters 
of legislative activity" (Art. 60(ii)), and extremely broad powers of 
impeachment,- The right to establish political parties is guaranteed 
(Art. 29). The Council of Ministers "shall have the supreme authority
I
of the Government" (Art. 92), but "shall be answerable, for all its actions, 
to the National Assembly" (Art, 98), The same conditions are imposed on 
the Prime Minister, and each Minister Is additionally made responsible to 
the Prime_Minister (Arts. 99-100), if the Council of Ministers refuses 
to proclaim a law,, this refusal can be overridden by a two^thirds majority 
of the National Assembly, and emergency decrees by the Council can be 
nullified if they subsequently fail to gain the Assembly^ approval,
(Arts, 76-77). The Emperor loses the right to intervene in the judicial 
process, and a Supreme Administrative Council under a powerful Afe Negus 
('Chief Justice,', literally "Mouth of the King") ensures judicial inde~ 
pendence (Arts, 120 - 1), An ombudsman was to collect information about 
maladministration and report to the Prime Minister and National Assembly 
(Arts. 143-6).
Articles 21 to 59 of the Draft Constitution introduce a more exten­
sive and precisely-defined catalogue of "Rights, Duties and Responsibilities"
when compared to the one promulgated in 1955* "Equal protection" is expanded
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• m*r‘-tot' encompass^ the r ights'.to^vote'and* to equal pay ■ •(Art:s9'*46£f‘,48) taiid*-■ • * *
Article 22 specifically prohibits discriminations based on "birth, prop­
erty, religion, race, language or political affiliations" (but not sex). 
Freedoms of speech and conscience were made more precise and broadened 
expressly to include the rights to communicate, demonstrate and form 
religious, occupational and political associations (Art, 24-5, 27, 29).
The rights of the-criminal accused were expanded and a broad 1 habeas 
corpus1 was elevated to the status of a constitutional right (Art. 44).
Laws cannot "hinder the effective and continuous application of rights 
. , . guaranteed" (Art. 54), except upon a declaration of "defensive war",
martial law, or a state of emergency (Arts. 111 -*3). The recent experiences
of - F’thiopi a-and other Th ird* Wor-1 d states suggest that ’these provisions 
- could have been used to truncate significantly the rights•guaranteed in 
' what is otherwise a detailed exposition, in the nineteenth century liberal 
mould. . . t '■
One of the reasons given by the Derg for rejecting the Draft Consti­
tution was its failure to ensure the "human rights of the people," Since 
the Draft arguably reflects the furthermost point to which a contemporary 
government would be prepared to go in the libertarian tradition, the 
Derg’s statement must be construed as either self-serving or as referring 
to the absence of material rights included in many communist party-state 
: const I tut ions, The Draft did, however, contain the nucleus of a social 
democratic state: Article 55, for example, recognises the right to
education,, health .care and unemployment and retirement benefits, "the
level of development and wealth of the country permitting," Parallel 
provisions are similarly programmatic and adopt a French-style organic 
law technique, requiring the promulgation of additional laws as a pre­
condition to their implementation. No reference is made to Ethiopia Tikdem, 
but some basis for a socialistregime can be found: for example, "fair
distribution of. property and uniformity in the livi.ng standard" is the aim 
of the nation (Art. 5(0), and "all land is a free commodity and a common 
property of all Ethiopians11 (Art, 36(111)’), There is a conspicuous omission, 
when compared to Art, 44 of the 1955 Constitution, with regard to the right 
of property ownership, Property is dealt'with in a separate Draft Consti­
tution Chapter which is segregated (spatially at least) from provisions 
dealing with rights. Ethiopia was to become "self-reliant", and property
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'ftdi vt6' beAowhed "wi th i tr the“ 1 imi ts of ■ the• 1 aw11 and expropriated on payment : 
of "just compensation" - Article 136, the wording typically adopted for 
communist party-state constitutions.
Taken as a whole, the Draft Constitution was an attempt to compromise 
the interests of the anci en regime with those of the insurgents, Like the 
Commission of Enquiry and Endalkatchew’s short-lived Cabinet (see Chapter 
Four), it was an attempt to control the pace and direction of events dur­
ing 1974. This attempt failed because of a lack of political resolve 
among conservatives and because modernising elites had tired of symbolic 
constitution-making. While the Derg’s Proclamation No, 1 of 1974 states
that the Draft will be "put into effect after necessary improvements are 
9
marde1’'; "this*ts"unlikely; and the Draft reta i ns our interest chiefly as ..
an indicator of the temper of the times.
B, The "Suspension" of the 1955 Constitution
Proclamation No. 1 also stated that, as of 12 September.1974, Haile 
Selassie’s 1955 Constitution Is "suspended" (Art. 5(a)), although the 
courts shall continue their normal functions (Art. 7 ~ the courts were 
later restructured substantially) and laws which do not conflict with 
the Proclamation and future laws, orders and regulations shall continue 
in force (Art, 10), The problem of repeals by implication, serious enough 
in most legal systems, is particularly acute In post-Revolutionary Ethiopia, 
owing to the hasty promulgation of vague statutes and the fact that regu­
lations can apparently be used to override proclamations, The suspension 
rather than the repeal of the 1955 Constitution, the promised Implementa­
tion of a modified Draft Constitution, and the official title of the Derg
- the Provislonal Military Administration Council or PMAC - were all de­
signed to create the impression that the Derg was a temporary institution
- a view which many Derg members undoubtedly shared at the time,
According to the Prologue to Proclamation No. 1, the 1955 Constitution
was suspended because it
was prepared to confer on the Emperor absolute powers; . . . Itd.id- 
not safeguard democratic rights but merely serves as a democratic 
facade for the benefit of world publ ic opinion;. . . .  it was not 
conceived to serve the interests of the Ethiopian people; . . .  
it was designed to give the baseless impression that fundamental 
natural rights are gifts from the Emperor to his people; and ... . 
above all, it is inconsistent with the popular movement in progress 
under the motto 1Etbiopia Tikdem1 and with the fostering of economic,
political and social development. . . .
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•Takerr'at*face- vaVuey-s-o 'devastat ing a" cri t ique -argues fop' repeat rather ' 
than a suspension, yet it can also be argued that three important con­
stitutional postulates were upheld by the Derg: a monarchy was kept,
albeit in altered form and, as things turned out, temporarily; a powerless 
Parliament acquired a de facto successor in the Provisional National 
Advisory Commission (infra); and a concern for human rights was reiterated 
at least as a goal to be attained in the indefinite future (see jnfra) .
The suspension of the 1955 Constitution is at least conducive to legal 
coherence: new law-making processes and the revolutionary changes that
were anticipated are In direct conflict with constitutional provisions, 
and the Derg does not have to face (theoretically possible) challenges
'"based"onnthe const rtut ional S ty of i ts proclamat ions, - --- —  • -  - — ...
Article 3 of the Proclamation provides that the monarchy was to con­
tinue within the line of Haile Selassie, with Crown Prince Asfa Wossen 
assuming the purely symbolic functions of a king (not Emperor) when he 
returned from Geneva, (This was later repudiated and monarchy was abol- ' 
ished:) The Prologue to the Proclamation refers to monarchy as a highly- 
esteemed Ethiopian institution, not- corrupt.in itself but abused by the 
deposed Emperor: ,
although the people of Ethiopia look in good faith upon the Crown,
which has persisted for a long period in Ethiopian h.istory, as a
symbol of unity, Haile Selassie 1, who has ruled this country for 
more than fifty years ever since he assumed power as Crown Prince 
has not only, left the country in its present crisis by abusing at 
various times the high and dignified authority conferred on him by 
the Ethiopian people, but also being over 82 years of age and due 
to the consequent physical and mental exhaustion, is no more able 
to shoulder the high responsibilities of leadership. , , ,
The speeches of Derg Chairman Aman at the time were studiously ambiguous, 
describing Ethiopia’s Imperial traditions in glowing- terms while predict­
ing that a "republic” would be established soon.
Parliament also came in for heavy criticism in this Prologue:
the present system of parliamentary election is undemocratic; , , , 
-Parliament heretofore has been serving not the people but its 
members and the ruling and aristocratic classes; , . as con­
sequence [sic] it has refrained from legislating on land reform 
which is the basic problem of the country while passihg laws at 
various times intended to raise the living standard of Its mem­
bers, thereby using the high authority conferred on It by the 
people to further the personal interest of its members and aggra­
vating the misery of the people; and , , . Its existence is con­
trary to the motto ’Ethiopia Tikdem’. , . .
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The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate have been dissolved and there will 
be no dIrect elected representation of civilians - whether of substance 
or pretense - until what is termed a People's Assembly is constituted,
Some of the institutions countenanced under the 1955 Constitution, such 
as the Crown Council and the Emperor's Chi1ot Court, were abolished by a 
public statement from the Derg rather than by a law. This was also true 
of such "intermediate" institutions as the Constitutional Conference and 
Endalkatchew's Cabinet, yet one intermediate institution bridged the im- 
-mense gulf between regimes - the Commission of Enquiry, Composed -initially 
of non-1 nf l.uent ial appointees of the Emperor, the Commission was dissolved 
after its members resigned. Later, Parliament reorganised the Commission 
and elected some of the Commission members, including its Chairman, a 
University geography professor named Mesfin Wolde Mariam, Mesfin changed 
the Commission's purpose radically: it did not, as expected, investigate
maladministration or abuse of authority in general, but focused on fixing 
the blame for concealing the Wollo drought and famine. The lengthy Com­
mission Report was examined by a new enquiry group composed of 35 members 
of the Police. At about the same time, Mesfin resigned because of the 
Derg's interference and was replaced by a naval commander. The executions 
that took place on 23 November 197^, shortly after the Commission finished 
its investigation of the famine.and two days after the publication of the 
Special Penal Code, showed that the Derg was prepared to circumvent the 
Commission, and it died a quiet death in November 1975, ^
C. The Law of the Derg
The initial reformulation of the Ethiopian Government is found in
Article^, of Proclamation No. 1: .
The Armed Forces, the Police and Territorial Army has hereby 
assumed full government power until a legally constituted 
people's assembly approves a new constitution and a government 
is duly established. •
The law-making process established under the suspended Constitution, en­
compassing proclamations (enacted by Parliament and the Emperor), decrees 
and orders (the Emperor acting alone), has been replaced by a new process 
of enactment. Proclamation No. 2, also issued on 12 September 197^, states 
that the Derg
shall enact all types of laws and provide for their implementa­
tion, provided, however, that nothing herein shall effect the 
authority given by law to Ministers and Public Authorities to
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issue regulations [Art. 6],-
[A]11 treaties of peace and all treaties and international agree­
ments involving a modification of the territory of the State or
of Sovereignty or jurisdiction over any part of such territory or
laying a burden on Ethiopian subjects or modifying legislation in 
existence or requiring expenditure of State funds, or involving 
loans or monopolies shall, before ratification by the [Derg] . , .
- be .del j berated upoa.by the Caunc.il of.Ministers , . [Art. b ], ^
;; _^-:dJnder. th i s -new-consti tut ional law, the Derg and : i tsvsubcorrimi ttees and . 
reg ionaTcommi ttees (see -Chapter Four) -have concentrated an' almost" unlfmi ted ' 
power, with the merger of legislative and executive functions in their 
hands and -through a collective exercise of the functions of Head of State 
- initially until the Crown Prinee.returned (Art, 2), but this pretense 
was soon dropped. Given" that' it was the'DeTg "i tself" Which final 1 y deposed 
the Emperor, "the law could hardly read otherwise, and subsequent events 
such as~the November 197^ executions served notice that the Derg was pre­
pared to,v i ntervene. in judicial .processes and i nvest i.gat i ve enquir i es as'well. 
Few powers were conferred on the Chairman of the Derg by Proclamation No. 2; 
he receives foreign emissaries, conducts meetings," introduces policy matters, 
serves as a spokesman and implements decisions when di rected- -to do so by .
the-Derg (Arts. -8,- 10) This was^ to change, - however.  r ---
Subsequent Proclamations gave Article 6 of Proclamation No, 2 (supra)
as the authority for their promulgation until December 1.976* when No, 2
] 2
was repealed by Proclamation«No. 108, This abortive attemot by the Derg .
-to curb the -power- of Mengistu and-Atnafu is discussed in Chapte-r-Four-. \t• —
1 3was,rin turn, repealed by No. 110 in February 1977, after Mengistu asserted 
himself and Teferi was executed, but before Atnafu1s execution. The dif­
ferences between the two Proclamations are fairly minor. The post of Derg
Second Vice-Chairman (occupied by Atnafu) is.-abol i shed, and-hi s. powers.
1 b
were transferred to the Vice-Chairman. Both Proclamations provide for
three organisations wi th i n the Derg: a Congress of all members; a Central
Committee, whose membership was reduced from b0 to 32 in February; and a
Standing Committee, which acquired a few of the functions of Congress and
the Central Committee in February and whose membership decreased from 17 
1 5
to 16. (Subsequent references are to Proclamation No, 110), The powers 
.of'-subcommittees- and regional, commi ttees. of .the Derg have not been explicit­
ly defined by law. While Congress is theoretically supreme, in that the 
powers and responsibi1ities of all committees are subject to Congress
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directives (see Arts, 6-7), the available evidence suggests that the 
political realities are often otherwise and that Congress may only meet
L . n i 16briefly once a year.
Congress "determines" military, "internal and foreign policies", 
"safeguards" national unity, establishes politcial.parties, issues procla­
mations, .receives reports from the Auditor General relating to revenue, 
expenditures and governmental efficiency, and acts upon.recommendations 
from the Council of Ministers concerning budgets, development plans, 
administrative reorganisation and declarations of war, emergency and 
natural disaster. The Derg Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Secretary-General 
are appointed and dismissed by Congress, which also acts on "recommenda­
tions of the Standing Committee relating to serious measures to be taken 
against . . .members" (Art. 5)* An identical provision in Proclamation 
No. 108 was violated when Charrman Teferi was executed (see Chapter Four), 
The Central Committee makes "high official appointments" and concerns 
itself with policy implementation and diplomatic and foreign aid matters 
(Art, 6). The Standing Committee can delegate its powers to individual 
members, safeguards national unity and "shall . . , direct on behalf of 
the Congress and the Central Committee, affairs of State on the basis of 
collective responsibility." Immense power can thus be delegated to one 
man, but there is little concrete evidence that this happens consistently, 
Other functions of the Central Committee include: preparing official
statements, confirming death penalties, granting amnesties and pardons, 
mobilising the military, implementing "democratic rights", and mobilising 
the public in accordance with the# dictates of the April 1976 Programme 
(Art. 7 “ see Chapter Four). The Council of Ministers is collectively 
reponsible - presumably to Congress - for submitting policy matters to 
Congress, coordinating governmental activities, law enforcement, and 
taking "all necessary measures" to safeguard peace, orderrand national 
unity (Arts.-1-2, 1*0. • - ■ ’
While these provisions are more detailed than the ones found In 
Proclamation No. 2, supra, many, key clauses are hopelessly vague: for
example, no indication is given as to how Ministers are to coordinate 
Government's activities. Two or more bodies are granted concurrent juris- 
diction in numerous areas, in a way which creates confusion and opportuni­




b^al.ances..,.. ..These, tendencies, can ..a Iso. be observed .i n. .enumepa.ti.on.s- of. the . ....
rights and pesponsibi1ities of the Derg's officials. The Chairman: con­
venes the Council of Ministers and chairs all meetings; acts as Commander- 
in-Chief of the military and as Head of State "on behalf of" the Derg; 
initiates, supervises and implements "decisions"' and "policies"; coordinates 
governmental activities; safeguards peace, order and unity; and makes 
"high official appointments" (Art. 9). His powers, in other words, en­
compass the important functions of all of the Derg's organisations. The 
Vice-Chairman is made responsible for "political consciousness", "auxil­
iary services" and the equipping and organising of the People's Millta 
and Revolutionary Defense Squads (Article 10) - the functions that Atnafu 
.al legedly.performed.so poorly. A Secretary-General. .haAdJjes J:.he. paperwork . . 
and the Derg's budget (Art. 11).
i lv ? Pari i ament was replaced in* 197** by an Advisory Body" ■ pe rform i ng - its ■
de facto functions: proferring advice, staging debates and appeasing 
public demands for participation. The duties of this Body were outlined 
in Article 7 of Proclamation No. 2 and spelled out In'Proclamation No. 12 
of 197**,^ where it was termed the Provisional National Advisory Commission. 
The Commission began to meet in October 197A, and only 58 of its 60 members 
were elected to serve, as the University refused to send representatives. 
Trade unionists, teachers, religious leaders, bureaucrats and businessmen 
met in closed session to draft a constitution, prepare for elected govern­
ment, gather data and expert testimony, deliberate on matters referred 
to them by the Derg, and propose changes in "all legislation enacted to 
strengthen and maintain the feudo-bourgeois and imperialist order [Art. 7]." 
If the Derg disagrees with Commission proposals - if they need "further 
study or elaboration" is the euphemism adopted - the Commission had to 
try again. In November 1975 another Commission was established by a 
letter from the Derg to the Minister of Justice, and empowered to make
"short-term adjustments" in Ethiopia's statutes. Other Commissions have
18
met regularly to review particular areas of the law.
In May 1976 the Derg felt that its "revolutionary duty" was to create
a People's Organizing Provisional Office (P0M0A - see Chapter Four) stated
to be "independent of the control and influence of any Government office,
19organization or group" - but not independent of the Derg. A Supreme 
Coordinating Committee links the Head of State (the Derg as a collectivity
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then, the Chairman acting "on behalf of" Congress since December 1976) with 
the PQMOA, which is- composed of four committees concerned with political 
Education, Current Affairs, Organization Affairs, and Philosophy Dissem­
ination and Information (Arts. 2(1), 4(2)). The POMOA as a whole is em­
powered to: enforce a Democratic Rights Proclamation which we have been
unable to trace; implement the April 1976 Programme - s e e  Chapter Four; 
devise and distribute "propaganda" concerning Ethiopian Socialism; oper­
ate a political training school and arrange for the training of "cadres" 
abroad; devise policies designed to cope with "trans i tory" _,£trans i t ional ?) 
social and economic changes; and aid in creating a "People's Democratic 
Republic which guarantees the Dictatorship of.the bpoad masses" (Art, 8), 
The powers of the Advisory Commission and the POMOA to act indepen-s 
den.tly of the Derg are nil. Today, Ethiopian constitutional law attempts 
to universalise the interests of particular factions within the Derg. 
Membership is a precondition to attempting to secure political objectives; 
the legal effect of the Proclamations is to give free play to conflicts 
within the Derg while suppressing those outside of it. Such a system 
Works poorly because the in-group is too small and unrepresentative and 
because the Derg's laws attempt to freeze politics within a set of pel—  
petually transitional ("provisional") arrangements, which are not respon­
sive to shifts in ideological coimiitments and the balance of power among
the participants. As Edmund Burke remarked, "a constitution without the
20
means of change is constitution without self-preservation."
Haile Selassie's long reign and his Constitutions were frozen in a 
perpetual transition too, and the blockage of incremental changes in law 
and politics was a major cause of the Revolution (see Chapter Four). In 
addition to repudiating the 1955 Constitution, the new Proclamations 
amount to a declaration of autochthany, a rejection of the tenuous stand­
ards of/legality applied under the Emperor, While these standards were 
of dubious benefit to anyone save Haile Selassie, the new postulates that 
are emerging - the overarching power of the Derg and the implementation 
of Ethiopia Tikdem - are equally suspect. They must, however, be eval­
uated in. the context in which the Derg uses them. Taking the, probably 
correct, view that a thoroughgoing revolution was the only wayin^which - -
sudden changes in social and legal norms could be forced on an entire
21 . . . . .
population, the Derg has moved step by step in that direction, ignoring
Western notions of legality almost entirely. An important facet of this
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legal context ~ what may be termed a penal model of politics - is 
described in the next Sect ion,
II, Revolutionary Justice and the Terror
. j _ .... , ... .<  .......................... . um,„ * .      ...i. 1.1     ilN
The Derg is particularly keen to punish, neutralise or liquidate
"enemies of the people": • those who‘part Ic jpated In the Emperor’s regime
and/or who oppose the Derg, ‘ After a few.detentions, a Special Penal Code
was promulgated a.week before the executions in November 197**, Initially
applied by Special Courts-Martial (i nf ra) only this Code states that it
adapts "the criminal laws relating to grave offenses to the changed situa^
22
tion which the new order demands," Prosecutions increasingly gave way 
to detentions during 1975 and 1976 and these were, in turn, replaced by 
the streetcorner assassinations by agents of the White and Red Terror 
that seemed to abate by mid-1978, We will assess the overwhelmingly 
negative effects that these events have had on political and legal de­
velopment, and begin by briefly placing them in their historical setting, 
Traditional Ethiopian penal policies have a flavour of the Old 
Testament about them, David Mathew finds that an Ethiopian "concept of 
just-ice was of course essentially eastern in Its character, It dealt at
23
times in mercy but not in kindness; it was far too antique to be humane",
Reviewing the sketchy evidence carefully, Harold Marcus concludes that;
X
Menelik’s despotism and prejudice seem to have been accepted as 
Inevitable in the ordering of his empire, • , . When Alfred Jig 
• . once -compla I ned about the severity of customary law, the emperor*.
  ^.retorted: . ’You speak like a European, .as ff.„i have to ,govern,.,™__
people trained in the laws of your country, I have no prisonsj 
* r*'do~ not’wish people who work to have to feed thieves, While 
in this manner, mutilated, wandering, abandoned, they walk to 
the end of their lives [as] an example of punishment
Haile Selassie formally put a stop to the cutting off of hands and feet
in 1921, but a frequent recourse to self-help, an extensive discretion
exercised by arbitrary and often corrupt judges, and other forms of petty
despotism survive to this day. A vague Penal Code promulgated in 1930
attempted to counterbalance concepts found in the Fetha Negast (see Chapter
One) with those of modern codes; It lacked a comprehensive approach to
the disposition and treatment of offenders, Jean Graven’s Swiss-based
Penal Code draft was altered substantially by the Codification Commission
(see Chapter Seven) before it was enacted in 1957; the major change was
that Craven's emphasis on the rehabilitation of offenders was displaced
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• L 25by expiatory punishments,
2 6
A. The Special Penal Code
This Code was criticised severely by the (nternat{ona1 Cororoission of 
Jurists less than a month after it was promulgated^ Amnesty InterriatIonal 
subsequently expanded upon these criticisms, condemning the Code's retro­
activity, the vagueness of theoffenses created and numerous violations
27
of the "principle of legality". While we do not dissent from these 
evaluations, we would add that the Special Penal Code is largely an ex­
trapolation from traditional juristic techniques and those adopted under
2 8
the Penal Code of 1957. The Derg is, in other words, operatIng within 
a tradition of human rights violations rather than beginning something 
fundamentally new and different under this Proclamation. The Special'
Penal Code discloses three main objectives: punishing Haile Selassie's
officials for maladministration and for sycophancy, reducing adminIstra" 
tive corruption and, most significantly, augmenting the Derg's legitimacy 
and safeguarding its membership.
Articles 7 through 11 of the Proclamation offer direct protection of 
Derg members, their families and their political activities. The elabor-. 
ate nature of these provisions is telling evidence that, even in November
197^, the Derg was envisaged as something more than a temporary expedient,
x
This protective function is also accomplished indirectly by other offenses 
created in 197^. Articles 1 through 5 detail offenses against the State 
endangerhng~ its independence,- pol i-tical integr I. ty,-defens ive-power.v-..«-.-*~^  
etc. the Head■of State being the Derg-(per-sonlf ied-by ■ 1 ts-Chairman-^ 
since December 1976), Threats to national security, including breaches
i
of duty or secrecy and trafficing in arms or explosives, are dealt with 
in Articles 36-AO, These threats are, in effect, threats to the Derg, 
and the vague catch-all definitions of the offenses provide effective 
weapons for the security services while limiting individual freedom of 
action by posing uncertain penal limits. Despite the fact that (except 
for defense squad members) it is formally Illegal -to own a pistol or 
rifle for example, more than n ine mi 11 ion Ethiopians do so and face prison 
sentences of up to ten years under Article 39(1).
The Special Penal Code fosters an image of legal and political con- 
t-inu i <t y during the transition between regimes and at tempts-to.,.d,paw,.,u.pp.n, 
the traditional legitimacy of the Emperor by substituting the Derg's
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institutions for those protected under the 1957 Penal Code, For example, 
Article 3 of the 197^ Code, concerning armed risings and civil war, is 
identical to Article 252 of the 1957 Code, except that "Government11 re­
places Emperor, State and the other constitutional authorities against 
which the offense can be committed. Similarly, the Derg displaces con­
stitutional, legislative, judicial, public and executive organs as insti-- 
tutions against which "outrages" or "offenses" can be committed (Arts, 9, 
11). In Article 30, which penalises false testimony and translations, the 
Special Court-Martia1 (infra) is specifically named in place of a "judicial 
or quasi-judicial proceeding," Soldiers are added to the definition of 
"public servant"' in the offense of eompel-1 i-ng breaches of duty (Art, 36) 
and public servants join soldiers in the definition of persons who can 
violate the breach of secrecy provision (Art, 38). This is an attempt 
firmly to equate administrators and the military as servants of the people
and.-to point the way towards the participation of the soldiers in civilian,
administration.
Several new crimes are also created under the Special Penal Code,
The most prominent of these, and the offense most often charged in Special
Courts-Martial, is found in Article 35?
Whosoever fails to comply with Proclamations, [etc.J , , , 
promulgated to. implement the popular motto 'Ethiopia Tikdem' 
or hinders compliance therewith by publicly inciting or 
instigating by ,.. . any . . , means is punishable with
rigorous imprisonment from one to ten years.
This provision is obviously designed to safeguard the ideology (see-- . 
Chapter Four), which is so closely identified with the Derg in the minds 
of the public and judges that any criticism of the Derg or its policies 
can be, and is punished under it. The offense is treated as one of 
strictHiability as, indeed, it is on its face; judges refuse to read 
into it the intention requirements found in 1957 Penal Code, Article 58 
(i nf ra). Article 35 (and Articles' 10-(5), 11, and 37, which paral lei 
offenses created in 1957, except that the Derg is substituted and penal­
ties are increased) significantly truncates the freedom to assemble or 
to discuss current events.
Under Special Penal Code Article 10(5), a person who, with premed i- 
tation and with the object of supporting or (passively) permitting broadly- 
defined offenses against Government and the Derg, speaks, writes, etc.
"inaccurate or subversive information or insinuations calculated to
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demoralize the public or undermine its confidence11 can be imprisoned for 
ten years (emphasis supplied), None of the key words in this proviso 
are defined, and the resulting vagueness can be used to punish virtually 
any criticism of the Government, The offense of obstructing or attempt-- 
ing to obstruct the activities of the Derg "by any other unlawful means" 
(Art. 11) leads to the same result, Article 37 punishes the dissemina­
tion of tendentious information known to be false, with jntent to incite 
the military or foment military-civilian unrest. Again, virtually any 
criticism of the military could fall within the ambit of this provision, 
and the Special Courts-Martial seems to ignore the requisite mental state.
Article 3^6 of the 1957 Penal Code, from which this Article 37 has been
adapted, had hitherto restricted the offense to situations in which the 
military is mobilised or on active duty. We saw in Chapter Three that 
freedoms of speech and assembly were accorded little practical protec­
tion under,Haile Selassie; matters have not improved under the Derg,
A large number of Haile Selassie’s officials, including some of 
those investigated by the Commission of Enquiry, were tried by Special 
Courts-Martial under Special Penal Code.Article 27;
(1) Whosoever intentionally by commission or omission directly
or indirectly or with culpable negligence commits any prejudi­
cial act leading to the consequence of weakening the defensive 
power of the State or being aware of such fact fails to do what­
ever within his capacity or creates within the country a grave
^state of*misery, want or famine , , , especially by improperly' *
   ,<h id Tng^or hoard i ng . , , foodstuffs , i <.* 4  s '••pun 1 s ha b 1 e- • wfa h’*™**
rigorous imprisonment from ten years to life, and where the 
offense was intentional and where death has occurred , , , the 
penalty may be death.
(2) Whosoever, in time of such distress fails to carry out, , , , 
except in cases of force majeure, the obligations or liabilities 
incumbent upon him, whether as purveyor, middleman, sub-contractor, 
carrier or agent, or in any other capacity, , , , is liable to
the same punishments.
(3) . . .
Article 27 largely restates Article 509 of the 1957 Penal Code, except for 
the insertion of "omission" amounting to "culpable negligence" and "any 
prejudicial act" in 27(1), and the huge increase in the punishment that 
may be imposed. Culpable negligence is not defined, yet it is treated in
practice as a lower and less blameworthy standard than the ordinary negli-
29 . ( \
,wgence defd neydf, by the 1957 Penal Codev . . tiabi, 1 1 ty under. Art icle^27‘.
is very broad; there is no express reference to a state of mind, and the
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Special Courts-Martial cou1d impose a heavy criminal penalty upon what 
could, in the West, be a liability sounding in contract or topt? requir­
ing the accused to show the existence of force majeure in order to escape 
punishment. Both (1) and (2) of Article 27 are single sentences and,jr
despite the substantial editing dictated by space limitations, the extracts
supra give a feeling for the convoluted drafting style adopted in the
Penal and Special Penal Codes-,
There have been few amendments to the Special Penal Code since it
was enacted, but important offenses were added in July 1976, concerning
'■‘economic sabotage" - an expansion of offenses described in Article 27 -
30
and "counter-Revolutionary" activities. The new Article 17A permits 
the death penalty to be imposed for: hoarding, or destroying grain or
"other articles of commerce", "directly or indirectly" causing work stop­
pages or machinery malfunctions, counterfeiting, disrupting transport, 
damaging public property, or "any other similar act".' Anyone who attempts 
to leave the country without authority to do so, "directly or indirectly 
encourages workers or farmers or any other sectors" to resist joining new 
associations (see Chapters Six and Seven), or "in whatever way supports 
the cause of any counter-revolutionary or anti-people organisation" can 
also be sentenced to death (Art, 17 B) , The breadth of'.the term "anti­
people organisation" stands out, even in an extremely vague proviso,
v.
Corruption in Ethiopian public life prior to the Revolution is dis­
cussed in Chapter Three, The enormity of the problem led the Derg to 
at tempt- a ha r stv so 1 ut i on.. Under .Article,22 of . the,.Speci.a,l Pena I. Code.,, , 
for example, a public servant who, with In tent.to obtain .unlawful ad.van-_ 
tage or injure another, misuses his authority to the prejudice of the 
public interest, or exceeds his authority due to incompetence., etc, is 
punishable by imprisonment from three to fifteen years. An administrative 
paralysis already exists in Ethiopia, with public servants afraid to take 
even the smallest decision without a firm authorisation from the military 
(see infra). Article 22 only aggravates this situation, particularly as 
Special Courts-Martial can ignore the requisite mental state and impose 
a severe penalty upon an 'ultra vires' decision made in good faith, under 
Ethiopia's vague administrative laws. Article 20, as amended, punishes 
those who intend to solicit corrupt practices with imprisonment from five 
to 25 years, . . .  s, . .
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These Special Penal Code Articles dealing with corruption are virtual 
restatements of Penal Code provisions with, however, radically increased 
penalties, In the past, the likelihood of conviction under these vague 
provisions was slight, and there was little political interest in prose­
cuting corruption cases. Evidence from other African jurisdictions indi­
cates that a mere increase in penalties will not stem a rising tide of
corruption, and that the underlying motivations toward corruption must
32
themselves be changed. In order to be effective, increased penalties 
must be combined with well-drafted penal laws, as well as the political 
will to prosecute offenders vigourously, a new ideology of public ser­
vice, and changes in vague administrative rules which create the large 
measure of discretion that encourages corruption.
It is difficult to know how Special Courts-Martial interpret the new 
Code: no written opinionsare published, apart from brief newspaper re­
ports. Although it is unlikely that Special Courts-Martial judges refer 
to the 1957 Penal Code, they ought to do so, Article 3 provides that, 
although the Code does hot affect "special laws of a penal nature", "the
general principles embodied in this Code are applicable to those regula-
33tions and laws except as otherwise expressly provided therein," The 
Special Penal Code does not expressly exclude the 1957 Code and, while 
the phrase "special laws of a penal nature" is far from precise, the 
Special Penal Code arguably falls into this category. Courts have, how­
ever, often ignored the 1957 Code when dealing with offenses under other,
atguaVTy ^ ’T p W i  aT" l aws de^l ing with currency, tariffs,- taxes, -transport -■
3k
and public health.
One reason for exploring the applicability of the 1957 Code is to 
determine whether any of the overarching principles of legality found in 
it ought to be applied when offenses under the Special Penal Code are
heard. The rubric nullem crimen, nulla poena, sine lege is emphasised
■? r ' “
by the 1957 Code, Article 2(1) states that: "The Court may not treat
as a breach of the law and punish any act or omission which is not pro­
hibited by law," Article 23(2) expands upon this principle: "A criminal
offense is only completed when all its legal, material and moral ingredients 
are present," Article 55 of the "suspended" 1955 Constitution prohibited 
’ex post facto1 laws, a prohibition which survives today in 1957 Penal 
Code Art icl e 5 (2) : - - -■    •
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An act not declared to be an offense and committed prior to the 
coming into force of this Code is not punishable, Nor  may a 
punishment not prescribed at the time of the commission of the 
offense be imposed.
The second sentence Is more relevant for our purposes, since few genuinely 
new offenses were created by the Special Penal Code, apart from offenses 
against Ethiopia Tikdem. Additionally, many of the officials who are 
charged under the Special Penal Code are guilty (if proof is forthcoming) 
of some crime under the 1957 Penal Code and thus received a warning that 
they were engaging in criminal activity. The Special Penal Code is there­
fore, in most instances, only ex post facto as to the breadth of the 
offense (rather than the conduct punished in fact) and the severity of 
the penalty. There can be little sympathy for officials who are genuinely 
guilty of offenses, as they cynically gambled on retraining political 
favour under Haile Selassie to escape punishment and lost. The Derg's 
changes in penal laws and procedures make it more difficult to separate 
the guilty from the innocent, however.
The Derg attempts to justify the retroactivity of some of the Special 
Penal Code provisions in the Prologue:
most of the offenses , , , have previously been defined in 
the criminal laws and the rest have long been recognized by 
natural law, custom and the practice of the professions and 
as such have a solid basis in the law, lT]he retroactive 
application of this Special Penal Code is not repugnant to 
natural law and basic legal philosophy, , , ,
This- statement i s patent 1 y nonsens i ca-T^and-a revea l Ing-indfoafci on*of> the—  
, DergAs* akt.i-t.ude -towards law. Even i f-many-of- the*offenses are^found“4n=r“*' 
the 1957 Code, the new and increased penalties are not. The notion that 
new offenses such as those against the newly-created Ethiopia Tikdem have 
long been recognised by "natural law, custom" and "basic legal philosophy" 
(whatever that means) is absurd. Commenting on the Special Penal Code, 
Peter Schwab asserts that an "ex post facto law may be a necessity if a 
socialist state is to be created," This is a dubious proposition, and 
we analyse ft and others like it infra; in any event, its truth or falsity 
(as qualified) depends on how Schwab defines "a socialist state" - some­
thing he doesn't tell us. Absurd or not, the new penal laws are applied 
retroactively, contra Article 11(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human 
;,R.i ghts,, whTeh was subscribed to b.y-Ha.i le-.Selassie's regime in- T9*i8-.-and - i -s ■ 
arguably a statement of "basic legal philosophy",
\^’■ "v '• <“ “•
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Special Penal Code provisions are often so vague as to make it im­
possible to determine what the prosecutor must prove to secure a conviction 
and, therefore, how the accused may defend himself successfully, Many 
provisions create strict liability offenses on their face or posit vague 
and undefined states of mind, Provisions in the 1957 Penal Code are 
similarly vague but are, in theory, made more specific by general princi­
ples, such as the prosecutor's duty to prove: an act or omission (Art.
23(l)); all required "legal, material and moral ingredients" (Art, 23(2)) 
and either intention or negligence (Art. 57(1); see Art, 58), Intention 
must be read into every offense where negligence is not an express ele-. 
ment (Art. 59(2)). It is clear that special Courts^Martial ignore these 
provisions, but then Haile Selassie's judges often did too, concentrating 
only on the particular Code article under which the accused was charged,
B. Detention
The vagueness of Special Penal Code provisions positively pales In 
comparison with Ethiopia's detention laws, which create an unlimited number 
of offenses existing only in the mind of a Minister of Interior (taking 
orders from the Derg, lest he himself be detained), Writing early in 1978, 
we found this prior restraint in anticipation of unlawful conduct to be 
indefensible, arguing that Ethiopian penal laws "are amply supplied with’N
the means of dealing quickly and effectively with persons perceived to be
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- threats to public security, . , Our view is based on the arguments 
«..^ «*si2ipp0 r*t i ng -Ronald Dwork in' s-assertion * tha night sought - not-r to^be^anrLh L.l ated
- through" specuTat i o n A n  Amer ican- judgeLearned—Handr expressed.-tM-s.- vJew—  
best when he decided that the gravity of an evil had to be discounted by
oO
its likelihood. This 'discount rate' decreased markedly In Ethiopia 
from the end of 1978 onwards,, when Government seemed powerless In the face 
of the EPRP's assassination programme. Rather than order additional 
detentions, however, the Derg and its supporters embarked on an assassin­
ation- programme of its own (see Chapter Four and ?nfra) .
Non-trad i t ional Ethiopian detention laws have their origin in a .per^ ..- 
ceived emergency - the desire to intern those who collaborated with the 
Italians, The.Public Security Proclamation of 19^2 was supported and 
probably drafted by British "advisors", reminiscent as it is of laws 
T-- • adopted' for Ang 1 ophon i c A f r i c aHa i wT h e < ? 1 on.g-ke.osk.4e.tantio.n .of -)s.y,s,|?£&tied^
collaborators, rivals to the Throne and plotters of abortive coups and
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peasant rebellions was fairly common under Haile Selassie, and more 
than 2,000 students joined these detainees in the -late 1960s and early 
1970s, While the number of those detained under the Emperor will pre­
sumably never be ascertained, it is all but conclusively presumed that 
the Derg uses detention more expansively. Figures of 4,^00 detainees in 
■October 1975 and- 8,000 by March-=T977 are thought to be rel iable, al though 
it Is difficult to tell - particularly as detainees were being executed 
during 1977.39
if Q
The Public Order and Safety Proclamation, promulgated by the Derg 
in November 197^, is justified, in the Prologue, as a '’temporary" measure 
against persons attempting to disrupt the "peaceful change” that Ethiopia 
is experiencing. (The Proclamation repeals Haile Selassie's Public Safety
If ]
and Welfare Order of 19&9, on which it is patterned). If the Minister
"has reasonable grounds to believe that a person is a threat'to public
order, safety or welfare or the peaceful change in progress” , he can
require that person, on pain of detention, to give a surety of up to
Eth. $3,000 to keep the peace (Art, 3),
Alternately, on the same grounds of belief, he can detain a person
for a period of three months and for "further periods of three months each”
not exceeding six months (Art. A), Presumably, only one three-month period
should be allowed after the initial period, and the reference to "periods”
is the result of an erroneous adaptation of the repealed Order, which per-'
mi tted, detent i ons to con t i nue s o .. long...as.-the.. Qcder...cenja i ned. in., f   ...
Jnit tally.,, the Derg largely ad he red,, to a. liraitati,on^of.,.sJx...moDtbs,,OD. fie-
tentions, but this was tacitly dispensed with late in 1975, except for
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those few people who are released under periodic amnesties, On "reason­
able grounds,” the Minister can also prohibit the use of "any place" in 
"amanner prejudicial to the interests or safety of the public” (Art, 5). 
Persons who disobey his order can be detained under Article k t
A major change made by the 1974 detention Proclamation is the repeal 
of Article 6 of the 1969 Order, a modified version of the Civil Procedure 
Code 'habeas corpus' proceeding,^3 under which the High Court could deter­
mine. if the detention was in strict compliance with the Order, This is 
interesting for two reasons. First, the language of Article 6 of the 19&9 
Order shows a fear that, but for. the reword i ng., i n, effect, 0,f f)C.i y i 1, Pro.-., 
cedure Code Article 177(1), habeas corpus could have been granted in spite 




fact that the 1969 Order had been followed strictly), Second, the repeal 
could be construed as reflecting the Derg’s desire to make habeas corpus 
available to detainees and to those awaiting trial under the Special -Penal 
Code, This view is reinforced by the fact that habeas corpus was expressly
‘'suspended” during the State of Emergency declared in Addis Ababa in
bb t \
September 1975, which was rescinded in December (see Chapter Four).
Diligent research has, however, failed to uncover a successful habeas
corpus cha11enge. Since the Revolution, there have been at least two
unsuccessful ones. Habeas corpus applications occasionally succeeded in
Haile Selassie's High Court, but Government usually ignored the Court -
b$
see Tewfik Sherif in Chapter Three, supra,
C, New Courts and Procedures
Changes in the structures of Ethiopia's courts and stripped down 
criminal procedures introduced by the Derg have made the courts a more 
explicit instrument of social control and political repression: an ad-
b6
ministrative rather than a judicial approach to law is being follows,
A7
Haile Selassie's Criminal Procedure Code and Judicial Administration 
Proclamation (modified in 1975 - see infra) reflect a (largely formal­
istic) concern with the independence of the judiciary and 'due process'
b3
for the accused. The Special Courts-Martial Establishment Proclamation
and Special Criminal Procedure Code Proclamation*^ are, on the other hand,
justified in the Prologue of the former by a bureaucratic desire toj'pro-
, V i  y ^  ^  r^an""£f fTo t en t; s peedy and • dec i s t ve-macM ne-ry of - j us t i ee - ? -»-•? -t o
implement the mot to E th lop i a T i kdem , - ,j - «u — - — .... - - ---
Conclusions reached by Kevin Boyle et al ,, in their able survey of
the sorry legal history of Northern Ireland, can also be applied in Ethiopia;
the administrative response to the outbreak of violence is more efficient
than the judicial approach in the short run, but It results In a long-term
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loss of confidence in the legal system and may even foster violence.
At a fairly high level of generality, the same techniques are used in 
Northern Ireland and by the Derg - detention, special offenses and tribunals 
and, we would add, torture - with the same lack of success; both regimes 
feel unable to risk slow and uncertain proceedings against "enemies of the 
people." Additionally, the Derg has established peasant association and 
kebeTTe'4 tr‘i bunal s (whi ch can now-Impose* the-death,.,penal tyj-,-n£ee^Chapter.S'*
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Six and Seven) to decentralise the administration of justice, to dis­
place local courts and customary tribunals which were dominated by 
traditional elites, and to foster localised organs of social control 
which, the Derg hopes, will be more amenable to its dictates.
The temptation to establish special courts for special purposes is 
a recurrent one in Ethiopia. Over time, they either die out or, as is 
the case with the Derg's new courts, are gradually assimilated by the 
pre-existing court system, One precedent for setting up the Special
Courts-Martial is a special Security Court set up in 1947 and used only
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once, although the enabling law was never rescinded. Ordinary Courts-
Martial have functioned regularly since they were created under the Army
53Proclamation of 1944, but they can only try those subject to martial
law. Most offenses created under the Army Proclamation do not even
specify a maximum penalty, unlike the military offenses triable by or-
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dinary courts under 1957 Penal Code Articles 303 through 320, Special
Courts-Martial were created in 1974 to hear charges brought against any
person under the Special Penal Code and al1 other criminal laws. Since
October 1975, the ordinary courts may hear many of the Special Penal Code
offenses, at the election of the Prosecutor, The jurisdictions of the
55various Ethiopian courts are described in the footnote.
Article 12(1) of the Special Courts-Martial Proclamation restates
Article 11 of Haile Selassie's Judicial Administration Proclamation:
Judges shall be completely independent in the exercise’of their * * *
1 * T c m c tfb n S y  and fn'the administfatiofi" of justice they-shail -sub?* 
mi t to no other authority than, that ..of _.the Law*_ , ............
The creation of new courts and changes in the structures and functions of
the old ones presumably motivated the Derg to re-establish the Judicial
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Administration Commission under a new Administration of Justice Proclama­
tion"^ which extends Article 12(1) (above) for the benefit of judges in 
Woreda (district), Awraja (sub-provincial), High and Supreme Courts, Does 
this proviso guarantee a judicial independence in Ethiopia's courts? In 
the Soviet Union, vir-tually identical language is not intended to insulate
judges from general Party politics, campaigns against specific crimes and
58
executive influence over the severity of the penalties imposed,
A delicate balance must obviously be struck between judicial protec­
tion of human rights and judicial, sensitivity towards state pol icy and 
the needs of the people in a developing society, ]t is, however, difficult
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to maintain such a balance when an ad hoc tribunal, virtually a Nuremberg
Court, is established to consider the criminality of previous conduct in
a- politically-charged atmosphere, The independence of the Special Courts-
Martial judges is further tempered by the fact that, as military officers,
they are subject to military discipline and hold no tenure of judicial 
59office. Numerous violations of the standards of fairness and impartial­
ity proposed by Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
are therefore possible. Special Courts-Martial trials, for example, need 
not be public where this "might endanger public order or affect public 
morals, . . . "
The Judicial Administration Commission, re-established by Proclama­
tion 53 of 1975, recommends the appointment and promotion of certain judges, 
prosecutors and registrars, regulates their transfer, devises a code of 
ethics, ensures that standards of good behaviour are maintaned, and im­
poses disciplinary penalties, including dismissal, The Derg appoints 
Judges of the High and Supreme Courts and the Attorney-General, while the 
Commission appoints registrars, "public prosecutors" (as opposed, pre­
sumably, to Special Courts-Martial prosecutors) and Awraja and Woreda 
Court Judges (Art, 8), An appointee must be "of the highest character 
and reputation and , . . experienced and skilled in the laws which he 
may be called upon to apply" (Art, 9(1)), Any judge, public prosecutor 
or registrar may be dismissed by the Commission if he is found M to be 
incapable of exercising his office" (Art, 12(1)), It is at least argu­
able -that.'there was a greater measurec-of. judicial lndependenc.e.;..undej:-_th§. . _ 
traditional Fetha Negast (see Chapter, One) judges could .not. he. d i smi.s.sed _ 
in the absence of "justifiable cause" (nor could they resign without the 
consent of the person who appointed them),^ Taken as a whole. Proclamation 
53 of 1975 simply re-states provisos found in Haile Selassie's Proclamation, 
with one significant addition: the Commission is now to regulate the
careers of public prosecutors and registrars, in addition to those of 
judges. Proclamation 53 thus helps to formalise the bureaucratisation 
of the judiciary that was begun under Menelik II and Haile Selassie, In 
Ethiopia and most other countries, ordinary prosecutors are not expected 
to act independent of governmental policies, and no one would expect a 
judicial independence where government treats judges and prosecutors alike.
Paradoxically, the Prosecutor in the Special Courts-Martial has perhaps
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the greatest legal capacity to exercise an independent judgement within
the court system,' Many of the decisions on whether to prosecute and in
which court, hitherto reserved for "Government", have been delegated to
this Prosecutor, His decision is final and based on "convenience and
other causes", except where Government expressly directs him to prosecute.
He is given investigatory powers roughly analogous to those of a French
magistrate, and he may refer cases which cannot be heard properly by Special
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Courts-Martial to "other military courts" or the Awraja and High Courts.
This choice of courts amounts, in effect, to choice of law and creates
serious equal protection problems that are contrary to the spirit of
Article 7 of.the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
The Special Criminal Procedure Code Proclamation applies only in
Special Courts-Martia1,.and renders inapplicable the Criminal Procedure
Code prov?sions concerning bail (Arts. 63^79) > prePminary inquiries
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(Arts. 80-93) and appeals (Arts, 181-96), Since the Criminal Procedure 
Code was designed to function as a 'system', the resulting gaps disadvan­
tage the accused and hamper the Courts' determination of facts and correc­
tion of legal errors. Under the Criminal Procedure Code, the granting of 
bail is discretionary, although grounds for the mandatory refusal of bail 
exist (Art. 67). Any court could properly refuse bail where strong rea­
sons were advanced by the State (so long as judicial discretion is not 
abused). The abolition of preliminary inquiries can only have diminished 
the efficiency of Special Courts-Martial trials,'as cases in which'there*' ‘ 
is no prima facie evidence of a crime are not weeded out in advance, When 
the Special Courts-Martial were first established, a fair number of cases 
were dismissed for a lack of evidence, and this may have been the reason 
for expanding the Prosecutor's investigatory powers,
Along with objections to a process through which civilians are tried 
by soldiers with no legal training, in the absence of clear definitions - 
of when the death penalty is mandatory, the major criticism levelled by
Amnesty International against the Special Courts-Martial concerns the
6A
absence of a right of appeal, "No appeal shall lie from decisions of 
any Special Courts-Martial," but offenses punishable by death or imprison-’-
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ment from ten years to life "shall be reviewable by. the Head of State" 
which, since December 1976, is the Chairman acting "on behalf of" the 
Derg, Although the proliferation of specious appeals and petitions has
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been a problem in the past in Ethiopia, the curing of wrongful convictions
and the correction of legal errors requires that a post-conviction remedy
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be exercisable before 1ega11y-trained officials, This is particularly
true in Ethiopia, where it Is doubtful that Special Courts-Marttal judges
apply or even understand the resumption of innocence,
Initially, the Special Courts-MartiaV gave grounds for the hope that
elementary standards of fairness would be applied, In particular, the
first Prosecutor, a Major with an American legal education, refused to
bow to political pressures where the evidence was insufficient to secure
conviction, inevitably, he was replaced and standards began to slide; the
Courts' decisions became pro forma implementations of Derg policies.
While most trials were held in camera, the public was admitted to a few
proceedings early in 1976, and legal aid was even granted, Prominent
decisions allegedly taken by Special Courts-Martia1 - it is impossible to
be certain - include imposing the death penalty on 21 EPRP members' in
January 1976, on some of the "plotters" executed along with Brigadier
Getachew in July 1976 (see Chapter Four), and on seven Addis Ababa grain
merchants charged with hoarding ("economic sabotage") in July 1976 (see
Chapter Six), In several other cases, Derg Chairman Teferi substituted
the death penalty for prison sentences ordered by the Courts, This fate
befell several students, two alleged Oromo (Gal la) nationalists (General
Tadesse Biru and Colonel..Hai1e Regassa)- and four others who were charged
wi tfvopp'osfcfg’ land reform and Ethiopia Tikdem in March 1975. Defehd1hg^r
the latter decision, Teferi remarked that a judgement "meted out to the
enemies of the broad masses of the people cannot be changed into forgive-1 
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ness," This is not too far removed from a prevalent Soviet view, ex­
pressed- here by Anashkin:
Socialist humanism has nothing in common with Christian 'all'1 
forgiveness'. Genuine humanism excludes a sentimentally pitying, 
indulgent attitude towards human weakness, shortcoming and v i c e s , ^8
The machinery of trying cases in Special Courts-Martial and then hav­
ing the Derg Chairman review the decisions further truncates meagre human 
rights in Ethiopia without increasing the speed and efficiency of fact 
finding and rule application, The new Proclamations envisage, in effect, 
a permanent state of judicial emergency, Ordinary courts and procedures 
could be used to implement "revolutionary justice" but, as there is no 
meaningful independence of the judiciary in Ethiopia, the effect of their
299
decisions would differ but little from the executions and detentions 
ordered by the Derg.
D The Terror
Mengistu Haile Mariam (see Chapter Four) voiced the opinion that 
formal, trials are b.oth.soft and dangerous as. early as November 1974,
His rise to power has been marked by the substitut ion of street-corner 
assassinations for Special Courts-Martial trials. One form of legalised 
terror has, in other words, supplanted another - the secret and arbitrary 
administrative trial. There are currently very few cases heard by Special 
Courts-Martial and, for that matter, few civil matters are heard in the 
ordinary courts. Reports of "revolutionary measures" taken by kebelle 
courts or "military tribunals" are now taken to refer to executions with­
out trial. The best estimates suggest that some 32,000 people were killed 
in the urban areas as a result of*urban opposition (not including sepa­
ratist) political activity from November 1974 to April 1978, 1977 was
the worst year, and by mid-1978 there were hopeful signs that assassina­
tions - and the Derg's anti-EPRP campaign in particular « were tapering 
off. Warfare with the separatists continues, however: the number of
casualties cannot ever be guessed at, but various conflicts have produced 
at least 400,000 refugees. It has, for example, been reported that ten
lorry loads of military prisoners were executed in Asmara in December 
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197-7— ^ rW®~ou111 ned* .the course of - the Red* and • Wh i te Terror in* ‘Chapter-"-™ 
Four,“and shall round out'a horrifying picture at this juncture”,
At least twenty top military leaders have been killed for political 
reasons since the Derg assumed power. Large numbers of demonstrators - 
mostly students - have been killed: on May Day in 1975, 1976 and 1977 n
when 500 died; in July and on 22 September 1976; and on 29 April 1977, 
when 500 to 1,000 students were killed. Some 35 demonstrators died in 
December 1976 in Gondar. Many residents were killed during house-to-house 
searches in Addis Ababa by soldiers, police and kebelle guards in April 
and September 1976, on 23 to 27 March 1977 and from 7 to 9 May 1977. It 
has been reported that these "security forces" regarded hidden sums of 
money as "proof" of the fact that family members were paid agents of the 
EPRP. in March 1977, seven Government Printing Press employees were led 
from-their off ices and shot as * suspected EPRP “member's,1 The Sfecretery- 
General of the Swedish Save the Children Fund alleged, in May 1977, that
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100 to 500 children aged eleven to thirteen were being slaughtered nightly; 
their bodies - like so many others - were ravaged by the hyenas that 
prowl the streets of Addis.^
Hospitals often refuse to treat the wounded, who are automatically 
branded "anarchists" or "reactionaries." Morgues often impose a -b 30 'tax' 
on the return of bodies to relatives. Other bodies are simpl.y left on the 
street for a time; sometimes they are shown on television - a revealing 
indication of the brutalising effect intended by the Derg, Those arrested 
are often victims of malicious denunciations - special telephone numbers 
are provided for this - and subsequent executions are often purely arbi­
trary. Detainees are sometimes tortured to coerce-them into naming three 
people whom they know to be disloyal. Those named, who are often as 
innocent as their accuser, are arrested and, in turn, forced to name 
other "enemies of the people," Addis Ababa-"diaries,:, like the one by 
Hans Eerik published in The Times, while not always accurate in detail, 
convey the deep and agonising uncertainty of city dwellers? the Terror 
is often beyond comprehension yet It has 1ife-or-death consequences. it 
is.perhaps unsurprising that many Addis Ababans report that they have 
been able to adjust ■ in a limited way * to a daily carnage, just as they 
adjusted to squalor in the past, People are simply too busy, preoccupied 
as they are with finding food and protecting their relatives,^
Mengistu justified'the Terror to an American Congressman on the 
basis that the ordinary rules do not apply during a revolution. Other 
officials add that the Terror is a manifestation of a larger and necessary
class struggle, serving notice that Individuals can no longer act as they 
72
please. Amnesty International's allegation of a collapse of the Rule 
of Law in Ethiopia - presumably what Mengistu means by the "ordinary 
rules" - is certainly a reality to most Addis Ababans, provided there was 
something there to be collapsed in the first place,
E, A Brief Interpretation
Along with the penal provisions discussed In subsequent Chapters,
the application of the Special Penal Code by Special Courts-Martial sup-.
ports an English jurist's general assertion;
criminal offenses are the creation of the criminal policy adopted 
" from H  me to time by those sect ions the cp(Tjmunityrfwbp .
powerful or astute enough to safeguard their own security 
and comfort by causing the sovereign power in the state to repress 
conditions which they feel may endanger their position,73
In Ethiopia today, "security and comfort" amount to punishing enemies, 
consolidating power and attempting to foster legitimacy, having assumed 
direct control of the ''sovereign power" and ensured that tribunals con­
tinue to be a pliant instrument of Government policy. As in the Soviet 
Union, penal policies became the growth point of law in post-Revolutionary 
Ethiopia - a phenomenon unfamiliar to Western jurists, whose law evolved 
largely through the media of property and contract, Ethiopia's judicial 
hierarchy was substantially restructured, only to be totally circumvented
by torture, extra-judicial repression and mass executions - a re-enactment
74
of Stalin’s "intensification of the class struggle" during the 1930s, 
as well as a gross extrapolation of Haile Selassie’s policies.
The agonies we outline have been, for the most part, unnecessary: 
while the Derg’s desire to neutralise traditional elites is understandable 
and even defensible from the standpoint of promoting development, many 
'little' people have also become deviants solely because a small but vie- . 
torious elite has forced through changes in the definitions of right con­
duct and applied them arbitrarily. Stigmatised and manipulated, these 
deviants' reactions range from "putting their heads under their wings" 
to a violent opposition, provoking harsh countermeasures In an inflation­
ary spiral of violence. An intense injustice is felt when people are 
condemned without fault, by assassins or under strict liability provisions 
in the Special Penal Code, and such law as is left falls further into 
^ di srepu te.• - A • p r i me < goa V of -pena l^pofTey, ensu r fng^a^srcu re..-TTf e^fn,,s.oc i ety 
is far from being attained; the Derg^s preoccupation with "political"1 
crimes makes urban society the prey both of disorderand delinquency from J
below, which is neglected and even encouraged by the Derg,and of lawless- 
75ness from above including, in the, eyes of many, land and. business nation­
al i sat Ions,
Only a Pyrrhic victory is gained over opponents by assassinating 
them. The Derg's remedy has become more painful and more inimical to 
development than the disease originally identified by the soldiers, and 
nothing like a dynamic realignment of order and justice or a "revolutionary
~jC
law and order can be identified. We therefore conclude that Peter Schwab
interpretation of the.Ethiopian Revolution ceased to be accurate soon
after it was published in 1975:
‘ Wa's“ 1V  hot to be' expefcted1 that' thev‘fdrmer -a r fs toe ra t i o- '■'el-as'S- j — r 
of Ethiopia would attempt to stymie the decision to build new 
social, economic and political institutions? , , , If a national
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leadership finds it necessary to worry about and concern 
itself over elites who represent a former social system, 
then it may only be able to deal intermittently with the 
human conditions of the bulk of the population, and. will 
have to concentrate on securing its own political future,
. , , If reactionary forces exist, unrepresentative and 
small in number, and if they oppose radical social change, 
then they must be dealt with decisively, , , ,77
The Derg's initial ambitions, were pretty much as Schwab suggests, These
were, however, rapidly swamped by incompetence, intentions, which \yere not
altogether apparent in 1975, and an increasing reliance on repressive
techniques which endanger the most basic of human rights. We will return
to this theme infra and in-the concluding chapter,
III, Admi n strat ion
Despite declarations of the need for new and enforceable obligations 
running in favour of peasant and the urban poor, the.Derg has .not funda* 
mentally reformed administrative laws to take account of this goal, Its 
proclamations usually adopt the terminology and the adaptations of an 
Anglo-American legal style utilised by Haile Selassie, adding only Marxist-* . 
sounding prologues, It is therefore unsurprising that many of the trad!^ 
tional practices of central administration described in Chapter Three are 
perpetuated under the Derg, Such changes as have occurred in central 
Government are primarily the result of a sporadic political supervision 
by the-Derg, increasingly supplemented by the same arbitrary Terror which 
u i s appTi ed ' to- other ci ty dwel lfers; - * The‘■'Dertf1 s wpol f dies Vt th^ regard "to" —  j—  
local and municipal administration are more complex; rather than reform 
these foci of political opposition, the Derg is allowing them to wither 
and is gradually replacing them with higher-0eveI kebelles and peasant 
associations, Fuller discussions of these policies are postponed to 
Chapters Six and Seven,
A , Legal Changes
When compared to the Derg's radical changes in constitutional and 
penal 1 awsy aVterrations in administrative laws of general applicability 
are very few in number. New agencies of central Government have been 
created and old ones abolished since the Revolution (see Chapters Six and 
Seven) but, as under Haile Selassie, a great deal of shifting people about 
*^ has*'done*>1 kt’t lev.to;-attaok• -the >pr ima^yr-causeseof dm-t n fat irat i veua@d-e>!rdsve<lopa 




1975 to manage nationalised business and was, in turn, reportedly re­
organised in August 1976, While this reorganisation is not recorded in 
the Negarit Gazeta (legislative journal), it apparently included a redis- 
tribution of public enterprises among several Ministries, a merger of the 
Ministries of Agriculture and Land Reform, and a hiving off of the commer­
cial activities of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, These kinds of 
changes were also fairly common under the Emperor,
As we saw, the legal functions of Ministers and of the Council of 
Ministers were altered by Proclamation 110 of 1977. There, have been few 
changes de facto, however, as the Derg merely acquired Haile Selassie's 
powers over■ the bureaucracy and modified the law to reflect more-real i*s~ 
tically the real locus of power,. The only significant innovation with 
regard to bureaucratic organisation in Proclamation 110 is an expansion 
of the Auditor General's powers of inquiry into budgetary processes and
the efficiency of governmental units (Art, 5), Finally, a formal pension
79scheme was Introduced for employees of public interprises, and minor \
changes were made in arrangements for retaining the services of civil /-
80servants after retirement age. These regulations were then extended to
8l
judges and prosecutors, after the 1975 Judicial Administration Proclaim 
ation went further in the direction of turning them into ordinary bureau-' 
crats. The careers of civil servants other than judges and prosecutors 
continued, in theory, to be regulated by the Central Personnel Agency
82 " t h ­
under the Public Service Regulations. "The'Defg did, however^ adopt
the Emperor's legal power over senior appointments and continued a select
tive and extra-'legal interference at all levels of staffing, Including
O n
major administrative reshuffles in Feburary and October 1976,
The- inescapable conclusion is that the Derg felt the bureaucracy 
could be made to serve new purposes without changing its overall structure,
We would argue the contrary position, that administrative institutions, 
procedures and attitudes - defined only in part by law - are themselves 
a fundamental cause of Ethiopian under-development and operate as a signifi^ 
cant constraint on radical change, Most of Haile Selassie's administrative 
laws continue In force and, while not expressly inconsistent with some of 
the Derg's goals, they require no high degree of bureaucratic commitment 
to new and development-oriented aims. The parroting of revolutionary 
slogans Is being required politically, but military supervision has not 
been extended so as to ensure consistent changes in bureaucratic orientations
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B . Military-Bureaucratic Relations
The Francophonic African tradition of a military involvement in
administration and development projects was ignored by Hafle Selassie's
military, which was trained in the Anglo-American tradition of a strictly
military professionalism (see Chapter Three), As in Ghana and Nigeria,
however, these attitudes were only skin-deep and disappeared quickly
during the creeping coup. Like other fa!rly-permanent military regimes,
the Derg has aimed for an ad hoc and extra-legal militarisation of the
bureaucracy. At first glance, such a policy seems likely of success,
as the Ethiopian military and bureaucracy have much in common, Both are,
for example, more purposive than other social organisat ions, Modernising
officers and officials (as opposed to those who derived much personal
profit from a wholehearted support of the status quo); share similar
educational and socio-economic backgrounds; became accustomed to function-
ing within a rigid hierarchy and t o ’the frustrations of systems which
allow little scope for initiative; and perceive;the need for a tutelage
or "popular guidance" which does not extend to a political bargaining
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"with the public or a free play among organised interest groups,
Ernest Lefever may have had these kinds of similarities in mind when 
he suggested, in 1970, that much would be gained, but at a -high financial 
cost, from a direct transfer of military skills to the bureaucracy;
Ethiopia,.the armed -serv-iees-have contributud: to ecoh** ■
„  romti c.jiipfternteatj,on by,,the.i r .example^ef what~Fs-technical ly> — •
possible where resources are rationally marshalled to achieve _  
specific state-wide objectives^' [This example] cannot be easily 
duplicated in the less disciplined civilian sector, iAdmittedly, 
a] soldier probably costs from three, to five times as much as 
a civilian to do the same job because of the considerable mill-' 
tary overhead,^5
So crude a cost-benefit analysis has little relevance and, for a variety 
of reasons, Lefever's arguments have not been borne out in post-Revolutionary 
Ethiopia. There has been no general military management of civilian 
affairs, which is arguably a good thing: the Army occupying the American
sector of Germany after World War (I found that it had to hire many 
civilian specialists - in economics, public works, health, welfare, trans­
port, communications and public relations - and, even then, It achieved 
1 itt le more than the repair,of physical damage and putt i ng -the .economy >onr' ■ 
a care-and-maintenance basis, Like most other armies, Ethiopia's has never 
produced anything tangible, It acts, rather, as a consumer - the same can,
irt r% c i  W ' * -  w a s .
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alas, be said of the bureaucracy - and few soldiers in the lower ranks
have been trained for peacetime activities. There is a vast difference
between the kind of discipline required to depose the Emperor and that
needed to create a disciplined instrument of national policy, The mili-
‘fcary -wou-fd-• have- been' unab-le -to -part-icipate Tn: ttairsporty •sen'rtat'Lon and
other infrastructura1 projects which make fewer demands on administrative
expertise, as it had its hands full with the Soma 1 i invasjon, thejsepara-
t fsts' and^ 1 oca 1 i sed ru ra b’T e b eV1 i on"S" For t he* s a m e e a S o n s ;  i Ts 'reft ned"^“
.technical and communications skills have not been made available to the
civilian sector. Immune from day-to-day tests of its efficiency prior to
the Revolution, the military has also evidenced many shortcomings recently,
86
especially in battle situations,
It is therefore easy to see why the Derg, wishing to rule but incap­
able of doing so directiy and refusing to countenance popular political 
control, was driven into the arms of a bureaucracy whose competence and 
po-1 itlcal .loyalty.were-doubted, ^_The-,class.i.c statement_-of . this. jdi 1 emma_ Ls
attributed to a scholar who challenged China's first Han emperor:- "You
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conquered this country in a chariot - can you rule it from a chariot?" . 
Like many other revolutionary regimes, the Derg is aware of this challenge 
and seeks to purge and transform the bureaucracy through political means, 
'to? tbe-vi rutal exclijs ion of law, . r .... . .
The Derg's initial approach to administration involved the assign­
ment of a soldier - usually young, inexperienced and, often, poorly- 
educated - to supervise each senior administrator, As under the Greek 
junta, these soliders often take pleasure in countermanding the decisions
of senior bureaucrats, or lack the self-confidence to approve any course 
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of action. Later, when the Politburo emerged as a political force (see 
Chapter Four), its members also began to supervise administrators. In 
theory, members of a 1troi ka 1 - a senior civil servant, a Politburo repre­
sentative and a Derg appointee - function as equals in each agency, but 
the Derg's man usually dominates.
Inefficiency and lethargy continue to dominate the bureaucracy, as 
they did under Haile Selassie; while individuals are goaded periodically, 
they feel that special efforts go unrewarded, As under the Emperor, the 
Derg agrees to a programme but the Ministry of Finance refuses to release 
funds for it because the Derg had no real intention of authorising funding
forgot to do so, or because the demands for funds exceed the supply, 
Budgeting is. chaotic for the most part, The Planning Commission was 
closed in June 197^, Frequent reorganisat ions since then, plus a short­
age of staff and funds have meant that planning has advanced but little 
since the Revolution, It still amounts to ad hoc shopping lists from 
various agencies. From early 1976 onwards, attacks on "reactionary" 
bureaucrats have become increasingly strident In the media. Many of the 
officials dismissed during two major shakeups In 1976 were also arrested, 
but a purge of the bureaucracy did not begin in earnest until February 
1978, A POMOA spokesman (see Chapter Four) justified this "intensive 
programme" on the basis that the "feudal bourgeois" state structure had 
not yet been broken. In April, there was a mass meeting of 2,000 Ministry 
of Agriculture employees, in which the "guilty" were given a chance to 
denounce themselves; 200 were detained. An undisclosed number of Finance 
Ministry employees had been similarly denounced and arrested in February, 
There has, however, been no inclination to mobilise a civilian ’Red Guard' 
against the bureaucracy,^
Policy statements by the Derg concerning administration are fairly 
thin on the ground. The niost important one was delivered by Chairman 
Teferi in September 1975:
Unless the zig zag of poor administration is avoided, our 
Revolution will not achieve its goal, Since administrative 
.^ . employees* support product } ve-force sy^here^wf 1 ) be< no** etffec~ 
wt,tvVe„economic,„stracture, unless -the- administration- -ks -stfa 
ened out. . . . Some unnecessary organisations have been 
closed - new organizations , , have been opened, , ", ,
Various seminars have been held to carefully select the ad- 
ministrators and assign them to various places, Since the 
aim . , . is to decentralise administration, the administra- 
tive structure is being rearranged, , , , The administrators 
of Socialist Ethiopia are selected on the basis of their so­
cialism, ability, the way they protect the broad masses and 
their good work.90
Most of these policies have yet to be implemented fully, and there 
was an apparent change in the Derg's thinking about bureaucracysymbolised 
by a chanting of opposition to "bureaucratic capitalism" (see Chapter Four), 
which coincided with Mengistu's rise to power. The precise goal of this 
campaign is unclear, but it probably relates to Marx’s view that bureau- 
. era serve* as representatives of the-bourgeois i.e, and-.remain ?ln Irks.* soc ko- 
economic ambit after a revolution, Oscar Lange (and others) adds that the 
bureaucratisat ion of economic life is a greater danger to socialism than
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the largely technical problems of resource allocation; bureaucratic
capitalism can never be overcome so long as a commitment to centralised
bureaucratic organisations remains - a sentiment echoed by A ,R, Michaels's
"iron law of oligraphy." The Derg is seemingly aware of these dangers,
but it has adopted rather equivocal responses. In the rural areas, an
almost Maoist approach to administration has been adopted:
His solution was to minimise bureaucratic responsibilities 
- to limit taxation and procurement in order to leave most 
of the profits of increased production in the hands of the 
collectives so that they could take responsibility themselves.
There has,, on the other hand, been little attempt to devolve the 
responsibilities of central administration, The division of authority 
within a few new agencies does not serve to conceal the perpetuation of 
the administrative practices we noted in Chapter Three, and some of the 
pre-existing social stratifications are maintained through the privileges 
of bureaucratic employement, Something more creative than a simple com­
promise of poll'ic.ies of centralisation and decentralisation is obviously 
required. Careful administrative laws and policies are needed to ensure 
that the bureaucracy comes to act in the interests of peasants and the 
urban poor, and to defend the Derg’s main*economic goal - which can still 
be validly characterised as a market socialism, despite the rhetoric
adopted - against a backsliding towards the controlled capitalism favoured
i 92 - »- ■
In most'African countries,
C. Corruption....................... ......... ....................................
One noticeable change since the Revolution is a marked decline in the 
amount of bribery within the bureaucracy; it has now become risky openly 
to treat the public as ripe for plucking, Many of the conditions that gave 
rise to corruption in the past have not been eliminated, however. So long 
as cumbersome administrative procedures remain (see Chapters Six and Seven) 
so too does the temptation to shortcircuit them with a bribe, This Is 
particularly so when, as in Ethiopia, the struggle between the individual 
and the state continues to be grossly unequal, bureaucratic secrecy pre^ 
vails, decisions need not be justified under concrete legal criteria, and 
there is no legitimate political opposition which serves to expose public 
•* *-corrupt'iorr.1'- - Where- bureaucrat hr 'employment 'rhma i nS' so'T nseCUf&y" Tfr-th£'' *■ ‘p',v 
sense that an administrator can be dismissed, detained and/or executed for
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reasons wholly unrelated to job performance, he feels at the mercy of
new-found and, he h o p e s p o w e r f u  1 friends. He must also be tempted to
get rich quick, if only to provide for relatives, and these temptations
cannot be removed by salary increases, They require, rather, long-term
changes in administrative practices and in social values * particularly
the elimination of the traiditional tillick sew (big man) role that so
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many bureaucrats sought to emulate,
Since the Revolution, there has been a modest shift in public opinion 
away from an automatic expectation of official corruption, The Derg has 
also eliminated many of the patron-client relations that were so produc- 
tive of corruption in the past. There is, however, every indication that 
Derg members Slid' oliH^r *faVoured^bTf 1 cfats ate' becbYnfhg'^Trdns Trr^TrarJT^' 
tional fashion, Increases in the benefits associated with being a soldier 
. since the Revolution have.been only minor, when.compared to, for example, 
regimes in Ghana and Nigeria, Even so, Individuals can, for example, 
claim expenses of up to Eth, $100 (b 25) a day'whi1e on the Derg1S business, - 
Early in 1976, six Derg members were arrested and charged with soliciting 
gifts, seizing goods and finding "jobs for the boys." Conventional forms 
of high-level corruption have disappeared since then, at least on an ob­
vious scale. There have, however, been huge increases in what may be
termed the corruptions of power, associated with the license to assassin-'
3k
w .atey^to^detaTn,x.to - rob houses -dur i ng^sea.rG,he,s, ,and*6 0;, fcitth it wn.'rt i»<» terra: uk'-otepotg.js , u~*>■*,tkf-
D, Control of the Bureaucracy
The Derg’s policies with regard to the bureaucracy have led to a
situation'somewhat similar to the ones described by Fritz Moorstein Marx;
Both Mussolini and Hitler showed the world that moral fortitude 
does not live long in a bureaucracy if a sword is suspended on 
a silk thread above it. Courage vanishes when each civil ser­
vant discovers how little stock he can safely take in fraternal 
solidarity and how easily he can advance his personal fortunes — — ~ 
by blackening the record of his colleague. Within days, the 
corrupting influence of an environment of fear envelops the. 
entire administrative system, [In the Soviet Union,] everybody 
is In part the ideological overseer of everybody else, and suc­
cessful performance as ideological overseer brings personal ad­
vantages, 95
This "moral fortitude" and "fraternal solidarity" have always been in short 
supply within the Ethiopian bureaucracy (see Chapter Three), but a "cor­
rupting influence" of the Terror and its "ideological overseers" can be
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readily identified, Ethiopia is, as we have argued, one of Myrdal’s
"soft states"; there may be a need to soften it up further before it can
be remolded, but the Derg does not seem inclined to give the bureaucracy
fundamentally new and development-oriented tasks to perform. An adminis-
rative Insurgency manipulated by the new incumbents seems concerned only
with a narrow political loyalty: much else is simply not inquired into,
probably because limited powers of a direct supervision by the military
96are already stretched to the utmost.
Too many decisions are still made at the top or not made at all in
Ethiopia, Meaningful channels for the regulation of lower^level conflicts
must be created, so that the upper reaches of Government can coordinate
policies and engage in forward planning. These are the functions performed,
more or less adequately, by a British Prime Minister and Cabinet, The
absence of these kinds of arrangements or, for that matter, a workable
politburo and central committee, has meant that the Derg neglectsvital
planning and coordinating activities (see Chapters Six and Seven), Direct
military supervision has only added to bureaucratic confusion and, until
fundamental questions of administrative law are resolved, techniques of
development administration cannot be applied by what remains an essentially
97"guardian" bureaucracy.
The Ethiopian bureaucracy continues to lack legitimacy because the 
public perceives few payoffs to be gained from dealing with it, New 
special interests have moved into a power vacuum within the bureaucracy 
uncontrolled by the public, by itself or, for the most part, by the Derg.
At the end of the next Section, we will deal with the questions of how 
the bureaucracy can be brought under control and made over into an effect 
tive participant in development activities, Briefly, the answer lies 
neither in the Derg’s political terrorism nor in the dominant Western 
theories of a development administration, The latter have been criticised 
for
the irrelevance (or worse) or a rigid distinction between politics 
and administration, the questionable utility of the doctrine of 
civil service neutrality under new or changed conditions, [and] 
the frequently misguided emphasis upon "Instrumental efficiency,"
The basic problem posed by military-bureaucratic relations is that the 
Derg must ei thet^ci vrHatrHeH-tself ;of -rel-inqafsh its- admTnts-trat i ve >.<•■<.«■■»■-• ■ 
functions rather quickly,' if these soldier-revolutlonaries arc to accomplish
310
their stated goals:
the more complex the civilian society, the more dependent the 
military is on civilians who possess central managerial and 
technical skills, Thus, the more successful the army in modern-' 
izing, the more it modernizes itself out of its role as ruler,99
IV, ' Law and,Revolution
An intentional destabilisation of Ethiopian social systems, through 
revolution, has produced abundant evidence of what Lon Fuller has termed 
the eight elements of legal failure: ’’excessive specificity, incommunica­
tiveness, retroactivity, incomprehensibility, contradictoriness, unfulfill 
able demands, capricious change, and irrelevant administration,"^^ By 
definition, revolutions are anti-legal because law is regarded as a bulwar 
status quo that a revolutionary is seeking to overthrow. Ethiopia1 
legal system collapsed because it was incapable of either restructuring 
rapid change (through, e.g., the Draft Constitution of Prime Minister 
Endalkatchew’s legislative programme) or adapting successfully to it, 
through the Derg1 s vague and incomplete constitutional laws, This kind of 
legal collapse is usually temporary, as most revolutionary regimes soon 
recognise the need for an administrative continuity and for an elaborate 
system of alternate rules designed to foster legitimacy and stability.
This realisation has dawned on the Derg only to a limited extent: while
the major means of production have been nationalised and kebelles and 
peasant associations created, relations-among elites and ~betwse.Hr*'Govern**' ' 
ment and the public have not been spelled out and stabilised through law. 
As a result, no one knows what to expect from anyone else; the Revolution 
is being kept in a state of flux, probably because the Derg as a collectiv 
ity has not reached a consensus over what it wishes to achieve in the 
political arena. A nebulous ideology has proved avagueand fragile alter­
native to legal rules, and the Derg has largely missed the chance to use 
law actively to educate and mobilise the public,^ As an instrument of 
"class struggle", Ethiopian law has been almost wholly penal in effect, 
providing few incentives for the poor to develop themselves - see supra 
and Chapters Six and Seven,
It is doubtful that the Derg's new laws and extra-legal acts accord 
with the notions of justice and morality subscribed to by the majority of 
■Ethiopians'.' ‘As in many other Third'WoT I'd ; sta'tes", “Th're£ 4£etsir<6f 'tl'e^ a'nd s1" 
struggled for legal recognition in the Ethiopia of the 1960s and early
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1970s. To generalise a b|t, peasants and traditional elites predicated
their demands on localised trad!tional laws and political practices (see
Chapter One); a tiny, urbane, state-supporting elite looked to an emerging
state capitalism and to imported Western private laws to satisfy their
material desires (see Chapter Seven); and an equally small modernising
elite demanded that public law be used vigourously to achieve a national
development and socio-economic equalisation, Haile Selassie ignored the
demands of the latter group and accommodated the others through a legal
system which operated at two distinct levels of pol{tica1 rea1 Ity - the
social order of divergent local laws and the bureaucratic order of a
colonial-style state, in which individuals were free to enrich themselves,
102
provided they demonstrated a loyalty to the Throne, -The emerging 
dichotomy of Ethiopian law after the Revolution is that, while the Derg 
has■repressed Western-oriented elites and pursues development through a 
revolutionary socialist approach to law, the vast majority of the people 
continue to subscribe to the values embedded in traditional laws, chief 
among which is the non-interference of Government in the daily lives of 
the people. The Derg’s Inability to convince the vast majority of peasants 
of the validity of its vision may well constitute its Achilles Heel, in 
terms of acquiring legitimacy in the long.run (see Chapter Six),
A, Western Legal Perspectives on Revolution
Western'theories'or law and society are overwnelrrfi n'gly static yrfd ’ 
do not, therefore, provide adequate explanations of radical or extra-legal 
social change. The perspectives adopted by many social scientist? towards 
events in the Third World are nevertheless subtley but pervasively coloured 
by these legal theories, and we therefore explore them briefly in an 
Ethiopian context. in . its ordinary Western sense, all of law is adjudged 
the product of a sovereign state (which is why customary and religious
laws cause great confusion among- Western legal philosophers * see Chapter -
One), Varying theories of sovereignty are used to determine which rules 
are, in Austin's terminology, laws "properly so called,"- This cornerstone -
of constitutional analysis is basically an inquiry into efficacy - the
1 03
locus of power to make rules - and validity - the authority to make them. - 
Western jurisprudence, particularly Hans Kelsen's, has so muddled these 
concepts as to become incapable of accounting for more than incremental 
legal change in the West. Admittedly, the issues involved are extremely
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complex and have been debated over the centuries; for example, when,
if ever, does might-(power) make right {authority)? In the concluding '
Chapter, alternative criteria.of validity are proposed which, we argue,
help to circumvent the defects inherent In conventional theories of posi"
tivism and natural law. For the present, we restrict ourselves to an
examination of several Western theories, * ■ “ ‘ v
It is ironic that the most-esoteric analytical positivism (see
Chapter Two), Hans Kelsen’s, has proved the most popular explanation of
■the connection between law and revolution in the West, Kelsen’s ideas
are too wel l known to require mo re than-a'brief recapitulation here, and
ink
receive extensive discussion elsewhere. - The criteria of validity he 
expounds are formalistic and purportedly scientific, value-neutral and 
"pure11. They are used to jexpel what-Kel sen terms ideology and morality 
from legal analyses* His theory is another example of what we have termed 
the analytical1y immature positivist attempt to segregate the "Is” from 
the "ought” (see Chapter Two), Legal argumentation acquires an other- 
wordly atmosiphere. when.,_as Ke.lsen requires, the social, polI t leal and 
economic facts of life in the country under discussion are ignored. To 
— take but one example--of the irrelevance of this dist inction in the’Thi rd 
World, development planning involves the, pursuit of an "ought" (a desir-
•X
able future state of affairs), which taJtes Into account the. ’.'is" of exist­
ing markets, political preferences, etc, and,the "can" of- the..available..
. re^P.urces^^How^xan^tfte^roTe.;of Taw 1 npfann i ng~even -be d i s-cus-sed■- I f JH s u 
. and . "oughti.L are~r.i.g-idl~y segregated?- Further Kel sen ’ s theory contai ns ■*-—  
several grand value judgements which remain implicit, for the most part,
For example, his Grundnorm, the basic norm on which the entire legal system
re-sts, presupposes that a par 1 lament^ a monarch, etc, ought to be- obeyed,
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Why this should be so is never inquired into, despite the fact that such 
obedience favours whichever- regime happens to be in-powet — --a-value*-laden 
.. „ premj s.e .if. ever-there was= -one. A statement to-the effect -that- an incumbent 
, government can, compel some degree of obed ience beeause -tempot-ati ly * ■ 
wields more political and economid'resources th'arT The strongest of'its
J opponents would_presumably be rejected as ugscfent i.f i.e..______________________
For Kelsen, the first hallmark of the acceptability of a new Grundnorm- 
.... intr.od.uic.ed^ JA:ftet <£.-• revoJ UitTon j.s'. the, existence- of :a de jure'au.thor ity ,toiA •» ■* 
convert revolutionary norms and acts into law. Despite the many distinctions
313
drawn by Kelsen and others who claim to be elaborating his theory, this
can only mean the acceptance of the new norms by bureaucrats and judges.
Inquiries into how this acceptance is procured are1 excluded from his
“pure" theory. There is also a circularity in his reasoning; the legal-
ity of a new de factorregjme is ascertained by people who must draw their
authority (their right to exercise power), their pay and, often, their
right to life or liberty from that regime. Viewed in this light, Kelsen
has done little more than apply a convenient legal gloss to a hoary maxim;
“Treason doth never prosper: What’s the reason? For if-H prosper, none
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dare call it treason," As Geoffrey Marshall maintains:
Revolutions do not acquire validity or legality. What happens 
is that administrators or citizens who transfer their allegiance 
to a new constitutional system accept different criteria of 
validity or legal lty.^7
We-therefore inquired Into who transferred their allegiances in 
Ethiopia, and when and how, viewing answers to these questions as more 
important to an understanding of the Derg’s constitutional laws and prac­
tices than the vague and incomplete Proclamations 1, 2 and 110, Kelsen 
recognised the importance of these Inquiries, not in his “pure" theory 
but in a critique of Golunski and Strogovich’s definition of the law of 
the state as a "centralised coercive order", Kelsen argues that their 
reference to the state Is superfluous; the state manifest"itself only
through human beings who, as organs of the legal order, create and apply
108 1 
that order. Aside from the obvious criticism that it may be more -
realistic to treat the legal order as the organ of those who man it, this
is a useful way to flesh out an arid conceptualism; the Institutional
breakdown, assembly and reassembly that is revolution should be viewed as
a- product of individual and group decisions, rather than as an exercise
in legal logic.
Kelsen's critique of Golunski and Strogovich’s definition also cir­
cumvents some of the difficulties raised by the second of his hallmarks 
of a Grundnorm shift:
The laws which, in the ordinary inaccurate parlance, continue 
to be valid are, from a juristic standpoint.' new laws whose 
import coincides with that of the old laws.'^9
This is an unnecessary mystification of an observable fact, that a legal
...orjdetvM-isr mote, permanent?.than the.«jparti-cul-at^ governments *that-*mar#p'tfT*a
it. J.M. Finnis clarifies the matter:
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A law once validly brought into belngf in accordance with- 
criteria of validity then in force, remains valid until efther 
it expires « , , or it is repealed in accordance with condl- 
tions of repeal in force at the time of its repeal,
[The problem] for the jurist is the same as for the his­
torian or for the good man wondering where his allegiance and 
his duty lie. From neither perspective is the thesis of dis­
continuity, as expressed by Kelsen, persuasive or acceptable,
A revolution is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for anything that should be described as a change in the identi­
ty of the state or the legal system. H O
‘.No one puzzled over Grundnorm shifts or the validity of prior laws when
the Emperor's 1931 Constitution was repealed and replaced (by the 1955
Constitution), rather than being amended in accordance with Its provisions.
There is enough legal instability in Ethiopia today without exaggerating
the impact of the Revolution, The legal past and present can be linked
to each other..on the basis that the-rules of the moment exist because of a
cont 1 nuing- wi 11 (ngness to recognise them as standards for ‘action. Where
such recognition is withdrawn, Government’s most recent act prevails.
These are the criteria applied de factor in all states where a written
constitution does not serve as a significant constraint on governmental
power; In Ethiopia, the U.S.S.R. and the U,Kt, for example, the courts
are exceedingly reluctant to inquire into how a power regarded as legiti-
111
mate is actually exercised.
, TJ^th,i„rd.!,of(1.KeirS.esns^bal 1 msrksvo.f -the domestic ,or >iinternal -legality - 
-of - reg i me ’-(whether "estabT ished "tS'r £i Y i W r g d n r ) * " i 1  “th'£ TjVe"Teg’eTV 
system"- rema I n or become "by' and '~taTg€HteffectTvef ““Tftl s'te'sfl s essential 
to Kelsen's theory, despite its being rather crude and unscientific. Like 
all positivists, he assumes a unified legal system which grows out of a 
territory-wide monopoly over law making. Given a superficiality of legal”" 
and political penetration, and the vigour of customary laws (see Chapters 
One and Two), such a monopoly simply does not exist, in many Third World 
states, including Ethiopia under Emperor or Derg, Do Third World judges, 
then, regularly decree the illegality of the 1ega11y-ineffeetive regimes - 
they serve? Of course not, although the law reports are rich in condemna­
tions of regimes which have been overthrown. Lord Lloyd argues that,
if it can be shown that the basic norm is a positive guide to 
countries. torn by revolution or other upheaval, then it may 
prove a valuable construct after a l l , H 2 ’
This hope has not been fulfilled by cases which apply Kelsen's theory to
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fact situations arising out of coups and revolutions, unless Lloyd's
"positive guide" is equated with a mere bolstering of the status quo,
No.matter how judges in Uganda, Pakistan, Rhodesia and Ghana find
their way through the wilderness of Kelsen's theory, their decisions
manage somehow to’uphold the constitutional validity of the regime they
113
serve at the moment of decision, T-he inarticulae major premise of
these decisions is, we argue, nothing more than the desire of judgesto
save their own skins and/or remain in office, The only apparent except
tion is a Privy Council decision concerning Rhodesia's Unilateral Declara-'
114.
tion of Independence; in that case, however, the judges must have known 
‘from the outset that their opinions, delivered in London, would have no 
practical impact either in Rhodesia or on their own personal safety,
As might be expected, Ethiopian judges did not engage in tortuous 
analyses of Kelsen* That they did not do so may reflect a lack of formal 
elegance and the small measure of influence exerted by Western juripru- 
dence. Their simple acceptance of the Derg and its laws does, however, 
achieve precisely the same effect as exhausting Interpretations of Kelsen, 
while displaying what we would term a greater intellectual honesty, A 
de facto regime usually has abundant means to ensure a judicial accept-' 
ance of itself, its programme and even of its petty prejudices; propa­
ganda, coercion, packing the courts -and creating special courts. There 
is seldom a need to"exercise all of these powers to the fullest extent, 
as. most,, jujiges, fa.l \...Into J t.ne automat i cal.l.y Uke.' bureaucrats -they 
resemb 1 a... i a.a 1 L„but^ name,... H i ghr.sound i ng .statements^ to-, the- contrary - not* —  
withstanding, judicial independence in most countries is no greater than 
in Ethiopia, except where it is based on a venerable tradition, No djs^ .. 
cussion of the age-old dilemma of a judge's responsIb11ities to a non­
libertarian state has proposed a practical solution to these kinds of 
problems,
Perhaps we are being a bit unfair to Kelsen, but he does claim that 
his theory is applicable in all times and to all places, Socialist jurists 
in particular would reject this"assertion, viewing any, theory of law which 
ignores ideology and economic relations as irrelevant,' The purported 
universality of Kelsen's theory stems in part from his assumption of the 
primacy of. internet iona 1 law, particularly tthe rule that a revol uti.on ..or 
coup results in a change of government which does not affect the legal
i
identity of the state. This is all well and good, so long as the countries
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11 5
concerned recognise their "obiigations’1 under international law,
There is, however, a growing tendency among communist party’-•states and 
in the Third World to be more selective when incorporating principles 
of international law, especially those nineteenth century.ru1es which 
form the backbone of Western theories of sovereignty, In Ethiopia, *
1 itt 1 e practleal recognition, is accorded to "obligations."- under multi­
lateral treaties or to "world public opinion" (the main international 
law "sanction"), although the territorial claims of the Emp i re-are rigor- - 
ously asserted by the Derg.
Ethiopian -1 egal*.processes are becoming increasingly autarkicy and "  
many other Western perspectives on law and revolution are thus proving as 
irrelevant as Kelsen's. For example, a justiflcation for the use of 
extraordinary legal powers based on an analogy with the private law doc­
trine of civil necessity, has been considered by courts in Cyprus, arid 
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Nigeria. While these cases Involve less legal legerdemain than analy­
ses of Grundnorm shifts, and while necessity has- a firm grounding In the 
civil law that forms the basis of Ethiopian private law (see Chapter 
Seven), the radical extension of a doctrine meant to serve a. narrow . 
purpose As a dubious Judicial tactic, in Ethiopia or elsewhere, J tM. 
Eekelar has proposed other criteria, based on natural law* for ascertain­
ing when a regime (revolutionary or otherwise) is Illegal,' These Include; 
where authority is exercised for improper purposes; the abrogation of a 
constitution without a subsequent election (a breach of fai;th with the 
el ectorate, an j idea based- on. Grot i us1 s pacta sunt1 servanda) ; government__
without consent, however this is ascertained; and a violation of an inter-
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national law "right to self-determination," While these criteria
might be cited by scholars or activists as.grounds for civil disobedience,
the likelihood that a domestic court would invoke any of them against a
regime in power approaches the vanishing points the aims of the Baader-
Heinhof Gang are not recognised as legitimate In Germany, and Israeli
courts ignore any Palestinian rights to self-determination,
We offer a final example of the irrelevance of Western perspectives
on revolution, based on the ethnocentric legal philosophy of H,LCA, Hart,
The elaborate distinctions he draws between primary and secondary rules .
are singularly inappropriate for the Third World:
The definition of a legal system used by Professor Hart seems 
to imply that the development of secondary rules, the rules 
that govern how primary rules are to be employed, is the work
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of those who are privileged to run the state apparatus.
Such definitions are difficult to use in the African con- 
text, primarily because all privileges seem t:o stem from 
• government, and access to privilege is.the chief bone of
political content i o n J 18
Hart’s static analysis of a 1ega1 status quo is irrelevant where, as in 
Ethiopia, both the basic form and content of the legal system are still 
very much in dispute. It is clear, however, that if the Derg Is to permit 
a wider access to privilege, an equivalent widening of the legal system 
must take place* The State and its legal order must be regarded as a 
vehicle for whoever is in a position to control it, In any event, pro­
cedural rules are rarely as clear as Hart (or Kelsen) suggests « a point 
we will expand upon later, - 11 -is usual ly reasonable to accept (and eval­
uate) the new rules of successful revolutionaries: ’ they have made them"
selves masters of society and are therefore responsible for meeting future
119 , . . 'contingencies,
■. 1 -V ■ •
B. Ethiopian Revolutionary Law , ;
' Having obtained so little guidance from Western jurisprudence, we 
will proceed to assemble our own analyses. They are less elegant but, 
we argue, more faithful to what has been happening in Ethiopia,' Proclam­
ations 1 and 2 of 197^ and 110 of 1977 amount to redefinitions of Ethiopian 
Government and assertions of new political preferences by an elite come 
to power. They constitute constitutional changes, even in the positivist 
sense, being commands of tjie new sovereign under a ’Grundnorm1 of the al1 
but unlimited and undifferentiated power of the Derg, committed to imple­
menting Ethiopia Tikdem, The Proclamations attempt to set the- stamp of 
legality on the Derg’s programme, but they are not a '’living” constitu­
tional ""law since power struggles are not meant to take place solely within 
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their framework. Factions sprang up within the Derg, and violent con­
flicts have occurred and are likely to continue Into the future; it is 
unlikely, however, that law could have contained many of these tendencies, 
Unlike many. Third World constitutions drafted by lawyers for lawyers, 
Ethiopia's new laws are not purely forma 1istic or ends in themselves, The 
Derg uses law in a much less symbolic fashion than did Halle Selassie (see 
Chapter Three); there are strenuous attempts to enforce such laws as are 
made (see Chapters Six and Seven), Proclamations are enacted by ‘'tough- 
minded1' soldiers guided by the facts of their own power and perceptions of
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Ethiopia's underdevelopment, rather than by "tender-hearted" rationalists 
(a category encompassing many Western legal philosophers) who are.pre­
occupied with systems and principles, ignoring the relation between de-
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cision and power. Arguably, an 'ideal' constitutional law would be
devised by those with toughminds and tender hearts: the Derg's laws have
resulted in a wilderness of isolated decisions and operated to truncate
human rights while ineffectively marshalling the resources needed to push
back the limitations on political processes.
Legally, the Derg represents a fusion of legislative, executIve and
ceremonial Head of State functions, along with a predisposition to .inters
vene directly in judicial processes. As In the Soviet Union and under
Haile Selassie, a rudimentary division of labour is maintained through law,
at the lower levels of bureaucratic (including judicial) activity, but
often ignored in practice. There is no public control over-politidol
processes and sketchy provisions concerning due process of enactment, but
there is supposed to be a due process of adjudication, even in the Special
Courts-Martial - basically a Soviet model of public law. Viewing itself
as represenative of toilers and tillers, the Derg refuses to bargain over
political preferences voiced outside of certain military circles;, The
Derg thus sees no need for a constitutional apparatus to aggregate or
adjust conflicting interests, The absence of a meaningful'^separation of
powers plus an intolerance towards opposition mean that the Derg sees no
need to limit Government's powers through law. At so low a level_of 
political development, little more is needed in the way of constitutional
law than swift decrees emphasising the administrator's rather than the
jurist's approach to law and resembling military orders, from superiors _ 
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to subordinates,
Ethiopia's could-,-Tn fact, be termed a constitutional martial law
without risking a contradiction in terms:
'Martial law' describes the exercise of military force3to-preserve —  
order and insure the public safety in domestic territory in a time 
of emergency,' when the civilian authorities are unable to deal with
the si tuation,1?8.
The Derg is styled a "provisional" Government, to be replaced by a new 
civilian regime once the necessary foundations are laid* Ordinary courts 
and administrative agencies were intially to continue to function normally 
- a theoretical limitation on the Derg's freedom of action which was pro­
gressively eliminated through legal changes, a political supervision and,
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the Terror. Where the Derg sees its political interests at stake, law
becomes irrelevant. It is nevertheless interesting to note that the Derg
felt It necessary to declare a State of Emergency in Addis Ababa in
September 1975 (see Chapter Four), as if there were some vestiges of re-
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straint which had to be removed before new threats could be dealt with.
From the end of 197& onwards., however, the Derg dispensed with both this 
legal nicety and the one represented by Special Courts-Martial, when deal­
ing with the EPRP.
Elements of the traditional powers of Ethiopian rulers' (see Chapters 
One and Three), shorn of the traditional restraints on the exercise of 
power represented by the Church and nobility, have been utilised since 
the Revolution. Unrestrained and "partTcularTs'ecf cbmma'nds of the sovereign 
seem to suffice for the Derg's purposes, which mostly revotve around an 
exercise of eminent domain over persons and property, Open-ended standards 
do exist but are not used widely in any meaningful sense, as they point 
the way towards a delegation of power which does not exist in reality.
These traditional forms,Ithe legal style adopted by Haile Selassie, a 
socialist jurisprudence and an ad hoc experimentation can all be found 
in Ethiopia’s constitutional laws, This melange blends surprisingly well 
with the progressively Marxist interpretations of Ethiopia Tikdem discussed 
in Chapter Four. The preservation of a monopoly of political leadership 
through a spontaneous opportunism rather than the application of abstract 
principles continues to be. the major task of constitutional -lawT-as-it— i-s. —  
in the Soviet JJnion and was under Hal le Selassie. This monopoly is .now-- - 
just i f ied on the bas i s that the Derg expresses the wil l of two metaphys ical 
entities - the "toiling masses" and a straightforwardly-nationa1istic 
"Revolutionary Motherland" - whose interests are pursued through the entire 
coercive force of a socialist state, As a consequence, the Derg Is now 
tacitly treated as more permanent and having more substance, While this
kind of regime is contrary to coventional conceptions of a communist party-
1 25
state, it bears some resemblance to the ideas of Regis Debray. There
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are, in fact, numerous parallels in the evolution of the public laws of 
Revolutionary Ethiopia and Cuba,
C ,• Some Western Models of Law and Administration
As we argued in Chapters One and Two, legal positivism is the jural
* i
analogue of an equally formalistic sociological positivism. In both, the
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forms of social relations are examined to the virtual exclusion of their 
function or meaningful content. The most elaborate, systematised and 
"pure11 of these theories have been devised by Hans Kelsen (supra) and 
Talcott Parsons (see Chapter One), Both men assume a consensus over the 
most general, abstract and slowly-changing of social norms (the Grundnorm 
ought to be obeyed), and that bureaucratic processes can largely be ex­
plained in terms of two social relations: a rigid hierarchy of control
and a process of differentiation, with concommitant forms of reintegration. 
While stasis and change are equally likely in bureaucratic structures„ 
these theories - devised in and for overwhelmingly stable societies -
contain a strong bias towards equilibrium or what is calIed "pattern
• * it 127maintenance'..
As Kelsen and Parsons would lead us to expect, the Ethiopian bureau- 
cracy-is rigidly hierarchical, a 1 though ad hoc interventions by Haile 
Selassie, the Derg and the P0M0A have disrupted this hierarchy to no 
apparent good purpose. As we move down this hierarchy and towards the 
increasingly specific and concrete applications of rules, however, many 
serious legal gaps or weak points are disclosed which are not taken into 
account by Kelsen or Parsons, Proclamations and the acts of individuals 
may (at least in theory, until 197*0 be unconstitutional*, regulations may 
exceed the authority granted in a proclamation; and politicians, admin­
istrators and.judges may misunderstand, ignore or be unaware of the exis­
tence of regulations and proclamations. The channels of communication (or 
reintegration) which move upwards through the Ethiopean bureaucracy, seldom 
guaranteed by law, are always weak and usually blocked, The Integration 
of bureaucratic activities and viewpoints and the adjustment of law and
administration to social reality through a bureaucratic ’feedback* are 
1 20
thus inhibited. These legal gaps and weak points are merely institu­
tional ones viewed from a different perspective, and in Ethiopia, they are 
numerous at the centre, between central and provincial levels of adminis­
tration, and at the local level - see Chpaters Three, Six and Seven,
For positivists, the logic of decision-making moves smoothly from 
setting general goals to formulating particular policies, and then to 
prescribing specific tasks, fn Ethiopia (and to some extent everywhere 
else) however, bureaucratic institutions and tasks do not fit together 
so coherently. Each level of decision making occupies a distinct universe 
of discourse in Ethiopia, distinguished from others by, for example,
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differences in the statuses and allegiances of administrators concerned. 
There is little consensus, either within or between levels of administra­
tion. Ethiopian administrat Ive law ignores these discontinuities and 
focuses on formal hierarchies rather than the actual making of decisions 
or, what is more relevant, their purpose. The result is, of course, 
many uncoordinated policies, ineffective ones, or none at all, Bureau­
cratic modernisers occasionally took advantage of this jumble under Haile 
Selassie, while engagingMn an uncoordinated and ad hoc gap-fi11ing and 
bypassing of bottlenecks. Had this been done in any regular and con­
certed fashion, it would have been viewed as a threat to traditional 
authority and dealt with accordingly. The Derg is, if anything more
intolerant of this kind of bureaucratic assertiveness, __
Kelsen's theory supposes a degree of precision unattainable through 
administrative law in the real world, Procedural rules are rarely clear 
enough to settle beyond doubt what is an adequately authorised act, A 
higher norm regulates the creation, content and application of a lower 
one only to a limited extent. This indeterminacy of administrative rules 
means that they inevitably take on a political character through the 
exercise of" discretion and choice, Gunnar Myrdal could have been writing 
of Ethiopia when he argues that:
Partly out of necessity, but partly by predilection and choice, 
general policies become implemented less by general rules than 
detailed, individualized, discretionary, administrative choices,
. . . The wholesale resort to discretionary administrative con­
trols . . . increased ;the demands on administration. Such con- 
... .... trols-breed corrupt ion; the spread of corruption in"’turn gives™ —  
corrupt politicians and dishonest officials a vest interest in 
retaining and increasing controls of this type,130
Ethiopian administrators have never had reason to master any internally
coherent hierarchy of laws. We thus return to the notion of each rule as
a military command, as a specific action taken in reaction to a particular
situation. Under the loose discipline that prevails within Ethiopian
administration from day to day, laws are applied or not as circumstances
require, and they are occasionally reconciled; with others according to
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the predilections of each bureaucrat.
There would, of course, be little point in using Kelsen and Parsons 
merely as whipping boys. It is our contention, however, that many theories 
of development administration amount to an uncritical transpVantation of 
the concerns of these and other positivists, In particular, theorists
are so preoccupied with the dysfunctions identified by Max Weber that
they neglect the benefits to be gained from establishing, for the first
time in Ethiopia, something like his legal-ratIona 1 legitimacy. While
there are many differences between Weber's "ideal" state and the "pure"
theories of Kelsen and Parsons, they are nevertheless genera of positivism
which fit together well; they assume a societal consensus and emphasise
a rational bureaucratic control in defense of the status quo, achieved
through a continuous but hierarchical organisation of functions bounded
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.by secular, modern, precise and impersonal rules. Theories which act 
upon or react against these kinds of assumptions have little relevance in 
Ethiopia, where they simply do not obtain - as we saw supra and in Chapter 
Three.
Modern theories of administration replicate the divergences between
theories of societal conflict and consensus that were outlined in Chapter
One. Theorists of a consensus, who emphasise the managerial aspects of
administration, have the upper hand over those of their colleagues who
133stress the bureaucrat's political role. When compared to those of the
sociologists, however, theories of administration are rather crude and in-
1 3k
complete. As "a subject matter in search of a discipline", they are
135"predominantly ethnocentric, nonhistorical and microscopic" and offer
only partial explanations which often fly in the face of observable be­
haviour. The fragmentary nature of these theories makes it possible to
pick and choose among them carefully, without encountering inevitable 
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contradictions. We will therefore proceed to discard irrelevant 
Western assumptions of a bureaucratic consensus before assembling a theo­
retical perspective which is more relevant both to Ethiopia and to the 
issues raised by development in other Third World states. Specific prob­
lems of Ethiopian administration are then dealt with in Chapters Six and 
Seven.
Bureaucracy has been defined as a "career service under a merit 
1 37system", ■ characterised by "hierarchy, jurisdiction, specialization,
I38
professional training, fixed compensation and permanence", and by a 
set of self-maintaining institutions which achieve a state of equilibrium. 
Far.from maintaining themselves, the anarchic structures of Ethiopian ad­
ministration are acutely dependent on the wider society, in the sense that 
they consume far more than they produce. The "merit" displayed by Ethiopi 
civil servants is primarily a narrow political loyalty rather than a
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demonstrated competence in performing bureaucratic tasks, Each administra­
tive agency is virtually a separate career, as there are extremely wide 
variations in bureaucratic structures, pay scales and role expectations.
There was, and is, little professional training for the bureaucracy as a 
whole and' almost none of the professionalism that, in the West, enables 
bureaucrats"to res.i st some of"*the cruder .forms of political pressure.
A rigid hierarchy is prescribed by Ethiopian law and sanctioned by a tra­
dition of minute status differentiations, but it is often circumvented in • 
practice - particularly by young and low-ranking soldiers today. As under 
Haile Selassie, there is 1itt1e security of tenure for officials - the 
Central Personnel Agency and Public Service Regulations have little practi­
cal influence over staffing - and officials are transferred from post to 
post for reasons unrelated to job performance or the overa11 efficiency 
of administration. This combination of blurred hierarchies, vague job 
descriptions, low levels of training and little sustained experience in 
a particular post mean that there is little of,the efficiency associated 
with a bureaucratic specialisation in narrowly-defined tasks, Prior to 
the Revolution, it was difficult to describe bureaucratic Incomes as fixed, 
since a large portion of the benefits of office under Haile Selassie de­
pended upon bribes and "favours'1 rendered by clients (less the payments'
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and'services needed to secure a post and to please one's patrons),
While tTie^political context of administration often remains implicit 
in Western :theor,i‘es, i t“ is . usual;fy,..a ..distinctly Western governmental process 
which the thebries.t-Jias 1 ri* mi hdV-~.Many„.of these, poll tical assumptions are. unr 
duly simplistic, even when applied to particular Western bureaucracies.
For example, many Western theories state or assume that the powers of 
government are limited: discretion is controlled through the Rule of
Law; a knowledgeable public is willing to negotiate with administrators 
to obtain benefits; the services demanded by the public are well within 
the capacity of the bureaucracy to deliver; and private organisations 
display large measures .of competence, which serve to decrease the burdens 
thrown on public administration. The spheres of competence of Ethiopian 
administration are narrowly limited, but certainly not for these reasons 1 
(see Chapter Three). An even more naive theoretical perspective is that, 
while pollticans engage in power struggles to define the ends of govern­
ment, the bureaucracy impassively supplies politicians with the means: 
information, expertise and an impartial obedience. This political neutrality
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simply does not exist in Ethiopia or elsewhere, Under the Emperor, 
much political power at the centre could only be exercised by virtue 
of occupying a nominally administrative office, Under the Derg, enthu­
siastic commitment to new political goals must be displayed by civil 
servants. The demand for governmental posts is particularly strong in 
Ethiopia, where private sector occupations bring comparatively fewer 
rewards than in the West, As a result, managerial, entrepreneurial and 
professional. ski 11s are in extremely-short supply within private organic 
zations. The secure and stable political foundations of administration
that are taken for granted in the West have never been created in 
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Ethiopia. ....
While bureaucratisation in twentieth century Ethiopia served to
diminish the power of traditional elites and, initially at least, cen«
tripedal tendencies, Increases in bureaucratic efficiency and regularity
have not been forthcoming as rapidly as Western theorists might expect.
Their emphasis on written rules, precedent, predictability, consistency,
equity and routine is almost the direct antithesis of Ethiopian practices,
Consensus theories have the effect of minimising the importance of bureau^
cratic policy initiatives and programmatic innovations by groups - a
reflection of laissez faire attitudes and an inappropriate perspective
on development administration. Perhaps the most misleading of assumptions
commonly adopted, one that is related to notions of a political neutrality,
is that the bureaucracy has no interests of Its own, apart from- increased
efficiency, if this were true, all problems could be treated as technical
questions and deal t with accordingly. This is the approach-adopted by
most official American advisers, in Ethiopia and elsewhere; at best, it
accomplishes little more than to mystify its opponents with jargon and to
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maintain the status quo.
Needless to say, individuals and groups employed by Ethiopian agencies 
have distinct interests of their own, which revolve around maximising the 
the return, in terms of personal wealth and power, from a minimum of effort 
Sometimes these interests coincide with those of the organisation-- result­
ing in empire-butlding, buck-passing and refusals to cooperate with other 
agencies - but shum-shi r (rapid-fire appointments, demotions and transfers) 
Is designed to minimise this kind or organisational loyalty in Ethiopia.
One result of shum-shir Is that cliques and patron-client relations often 
span several agencies: the activities of the group are coordinated across
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institutional boundaries, but usually for reasons which are unrelated 
to official policies. Bureaucratic competitions thus shade over into 
bureaucratic conflicts - the kinds of conflict that reinforce traditional 
practices rather than promoting change. Far from being automatic, com­
pliance with the rules of administrative law is always problematic and 
unpredictable in Ethiopia, It is precisely at those points where bureau*" 
cratic competition and conflict are greatest - where the need for regula­
tion most clearly manifests Itself - that the application of rules is
1^ 3
most uncertain and arbitrary. If even a smal1 fraction of the energies
absorbed by these conf1icts could be harnessed for development purposes, 
the gains would be great indeed,
0, A Development Administration for Ethiopia?
Western consensus models of administration form part of an ideology 
of satisfaction and conservation, arid'are thus Inappropriate, for' 
countries like Ethiopia, The Ethiopian bureaucracy satisfies none except, 
perhaps, itself; it is certainly not worth conserving, since it is clearly 
unable to cope with the demands of development, The .Derg has adopted a 
change-oriented ideology and repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with! 
the bureaucracy,• Political preferences thus combine with development needs 
in a call for a more change-oriented perspective on Ethiopi-an administra­
tion, but one which diverges radically from "the Derg’s recent policies and 
„ iovolye^.jg .careful and...intensive., use. of., law,. Development-. requi res-a. reason* 
„abjy„stable,,1-egaJLenyironment,, partlcul-ar.ly as planning requires ,that_ . ,... 
future governmental actions be currently predictable, Predictability need 
not be so absolute as to lead*to a static public administration. However, 
in a dynamic modernising situation, predictability requires only that 
power be exercised pursuant to a rule (legality) so that policy moves 
towards CcTrefu1ly-defined but programmatic goals, in the Ethiopian con­
text, this means that many careful decisions would have to be made for the 
first time, that definite tasks and the power needed to perform them must 
be assigned to each bureaucrat. Some range of discretion . is obviously 
necessary, yet every grant of discretion to an Ethiopian administrator is 
clearly a calculated or uncalculated risk. The fact that law does not 
tell each. Ethopian administrator what, precisely, he is expected to do 
creates a certain amount of insecurity among bureaucrats, but this insecur­
ity is more than counterbalanced by the traditional attitude that
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administration is an exercise of privilege rather than a matter of skill,
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ability and training.
To a rather large extent, the dilemma posed by the amount of discre«
tion to be granted can be resolved by requiring a certain ’output' from
each administrator and ensuring that he receives the necessary 'Inputs' **
leaving him free to choose the ways in which his task will be carried out.
The success of such arrangements then depends on choosing optimal outputs,
devising thoughtful•definitions of qualitative outputs - a difficult but
not impossible task - and effectively coordinating the ways in which vari“
ous outputs are used, Planning and day-'to-*day administration are thus
j*t6
integrated in single process, Once this is achieved, the rigid and
counterproductive Ethiopian bureaucratic hierarchies could be relaxed,
While definitions of bureaucratic tasks are too loose in Ethiopia, the
1 A 7
organisational structure * the network of tasks ~ is too tight, Law 
should be used to shift the emphasis from who and where you are to what 
you do as an administrator. Many of the present problems of. coordinating 7; 
the activities of Government could then be elimjnated by organising admin« : 
istrative activities around development tasks in a decentralised fashion, ‘ 
rather than within the ad hoc and isolated bureaucratic subdivisions 
that have grown up in Addis Ababa over the years, Coordination within 
the bureaucracy and cooperation with the public would improve simply be« ;;V'
cause they are now instrumental to the performance of mandated tasks. ,
Competitions would be directed against objective criteria rather than 
against persons or organisations.
Each bureaucratic role should encompass definite criteria for the 
evaluation of job performance, criteria that are linked to a hierarchy of 
policy goals rather than offices, A strict pass/fail test should be
adopted, similar to the one employed (imperfectly) In the Soviet Union?
administrators who perform their tasks successfully should receive salary 
increases and. over time, promotions; al l others should receive demotions 
and salary reductions, These performance criteria should be periodically 
revised if they prove too easy, or difficult to achieve,, or inconsistent 
with new policies. While it would be nice if the bureaucracy could be 
turned into an unselfish and innovative organisation working solely for 
the public benefit, this would be a highly impractical goal in.Ethiopia 
for the foreseeable future (see Chapter Three)t The best that can be done 
Is to appeal to selfishness, to make pay and promotions depend upon
implementing Government's policies, Other controls would be needed too,
but the.emphasis should be on securing compliance rather than on.limiting
u 148bureaucrattc power.
Having outlined our approach, we will proceed to justify it in greater
detail. Development administration must come to grips with the particu-
larly Intractable combination of "extensive needs," low capacities, [and]
1^9
severe obstacles," In Ethiopian administration, people do not do what 
rules.and institutions say they are doing, organisations create the con­
ditions of their own ineffectuality, and many agencies are_"operating most
of the time in fa.i I ure .mode-," -From the administrative law standpoint,
150
"nothing works the way it's supposed to,". Since these tendencies in­
here in most large-scale organisations, their prevalence in Ethiopia is 
a matter of degree rather than kind and, to a large extent, of political
preference. The Ethiopian bureaucracy Is not "a mindless, accidental
151concatenation of roles and statuses," (t was consciously created and
can be re-created along funamentally different lines:
It is the existence of state power which makes possible rational, 
directed social [including bureaucratic] change. Given that 
potential, the state must be charged with responsibility for 
whatever institutions exist if there are resources in the state 
sufficient to change t h e m J 52
Given that the Derg has the power totally to reorient^adminfstration, 
the failure to do so must rank as a major shortcoming of its development 
^programme-;*— \ n* part icuJar, lve-.l»aw.-has 4tbeeawus.>e.d.-,aSqaj9,J
transmission" bel t for conveying politics tb society and the economy? ; 
little use has’ been made of this potentially powerful technigue for’mar-* 
shalling and allocating resources for purposes related to development. 
Compared to private law, which rather passively facilitates the implex- —  
mentation of self-interest (see Chapter Seven), administrative law per­
mits a more direct and active enforcement of norms and a more explicit 
statement of government's policies, The person to whom a rule is addressed 
the administrator (initially at least), is more directly under governmen­
tal control, although in Ethiopia the-extent of this control is-still 
fa i rly-ITmi ted - The Instruments used-to enforce admin! s.tr.atJ.ve- laws are. 
also more flexible than those employed under penal law. In addition to 
preventing or limiting activities through bullying, administrative rules
can offer’ rewards and incentives to "encburage or even force a- complex*-- —
1 53set of behavioural changes.
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Roberto Unger identifies two preconditions to the effectiveness of
administrative law which are related to its positive and public character,
A genuinely public law requires a firm differentiation of the state from
its social context, The State must, in other words, dominate other social
groups and limit their interactions, The positive character of adminjstram
tive law -the fact that it is consciously formulated rather than merely
accepted as traditional - presupposes the disintegration of traditional 
1 5k
communities? plus the erosion of traditional bureaucratic practices*
Judged on these criteria, Ethiopia!s administrative law Is but imperfectly 
public and positive and in transit from a traditional to a modern system 
of rules. Non-traditiona1'ru1es have not found wide acceptance within 
the bureaucracy, and these rules are forced to compete with local tradi-? 
tional laws in the rural areas (see Chapter One), Under such conditions^ 
law reform is essential, yet the difficulties of legal and Institutional, 
transplantation which were discussed In Chapter’Two are particularly- - *
acute. I
It should be borne in mind that, like Weber's theories, administra- 
tive law is an "ideal type", a picture of how a particular bureaucracy-— :
"ought" to operate rather than the "is" described by more empirical models.
When we come to consider the law-in-action, the ideal of .admfni strati vex* ■=. 
legality becomes little more than a keeping of the inevitabledeviations 
yri’&fopn* tolerab 1 e*-.bounds^.T-an^ 1 mp©rtant*1bikt^neGes!set»JJ»y.»Jmpe e teropt
- " to al ign the " i s" wi th the-"oughts" A failure to establish this “minimal’- ....
legality in Ethiopia will mean the.perpetuation of bureaucratic arbitrari­
ness and abuse, and the Derg's attempts at a political control will con- 
tinue„..to brutalise the bureaucracy. A vague and ill-digested ideology ■ -- - —
cannot serve as a guide to rational decision-making while, on the other 
hand, the adoption of an Anglo-American administrative legality would 
stifle innovation and permit only a sluggish adaptation to radical changes. .
For reasons expressed in Chapter Two and infra, we reject Anglo-American 
notions -in- favour of a more pra-gnatic and -programmat ic definition of ad— - .. •.;
ministrative legality: a channeling and focusing of bureaucratic power
(rather than overall limitations on it), through which eactr-admi n i-st-rat or­
is nevertheless compelled to act within the constraints of rules -he did





Attempts to attain an administrative legality would obviously re­
quire more rational and restrained law-making processes than those used 
by the Derg - an issue which is ignored by Ethiopia’s new constitutional 
laws. The usefulness of law as a development resource depends to a large 
extent upon its legitimacy, In the absence of the. respect accorded to 
custom or a charismatic authority, this legitimacy grows out of long-term 
perceptions of law as a coherent series of rational decisions, Poorly-'
1 56
conceived laws often intensify the problems they are designed to solve.
This tendency can be detected in many of the Derg's laws and extra-legal 
157actions.
Reacting against the dysfunctions ascribed to Western bureaucracies 
by Max Weber, many Western theorists advocate an "open" framework of ad­
ministration for the Third World, Broad .grants of discretion and the 
freedom to choose organisational means and ends are essential - so It is .
argued - to the establishment of an *'•!nnovative atmosphere" and the in- •
formal relations and unofficial practices that are conducive to organisa-
] 58 ■ ■ . *
tional rationality, In Chapter Three we saw that* In Ethiopia, broad
discretion,’informal relations and unofficial practices were conducive
only to the perpetuation of an administrative underdevelopment, !/n any event
these theorists seem to misunderstand the nature of innovativeness:
V.
As with painting, poetry, and music, individual achievement may 
reach creativity and high peak Isicj when operating within the 
coh’straTnts of'"given rules', 4 Creative" IndivfdUa 1 Ism Is usual !y ‘ f ■' ' *
" foutf'd'nbt1 so much in wanton nonco’nformi tyas' in the fra rtf a Y *-— v ; 
exploitation of existing rules,^59......  ........
While the i ntens i ve. use of'•'administrative law inevitably- involves* ttie 
sacrifice of some initiative in an attempt to secure discipline, the rela­
tion between discretion and innovation is a complex one: von Mises's •
assertion that no one can be both an innovator and a correct bureaucrat^^ 
is simply untrue. Through law, innovation can be prescribed as the appro­
priate form of bureaucratic .behaviour and directed towards the progressive 
realisation of an orderly hierarchy of goals defined through comprehensive 
planning, Discretionary rules are never explicit or final, and planning 
is a meaningless exercise where there are too many of them: policies re­
main unformu.lated or unenforced, as In Myrdal's "soft state," Lucian Pye , 
argues that:
The more precisely we can define the. appropriate role relation­
ships, the more effectively we feel we can define the standards
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of individual performance which should exist if the institution 
is to- rea 1 ize its ideal level of collective p e r f o r m a n c e , ^ !
Most broad, grants of discretion are the result-of the laziness or incom-’
petence of policy makers rather than a need for flexibility,. |t is un-
realisitc to hope that the recipients of this djscretion w i U  consistently
»
improve upon the handiwork of their superiors, * ' * • •
The requisite standard.of legal draftsmanship-fs easy to state but
difficult to achieve: each definition of a bureaucratic role should in-
elude a statement of purpose and the standards on which decisions are to
be made. The M legal command should be precise, its boundaries defined,
its exceptions-elear, the-possfbi1ities of its abuse anticipated and — - 
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blocked," This judgement is that of a revenue lawyer andy indeed, the-"--* 
care devoted to, for'example, the U tS, Interna.! Revenue Code should be 
lavished on administrative laws generally in the Third World, ' inevita­
bly, some range of 1 eg imate d iscret ion must be provided for; no rule can 
define correct performance in exhaustive detail. There is, however, a 
vast difference in the amount of discretion required by, for example, 
postal clerks and doctors in Ethiopia, where the tasks of most adminis­
trators resemble those of postal clerks rather than doctors, Bureaucratic 
tasks are, in other words, specialised, subdivided, standardised and even
interchangeable for the most part; little more is required than a routine
\
and predictable job performance, yet law has never deigned to spell out
these t a s k s " Major" reduct ions in d i scret Ton‘Could also be achie'Ved by
decreasing the trad i t ional ■ secrecy of Ethiopian bureaucratic prgcesses— -
(see Chapter Three), if for no other reasons than each administrator could
then know the reach of authority possessed by his colleagues, Where-a
greater measure of discretion is required, law can go beyond strict-def-in-*
itions of tasks to enumerate what Is desired (although not required) and
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allowed (although not necessarily desired). Law could take account 
of the traditional reluctance to delegate authority in Ethiopia (see Chapter 
Three) by prohibiting delegation and assigning specific tasks to-each 
administrator, This would have the effect of empowering the lower levels 
of the bureaucracy and requiring - for the first time in many instances - 
that they accomplish something besides the endless shuffling of papers.
If this cannot be”done for existing offices, they are probably-superfluous 
and can be abolished or restructured accordingly.
The functions that we propose to assign to Ethiopian administrative
law are very much the Weberian ones of ensuring that the right person 
makes the right decision.at the right time. Such a scheme assumes, of 
course, that all of these '’rights" are known - that many careful decisions 
have been made in advance and that rules and concepts are both internally 
consistent and conform to changing social, political and economic values.
Our scheme might be seen as old fashioned, authoritarian and mechanistic 
by Western theorists, but it at least tries to deal with factors which 
are important in Ethiopia but have largely ceased to be of theoretical 
interest: clarification of duties, an explicit coordination of complex
systems, and attempts to secure rational behaviour through bureaurcratic 
discipline. Our proposals are admittedly authoritarian but, as such, they 
might appeal to a military regime and, in any event, democratic administra­
tion at the centre is unrealistic in Ethiopia's present circumstance. The 
psychological aspects of bureaucratic theory, emphasised by many contempo­
rary Western social scientists, relate primarily to Western rather than
<i. -
Third World cultural values. In any case, we are far less concerned about 
the alienation of bureaucrats (provided they can be compelled to do their 
jobs) than about the preventable starvation of peasants, A more serious 
objection to our scheme Is that it exceeds the capacities of the Derg and 
of the bureaucracy: many specialists would have to devote^a great deal
of time to devising performance criteria, in collaboration with lawyers 
, who^wQMld, janjbody these, xi^ i be rj.a 4 tvwork able rules w4fe-<*woul.cl*. however 
argue "that* this^rrepresents* *sr
power than--does-the present^praxticexfutlliSiTfg“^pWdiaTfTts Th a'mTdcfVe-'
level supervision of general administration. It would also help to ensure
that, through rules, rationality flows downwards from the higher reaches
of Government - a cardinal assumption made by Max Weber and many other 
1 Gh
theorists which does not obtain under the Derg's arbitrary and sporadic 
supervision.
In Weberian terms, it is the substantive rather than the formal ration- 
ality of the Ethiopian bureaucracy that should concern us: for purposes
of development, bureaucratic effectiveness is more important than effi­
ciency, Service to the public (particularly the much-neglected peasants) 
should form the basis for allocating resources, rather than self-serving 
definitions of the seemingly infinite problems* and needs of various agen­
cies. Once it is accepted1 that administrative products are mope important 
than processes, the structures of administration can be allowed to grow
out of the tasks to be performed rather than - as hitherto in Ethiopia -
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the other way around. While there was a certain poiItical logic to 
the growth in bureaucratic institutions prior to the Revolution (see 
Chapter Three), their present-day structures could serve as a case study 
in administrative irrationality.
The ever-changing political needs of the moment dictated constant 
shifts in bureaucratic power in Haile Selassie's Ethiopia; a great deal 
of motion has, however, led to the perpetuation of traditional practices 
•rather than meaningful and non-reverst b1e changes, The first Ministries 
were modelled on traditional forms and dominated by'courtiers who dealt' 
with revenue matters and the maintenance of order in a cumbersome fashion. 
Subsequent Mini-str-i.es were- automatical ly starved for funds and- accorded 
a lower status, regardless of the importance of the functions they per­
formed. Elder 1 y. and .untrained officials, became susp ic ious of-and-' hos-tlle—  
towards their increasingly well-educated underlings; they sought to retain 
control by reinforcing bureaucratic hierarchies and through arbitrary 
interventions in the programmes advocated by lowemlevel modernisers,
Many institutions, offices and officials became increasingly anachronism 
tic as administration grew more specialised and technical, Few positions 
or organisations were dispensed with however, since they provided a con­
venient means by which to reward political loyalty, When old organisations 
got bogged down, new ones were created.to circumvent them and, towards 
.the.. end^Oif, fia-Kl e»«Sel b s • fash!onable ifto charaetfeH se^ 5 »■ 
. t he s e- n ew» -a gen c i e s ■ *1au tonomo u-s ’ • T-h e~ p roll f e ra tJon-of-organr sat i o n s H e d  ” * * ~ 
to acute budgeting and coordination difficulties which, in turn, stimu­
lated periodic reorganisations. These reforms were so modest and poorly
thought out, however, that they only served to foster additional complex-
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ities and confusion, Paricularly pernicious devices were adopted to 
coordinate administrative activities - boards composed of large numbers 
of unqualified bureaucrats, who proceeded to ignore such ill-considered 
decisions as were made.
As we shall see in Chapters Six and Seven, the Oerg has done little 
more than pick up where Haile Selassie had left off, from the standpoint 
of bureaucratic organisation. The need for radical reorganisation man!-'
■ fests itself at every * stage- of our-analysis, There i s 1 i ttl e.-bureaucrat ic 
efficiency to be lost during such a reorganisation, provided that the 
tasks of individual administrators were carefully defined and enforced.
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All of Milton Esman's policy prescriptions could sensibly be adopted by
r * * * • • _ * *"*...
the Derg:
Experimentation with new organisational forms which flatten out 
hierarchical controls, integrate services at the level of clients, 
increase relative regards for service in the field, and organize 
by project or multi-project task force are needed to loosen the 
rigidities of the functionally specialized hierarchical strucz7 
tures which dominate administration in developing countries.
Since all methods of organisation have their disadvantages and reflect the 
compromise of conflicting aims, Esman's experimentation is necessary in 
order to identify a workable organisational 'mix' for Ethiopian develop­
ment administration. While a certain .amount, of clarity and orderliness
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in organisation is required*if anything is to be accomplished, most 
Third World bureaucracies are,.for development purposestoo tightly 
structured. In Ethiopia, bureaucratic change, requires, above all, break­
ing through the established order. The Derg has done this on a political' ‘ 
Jeve.l only,..leaving the structures of Imperial bureaucracy largely intact 
at the centre.
Bureaucratic hierarchies are, of course, potentially important con­
trol devises, but these controls usually functioned imperfectly in Ethiopia 
and were seldom exercised for development purposes. The effectiveness of
hierarchical control can be increased by making promotion depend upon
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implementing a hierarchy of governmental policies and,- paradoxical ly, 
through an administrative decentralisation. The larger-an organisation, 
the" more Obvious and inescapable the need for'maintaining "order;‘the size 
and complexity of Ethiopian Ministries have made them all but immune to 
an overall supervision and control. This lack of control was most obvious 
with regard- to administrative-activities in the rural areas prior to the 
Revolution (see Chapters Three and Six). As resources are so limited and 
seldom penetrate into the rural areas, it makes sense to restrict their 
application to deconcentrated agencies at the centre, relying on the public 
for the day-to-day supervision of local admfni-s-tnative units in the rural 
.areas. Myrdal terms this kind of decentralisation a Jldemocratic planning", 
in which bureaucrats and the public influence and participate in each 
other's decisions. If bureaucrats are able to confer real benefits, they 
may succeed in persuading or Inducing peasants to change their behaviour, 
while gaining an awareness of the realities of rural life, ideally, this 
kind of decentralisation would go a long way towards humanising Ethiopian 
administration,decreasing social distances in the rural areas and
'stimulating'publ Ic loyalty towards local government,!'70 As we will see 
in Chapter Six, the peasant associationscreated by the Derg represent a 
first step in this direction.
Taken together, job evaluations, hierarchical controls and local 
participation would still be inadequate to bring Ethiopian administration 
firmly under control for development purposes. This is because maladmin­
istration is so widespread and complex a phenomenon, It encompasses - 
in the words of an English jurist -
administrative act ion.(or inaction) based on or influenced by 
. improper .considerations of conduct, Arbitrariness, malice or 
bias, including discriminations, are examples of improper con­
siderations, Neglect, unjustifiable delay, failure to observe 
relevant- rules and procedures, failure to take relevant con­
siderations into account, failure to-establish or review pro­
cedures where there is a duty or obligation on a body to do 
so, are examples of improper conduct,*71
All of. these improprieties operate so as to diminish the effectiveness’ of
Ethiopian administration, but Ghaiand McAuslan'-s simpler formulation is
arguably more relevant to Ethiopia: administration should hot cause
avoidable inconvenience to the public,.and the benefits conferred must
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be publicly known and defensible, The remedies applied to various 
kinds of maladministration in different legal systems are many and varied,
x
but few genuine successes have been recorded - especially in the Third 
World,
the West,,. Import,apt. .cont mlis..pyer, the, bureaucracy are -exercised —  
by priyate^itazens/^through .the pourts, -.These controls,were ’introduced?* — - 
in an attenuated- form, into the Third World during the colonialera, bat 
their popularity is declining steadily. Even in their countries of origin, 
these controls are. less efficient (but sometimes more effective) than a 
bureaucratic self-discipline, dependent as they are on private initiatives, 
-In the Third World, an overall absence of genuinely democratic processes 
and independent courts makes these controls all but worthless, Where no 
reliance can be placed in an equal protection of persons who challenge 
governmental activities, the ability of individuals and groups to influ­
ence administrative processes depends solely on their political and 
economic importance and organ!sationa1-cohesion, The motivation to-inter­
vene in administrative processes is most often supplied by threats to
1 73property interests, and Western-sty 1 e controls in Ethiopia would only 
help to limit Government’s power on behalf of the propertied strata that
the Derg are trying to eliminate - an unrealistic proposition, While 
peasant associations, kebelles and, possibly, trade unions may one day 
acquire a measure of influence over Government and the motivation to 
exercise it (see Chapters Six and Seven), they are unable to ensure an 
administrative legality at present.
Judicial control of administration never worked in Ethiopia prior 
to the Revolution (see Chapter Three) and, even in the West, It is a slow, 
complex and expensive process which often leads to anomalous results, 
Anglo-American courts, for example, tend to go to extremes by, on the 
one hand, displaying a reluctance to probe the factual foundations of 
bureaucratic decisions and, on the other, by superimposing uninformed 
judicial preferences on administration, Frrtz Marx concludes that, in 
the United States, the "resulting string of court decisions has left the
administrative process tattered and torn without any suggestion of better.
1 yh
alternatives for serving the general interest,"- Furt+Ter, Anglo-Amerrcan 
interpretations of the Rule of Law emphasise a literal conformity to regu™' - 
lations for the protection of private individuals, rather thanveval.uations 
of initiative and overall bureaucratic performance - a formal rather than 
a substantive rationality>By- Way of-contrast, Coritinental administrative 
law provides the basis for a more technically-informed assessment of ad« 
ministrative legality and, occasionally, for inquiries into substantive 
, r.stj.pgaj, | ty. yndec t fhg.(tub,ci cs, of. exces de purvoir and d e t o u r n e m e n d ^  , 
^pouvoi r; - 4 1* ha^pTpved extremel ywdtffi \’
Cont- i nenta 1 tradflrl ons-f nfi the "Th i rd^Wortd
specific as the probity and conventions that constitute the basis of the 
Whitehall Model.
The shortcomings of a judicial control over administration have led 
many countries to experiment with ombudsmen. There is, however, little 
likelihood that any such independent control would be accepted by the Derg.
It is therefore more practTcal to” a nirictpate'~an 'admftTi st rati Ve "Control 'by 
a Soviet-st'yle Procuracy, which would undertake bureaucratic supervision 
and ensure an overall efficiency and effectiveness on behalf of the state, 
rather than pursuing violations of individual rights, The germ of such an 
institution can be found In the Derg's reform of the Office of the Auditor 
General (supra). Other controls exercised in the Soviet Union’ - ideological 
pronouncements, planning directives, censures in the media, supervision by
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financial institutions and workers’ committees, and direct intervention
by a.political police - have also been adopted, in a rudimentary fashion,
in Ethiopia, The problems in both countries are the same; the controls
are erratic and confusing in operation and serve only to achieve a mini"*
mal rationality at the lower levels of administration, since the top ^
1761 eadership Is Immune to confroT, r -r- ~ -
Our call for an administrative legality in Ethiopia is not so far-' 
fetched as it may seem. It stems from the Derg's desire to bring the 
' bureaucracy -under firm control and to then use it to foster development, 
rather than*from a reliance on the Derg's goodwill: ’ "Every government 
which is concerned with survival and efficiency needs organs of critical
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evaluations of its accomplishments and intentions," . The fact that a
state is avowedly socialist does not lessen the need for administrative
legaljty, but It does alter its focus somewhat: , - • , / .
The Identity-of the socially co l-Teet-ive-and i-ndjvidua 1 interests - -
constitutes the essential driving force in the development of 
, socialist society, , But. identity of Interests Is not a
spontaneous occurence, It must be constantly created and secured 
. and its effect-ivenes.s fostered.. Herein .1 ies a. decisive function
of socialist law V * it provides such forms of'organ!sat ion.....
and rules of conduct as can from the very beg inn Ing render the 
community of Interests highly effective, and it regulates^the 
solution of conflicts of interests, 17.8 r \
At first glance this reads a lot like Roscoe Pound, until- It is remembered
that the bureaucracy unde'r"*d i scussion is VTeWted"raT’'fert§ilig1Wg1rf.'-W^ ciTa§1s‘
■.-sS um svsv j'M  *  v  - ■ i - v i i s ’ s t.sssa c-vw f.fs r.i'iiiv 's -i v . * - a r s v y . w ’ j . i  t  *•
struggle; whi1e-Western theorists are bedevilled by observable disintegra^ -----
tions in a societal consensus, socialists refuse to doubt that a new 
harmony' of: interests can be created through political and bureaucratic
167 .means  - -
Finally, we should mention the obvious, that "the best laws cannot
\  *j g Q
surmount bad administration," The Ethiopian bureaucracy must also be 
subjected to many non-legal reforms, particularly In the areas of training, L 
retraining and the gentler forms of resocialisation - rather than the Derg's 
massive application of terrorist tactics,
E „ Human Rights
r # * *
There is a long and sad tradition of human rights violations in 
Ethiopia, The suffering of peasants, who were treated in a traditional 
fashion under feudal land tenures right up to 197^, was immense (see Chapter 
Six), Long-term political detention, without trial or on the basis of a
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manifestly unfair trial, was widespread under Haile Selassie - a fact 
which was ignored by many, journalists and academics at the time. Clandes­
tine enemies were dealt with clandestinely, while publically-(dentified 
opponents who retained a measure of political power rarely paid a heavy 
penalty. The Derg's political violence is both more open and subjected 
to a more intensive international scrutiny. Under the Emperor, prison 
conditions were harsh and torture was widely used. Potential rivals to 
the Throne, Eritrean Parliamentarians (prior to Federation), Ethiopian 
journalists, members of Oromo (Gal la) self-help associations and, gener­
ally, anyone considered dangerous were detained freely. Alleged partici­
pants in the I960 coup attempt were still being arrested in the mid-1960s.
The late 1960s and early 1970s saw the wholesale detention of students,
l8l
although there were limited amnesties, too, The Derg is therefore 
operating within a well-worn tradition while, at the same time, intro- - 
ducing city^dweTlers^ to*-a whoTly d ifferent—magni tude of suffering,
Having heard testimony from conservative Ethiopianists with a limited 
knowledge of events occurring after the Revolution, several Committees of 
the United State Congress labelled the Derg one of the regimes most prone 
to violating human rights in the world today, In September 1977, a sub­
commission of the U,N, Human Rights Commission classed the Derg with 
such unsavoury Governments as those of Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, Indonesia
and.»UgaDda^£;LndiiBg..t.hafVJs.^QD&Ut^t fp a * on.s human
rights has.developed" since the Derg came to power, A careful study by
Amnesty international reached a similar conclusion one month earlier:
Persistent gross violations of human rights as instanced in 
Ethiopia, are not justified by the situation faced by the 
government. Amnesty'Internationa1 does not believe that an 
atmosphere of te.rror can establish security or the rule of 
law, or protect the human rights of the citizens of any 
country. ^
in outline, Amnesty International cites numerous instances of politj- ' 
cal and judicial murder by military tribunals and kebelle courts taking 
"revolutionary measure's"; since this report was published, the Red Terror 
(supra) has escalated and then died down, Prison conditions are described 
by Amnesty as "very poor": torture continues at the same high level as
for the last twenty years, and detainees live in dai-Ly fear of being tor­
tured and killed for newly-discovered "offenses" or invented*infractions 
of prison rules. Clothing and bedding are never supplied to prisoners 
and food is sometimes not provided, Interestingly, social stratifications
ueitW.-lM *i~3
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are perpetuated in detention; prominent prisoners are given better
quarters, are less likely to be beaten, and receive food from relatives
and medical treatment.^ _
When the Derg first deposed Haile Selassie, extensive assurances
were given with regard to human rights, To the extent that "fundamenta1"
human rights were reflected in the 1955 Constitution, these rights were
not suspended along with the Constitution ^ according to the Prologue of
the subsequently^repealed Proclamation No, 1 of I97A, Article 5(b) of
that Proclamation gave the inadequcy of the protection accorded to human
rights as one of the reasons for rejecting the Draft Constitution, In
December 197^? Chairman Teferi emphasised that the Rule of Law is a major
guideline followed by the Derg and that "the laws existing in the country11
would be applied during trials of detained officials, He also promised
U.N. Secretary-'General Waldheim that, "justice based-on the rule of law 
. . 1 8 5
will prevail,"  The Prologue to the Special Pena-l-Code-sta-tes-thad:— ----
"fundamental human rights and natural justice" will be preserved and ‘re­
stored after having been perverted for so long, It will be recalled, 
however, that this Prologue also justifies the new offenses as consistent 
with "natural law" and "basic legal philosophy", giving rise to the sus- 
picion that the Derg}s notion of human rights is vague and highly abstract 
- a goal for the indefinite future,
As we noted, the Special Penal Code is a revea l Ina. i nstance, ofL the , -v . ..... - —  Zr.r’- » = nv ,.v . - - * •' - i ; n'> ■-•*>* * ■ • ■- •“
^^^LtMPi^iDg.v:^.Tthes,,,tlnie^j«Unde4i«the^«T©r«ro,r--'-tha't*f'-'C©il-frc>1rd'6d wi th
M e j i g l s t e  .to—power., even these -n i ce tf es^ha ve - been^pspens ed 'TV i th~,m '
One example of the cynicism that now prevails in official oirclescwas pro
vided by the Hayor of Addis Ababa In February 1978;
You can say what you want in Ethiopia, r , The question is 
whether what you say corresponds with the aspirations of the 
broad masses. If it does not, you will be kicked out r* no 
doubt about it. If it does, you can go on saying it, And 
the broad masses will embrace you,186
A more serious attempt to justify Ethiopian policies was offered by
Mengistu himself during the 1977 OAU Summit conference in Libreville;
When countries begin the revolutionary process all the West 
starts talking about violation of human rights, whereas actually 
they should talk about the restoration of human rightsc^ 7
The idea conveyed is similar to Barrington Moore, Jr,'s analysis of the
French Revol ut ionary^error; instead of merely recoiling in the face of
political violence, we should examine the causes of that violence
degradation, oppression and preventable starvation and injustice - and 
recognise that rebellions acquire the character of the societies against 
which they are directed,
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Elsewhere, ^ we have compared the Ethiopian concept of revolutionary
justice with those obtaining during the French and Chinese Revolutions.
If an official justification of the Derg-s human rights policies were to
be elaborated, it would probably revolve around the notion that sins of
commission are needed to reverse the consequences of centuries of sins of
omission. Revolutionary justice would be described as a reaction to the
earlier tyranny of class law_and class injustice, The Terror might be
defended as a 1 eg i t imat ion of popu 1 J_sm*._o.f_j'Voluntar.yii a-ttemp-ts—by-~ke^e 1 1 os
and peasant associations to eliminate ’’enemies of the people,” As Marx
said: "Right can never be higher than the economic structure of society
T 90
and its cultural development conditioned thereby,” Some socialists
would argue that, in order to promote material human rights by changing ...
the economic structure of Ethiopian society radically and rapidly, d.issent
must be treated as treason and error as sabotage. In the eyes of the
Derg, its policies create few hardships: in the past, the liberty of a
small minority was purchased at the expense of the welfare of the major^
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ity, who have few freedoms to lose anyway, It might even be possible- 
to justify this approach under Western notions of constitutionalism,
For example, the Eire Supreme Court argues that rights are guaranteed 
to citizens as a whole,rrather tfean.-toJpdlyldualsHqtu.groups:<i««a-nd.-^ tlasb^ J?.^ ;*», 
the duty of determining the extep£ to,,whichjthe.,nights. of-aR.y.i«^*«™-
particular citizen, or class of citizens, can properly be har>
"mohised with the rights of the c11izens as a whoie~S‘eemrs~to us 
to be a matter peculiarly within the province of the Oireachtas 
[Eire’s Parliament], , . .192
The validity of such a justification turns on the extent to which decision 
makers represent the interests of the public and on the amount of coercion 
used while rights are being "harmonised," - - ■ ”
Beg inning, .with. .Franz...Fa non, . the_thre.sh_ojjl.of .XLp-l.enoe,.,accep.t^ b:le..ta,-._,, 
many of the peop 1 e wr i 1 1 ng about--Third World problems'has Increased radi­
cally.--— The ideas of Enver Car im are'r^pTesenTaTive of Yh'l s trend:
-- ^To-^be^-aceep-ted as an i nstrument of'm o r a l ^ e ^ o p m e h T *as weTT "qT 
a means to social change, violence has to satisfy only one re- 
quirement, [It] must pierce the dykes, of repress ion and ^r.el ease, ,,, -
the creative energy within people that has dammed up over cen-' 
tur i es,
[Tills Is what] makes revolut ionary violence ~ as opposed
3^ 0
to criminal and self-1ndulgent forms of violence—  not only’ 
desirable but morally necessary, , 11 encourages the dis-
possessed and the down-trodden increasingly to bring into 
play the powers that lie dormant within themselves,
. . . The institutionalised violence embodied in high 
nates, of-ch i-1 d mortal j ty and hIgh- 1 evetl s of disease and main-- — -. r_—  
nutrition is^a measure of the degeneracy of those concerned 
only with maintaining "law and order,11 ~ - —  ■
Gn this basis, it can be argued that, as in the Soviet Union, law, politi­
cal action and a sanctioned violence are being used in concert in Ethiopia 
in an attempt to foster the cognitive and emotional growth associated with 
the creation of the "new socialist man." But, as Kiralfy notes,
interests may be secured in more than one way; the justification 
of public welfare may be used to cloak the tyranny'of those~wh’d"
public, a danger from_which no country is
We would argue that the burden of proof Is on those who use violence in 
Ethiopia - the Derg, and its opponents who must bear the-responsibi1ity 
for much of the violence - to demonstrate that is Is in fact*conducive 
to development and socio-economic equalisat Ion, rather than to the acqui- 
sit ion of a merely personal: pol i-t.ical. power, We. .believe that this burden 
• has not been satisfied, that alternate means to the Derg’s ends would ’ 
have been; more effective (see infra). Further, we suspect that what 
Ethiopians have been doing to Ethiopians since 197^ stems jn large mea- 
sure from their being Ethiopians - from a far greater historical depth
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than.the^ tenets of a day^beforedyestecday.revolution*. __u.— . ^ .
It may nevertheless be argued that, in a socialist state, the major 
task of law and politics is to preserve the monopoly of political lead­
ership, The„ class newly come to power has the fight to use the coercive 
power .pf the state to suppress its opponents and deprive them of their 
rights. Applied to Ethiopia, such an argument rests, of course, on the 
congruence of interests of "the people" (who are mostly peasants), and 
the Derg, Our analyses at several junctures, supra and in Chapters Four 
and Six, indicate that there are numerous divergences of interest (unless 
Marx’s problematic "false consciousness" is incorporated Into the argu­
ment )V" A'Cehin riright argue. that repressi'orr„a.n.d-~r,estri.c.ti-ons on -
rights in Ethiopia are necessitated by war, economic dislocation, the 
immaturity of socialism, the overriding need to stabilise power in a 
country where political institutions are fragile and lack a traditional 
legitimacy, the desirability of eliminating feudal attitudes, and the
know better than the
ovomrst 1 9 A
need to Improve social discipline, A Trotsky could, however, reply that
all of these explanations taken together are still an inadequate justi- ‘
fication for the increasingly oppressive character of the State, and
that a true Ethiopian socialism awaits a second revolution,*"^
Western jurists would approach the human rights situation in Ethiopia
from a radically different perspective, citing numerous violations of
the values they prize, such as the Rule of Law and the related principle
of legality. The retractive validation of executive and administrative
jactign,. the vagueness and .retroactivity of Special-Penal Code -provisions, ~
the abolition of minimal procedural protections in Special Courts~Martial
and kebelle- tribunal proceed! ngs, the evils~tnherent i n the detent ion
I aws and, f ina l l y t h e  I icens i ng of an adtroc~arttl aTt i trary'Terrdr~ wou I d;
all be round Iy .condemned, The principle of legality is generally taken ——
to mean that puni shment- can only .be .imposed in accordance with fixed,
. ,pxe.dct.ecro.i ned^ruXes. j,nterpret^^i n -a-nar-rowy restr-fct lv&:-manner- by ? n d e ^ ---
pendent courts,^ TTiese~crrTtef7a *are certafnly not compiled with in
Ethiopia, and most of those which Jerome Hall equates with a "transnation-«
al criminal law theory" are ignored repeatedly:
the widest concepts are seven in number and concern mens-fea,
act (manifested effort), the concurrence or'fusion of mens., re a. _____
1 and act to form conduct, harm, causation (connecting conduct 
and harm), the punitive sanction and, finally, legality,
[Intermediate] propositions , , , concern infancy, insanity,
-Hw«™a.w.flTJstai<ie' o fr -f a c t-o r 1 awy^  coexctdTP,1- neiXSSl
soXit.Lea.tJon and conspi racy , X9jX— --- - ■*...............*.
• In Ethiopian tribunals, only the vaguest standards of proof-are ap'pTied -t-d:
numerous strict* 1 iabjj jjty offenses.; dor-tde—streets-, aasassinations” are
carried out on the vaguest of rumours and,_in-particular, the youth of a
suspected offender is. ignored, .... . __
The underlying purpose of the principle of legality is the avoidance
of “purposeless cruelty" or “arbitrary acts of violence":
   the- principle i s -not sa t i sf I ed merely by -the f ac t he " - - " '
punishment inflicted is technically legal. The Star Chamber 
was a 1ega1 tribunal,"bur it does not exemplify the rule of 
law.in Dicey1s philosophyJ98
The Rule of Law, as Dicey formulated it, prohibits arbitrariness or even
wide discretionary authority. This formulation is no longer accepted
widely ,< especia 11,y in the Third World where the need to'overcome-hungery<..
poverty and unemployment are commonly held to render it impossible fully
to implement the Rule of Law, Many Western jurists - and the International 
Commission of Jurists in particular - have attempted to modernise the Rule 
of Law and would, for example, permit the Derg broad executive powers to 
discharge its public welfare functions efficiently, The 1CJ would never­
theless argue that power should be exercised within the narrowest possi­
ble limits, subject to judicial review, so as to avoid human rights vlo-
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lations, This Is, of course, not the situation in Ethiopia, where no
separation of powers or other legal limits on the Derg's powers can be
"t
found, A legal and extra-legal overkill is employed, in what amounts to
a permanent state of emergency which is largely of the Derg's own making*
'■ Unfortunately, the Rule of Law remains a vague set of standards for
evaluating the behaviour of particular regimes. Consider the following
statement by the International Commission of Jurists?
a democratic state, no matter how far its planning and'soctaf{za- 
tlon extends, should ensure that it does not put itself above 
the law and that the private sector is not unjustly discrimin­
ated against or destroyed, , , , The right to own property is
Do land and business nationalisations in Ethiopia (see Chapters Six and 
Seven) amount to "unjust” discriminations when, as can be convincingly 
argued, these measures promote the achievement of social justice and the 
elimination of exploitation? Property and ownership exist only in forms 
defined by law, and if these definitions are changed by the Derg, can 
Government be said to be setting Itself above the law? Finally, the Rule 
of Law has different meaning in different legal systems^ In Its narrowest 
sense, the Rule of Law is little more than an admonition to follow the 
law, and human rights depend upon the nature and content of the rules 
be!ng appl ied,
If Western jurists were ever to convince Ethiopia's leaders of the 
merits of the Rule of Law, more tightly-drawn guidelines and justifications 
are needed. At present, the Rule of Law is often viewed as a Western 
ideology or ethnocentric value judgement In the Third World; perhaps 
Western jurists should regard it in the same light and attempt to reform­
ulate Its precepts* Consider Hartley and Griffith's analysis of public 
law in the United Kingdom;
A rule of lawsand not men is impossible in our society* Laws 
.there must be to confer powers on men who rule and to limit 
their activity within the bounds of the law. But those laws 
also give them some freedom of action and of choice, some
3 k3
flexibility. Yet those who rule must be subject to the law,'
[This principle] is crucial to the preservation of any measure 
of liberty and to the control of governments,202
This definition, applied in Ethopia, focuses on some of the relevant
issues, but also neglects^several importantiemes. Laws are so broadly^ ^
drafted as to preclude limitations of governmental power, and no con-1
trolling institutions have been created in any meaningful sense. In the
absence of popular political participation and control over government,
legal limitations and controls cannot function effectively. Finally, we
must recognise that al1 regimes are prepared to suspend human rights
when their perceived basic interests are threatened « Korematsu ?n the
U.S., Ljversidge v. Anderson in the U,Ke and Canal in France serve as
examples of thi s *->-arrd many third World states simply have a lower
threshold beyond which the Rule of Law becomes irrelevant. We cannot
resist the temptation to add Lord Denn 1 ng1 s- vi ews~on irhe— subjeotr —
Wherrtfre*' state'itsel f ' is "in • dsngfe r-T’isu f e h e  fTs^d^f r^ed’Qfis ~““ 1-4 ~
may have to take second place and even natural justice it"
* self may have to suffer a setback, 20f
The threshold we mentioned must be fairly low in the U.K, of Lord Denning,
for these words were spoken in the Agee^Hosenbal1 case,
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides yet another basis
for assessing the Derg’s performance, While Ethiopia has never acceded
to the broader Covenants on Policital, Civil, Economic, Social and Cul"
£{jr4a 1 ^ Ri"gfilfs™ s^^ ncond Tt fo1 naT*fy“*,su6 o^ t:TTe DecfaT* ftoiTTn'
19^8, (as well as numerous International Labour Organisation conventions^0^) 
- and Article ^ of Proclamation No, 1 of 197^ stated that international
agreements will continue to be observed bytheTferg, in Ethiopia, the 
imposition of the death penalty for minor political offenses and the 
official encouragement o f  political assessihatTon amount to a denial of 
the right to life (Art, 3 of the Declaration) $ arbitrary arrest and de­
tent i on without trial v t o 1 a te Art rcTe *f2 ;■ freedoTtr-af -mcmsmBrrftb itr'arrd
'” ’ ..oufsTcTe rtlTidpta-- has "Been greatTy--fes-tr icted, contra-Art icle-1-3; and. t-he
rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly are denied 
(Arts.* 19-20). Additional ly, Amnesty rriterhaticmai argues that the use 
of torture violates the 1975 U,N, Declaration on Cruel and Inhuman 
Punishment, conditions in detention "fall very far short" of the U-N,
? ’"•■n?!'-sr j- •. * • - ■ ■ . fvj. ■ » >.• • ,r. 'f1 ! r,< >jiu ■< v  u e  t - o  • e  r n..;;-, c  l - ■>}
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, attempts to enforce
the involuntary repatriation of refugees violate Article 31 of the 1951
1
U,N, Convention on Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and the common practice
of taking hostages and murdering civilians .in areas of armed conflict
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is contrary to Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 19^9,
The Derg has shown itself markedly insensitive to the application
of these international law criteria and to adverse international opinion,
Despite the criticisms of the International Commission of Jurists (.see
supra), the Derg, has" not even..deigned[ to refer to the Rule of Law since
197*K ’ The Rule of Law may be an irrelevant Western ideology, yet a
soeiiaii srt^ rjus't i f rest i-on “for t-runcat4ons~of human^pLgh-ts Ethi^ia I.& — ^
.rather threadbare, We would therefore propose more pragmatic grounds
for disapproving of the berg’s penal policies, based on Kiralfy’s asser-
tion, supra', “The appl ication of pol ice- powers is always essent ial ly-a-e~
bitrary - even in liberal states but, beyond that, the...
extent to which the legal system is involved in the process of 
eliminating opponents is a matter-fdr~pbIItTcal judgemenf, In 
some situations it may be convenient::for: the government to give 
an air of legitimacy to operations of this kind,- In othersthe 
ri’sTTof an adverse decision at^the^ahds^of'a“ system which“’W > r“" ^ “ 
not share the objectives of the-government may be too great to 
be risked. Whatever means are used,-two things are certain; 
that those injcqntroj ape l ikely to^ usee the .1 egal _system in _ 
whatever way they think wl 11 best serve, thei r purpose, and that 
the eventual outcome is uncertain- General acquiescence in ex- 
treme measures , , ,-cannot be taken for g r a n t e d - , -206 , .—
A Marxist, Alan Hunt, uses similar language to analyse a more general
'issue:-'- •'... .... . - ^ ....r-v r:. —
: The-lurch to legal author.! tarianism is checked by-an-_egua 1 .ly.: 
strong need on the part<of the ruling class to maintain the 
legitimacy of their class rule. This contradiction Is not an 
interaction between two equal forces which smoothly balance 
each other out; Hence there are periods in which there are 
major shifts towards authoritarianismy-but equally there are
periods of movement -towards more liberal and less coercive „ ____
forms. The particular result at any point in time is a com^ 
plex result of the level of the class struggle itself,207
A further "lurch" towards authoritarianism has been observed under the
Derg, but i t >are 1 y~assumes Wes'tern legal formsand praceetfe-’-whoTiy -T=e~=
gard’les-s of the-Derg’s legitimacy, As traditional-and-Wes ter n^orien ted
elites have already been neutralised fairly effectively, the state of
the Ethiopian "class struggle" does not necessitate massive doses of
terror. We,can, at the very leastaccuse the. Derg of exercising poor
political judgement over the most basic issue of penal policy - how and
when the varying forms of violence are to be u s e d , 208
A crude and'short-term cost-effeetiveness may dictate the killing
rather than the detention or trial and imprisonment of enemies, but there 
are other considerat ions-whIch a wise politician takes into account. In 
addition to the obvious humanitarian concerns, the fact is that the,use 
of force leads only to a "temporary result, As Edmund Burke noted, a 
state ruled by force is perpetually to be reconquered, It Is compara­
tively easy to defeat a tyranny which makes all aspects of life perma­
nently dependent on caprice; the clever tyrant conceals the use of terror 
(political and ideological discipline) by clothing it in law and justice 
(moral and social discipline) and does not antagonise segments.of the 
populace whichJ3re larger J:han the security forces .can_cpnmtrql. Perhaps.
no injustice antagonises Ethiopians more than the arbitrary imposition
209of a severe penalty in the percevied absence of guilt.
Further, crimes committed in the ,name of authority adversely affect 
the quality of life for .everyone they touch, thereby slowing the pace at • 
which the qualitative dimensions of development can be-atrta 1'n'ed, In 
Chapter Two we argued that, while the strategic use of coercion Is justi­
fied in Ethiopia, the continued use of excess i ve -force postpones further- 
reforms; the ’profits1 obtained from exploiting a position of power are 
consumed by the costs of maintaining cevep- higher levels of coercion,
For example, the development administration reforms we proposed supra 
could not be implemented so long as an over-crimlna1isat ion of the legal 
sys tern^a ndw a^pOT14^Fcaili oj e nee* e-1 a i sao 1 a r « h a  v ©#*-Government1 s ~ ■ * 
resources and serve only to further paralyse tne bureaucracyt Other 
agencies of social control which have a potentially significant role in
development*:acti vitI'es"™Rebel 1 es, peasarif‘.aMocla.tIonsf,~3Tolu3iEan^asso?T" 
cl at ions, religious organisations, trade unions, schools and the media - -
are similarly paralysed and starved for resources, while becoming'poljti-
210
cised in ways which pose additional threats to human rights in the future, 
The reduction of violence requires that the Derg bargain with its opponents 
and negotiate a serjes.of settlements - someth.ing It is seemingly incapa­
ble of doing. * - —
F, Summary
In this Chapter, we analysed many of the changes In Ethiopian public 
law since the Revolution and assessed the extent to which Wes.tern and 
socialist legal theories explain and account for these changes- The Derg's 
approach to law and politics is reminiscent of Stalin's; active use is
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made of legal machinery in certain'areas while, in others, politically- -
sanctioned acts occur without reference to the formal legal system, The
functions of Government in the legislative, executive, judicial and penal
spheres have been radically altered in ways which are only partly .
accounted for by the new laws, while administrative law remains unchanged
for the most part and the elaborate system of "lawyer's law" set up under
Haile Selassie has been largely ignored rather than repudiated (see
Chapter Seven), The apparent lack of tension within the resulting legal
•system reflects the fact that the Derg refuses to countenance legal
challenges to its actions. Its policies are being disputed by violent
and extra-legal means which call forth bloody repression, The Derg thus ____ ^
faces a familiar. Third World dilemma; the need t.o balance the immediate .
des i rabi 1 i ty of el iminat i ng a reg ime1 s enemjes__aga_i.nsi^ the 1 ong"term________
211
problem of winning support for good government, Ambiguities in the
   Derg ' s use of law are the outcome pf^ an i nte_ract jpn of^ many factor si..............
traditional Ethiopian attitudes about law and the exercise:of political .
power which reflect a militant chauvinism, the continued use of Haile 
- Selassie's legal style, deep conflicts In Marxist.theory, concern i.ng the , , ---w*
usefulness of law, an ad hoc experimentation and, above all, poor politi­
cal judgement.
The Derg radically transformed Ethiopian constitutional law but 
\ missed the chance to turn this transformation into "the ideal dialectic
' act", . through which the moral and ideological, values of,.a new sociaj
.___ ___  order are expressed, the relations among political elites are stabilised,
and political economic and social resources are marshalled and allocated
for development purposes. Needless to say, such a critcism i^ far re­
moved from the nineteenth century preo.ccupat ions o£..Western. const itut iona 1
theories: in the Third World, constitutions should be accelerators of
213
development rather than brakes on governmental action, Ethiopian ad­
ministration continues much asjbefore, and meaningful mechanisms of 
administrative legality (propery defined) and accountability have yet to’ 
be created, As leading Western theories of law and administration prove 
irrelevant when applied in Ethiopia, we propose a more appropriate and 
development-oriented framework for analysis, The Derg's penal policies, 
J,n.cl ud | ng. ...the Terror., have -fa i l,ed to. achj.eye jihp. Derg s^.stated..goaj s4 at., 
an immense cost in human suffering. Since the Derg has remained unmoved
347
by criticisms based on the Rule of Law and its obligations under inter­
national law, pragmatic -justifications of more humane policies are 
offered.
We return to these issues in the final Chapter, after examining 
other laws and policies in Chapter Six and Seven, Theories of natural 
law are rejected in all countries, and the-relat1vistic and positivistic 
legal concepts dominant in the West make it impossible effectively to 
criticise the unprincipled exercise of power. Individuals and groups 
are left with an unenviable choice among blrnd faith, blind obedience 
or an extremely uncivil disobedience in the face of an ebb and flow of 
threats; Westerrr~jur tsrpruderrce~pTovides'few 'affswers when“ as~irTTthiopTa 
the interests of groups are not compatible to any appreciable degree.
The best that can be hoped for is that the interests reflected by law, 
politics and administration are consistent with the interests of .some of. 
the groups affected, and that' others are not dealt with too harshly, 
Unfortunately, a legalised brutality disappears only when a government 
is convinced that changes in 'policies serve' its best interests,'
\
■ ne c.i -
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PART Ilf: Peripheries and Centres
Having seen the least attractive of the Derg*s legal changes in the 
previous Chapter, we will examine several important instances of the 
creative use of law in the next two Chapters,
Ethiopian underdevelopment, we argued in Chapter Two, is primarily 
the outcome of transactions which took place withIn subsistence and small- 
scale pol i t ical and e c b h o m i t : * m a r k e t i ^ ^ ^ l i e ^ f o g r e ' s s r~ 
smooth flow of resources which we defined as ongoing processes of develop­
ment necessitate a broadening of these markets - the forging of''links 
between centres Turban areas, particularly Addis Ababa, and enclaves of 
commertcal agriculture) and peripheries, as well as among the rural areas. 
This kind of approach to an integrated development has been grossly 
neglected, by many development theorists and certainly by Haile Selassie; 
the emergence of centres began relatively late In Ethiopia and, while the 
—  — ~ power of'-provinctaT’■el rtes was1 befiTg'eroded',~ *Ott1y“~a“~frev5TnaTY'dPTTfffisTTri-' 
flexible channels of'communication and commerce were extended outwards 
from the centres. Channels running in the opposite direction, among 
rural areas and from peripheries towards centres, were consistently sup-' 
pressed; policies of divide et imperia were pursued nationwide, so that 
the mutual suspicions of city dweller and peasant and among urbanites and 
peasant groups would forestall the emergence of a broadly-based opposition 
, rPc t0 the Throne. An arbitrary exercise of powers emanating from the centres, 
unrestrained by law or politics, caused resentment and, periodically, the 
onset of isolated guerriUa-type rebellions within the peripheries.
Where agents of the centres managed to penetrate Into the rural areas, 
the economic and political colonialism they brought with them prompted 
the decay of the traditional socio-economic structures that were dis­
cussed in Chapter One, Viable alternatives to these traditional arrange­
ments were never introduced prior to the Revolution, although the impact 
of authoritarian policies was occasionally softened by the half-hearted 
paternalism of the more change-oriented ministries and agencies,^
The effect of this colonialism was- to enrich the wealthy living in 
the centres at the expense of the peasant, although the overall lack of 
penetration of central Government and the absence of a national Integra­
tion imposed a low ceiling on the extent of this enrichment and on the 
numbers of people who benefitted from it, If larger segments of the public 
are to be drawn into national development efforts, the effects of
traditional Ethiopian politics have-to be reversed through a redistribu- 
tion of wealth and power, both within centres and peripheries and between 
them, in the first and second Chapters, we argues that the ways in which 
people behave in ethnically-fragmented and highly-stratified societies 
is a fundamental cause of Ethiopian underdevelopment, and that this be­
haviour must change in certain ways if development prospects are to be 
enhanced. For the individual, the incentive to develop is ultimately 
supplied by the perception that he or she can begin to assert a measure 
•of control over life's circumstances, More equitable distributions of 
wealth and power increase each person's capacity to take controlr improv­
ing his bargaining power and, through him, that of his group,
..C.qot r.a.ry . to.-,the views^of.-many-^economi s t s a  -more equ i tab 1 e d i st r rbu-: 
tion of resources is not antithetical to a rapid economic growth: the
resulting expansion of internal demand for agricultural and industrial 
goods can encourage domest i c. p m d u.c.tJ.oriy„prp\4 4 a~jno-fce-J4i cent-fv-es--t*o--4-pi-* 
novate and reduce the propensity to import, to indulge in conspicuous 
consumption and to invest capital abroad or in urban realty. Government 
would also benefit from an expanded tax base, from a reduction in the 
opportunities for tax evasion and from a greater measure of public sup­
port for its policies. Law's role with regard to .these redistributions
X .
*s» Inter alia, "to cease coddling the rich quite so much at the expense
of the poor" , and to intervene on behalf of the poor and poy/e.rJess-.
Laws conj^ erjied. wd.th-J^ei.co.ntrcuLlan.drtUser-ofc. resources -(the* ‘property -'■■a_nd_ 4; 
1 contract-1. .1 ayt§__v4hj.c.h„-wer&, d,i.sc.uased.^ in -^Chapter Two)--must -therefore'be^  ^ " 
reformulated in Ethiopia, i f ,socio-econqnujc~equal i sat ion-i-s to proceed* —  
In the next Chapter, we will focus on the development potential of 
the rura 1. areas for, a.s . dph.n_do.ben and :-Sj-les.hi— SJsjye--notev- —
the rural social system [of Ethiopia] constitutes, in most cases, 
the largest population segment and jDOtential reservoij^ of most^of 
the central '"S^ ’wealiili'Vhld^ower.“ The task of development, - -
in its most primary form,- is the transformation of the rural 
social system, for change in this system constitutes a basic ele­
ment and condition of the process-of nation building and consid­
erably influences the nature of that process.3
This task can only be accomplished, we argue, through^a deyeTppmenJ:..... .
strategy which is integrated in two distinet senses: -Government's rural
pol ipj es.jpust epcompaBss,,a coherent,,,apdv.-co.n-s isteat .-package ,q,f «a,-H .-p.f -*fcb%-.vr
inputs needed to fuel rural development; and rural development must, in
turn, provide the basis for developing the centres - a topic dealt with
in Chapter Seven. In the absence of these kinds of integration, Ethiopia's 
centres would, over time, come, to resemble- the enclaves in, for example, 
Brazil, where developments(as^opposed to a purely economic growth) is- 
neither self-generating nor self-perpetuating, (n addition to creating 
additional produce, capital and employment opportunities In the rural 
areas, an Integrated development would foster the growth of the.j^egu 1 ar 
agricultural surpluses that are essentlel-^feo-“t-rade-arrd manafaTrfiiTeT" “f'T'5 p 
an effect!ve'cornmercia 1 and political linkage of the centres and peri­
pheries were achieved, agricultural surpluses could be exchanged for manu­
factured goods and used as exports, as the basis for creating industrial 
capital, for the financing of urban services through the tex~-sy~s4em-and, 
last but by no means least, for feeding a burgeoning urban population and
/l   . - r ■ ’
as a hedge against rural’famine, v'■ ■ - - - ..... .
As far as can be ascertained from policy pronouncements and programmes 
which are often vague or^even,contcadtc.toxy^«t£J.&wthe Jjai eg-pafce-d-and -re~ - 
distributive-development strategy we outlined that the Derg has In mind,’ 
Those who now hold political power In the*centres are prepared to coun­
tenance and even consciously to foster large measures of agrarian change; 
sign!f icant quantities, of. scarce resources^ have been clevofetf ’.tora|Tproprlate 
rural reforms, at least-prior to the E'thio^omai r War of 1977* These 
reforms were broadly welcomed in many rural areas, particularly in the 
South, but-other policies of the"Derg - and attempts to stimulate.Jlrevolu-
support P’ racjmaU c, catl%^wa,lt«lng^o ee-whether* benefd ts
wl11 materialise, while middle-income groups in the centres (including ’ 
unionised workers) bear the costs of the new development po.lJc|esf.J[n
terms of^tncreased tax. burdens and a decline in 1 i ving standards- a rrd -
5 . . .
.socio-economic expectations. There is some doubt as to whether future
conflicts of interest between peasants and city dwellers or between Govern­
ment andseparat i st groups w.i.ll force the Derg to -abandon-these policies;- 
-at the.very l.east, it will be politically necessary to ensure a continuity 
- in the supp-ly of—g-ra4-n to the urban areas. Be that as it may, it” seems 
that.the Derg's more development-oriented policies, are moving in the right 
direction although, as Chapter Seven demonstrates, many of its urban 
policies have jD.eejt ..less. fjta.n 7successful.,,.v,,,,() r, ^ Cu.veur-i” ‘"V".
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CHAPTEft 6: The Peripheries
The overview presented in Chapter One lends support to the proposi­
tion that economic development and rural development are virtually syno­
nymous in Ethiopia: 90% of the population are engaged in agricultural
pursuits, and they generated 97% of exports and 5^% of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in 1970-71. The latter figure includes the 45% of GDP that 
was imputed to subsistence agriculture. This degree of national depend­
ence upon subsistence agriculture is extremely high, even when compared 
to neighbouring East African countries, and leads Gerard Gill toconclude 
that, for Eth iop.iaagr i cul tural. development M i s not an alternative to 
industrial development1, it is a precondition without which industrial 
development cannot take p l a c e . • ' *
The level of productivity within the traditional sector -of Ethiopian 
agriculture is extremely low, and-agricultural technology andmethods of * 
- cu°Tti va t i on- a’re*-a rcha i c ; 
hectares (3*8 acres, cons
The totaiyyleid* from 'W~aVerage! *‘fa ftfnsf‘“T;: JT—  
sting typically of four or five isolated plots) 
is only 1,000 to 1,200 kg, of grain. This average encompasses wide varia­
tions, particularly since the distribution of l a n dprior to 1974, was 
considerably more unequal than the distribution of other assets in the 
rural areas, In the twentieth century, rapid population increases have 
been accompanied by a growing imbalance in agricultural ecology: pastures
Ion <^h3s^bec0m©^al^*'-^^«'•^■~*r 
ma j of' p:roifTem i rp ma by" & rea s"; tltlt&fyrtHat‘ jT~f1 ~tb rt-e nfybafs ffern "
nowy' Ethiopia'1 s’ etolog ical decl ine - ‘tptibfetf'byr'tH^ "EtHfprSbrna^T i War :*arid ' *'" J l‘"J ‘
various insurrections -will be irreversible or revers!b1e only by methods 
too costly for a poor country, Crop yields on unfertilised land have 
fallen, despite a more intensive cirl 1 1 vat ion - by an underfed and rapidly- 
growing peasantry. Since rural capital is a relatively direct embodiment 
of family labour, the rate of-return on capital has been driven down to 
the low levels realised from other applications of labour, Dispersed 
settlement patterns and the paucity of towns -1 sol ate peasants-from low- ;
cost credit, supplies, information, incentives and markets. The’manifest 
inadequacy of road networks and marketing and storage arrangements raise 
the costs of handling and transport to the point where It is impossible 
.t-or.e'X'port': 'this- produce: of many bTea^rorteVdw t'O^m'arket ■ i ts-'lh tfreema^orr rt-.'r^ rh
urban areas, While a nationwide calorie deficit of 10% makes it impera­
tive that agricultural production be expanded radically, peasants mus t, of
necessity, aim for little more than sel*f-sufficiency In the face of * 
drought, floods, pests such as locusts and disease, particularly malaria 
in the lowlands and tuberculosis at higher altitudes,
These are some of the major obstacles faced by any kind of community-1 
level development programme in the rural areas, and Halle Selassie's in­
terest in altering these parameters of rural underdevelopment was, as we 
shall see, minimal. There was a marked preference for policies aiming 
at an economic growth in the centres, and famine and severe agricultural., 
•lags resulted. The few so-called rural development projects established 
by foreign aid donors failed to spread their benefits widely, either 
geographically or among local peasants in the lower strata (see inf ra),
The half-hearted attempts by Government to create an agricultural research 
and extension network failed to reach-a large percentage of the*population 
Local government was unwilling and unable to initiate rural change, given
the.fact X h a L . t M J  nterests~of-^pr.ovi.nc.iaX e.U~tes-«wer e ~s uppor t ed tae-itly, —
and sometimes actively, by the policies pursued by elites in the centre’s 
(see Chapter Three). As a result, the ’’Grain Basket of Africa” , as 
Ethiopia has been termed, never achieved anything like Its full potential. 
Comparing Ethiopia to eight other East African countries in 197^, Gill
found that, with minor exceptions, Ethiopia-ranked lowest in grain yields
x ■
and fertilizer consuruption per hectare, carcass weight of slaughtered
in.vs.stme.ot * _p.airtitu.lar1.y, .publ 16 .sector- I nves tine»W: — ...
... We^argufi-^that. i>±. Is the constraints-we^have-'OutVined in the previous - 
paragraphs - and the effects of...the- traditional land tenures that were 
outlawed in 1975 “ that are the ones relevant to a study of rural Ethiopia 
rejecting the thesis of an Ethiopian peasant fatalism, irrationality and 
resistence to change that dominated the analyses of Ethiopianists until 
late in the 1960s (see Chapter One), The risks faced by peasant are 
large and profitability, in terms of the return received by labour, is 
small, Transactions in goods and services are few in number and tend to 
be localised episodes in continuing relationships, in which social rather 
than economic considerations dominate. The few transactions.that pass 
through markets are often between, rather than within, social strata and 
at.bn.ivc, g rogps,, . J n, th.i s. .-context,. peasants-e.re- -n;eye:rthe;le;s^ -a l-e-pT-- to. -- ■ -
opportunities and act in a rational manner, but they are weighed down by
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the tyranny of lieavy agr t cu.l tura ] labour, Give the constraints, tftey 
strike a balance between maximising the return from available resources 
and minimising the risk of starvation and of a loss of freedom of action, 
Once basic needs are assured, it would be irrational for peasants to ex­
tend the drudgery of self"exploitation unless new opportuni11es appeared 
to be clearly profitable, Under H a H e  Selassie,-el i tes from t-he cen.tres 
and the 'opportunities' they offered appeared to be (and often were) 
wholly negative quantities to Ethiopian peasants who, like most other 
•peasants, are predisposed towards an-agrarian anarchism,
A purposive linking of the peripheries with the centres jtherefore
necessitates a demonstration of benef i ts .flow! ng towards a peasantry.;---
To succeed, the Derg's policies of stimulating "revolutionary conscious*' 
ness" (legitimating the new regime) in rural areas must persuade peasants 
that old injustices -have_heen ameUor'aJ^ed_.and that new def ini tions of rural 
. justice. a^e,jthe ^ apprp^riate ones, Jjf the ci rcumstances under which the 
struggle for dignity and a livelihood take place are changed (.Including 
a more equitable distribution of resources), many traditional social 
values will also change - slowly but automatically as would rural so-- 
clal relations (see Chapter One),
I. Man and Land under Halle Selassie
k  novelist tjave us thi s-portra i t of rural Ethiopia, on the. eve of the
Derg's revolutionary declaration (3f land reform:
.rrawr.wjsv *• -  ' ■ • . < -  r  w-vne* v  ''i t
The land is rich . . . but the people poor. The land and the 
l ”s*' 1 anBTordsY*''tHe*1 ] ari'd^h’dTfie clTOnnclt;CT4fhe f a n n d J trs ru+ers-************•
are rich. Let the students jhout the[r slogans^. Land to the 
tiller. Collectivize. Let the Americans whisper their advice.
Land to the tractor. Commercialize'. Whatever the system, the 
peasant would always be another man's slave.5 ...
This fundamental rural poverty isgrounded in traditional tenure rules, 
which were the basis of rural patron-c1ient relations and the organisa­
tion of state power, as well as the pivotal points of all other political, 
ethnic, social and economic relations. Until very recently, the limits 
of Ethiopian power corresponded with.the limits of the collection of 
land-based tribute payments. For most Ethiopians, land is central to 
life: "to be landless deprives one of his humanity" runs, the .Arnhara
proverb. .—  Ethiopia had one of ,the wp.rldfs_.most,comp 1 ex system of land 
tenures: it has been estimated that there are 110 distinct tenures in
Wollo Province alone. The situation is roughly analogous to that in early
4 V
medieval England, except that there Is no Domesday Book to assist in
unravelling the mysterie.s. The underlying institutions and processes
that generated these complexities can, however, be meaningfully general-
£
ised, and they remained constant for many centuries, An eUtest atti­
tude that was often voiced by politicians under Haile Selassie was first 
attributed by a Jesuit, Baradas, to a provincial governor in the 1630s; 
"Father, trhes'e villeins are like camels, they cry and groan when they
7
are loaded, but in the end they carry the load. , , Graham’s mid­
nineteenth century observation still held true in 1973: "The prosperity
or adverse condition of a village depends almost entirely upon the 
rapacity or moderation of its immediate chief
9Statistics concerning tradi t ional "tenures indicate that much 
arable land is not utilised, an extreme inequality of land distribution 
existed, and the vast majority of peasants cultivated economically un- 
viable and fragmented plots, -Peasants supported three layers-of govern- 
*ment: local large landowners, the Church, and the central government *
that maintained political loyalty through grants of land. These land 
grants conferred the power to command the labour of the peasants occupy­
ing it. It was not uncommon for a colonel in Haile Selassie's army to
retire on a 'pension' of 16,000 hectares of government land. The most
- . N
extreme instances of large landownership were Ras Mesfin Sileshi's two 
million hectares (plus a large chunk of Addis Ababa), and one member of 
the royal family's ownership of 900,000 hectares in Hararghe Province,
TV-more typica 1 •*»examp 1 e , documented -by Patr ick G M  kes-,~* i s^-that- -of- arv^ -fn-** , 
dividual who seized 20,000 hectares in Sidamo Province and used a jprivate. 
army to force land sales. ^ Viewed from the centre, these and other 
land tenure relations were regulated in an extra-legal fashion for, as 
Christopher Clapham observed, "there" can" be^fevr parts erf 'thenvo-rld-wherre- ■ 
the daily life of the people is so little affected by written law,"^
A, Traditional Tenures
All of the major categories of Ethiopian peasant tenures  ^ the 
northern and central kinship tenures (rest and rIst) , the village tenures 
found in the North (desa), and the Southern or private tenures - operated 
as constraints on rural development, with private tenures constituting 
the most s%gnificant constraint from the perspective of a national economy 
centred on Addis Ababa. In Southern and South-central Ethiopia, where
some' 60% of Ethiopia's peasants 1ive, more- than.50% of the peasants 
* ' *
farmed part or all of their holdings as tenants (see' infra) , compared 
with 25% of the peasants in central Ethiopia and about 5% in the North. 
Most people in the South owned at least some of the land they farmed 
under the rough equivalent of an Anglo-American freehold, except for the 
minority group craftsmen (such as blacksmiths and tanners) for whom
landowning was prohibited. In an agrar I an- system that is fairly un- '
12 . . ... 
common in Africa, these tenures formed the base for an extended hier­
archy of claimants to the peasant's output which is termed, by consensus, 
feudal (see Chapter One), Although most of the characteristics of 
European feudalism were to be found in Ethiopia, the tenant was not 
legally bound'to the land, although population pressure, a poor bargain­
ing position and a lowly status did, in practice, tie the peasant firmly.
Further, this' f e'udar~pattern of^Soci’a 1‘ TeTattons'was somewhat f 1 ui-d— and—
competitive; as a result of ambt1ineal success Ion rules, ambiguous land 
TTgTrts™rre^ent"' cH Vo,lr1b^'s''''faifid*''a^ jlJdTel si" wii 11 rrgness' to-trace • success ion- 
from exceedingly remote ancestors, -peasants in Central Ethiopi-a cherished 
extensive claims to land. Upward mobj Tjty' was perceived as the result 
of success in an endless chain of litigation over land rights, In real-' 
ity, the costs of land litigation placed it beyond the reach of most 
Ethiopians and control over land was based on political power rather 
than vice versa. The perception of a social mobility did, however, en^ 
courage peasants— to— identi fy-w-f th landlords and decreased the— level -of 
‘tens 1 on^Tff^retat t on's5 ''b^weerf ‘s’ e
i s "reiVforcecfBy' ‘absence of' gfre!1E*,'cTfTTOiF^^6f!,,n9%6g'r^hTc<rdl^tahces^
13between peasants and traditional elites, ..
Gilkes is therefore not a 1 together correct when he concTudes"tHat
the basic contradiction within most of the Ethiopian Empire 
has been between the landless tenants, small peasant land­
owners and a growing rural proletariat, and the landowning 
aristocracy as a whole.^
We can, "however,-unreserved 1 y accept another-of his assertions:
Democratization remains impossible while the conjunction of 
land and power remains as the fundamental basis of control 
in the country, and while the system is geared to perpetu- 
ating .the_...righ.ts jaf phe landowners. 1 5
This statement is equally valid if any form of modernisation is substi­
tuted for "Democratization", provided we realise that land reform is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for a genuine rural modernisation.
   . 3 5 6  ' .
" ■ * * *
Ethiopia's IdVided gent ry'evol ved from a mi 1 i tary'cl ass to a taxa­
tion and administrative authority and symbolised a feudal fragmentation 
of political power resulting from grants of 'service tenements' or 'fiefs' 
(gult) in lieu of payment and under the ultimate, but often purely 
theoretical, authority of an emperor, Gult was thus the traditional 
basis of administration in many partsof the country. The nature of the 
landlord's privileges varied widely according to the types of service 
they performed, but the obligations of tenants (or the means of extract­
ing the peasant's agricultural surplus) were largely the same: the
- - tenant gave one-thi rd, one-ha 1 f -or. more-of—h-is^roduce to the~4-a.ndlo.rd~-— —
and. performed such services.as .were required -including, j o. the recen.t__7 7„_ 
past, bearing arms. The tenant had little incentive to expand produc­
tion beyond subsistence or uti1ize modern inputs, since his tenure was 
insecure and the landlord would claim a large share of any additional
produce.,. The tenantjs,position was thus^def ined by custom, law and
   '   • ’
naked coercion acting in concert and, given asymmetrical social, economic 
and political relations, a 'landTord could "shift any obligations (includ­
ing legal obi igations)' onto his tenants* shoulders, Landlords tended’to 
seek income levels sufficient to live a relatively sumptuous rural life
and to maintain their status with a minimum of investment and personal
\
effort - conditions that ace not conducive to efficiency .and high pcoducr 
\ tivity. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church was the landlord over about 28%
- ym,..QfLfhe .cuItjyated J.ar\d under semon-type tenures, and i t ._had no part icular 
scruples jabout exploi t i ng peasants .. „ [ts.js.uthor i ty stemmed as much f rom ; 
landed wealth as from the Orthodox ethic, - -(Major .gul t and semon tenures 
are described in greater detail in the footnote^),
The Amharic negressa means both "to rule" and "to collect tribute" 
and, as thi s usage suggests., the Amhara, partlcufarLy those.from.Shoa-Provinee, 
'colonised' other ethh"Ic' groups~f'see Chapte rs"fTne~ hgrifF“Thr e A T ' t h o u g h  —
, patterns of...aix. internal ..col.o.ni^ .ljsm cou.ld be fpund throughout, the country, 
they were most In evidence in the southern Provinces conquered by Emperor 
Menelik II late in the nineteenth century, There are few limitations on 
an authority based upon rapid personal conquest, and Menelik confiscated 
two-thirds.of the land and granted much of it to the Church and, as gult, 
..to his soldiers, particularly the Shoan ones, While the new tenures bore 
some resemblance to those adopted by other emperors in northern and 
central Ethiopia, they more clearly reflected the need for a direct and
•TT + T3=< i= !-!C W  S3
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uncomplicated pattern of government * which would attract colons, reward 
soltders, and oppress the conquered peoples in an attempt to'maVntaIn 
order. Local rulers who allowed themselves to be coopted by Menelik
- * (ballabats)- administered* the rerna rntiig third *of-vt h £ ~ T 3 n d  —
authority, many customary rules survived including, in some areas, the
sale-of-land— and-;.tx&nsfers— M h  causa mortis*, Many- farmers suddenly-^ . “
found themselves to be tenants on what they regarded as their own land, - 
Although some of the worst features of the new tenures have beenahan- ~
• doned ‘during trhe-fa^r thi rty years, a-var iety of"persOTTah ^ ervfc^s^re-'' '  
sti 11~perf or med (at 1 east until 1975). and-the^t:enatrtsTstil 1 fee 1 _the_. _ i _ ".‘ ^  
loss of their rights— in-4-and keenly.— A popular Wolamo proverb says that - 
’■ H thd AmharVend the -wd-l"f : hourft- 
colonial-si tuatrons-, domination by what is- -rega-r-ded•.-as-a-•,€Qj^i^n^owei===^~~-~ws 
did little to stimulate loyalty towards a central government, “
The further north we move in central Ethiopia— (the heartland of 
the'Amhara), the more rist tenure dominated land use, particularly in 
Gojjam Province Where the Inhabitants have an intense dislike for Shoans,
Rist was an inheritable right of use rather than of ownership: although
~ f~a"Prtii ng was.IlTVdTvLdual Jsed, each farm was vrew.ed as a tempdrary ~and". vague!y^ *:: 
delimited share of * corpora te- land held by-a f ew~of the-de sceddahthstrdf ’ a.v *=7
remote legendary .figure,', .-R Is t-'-eights never died, and they'provided each_. 
person with a comparatively wide range of family and kin ,affj 1 lations 
~ and wi th'-a— la-rge-meas-u-re of -pe-r-sonal' satlsf ac-tlonr '-Tfri-s-^tenure^-couLd be — =- 
-- one- of-Thtr-IInbS' between ■ Eth i op i an -and contempora ry 
cultures ..(such as-in Sicily), and 11 helps to. explain~T.be._indlv.i 
and conservative character of Amhara peasants, the ambig'udU$_hatute of 
rist rightsoften served to foster suspicion and conflict. As little- 
produce is marketed and as land Is “Virtual ly the only rural resource^t'frir 
responds to the application of l a b o u r t h e r e  is an intens-ely-emotional 
and-corporeal sense of-property; In most-part-s-of Ethiopia., land has not-- 
• acquiredmonetary*-Val uea-s: an asset which * can be mortgaged\or-used to..— 
generate an income through the sal e of plod'uce, The ~b u"rden “of “paying 
tribute was lighter for r i st holders than for southern peasants and rela­
tions between lord and peasant wereeasier, since both usually belonged 
to the same ethnic group. Nevertheless, there- were, for example, about - 
375,000 peasants in Wollo Province who had no rist or rest rights just 
prior to the 1972 drought, and 'rent' and ‘taxes1 absorbed up to 85% of
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'their produce as tenants,^ • • •
Rest tenure was found in parts of Northern Ethiopia; In-Eritrea,
Begemder, Wollo and a part of Tigre Province, Rest was often mistakenly 
termed a communal tenure, despite the fact that It is similar to rist,
Under rest, ownership was not perceived as collective and there is little 
collective working of theland, The land returned to the extended 
family's 'pot* when the occupier died, however, and a right to claim a 
"share of— the family's land was inherited, Another common land use pattern 
. in the. North was a_ village (desa.) tenure, in which land was redistributed 
to family. heads-.every flveL. to.seven-years, with lota.being drawn for Land -
in,each of three fert i 1 i ty. g r a d e s A n  outsider could only^obtain land 
if he established himself in the village, and land redistributions did 
not take account of family size. In recent times, desa grew' at the ex-
 1_____pense of rest because Northerners -preferred-It and-t-he-l-talIan-- c&l.oji i a 1 ^
— .....  admlnlstratJbh had encouraged it. When compared ’to:other Ethtopiari - -
tenures, rest.and desa- generated excessive fragmentation, greater tenure 
insecurity and less of an Incentive to .improve the land In a part of 
Ethiopia that is relatively overpoptilated; Farmers do not, however, 
view fragmentation as a disadvantage! under traditional modes of culti­
vation, widely separated plots of differing fertility permit crop diver­
sification and act as a hedge against total crop fallure,v There were 
\ a large number of land disputes, and the older men in desa areas were
reluctant to redistribute the land. These tenures were fairly equitable
TiY; ’/  '£4 S'V.WlfiV’* '&  YVI, «!2rY ' ita y & tfi»V5Jt§-«S3rV<UV . . -OffCJWt». ,.V£S  f  it-"' ■' V iJ.-'I IV. v£kV. V . . ./ S. i£  ,_T j :r .Y iW SV  '• I .
. ^  . *.hqweyer...festered a relatively stronger community spirit and served to
discourage-tenancy^arrangem ents, ^ -■ - --------- -
The final distinct land use pattern is the nomadic tenures of the
*
Afar,^Somalis and pastoral Gallas who 1ive along Ethiopia 1s.eastern . ^ ~ 
boundary, and constitute S% of the population, Their tenures constitute 
response to life in a harsh environment and consist of group claims to 
. widely dj speysedj^a^turi ng and water r ights which are fiercely defended,
The nomads have been all but unadministered by central Government and, 
until .1975, Government consistently refused to recognise nomadic rights 
to land, holding that nomads could establish neither an ancient title 
based on Imperial grant nor the customary riqhts associated with the 
known traditional laws and the land tax payments of sedentary agricultur­
ists, traditionally, nomads were expected to give one-tenth of their 
herds to the government annually, and this was commuted in 195^ to a
cash payment that was, however, not classified as a land tax and often 
went unpaid, The Afar encompass a ruling aristocracy (Beni Amer) and. 
serf class (Danakalia) who live together in mutual dependence, The Beni 
Amer have unrestricted grazing rights while the Danakil must obtain the 
local ruler's permission to. graze thei.r_anLmal.s...in .certain areas. Small. 
: fami 1 y and .kin: gr.oups-bf:len-Liho ven-wlep^defii-Tyin S^liJe-Fa'dgi ng‘^ f^t^nes: 
for particular needs,^
As can be seen from this brief description of traditional Ethiopian 
tenures, they constituted a major dilution of development incentives. 
Throughout Ethiopia, and particularly in the South, economic dec i s ions, 
landlord-tenant and creditor-farmer relations and the environment itself 
were totally.exempt from. tbe-.control of peasants, either-as-individuals 
or in groups, Prior to the development of a more powerful centralised 
state, lord and peasant had been dependent upon each other for defense 
against outsiders and for securing the means of subsistence. Tradition­
al land laws reflect this relationship and the dominance of small-scale 
social considerations over purely economic criteria in the organization 
of production and distribution. These laws ignore the technological 
changes that seldom penetrated rural areas and the fact that the rural 
elite was able to alter the terms of subsistence production and obtain 
the minimal state protect ion. of their landhold.ings that, enabled them to 
shed many of their obligations toward peasants, A sense of injustice 
began to emerge among peasants; equivalent value was obviously not ob­
tained when' goods and"“S W V “i"ces' were exchanged wi th Targe” ! andowners,
Elite indifference and a lack of peasant control have prevented the emer­
gence of a social surplus - a regular and reliable food supply in excess 
of consumption that can be used to promote development - in a country 
with a generally good soil fertility and climate and a relatively low 
population density. This exceedingly small margin of suryjyal =jn rur^l_ 
..Ethtop-La. i.s .both. .a. ca-use-and effect of the extremely -unequal- and gener- - 
ally insufficient access to land, employment opportunities, managerial 
experience, credit and capital, and the absence of incentives to acquire
these resources - a state of affairs generated, In large measure, by
. . . .  2 1  
traditional tenure rules.
B, Interventions from the Centre
Although several of Haile Selassie’s predecessors promulgated laws
relating to land?. most of these have been lost and i tf is fair to say 
that traditional tenures, held absolute sway until 1944, Since then? 
the only laws that had a measureable Impact in many of the rural areas 
were those concerning the land and livestock taxes and the I967 agri­
cultural income tax that were discussed in Chapter Three, The effect 
of these taxes was further to exacerbate economic inequalities In the 
rural a rears: "about 75% of the revenue realised under the agricultural 
income tax was obtained from peasants with incomes of less than Eth,
$140 per year (U.S. $1 = Eth, $2,08),^
Haile Selassie felt the need to placate foreign aid donors and 
his educated elite under circumstances in which land reform and rural 
development would have been risky: new hopes and fears would have been,
stirred up in return for few short-term benefits accuring to a tradition-
reared pol it i c ian, He also had to obtain additional revenue 'wtthout  .
^antagorri &i ng 1 a rge 1 andownersv^sorne-of ^whom ^ were^beeom I n g c o m m e r c e ^  ^ -  
farmers, The chosen solution to these problems was the manipulation of 
the symbols of agrarian reform in ways which forestalled meaningful 
change. Western (especially American) advisor-s were particularly eager 
to urge minor tax adjustments as'perpetual.preconditions to more thorough" 
going reforms. As a result, Hyrdal's "soft state" was extended to the 
rural areas; it was soft on the gentry and on the fulfillment of planning 
sf;a,egrets,, ^ .buf ,far,..fjtom^ s.oft - towards.^aa?J.mpoverdJshed^.Tpeasaiifer^.s^ rT.h.e^s^-JE'»^ 
ministration of-Hand ’reforms'v-common Ity'•"HeYeTopmerrt^ programmes^ - a n d : '
regional 'development1 projects^proceeded' withinthe framework of trad?-
23
tional politics, propped up by foreign aid, ...
An Agricultural Tenancy Bill was presented to Parliament In 1968, 
Under it, model lease covenants were binding on the parties, rents payable 
in kind could not exceed one-third of harvested crops? and landowners 
could not terminate leases without the consent of a Tenancy Tribunal,
The ~B"i 11 was passed by the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate rejected it, 
and a Joint Session of Parliament failed to iron out the differences^
Success I ve .Par 1 i aments failed to pass, the Bill., w.h i.ch . began to attract.
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radical as well as conservative opposition, Haile Selassie could have
promulgated the. law by decreee (see 1955 Constitution, Art, 92) but failed
to do so, and the only substantive provisions relating to rural land
^ 2 5
tenures were therefore to be found in the Civil Code of I960,
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A first and tentative attempt to regulate agricultural tenancies 
ts found in Articles 2375"’3018 of the Code, These provisions treat the 
lease of land as simple contractual relationship, leaving the parties 
free, with minor exceptions, to determine the nature of their agreement. 
Many rules apply "unless otherwise agreed or provided by custom", or 
state that "nothing shall affect any ;cu-s,tom to the contra-ry'f, ~T.be.se 
express exceptions to a qeneral repeal of customary laws (Art, 3347(1)
- see Chapter One) apply to; determining who takes all major decisions 
concerning ..the exploitation of the land,, presumptions as to the rent - - 
owed, the payment of rent in kind, sub-leas mcp and the dura.t fon,.and termi 
ation arfd~renewal of 1 esses "(Att“s, “2*977  ^ 2990, 2 99 7, 3002-4 and 3006) , 
Given the extreme inequalities in the distribution of land in Ethiopia 
and gross differences in the bargaining power of landlord and tenant, 
this freedom of contract could only be genuinely exercised by the few.
In other words, feudal (or patron-client) tenure relations could be 
perpetuated under the guise of a neutral facilitative law.
The Ministry of Agriculture drafted model leases, but these could 
be expressly negated (Art. 2976) and were in practice simply Ignored.
No minimum or maximum duration of the lease was specified; a lifelong
feudal type of relation was therefore still possible under the Code.
>>v
Most leases were, Jn fact, unwritten and of indefinite duration, - and 
Article 3006(1) stated that they would be deemed to be for four years, 
terminable under the Code by gjvjng six monthsj^no.tice prior /to the 
expiration of the term (Art, .3PP3,).*. Th!st provision did not,,, however, 
"affect any custom to the contrary" (Art, 3006(2)) and the relevant 
custom was that the landlord could terminate the lease at will (to 
borrow a concept from English land law). In recent years, many tenants 
were evicted on very short notice, as a result of the spread of agri­
cultural mechanisation or of the landlord's desire to collect leasing 
premiums from new tenants, Since a continuing insecurity made tenants 
unwilling to invest in the land, provisions entitling them to compensa­
tion for improvements (Arts, 3016-18) were largely irrelevant,
Under the Code, the ceiling on rental payments in kind was three- 
fourths of the crop; and the landlord was entitled to half where both 
the lease and custom were silent as to rental payment, although the 
tenant was theoretically allowed to retain that which was necessary for 
subsistence (Arts. 2 9 9 0 - 2 ) .  Although Article 1360 formally abolished
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personal servitudes in relation to land, the absence of enforcement
mechanisms meant that tenants continued to perform a variety of personal
services, The Civil Code did little to alter customary rules, and most
of the people concerned were totally unaware of the Code provisions, If
Code rules were known, the courts could be counted on to interpret them
as wholly congruent with traditional law; in rist areas for example,
claims to land based on succession from an exceedingly remote ancestor
26were preferred to those recognised under the Civil Code, In any event, 
■this purely facilitative law was not Intended to redress longstanding 
imbalances,
In the only daring innovation he attempted, Rene David, the Civil 
Codedraftsman (see Chapter Seven), modelled provisions designed to regu­
late the collective exploitation of property under '’communal” (and no­
madic) tenures on the Kolkhoze rules found in the Soviet Agrarian Code,
In attempt jjig Jlq„ i ntroduce,. col 1 ect-i vi sed-agr-icul tu re "where" nor? "had 7
heretofore existed, David seemed to share the misunderstandings of many 
others concerning the nature of tenures in northern Ethiopia, His pre­
liminary draft was rejected by the Codification Commission that was dom­
inated by the traditional elite, and replaced by Articles 1489-1500, 
Starting from the proposition that an owners could use andxexploit his 
property as he saw fit (Article 1205), Article 1489 recognised the possi­
bility of land ownership by an "agrlcultura1,c o m m u n i t v ■but fails’t o v 1 
,^eflfi.ei..thisyCo.ncep.tv:^^These* vague1-and^p’oorTy^'tho'bght-oQf^pfo^f'£Tons
..were,-,never real I y< appf-i ed, and'- have''received^v:dlrfai led anafysts"from'*
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others.
Although the population density of Ethiopia Is relatively low, 
there are areas in which population pressure Is very heavy and the ex­
treme inequality in land distribution meant that some people were totally 
landless. Little was done to alter this situation. A 1952 Order which 
is not recorded in the Consolidated Laws of Ethiopia allowed landless 
and unemployed people to claim 20 hectares from the huge stock of 
Government land, as well as permitting officials in the military, police 
and civil service to claim one gasha (40 or more hectares). Although 
Government officials, including many members of the educated elite, were 
quick, to seek. 1 and . under this Order or, more simply, - through "a* di rect 
gift from the Emperor, few peasants were aware of the existence of the 
Order or were able to afford the lengthy procedure and bribery of local
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officials necessary to establish a claim, from 1942 to 1970, Govern­
ment land grants totalled five million hectares; 80% went to officials 
and 20% to the landless and unemployed, Only 400,000 hectares were 
granted under the 1952 O.rder, however, An Order for the Distribution 
of State Domain Lands, drafted in 1972, was never promulgated, it would 
have provided for the leasing of Government lands, subject to the con­
dition that particular crops -be cultivated under specified conditions, 
There was a probationary period of three years and no ceiling on hold- 
ings, presumably to enable wealthy people to acquire large concessions. 
Several, development projects, such as WADU.and AVA (discussed i nfra), 
experimented with resettlement programmes, but resettlement on any large 
spale would have overwhelmed the modest financial and admtn i s t-ra t i ve' 
capabilities of Haile Selassie's regime. - ______  .
C. Agrarian Administration
The Ministry of Land Reform was established in 1966 and empowered
to prepare, recommend and implement reforms, alter taxing arrangements,
distribute Government lands, and supervise settlement programmes, land
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registers and surveys. it was, until 1975, an isolated and low-status 
Ministry, and many of its functions were in fact performed by the Ministry 
of Interior, The Land Reform Ministry tended to attract modernising' ■ 
personnel who were allowed, In the absence of specifically-defined tasks,’ 
to write a .plethora of reports‘'which*, they‘were told, would be very 
carefully considered. By 1968 they had developed an ambitious progranme 
of tenancy reform and . registrat ion, cadastral surveys -and land registra­
tion, and a progressive taxation of unused lands, These policies were
complemented, in 1970, by demands for the abolition of patronage land
30 ■
grants and for a subsidised resettlement of the landless, Nothing 
came of this., apart from the 1968 Tenancy Bill (supra) that was refused * 
by Pariiament,
The First and Second Five-Year Plans favoured an individualisation 
of tenure, while the Third Plan ignored tenure issues, Agriculture 
accounted for only 6% of public investment during the 1960s, and a stra­
tegy of granting commercial concessions over limited areas was pursued.
For rural peasants,, extremely attenuated programs, including the half­
hearted promotion of cooperatives arid self-help projects, were offered 
by the low-powered Ministry of Community Development, These policies
could never have had a marked impact on rural Ethjopia, reflecting as
they did a concern for preserving established rural relations and for by-
passing policies aiming at a socio-economic equalisation, Haile .
Selassie’s programmes relied on a channelling of innovations through
traditional leaders, a “betting on the strong" which only served to
exacerbate inegalitarian power structures. Peasants were regarded as
inferiors who must be told what to do and who were expected to work
without pay on projects which benefitted rural el!tes, under the super-1
31vision of indolent and comparatively wealthy agents of the centre.
Proclamations, orders, and regulations promulgated under Haile
Selassie successfully evade, the issue of what, precisely, administra^ -
tors are expected to do in order to promote rural development. For
example, Ginsberg and Smith stress that an Ethiopian rural development*
is heavily dependent upon an educational system which is committed to
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social chahgfe, rural'heeds, and" sens Ible’ planbi ng 'prior i t iesf Under ”
•Haile Selassie, this was simply nof'the case; the educational system
followed a Western model in the pursuit of upward mobility for the
privileged few, who consistently demanded an urban lifestyle, There
were no strenuous attempts to ach i eve the Five-Year Plan targets related
to education. One reason for this state of affairs is that the law
governing educational administration is vague and irrelevant to rural
s- ••.deve*lopman>tm ■ T-he^mfS’ter • of ■< Edueafrhsrwnust-gncowrage^and'^ewTO^^«■
genera 1 - educat ion"; establ i sh publ ic:school s;: 11 cense pr ivate schools -:
and supervise curricula, students, and teacher training. No other
relevant law exists, apart from an unknown quantity of unpublished and
oftenrignored internal regulations! It is therefore impossible “to co-~
ordinate education with other rural development efforts or to assess
the Ministry's development activities in light of legal obligations.
Before these kinds of gaps can be filled, many careful policy decisions
must be made (see Chapter Five). In 197*t, the Derg announced a policy
of free and development-oriented education for everyone, but the impact
3 3
of this policy (if any) will not be felt for some time. Applying an 
analysis similar to that of the Ministry of Education, we find that those 
Ministries directly concerned with rural development - Agriculture, 
rGommun i ty; Development-, and' Interior— ? have wag tie-ly-* defined r standards £-of^  
performance which bear no relationship to the achievement of the plan
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priorities, or, indeed, to any other aspect of rural development,
The organisational framework of "semi-autonomous" agencies deal­
ing with important Ethiopian agricultural exports, such as the Coffee 
Board and the Grain Board and Corporation, suggests that they were 
designed to avoid some of the inadequacies of the purely bureaucratic 
Ethiopian organisat ions (see Chapters Three and Five), They were granted 
broad powers to process, store, market, sell, export, license, and con^ 
trol production and price, Criteria concerning explicit goals and the
■i
means of achieving them were, however, lacking once again: there is no
requirement that a high volume of quality commodities be provided'-for- 
export and domestic consumption. Governmental interventions in the 
market were generally weak and inconclusive. The Grafn Corporation, 
for example,- suffered from a shortage of capital and an absence of con-i : *
sis-tent pricing policies; it also lacked adequate market information,
■ *■ - - •• the administrative capacity toTmake,r small ^  "i so lated purchases and the
desire to expedite the delivery of foodstuffs to urban areas other than
Addis Ababa, The Corporation frequently failed to cover its* costs and,
because it accounted for only 5% of the wholesale grain trade, it failed
35to influence prices so as .to favour peasants,
D. ’Development1 Projects 
\ The absence of. general laws. g.Q-Vernj.ng- Ethiopian. rura 1 • development--vu-
n.vd'-vMyi’rte.'j •'t ' * '‘•'s' ’ *“ ■" ’ * v n'*' 1'
**£*■*-<*'<P£'9de:Q.t;s,.'k^ 5*,me.etnrtact-haX. c-onf 1 tet'kngHpo-l Tofes^haVefi 
t , 4.i.prodects.,~J.ru Lime-wuth* the- «i nteres^ts ^ of ’•fore i grr ald ’dOhbrs T’aiitiT;'T6£a'T'1' 
project employees. Disparate policies include'outright gifts of income 
(AVA), raising the political consciousness of peasants (CADU) , and push­
ing poor peasants off the land (Ada). The Ada Awraja Project, for ex­
ample, was supposed to test the transferability of a low budget "cata­
lytic" project design, through which rural development efforts could be 
diffused more widely. When expatriate Project employees decided, for 
reasons of their own, that this goal was not feasible, the emphasis was 
switched to experiments with least-cost combinations of inputs and infra­
structure, The latter research is being conducted throughout Ethiopia, 
while the former is a vital link between existing development projects 
. t . and,' P- broader, rural, development, Expl left cri-teria -coul-d have prevented1' 
this switch and forced Project employees to perform their tasks more 
thoroughly, There is also evidence to suggest that projects such as the
Awash Valley Authority (AVA) performed some of their functions in ah
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unconstitutional manner under the (suspended) 1955 Constitution,
The failure to achieve the purpose for which the Ada Project was
established is so significant because Ethiopian projects served to place
all of the available eggs (scarce resources, the status of bureaucratic
agencies) In a very few baskets. The short term success of the projects
was pursued at the expense of a long term diffusion of development, yet
the projects were unable to pay their own way, much less provide a re-'
turn on capital which could have been used to fund other projects. Most
.projects were located on roads rather than/ where most of the, peasants
live (and starve). They purported to encourage the individual farming -
of uneconomic plots, rather than a collectivisation which would have
been politically unacceptable under Haile Selassie, The result was, in
fact, the acceleration of agricultural mechanisation in project areas
"bft'd , ‘bft'etfr thier fevi c'titm * of" peasant sma 1 *1 holder s , ■j Never t hel ess y * the-" —  -
fact that project administrators had relatively clear and visible ob*'
jectives - and many of the. resources necessary to achieve them *■> meant
that the standard of efficiency*and competence in project administration
37was higher than for Ethiopian administration generally. We will briefly 
examine the three main projects,’ CADU, WADU and AVA, as well as a broader 
approach to. st imulat I ng productivity introduced In 197.0, the MPP, 
es<tabhi shed-vain* The-Gh iAad:a»tAw.ra^ a?:Qf ?Aiw.&s.i«wPi OG-e 
Swed i stfUeVel bprhbnt'"1 Ati'tht>K ty i n T 9 6 7 T ‘ at ’ a : ^ bner^tJ soC-icrecOnom-i-e^^ - 
development, emph'asisi ng1' participation’hy low-income farmers , ’ improved 
employment opportunities, reserach on inputs and intermediate technologies, 
and the training of local Project employees. Significant achievements 
• of the Project include the Introduction of dairy farming, the development 
of high-yield seed varieties and raising grain yields from 1,000 to 2,100 
kg. per hectare - and a not unrelated radicalisat ion of Project employees.
The estimated net revenue from the use of fertiliser and hybrid seeds 
is Eth. $126 per hectare annual ly,. and credit was made available on rela-. 
tively easy terms to ChMalo residents. (The collateral and security 
requirements for credit available in other regions from the Agro-Industrial 
Development Bank had the effect of making 80% of Ethiopia's peasants in- 
e4 igTbley :f u'ral ' mon'ey-'l enders charge ;an average, annual Interest;*
110%). Only 36% of the loans in Chilalo were repaid on time prior to the 
Revolution, and large landowners had the worst repayment records. They
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relied on the i r pol i t i ca 1 powe’r and th*e suborning of judges to resist 
the Project's demands for repayments, Larger landlords tended to dom­
inate the new cooperatives and credit resources, applying for benefits 
through their tenants, Uma Lele concludes that CADU's policies prevented 
the emergence of a sense of financial responsibi1ity,and that a local 
-- - involvement in financial matters would have been the-only mean-s of escape -
■30
from CADU's benign but suffocating paternalism, - . . . . . . . . . . . .
.... WADU was established in 1970 in Wolamo Awraja, Sidamo Province, by
■ a variety of foreign donors, The major goals-of WADU-differ s ignfficant-1 y 
from those of CADU and include: promoting a shift from subsistence towards
cash cropping, raising the cash incomes of highland farmers, resettling 
’ .. 1,750 families in the virtually unoccupied lowland areas that -had. been-.
cleared of malaria, and increasing the tax revenues received by Government. 
If the high costs of clearing and draining the lowlands-and settling- the
  farmers, are. i gporedthe..pet revenue realised from using improved inputs--
in lowland agriculture is Eth, $200 per hectare annually. Despite short­
ages of staff and research facilities, impressive increases in maize 
yeilds were recorded in Wolamo, In contrast with the partial successes 
- recorded by CADU in stimulating social change however, WADU was not de­
signed to promote social change and largely failed to do so, ■ Neverthe- ‘
• - s,
less, provincial elites opposed the extension of the Project, in spite
\ of their being its .prime beneficiaries, Just prior, the Revolution, there
•»«.. was,,,oheG;,a(g,r,i cu.l tutaje*te.ns ion. agent^far^eveny .3-3S-^farmers -i n-V/A'DU-and
<*.,« «• r 1 >: If7-0....In* .CAPUwh i.le..ex-tens lon-se.rvLi-ces wer-e-.vi. ittuaJ .Ly.^unobtal-mab le-»oufev.
39side the Project areas.
The Awash Valley Authority contains a variety of commercial con­
cessions that were granted to: a -Dutch-sugar refinery (HVA --see Chapter
Seven and i nfra), an Italian firm exporting fruits and vegetables, a 
British cotton consortium, a Japanese animal fodder concern and American 
cattle-breeding companies operating in conjunction with an AID livestock 
. .project, (These concess ions. were nat iongl i.sed. by the Derg in- 1975).. The 
profitability of- irrigated agriculture ’in the Valley was extremely high: ' 
the cotton concern, for example, was reputed to be the most profitable 
of its kind in the world. The combined incomes of the concessions dur~
„ , . ing the 1972 growing season totalled Eth, .$120 mi 1 1 ions, wi th future..
incomes estimated at $600 millions. The land utilised by the concessions 
was obtained by excluding nomaid herdsmen, As a gesture towards
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compensation,- a few of them were settled in the hope that they would 
cultivate cotton, When they declined to do so, they were paid.a high 
’imputed' income and more labour was brought in from outside the Valley.**0 
These and other projects were costly in terms of finance and 
trained manpower, and they could never be replicated nationwide,- The-- 
Minimum Package Program (MPP) was therefore funded by a variety of donor-s 
to provide that minimum of services required by peasants. The Program, 
and CADU and WADU as well, came to be supervised by the Extension and1 
Project Implementation Department (EPID), created within the Ministry 
of AgricuTture in 1971* Ten new MPPs were started each year and*-fjve- 
extension'agents were assigned to each Package area, encompassing-T6,000'- 
farmers living in close proximity to.an all-weather road, Each exten- 
sionareahas a marketing centre and a demonstration plot, and agents 
sell fertilizer and seeds on credit and, prior to the Revolution, en- 
couraged the formation of producer's cooperatives without promoting a 
large-scale social mobilisation, In one sense, the MPP was a success: 
from 1971 to 1975, its fertilizer sales rose from 9,500 to 78,700 quintals 
and seed sales from 222 to 3,175 quintals (1 quin, = 50 kg.), Many of 
these sales were, however, simply another obligation imposed on tenants 
by their landlords, who sold the bulk of the increased produce on their 
own account. The paucity of all-weather roads and tra i ne8' ex-tens ion
k\
agents continue to act as major constraints on the MPP strategy, now 
undertaken by Government^.]n conjunction with peasant associations (i nfra) .
E;"' -Commercial Agriculture •* «-«<■*.•* 1 t..r0 1
For Michael Stahl, the commercialisation and mechanisation of agri­
culture cohsitutes a "dynamic" which competed with the MPP for scarce 
resources under Haile Selassie, Commercialisation began in the 1950s in 
the Awash Valley and, during the 1960s, in the.areas surrounding Addis 
Ababa and i-n the coffee plantations .of .Kaffa Province,- Such agricultural., 
productivity gains as were recorded in Ethiopia.during the 1960s and 
early 1970s Were almost entirely the result of the mechanisation and 
commercialisat ion that were fostered and, to a lesser extent, funded by 
AID, FA0 and the World Bank, As Alan Hoben notes: --
the introduction of green-revolution inputs and mechanized 
..■.-t? - farm i ng- duri ng the late 1960s ..[allowed]' commercial, - *.-.!*■.<;
farming [to become] a more attractive investment than could 
be found in the urban or industrial sector. Weekend farmers
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from Addis Ababa, the businessman and bureaucrat alike, began 
leasing land from landlords in the fertile and accessible - *
regions, , ,
For the most part, the- nobi li ty- d id ncrt’take the initiative in.
commercial agriculture: cultural attitudes contained a prejudice against
commerce, most tenants were still paying their rents, and the absence
of nearby market towns or adequate transport reduced the potential
profitability in outlying areas, As in eighteenth century France, an
agrarian capitalism penetrated the accessible rural areas by feudal
means - politically rather than economically, Provincial elites were
ideally situated to benefit from these trends without exerting them"
selves; Gunnar Myrdal could have been writing about the rural areas
surrounding Addis Ababa when he contends that'
the big landlord in South Asia often managed to enjoy the 
pterogatives of ,a capital ist landlord without giving up the 
privileges of a feudal chief. At the same time, he avoided 
, nearly a. 11„ the obl igations or both;" the]'dtje^’nof'typleaffy^ " '' 
invest in improvements in land, nor does he contribute to the 
working capital of his tenants beyond sometimes supplying 
part of the s e e d . ^3
Commercial agriculture in Ethiopia, Patrick Gilkes argues, was
essentially turned towards import substitution, at high cost 
to the consumer, or to cash crops for exportst using mechanisa^ 
tion procedures that tend to benefit the larger landowners 
alone, . . . There appears to have been a growing alliance 
between the feudal and commercial forces'that has undercut ¥t 
-the dynamics* that would ""otherwise 8$Braie cfor 'change "wftfif n 
.. r, . -.the* E-t-h'iopian State.^ • -1 tufc-xtmoDta?)
„ *. *>• nj* * * ’ •* * -'J ' T '*,■ x*  ^ j !* m'£‘ ft* «
, > t r These-"commercia 1 forces” i ncl tided *mb TtTdit:fona 1 ‘agrfbus i nesses and 
foreign nationals who hadacquiredTEthiopian citizenship " chiefly 
Italians, Greeks and Armenians. While strengthening the status quo 
economically, these businessmen were incapable of becoming a domestic 
bourgeoisie and of demanding political change. The HVA Sugar Company 
was perhaps the most striking example of non-development through agri" 
business. One of Ethiopia's, largest employers, HVA produced sugar as an 
import substitute; the.result was an annual loss in Governmental tariff * 
revenues of approximately Eth. $9.5 millions, Despite the abolition of 
high transport costs and import tariffs, its monopoly position enabled 
HVA to increase the retail price of sugar by 30% from 1965 to 1975, in 
response to -the di v I dend • demands of'Dutch shareholders", "Th^e1 cfi v rdehds ,'i’r 
represent, at least in part, a net capital outflow of seven or eight times
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the total wages paid to Ethiopians; while additional employment was not 
generated' and wages faile'd to rise, output per mah/hour increased 50% 
over the decade and the 2% of the labour force that received 37% of the 
wages remitted most of their wages abroad,
The impact of commercial agriculture, in terms of the amounts of 
labour absorbed or taxes paid, was relatively small, Government subsi-^ - 
dised the use of fertilisers, improved seeds and pesticides, turning a 
blind, eye to the fact that, under agreements with foreign a i d . d o n o r s .. . 
a large percentage of these inputs were to be supplied to small holders 
only. Tractors and fuels were also subsidised, and each new tractor 
prompted the eviction of about twenty tenant families, thereby creating 
add i t iemarh unempl oyment and inequa1ities in income distribution," -The— ■ -
Derg is obviously keen to reverse these effects of previous policies, 
yet it has fallen heir to infrastructures, field layouts, and-machInery 
designed for large-scale operation.*4^  —
U JU JL A
Commercial agriculture was but a drop In the bucket; to sum up our 
discussion, traditional tenures were all but unaffected by Government's 
rural policies and the laws enacted, with great fanfare, from 1944 to 
1974, The investments by Government i ^ ’development projects and land 
reform which we have described were miniscule Inrelation to the need, in 
terms'*of'finance pcffftical commi tmeht and legal rd^ourcds, Legal man— : ’ 
oeuvres, far from promoting rural change, served only to further solidify 
peasant suspicions of Government's intentions. As a result, rural people 
continued to rely on traditional land laws which are based on outmoded 
sociaf-and production relations.- Agricultural and land tax laws promoted 
neither adequate revenue collection nor, as advocated, modest land redis­
tributions, rationalised land use, incentives to expand production and 
an expansion of the monetised sector of the economy. Government used 
few resources to'communicate the Civil Code provisions that were, in 
effect, a reification of the status quo. As such, it is not surprising 
that the Code failed to improve the socio-economic position of tenants 
and of "agricultural communities",
Any law which contained a semblance of genuine reform was either 
watered' down', never promulgated or, in the case of the 1952 Order promis­
ing land to the landless, not communicated to those affected. A conserva-
tive Parliament, consisting principally of large landowners and heavily 
under Haile 'Selass i e 1 s - i nf luehce-,-'cou id be r e N e d u p o n  to deflect- reforms , 
leaving the implementors - often equally conservative local rulers and 
administrators - to complete this task, even in the face of Government's
revenue needs, These land 'reform' failures were one of the Derg's major
justi f icat ions for its prorogation of Parliament (di.sc.uss.ed in Chapter 
Five) and its intense distrust of local administrators, Contrary to the 
views of many of the older Ethiopianists, Hai le Se-las-sie was not committed 
to land reform: he could have, for example, promulgated the 1968 and
1972 draft Bills as Decrees under Art, 92 of the (suspended) Constitution
of 1955 rather than wait for a puppet Parliament to proclaim theffl,"" When, 
in 1972,— the-Government of Sweden refused to finance the second stage-of - 
CADU until substantial land reforms were enacted, Haile Selassie could 
only throw up his hands and complain about Parliament, In the end,- 
Sweden gave the money,
Vi, The Rural Revo).ution ~ ~~ . - ~
The preceding Sect ion’attempts to trace the patterns- of rural ■under*' ■
development in twentieth century Ethiopia, On the eve of the Revolution,
mo'st Ethiopian!sts agreed with T.J, GoerIng that land reform "is the - -
virtual sine qua non of broadly-'based employment and output gains in  ------
highland Ethiopia, , , ," It can be argued, for example, that the 
' ahhusrt"* i ntrVease^bf 1% iff Ethiopia1 s"urban" popul dtfon; -although not i 
bly large by African standards, represents a "protest of the feet" against
48' -
rural living conditions fostered under traditional land tenures, The 
centrality of land reform was keenly felt by the Ethiopian Intelligentsia, 
for whom cries of "land to the tiller" encapsulated a vague ideology of 
development in which agricultural policies and detailed implementation 
strategies receive less emphasis, "Land to the tiller" Is the universal 
Agrarian Creed found in the Old Testament and the French Revolution, the
writings of Proudhon and Gandhi, and the philosophy underlying ko1khozes,
->■■■■- - - - - - • • -    - - 49".....  ->•" • .— ■   .
K?bbutzim and land reforms in Taiwan, It is so vage as to be meaning-'
-less and,, wh i J e. ..the ,..1.9 75- .Proclamation .served to, - ab sp.r b '.1 and to- ■ t h e,t M  I e r1'
as a part of Ethiopia Tikdem, the Derg's subsequent policies suggest
that an integrated rural development will be pursued.
Much of the proceeding Section is cast in the past tense to indicate
those tenures and laws that are tentatively or theoretically abrogated
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in rural Ethiopia, under the Derg's Public Ownership of Rural Lands 
50
Proclamation. A brief 'legislative history' of this March 1975
51
Proclamation is presented in the footnote, and shows that successive 
drafts display the same leftward march in the Derg's thinking that 
occurred in the area of constitutional law (see Chapters Four and Five), 
To the extent that this Proclamation remains unimplemented, unenforced 
or unenforceable, traditional tenures will, of course, continue to in­
fluence events in rural Ethiopia. Given the problems related to the 
legal penetration of the rural areas (see Chapter Two) and the numerous 
revolts that occurred in opposition to land reform (inf ra), t-r-ad i t iona 1 
tenu-neS‘ have not d i sappea red-overn ight p  at the stroke-ofa perrp
. The Derg was unwi 31 i.ng. and unable to grapple with the intimidating 
complexities of traditional tenures, and simply stated, in Article 3(1) 
of the A 975 Proclamation, that: “All 'rural lands shall be the collec­
tive property of the Ethiopian people," Thus, pre-existing landlord and 
tenant relations and individual, individual-ancrestral, village, and 
nomadic tenures are theoretically abolished, along with related rental 
payments and servitudes. The meaning of this conversion to collective
property is not altogether clear, although peasant associations in the
v ■ 52
South are to redistribute Hi 1-defined "possessory rights" in the land.
Article 32 repeals inconsistent laws without naming them; many of Haile
Selassie's 'reforms' therefore disappear. Peasant associations are now
to perform a variety "of functions, and any underlying reason for the
agricultural communities rules found in Civil Code Articles 1^89-1500
vanishes. Likewise, land lease provisions found in Articles 2975^3018 .
are no longer meaningful, grounded as they are in the concept of an
exploitation of property by a private owner. Legal discriminations
against nomadic tenures, which were considered to be within the State
Domain under interpretations of Article 130(d) of the (suspended) Consti
■tution of 1955 and Articles 11A6-59 and 1194 of the CivH Code, are
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eliminated. The 1 9 ^  Land Tax Proclamation, was based on private land 
ownership and is therefore repealed, although the Agricultural Income. 
Tax Proclamation remained in effect until January 197b, since income 
is not dependent upon ownership, Finally, the military, police, civil 
servants and landless peasants can no longer claim ownership of a piece 




Only a brief review-of a complex land reform can be offered in this
Chapter, and the reader may wish to examine the other analyses cited in 
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the footnote. While the legal format of land reform resembles the one
created under laws enacted in Yugoslavia from 19^5 to 1953, Ethiopia's
is far more .ambitious than the land reforms attempted in Yugoslavia or,
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for that matter, in Tanxania or China, Prior to the 1975 Proclamation,
the Derg's activities were designed to secure an urban power base;
peasants and the politics of numbers were tacitly irrelevant to a con-
tinuing paternal, factional and urbanised political style. Through land
reform, the Derg hopes to build a power base among the peasantry and to
make, its revolutionary changes irreversible. Depriving traditional
elites of a primary source of wealth and power in rural areas - land -
the Derg sought to drive a wedge between these elites and the peasantry,'
There'is also a strain of high 'Idea 1 ism In the Derg 1 s thinking ^ and,
as the Prologue to the Proclamation indicates, the Derg recognises the
centrality of land reform to a broadly-based rural development:
a person's right, honour, status and standard of living is 
determined by his relation to the land; . . .  it is essential 
to fundamentally alter the existing agrarian relations ;so that 
the Ethiopian peasant masses , , . may be liberated from age- 
old feudal oppression, injustice, poverty and disease, and in 
order to lay the basis upon which all Ethiopians may henceforth 
r.% v ® « a 1-ftv e q.u a .11X. y y * f r ee d om, * a n d ufira-tert n  ^{j| ti.}- ,ut o - 136 *>***» *T
mtv-a***«^Preas^agf.jcuXfcur al, product i on^and.to^make- '-t-he^ f i*l l-er^he* ’ownerr*** 
of the fruits of his labour, it is necessary to release the 
productive forces of the rural economy by liquidating the feudal 
system . , *, to provide work for all-rural people , , , [and] 
to narrow the gap in rural wealth and income, , , ,
In one of the shortest and most sweeping of contemporary land reform
packages, the various Ethiopian tenures and tenancies are replaced by 
"possessory rights." Under Articles h and 5, land must be cultivated 
personally and transfers of land are prohibited, except for succession 
by the-wife or children, with minor eh i Idren preferred, No attempt is"' 
made to sever the link, between landholding and kinship that was deemed 
inconsistent with rural socialism in China. Beyond a simple possession, 
apparently at will, the other common incidents of a land ownership - 
legally-guaranteed rights of use and management and to income, the capi­
tal and broadly to transfer the lantf - have apparently been abolished in
Ethiopia, although the position is far from clear. Wide variations can
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be found under the rubric of a "public" ownership of land, and it is
ironic that David's Kolkhoze provisos were deleted-from the Ethiopian
Civil Code in I960, since the occupiers of land now have legal rights
57and obiigat ions similar to those of kolkhoze members,
Which benefits flow from Ethiopia's rural* land nationalisation 
policy that could not have been obtained from a more popularly acceptable 
and less radical step, such as confiscation and redistribution of estates 
exceeding 80 hectares? Aside from the very real possibility that Govern- • 
ment_wi11 attempt to control peasants politically through their land, 
there is only one benefit: as the holder of the ultimate title -to all
land,' Government can require certa! nr,pat“terns-of *use; - cuTri vat-ion~-(whetbef~ * 
individual or col lect i ve)conservat ion, harvest-ing^and market! ng. a.s._pren. .. 
conditions to continued possession of the*land, The 1975 Proclamation 
makes slight mention of this policy, which has founq’so much favour i.i 
Tanzania, Article 29 empowers the Ministry of Land Reform to "issue 
regulations to give effect to the purposes and provisions of this Procla­
mation," and peasant associations are required to follow such land-use 
directives as are issued (Art, 10(2)),
If land-use regulations are to be created for Ethiopia, they should 
be adopted quickly so that the lengthy implementation process can begin
• i
before peasants assert land-use notions of their own, A serious problem 
would-thdn remain: previous experience indicates that it would be vir~
tually impossible to enforce use regulations, by taking._a.way the peasants’ 
land. In the absence of effective regulations, however, the nationalisa­
tion of land is in large measure irrelevant, from the standpoint of 
development; the adoption of innovations js not made a quid pro quo of 
a security of tenure, Peasant associations might as well redistribute 
or merely recognise the 'freeholds1 that would be greatly preferred by 
peasants since, without appropriate governmental regulation and super­
vision, security of tenure is totally dependent on the quality of politics 
in a local peasant association. . .. . .
B, Peasant Associations
Under Articles 8and 10 of the Proclamation, .1 oca l_pea.sa.-nk- assoc fa- , 
tions are established, and their functions include: administering and
conserving-public property; establishing Vvillagisation programmes".; and;. . * 
marketing, credit, labour, and related cooperative associations; and
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building, with Government assistance, clinics and schools, There is no
automatic right to membership in these associations which, in southern
Ethiopia, "redistribute" nationalised land in equal plots that are no
.
larger than ten hectares (25 acres) per family, This maximum farm'size
helps to satisfy land hunger, promotes egalitarianism, encourages increased
production on existing land rather than the desire to acquire more land
and represents a total repudiation of traditional tenures,*A-2-5~acre..........
• ■ - - - farm is, however, sub-optimal from the standpoinf'of 'introducing the —  -
agricultural technologies of developed countries*, this will have to be
done t  if at all - on a cooperative or collectivised basis, • - -
In Northern and Central Ethiopia, peasants are simply accorded
■ ’ "possessory rights over the lands they presently till" (Art, 15), and
their associations have the "main function" of promoting-cooperative
farms (Art, 23). The Derg is obviously reluctant unduly to irritate the
„   . .yo.l ajt,i J ,£. Japjvj arnXa. .and, JErJ treansT or-to undertake-extens ive -superv i sory— .--- w---
responsibilities in provinces where its mandate is most open to dispute,
Also, a redistribution of land is not as essential as it is for southern
farmers: there are fewer tenants in northern and central Ethiopia, many
of these tenants owned part of the land they tilled, and absentee owner-1
ship and i nequa.l i t i es in the distribution of land were not as marked.
If Article 19 is fully implemented, however, it would freeze the transi-
_ tory patterns of landholding that arose junder kinship and vi 1 ,1age. (rist
i ..t■- rest, vde.sa^i. tenu,res.^fj1usit< prJors.tOi.the^.Revolutuon fn^tbe »Tongueuny>vtsbi*s
I'S 57. W  f. i ^  ^ f-i* pol i cyr wid*^ cause * t hose i communal-5 procedtn?es ^fcha-t^ are-'.'.u sed--* boomed J a te U *i»'A fi » *31*K8*TJ J
59claims to land, and which the Proclamation seeks .to exploit, to atrophy.
Article 2A abruptly shifts government policy by recognising the 
possessory rights of nomadic■peoples over customary grazing and agricul­
tural land.. Optimistically, associations of nomads are proclaimed under 
Article 26, in order to promote cooperative grazing and water use - the 
major sources of conflict among kin groups in arid areas. Ultimately, 
political control over nomads can only be achieved by permanently locating 
them and settling colons in their midst. The Derg has shown little inter­
est in these kinds of policies to date, and the Somali invasion of the 
Ogaden has forestalled reforms there,
  ... . . It was obvious from, the begi nni ng. that the prov i s ions of the , land......
reform Proclamation (No. 31 of 1975) relating to peasant associations
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organised them in too vague a manner. Their functions were clarified and 
expanded by Proclamation 71 of December 1975,^° and they became a signi­
ficant cog in a new and decentralised system of local administration. A 
peasant association must be registered with the land reform Ministry and 
is accorded legal personality, the power to sue and to issue and implement 
internal regulations and the liability to be sued, so as to "enable
peasants to secure and safeguard their political, economic and social
61
rights" and to "work col 1 ect.ively".
Functionally specialised cooperatives are envisaged, which are some­
what similar to Tanzania's. They are distinct from each peasant asso­
ciation, ajid„;Q^ assistance, i s only- promi sed with regard1 to '"co'h-”
struction"and land redistributions. If these cooperatives are to-bear-- 
the brunt of rural development activity, they will have an uphill fight
to estab1ish themselves. Group activities have never been voluntafyTor '
cooperative among many of Ethiopia's ethnic groups and, when they took 
place, traditional elites usually organised them. Prior to the Revolu­
tion, the self-help activities of traditional voluntary associations 
(equbs, ed ? rs, mahabers, waqfs) had a significant impact in a few areas, 
particularly in the South. Political and economic activities of volun­
tary associations were, however, actively discouraged under Haile Selassie, 
and the leadership of the associations was dominated by provincial elites.^ 
The Derg has attempted to co-opt these associations, but displays little 
■Tnte resT> * n - f os ter rng:~neW"'o*nes t " m ' 'L ’ ^ ? '
Many of the functions of voluntary associations are now performed 
by the service and producers' cooperatives created under Proclamation 71; 
another Proclamation.concerning their organisation and administration is 
forthcoming (Art. 9). Service coops are voluntarily created by from 
three to ten local peasant associations (without affecting their’legal 
personalities) and are loosely supervised by the relevant woreda (district)
peasant as.soc.iat ion (d i scussed i nf ra) . In-addition to functions like J
those of the local peasant’ associations, service coops shall: "procure
crop expansion services", tractor services, flour mills and improved 
agricultural implements; market its members' produce "at fair prices"; 
grant loans "at fair Interest rates"; provide facilities for storage, 
savings and the supply of consumer goods; promote cottage industries; 
provide education in "social i si' phi losOphy" ’arid1 c6operative management’, 
and to enhance political consciousness and to encourage the formation of 
producers' coops (Art, 7).
377
These producers’ cooperatives are "estabIished voluntarily by
peasants [sic] associations", to place the "main instruments of produce
tion" under the "control" and/or the "ownership" of society and to form
collective working groups for mutual and social benefit, No compulsion
has In fact been used to establish these {somewhat Chinese-sty1e) coops,
a fact that led Peter Enahoro to observe that the Revolution is less
rigid than it presumes; the Derg's ideology thus attracts an unncessary- 
63od 1um.
Producers' coops may sue and be sued and issue internal regulations, 
but as a result, perhaps, of sloppy draftsmanship, they have no separate 
legal persona*! i ky*»or^author<.i t-y^feo--implement, regul at ions, .. TheTr . o t h e r , . 
functions include: helping "poor and middle peasants" and advancing them
to leadership roles; enhancing political consciousness, democratic rights 
and unity; abolishing exploitat ion;« raising' production and improving 
the instruments of production; and paying members according to the qual­
ity and quantity of their work, subject to the maintenance of a "special 
welfare fund" (Art, 8), . ..
in addition to clarifying matters of general administration somewhat, 
Proclamation 71 provides that members and leaders of peasant association 
"defense squads" are elected for two yeafs "from the broad masses of 
peasants" and function as a police force and as the executive arm of 
peasant association executive committees and judicial tribunals, They 
also perform such' %etfuriiry kn'd *d%fem entities'* aTParer'T<equI red" by-centra 1 
Government (Arts. 11-13)* Women’s associations may establish "professional 
associations" and "mobile teams", which "follow" the political, economic 
and social problems of their members and "do everything necessary" to 
secure members1 rights (Art, 10). That the vagueness of the provisions 
concerning women stands out in a generally vague Proclamation reflects 
the fact that only an extremely complex law could encompass wide varia­
tions in the degree of sexual equality among Ethiopian ethnic groups,
It is also doubtful that urbanised"sold \ers can understand and respond 
to the interests of rural women,
in March 1975, higher-1evel woreda (district) and awraja (sub-province 
peasant associati'ons were created' under Art i'cle ^ Tf df ProtT^niat ion''3 V,
Once again, formal structures are vague: woreda associations are "composed
of delegates"'from •locat-as'So'ci a rioti-s who''coord i nate local activities-.,.
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equalise peasant landholdings and allot unoccupied land to the landless, 
Awraja'assoclations, “composed of delegates1' from woreda associations, 
coordinate the activities of the woredas, These coordination functions 
are not continued to the provincial and national level and, as there are 
108 awrajas in Ethiopia, a great diversity of activity has resulted, 
although the Ministry of “-EandH^efor-nv has -undertaken -a Timi ted~-degree -
coord i nation.
Another set of institutions involved in the coordination of policy 
-making and implementation was created under Proclamation No, 71: Revolu­
tion and Development Committees, established at the woreda, awraja, pro­
vincial and, at the national 1evel, a""permanent central committee"; '’ 
These committees are a tempor-ary expeddent’,-and -wil l d i sappear-when-a * - ■ - 
local self-administration law is issued. Proclamation 71 perpetuates 
the defects found in Ethiopia's unintegrated prefeetural system of local
administration (see Chapter Three); the Committees "shall not interfere
64
with technical matters of government offices," , The Articles enumerat­
ing the powers and duties of these Committees were repealed and replaced
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by Proclamation No. .115 in May 1977, This law illustrates the Derg's 
increasingly militant leftism; the Committees were more broadly empowered 
"to mobilise full moral, material and other support", in order to "main­
tain the unity and integrity of the Revolutionary Motherland" and "to 
completely eradicate feudalism, imperialism and bureaucratic capitalism" 
(Prologue).
In particular, the Revolution and Development Committees are expected 
to: deta*in and prosecute those who engage in "anti-revolutionary" or
"anti-unity" acts or who sabotage production or marketing arrangements; 
coordinate battlefield aid; protect public property; "agitate and rally 
the broad masses", promote cultural education and prepare the way for 
local self-administration'; and "control and supervise Government and mass 
organisations" (Arts. 3, 6), These powers, and the latteronein particu­
lar, are extremely broad and vague, Under them, the Committees are begin­
ning to supplant both peasant associations and the Ministry of Interior's 
hierarchy, particularly in light of the need to coordinate defense efforts 
during the Ethio-Somali War, While the pretense of only sending volun­
teers from the urban areas to fight, the Somalis was maintained, a compul­
sory conscription was used in the rural.areas, These Committees are com­
posed of representatives of the military, police and most of the ministrie
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plus, at the woreda and awraja levels, representatiyes of peasant asso- ■ 
ciations, urban dwellers associations (see Chapter Seven), women's and 
youth organi sat ions. and..the A11-Ethio-p.ia Trade Union (see Chapter Seven), 
Elected representatives are therefore excluded from the upper reaches 
of political and administrative activity once again, •
In September 1975 the Ministry of Land Reform announced that 16,000 
peasant associations with 4,5 million members had been formed, By May 
1977 the number of associations had reportedly grown to 60,000, These • ~< 
.figures, and the organisational stability they imply, should be received 
with caution, although the figure of 54,000 hectares of choice, farmland
" d i'strtbuted 'by -’Government' to- the^-peasant'^a'ssaefa tj ons i s' probabiy-aecu-'- ----
- • -r-atey - ProcTama-fcTons 31 and 71 .--do^ not. detail-the, .ways In. which peasant- .....
associations are to be run but, in practice, a general assembly formulates 
policies and elects an executive committee, The committee executes 
assembly directives and consists typically of 1iterate and numerate 
former small landowners who had behaved.well towards peasants and who 
are able to stand up to local bureaucrats,^
C , New Approaches to Rural Administration
Revolution and Development Committees are an obvious and radical de~
parture from the administrative practices of Haile Selassl^ (see Chapter
Three) and the Derg's approach to central administration (see Chapter
s? wi .Tfchfe ^emec-'ha^ -^ T h i&  adj; hoc dm t jvl®t<r»a t4on*©f 1 a nd c isef o*rsm wfeym c
secondary school and'uni versity studenfs was termed the Progress Through
Cooperation, Enlightenment, and Work Campaign ~ .or zemecha, an Amharic
equivalent of jehad or military campaign, Beginning in November 1974^
/  ■ 
most of the 30,000 students were-^sent to rural areas* largely in the
South. In addition to land reform and the-Derg's policy of keeping dissi-^
dent youth out of Addis Ababa, the students were expected to explain
Ethiopia Tikdem to the peasants, to improve literacy, to foster self-
reliance, to eradicate "reactionary" traditional beliefs and to assist
j . . .  67drought victims*
The students were initially left unsupervised by the military and
i
. police and were thus able to define their own strategies, which tended
to be even more radical than those found in the land reform Proclamation.
’ Students' promoted col lectiVe farming, • red Ts.tr i buted pl ow.-oxeh, ..forced,.,'the.; «- • \
election of landless peasants and members of minority groups to leadership
\. re.'K ; .1
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roles, hounded “enemies of the peasants1' and, in some cases, supplied
guns to the peasants, Clashes between students and residents of Sjdamo
and Hararghe Provinces during April 1975 led the Derg to assert a measure '
68
of control over the students, It was felt, however, that the services
of zemecha students would be needed in the future and, in August 1975,
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the campaign was extended to September 1978, Many students became 
dissatisfied with rural living conditions, the pace of rural reforms and/ 
or the lack of progress towards civilian rule, and about half of them 
drifted back to the urban areas, In.December 1975, the Derg pro­
claimed its willingness to exonerate a variety of offenses committed by 
zemecha students, provided the students performed such tasks as were 
prescribed by the zemecha headquarters,^ By this time, however, many 
of the students had become involved in the urban opposition politics that 
were described in Chapter Four,
One of the most interesting innovations found in Proclamations 31 
" and * 74ij i -sj <thej d^vd-a i on - of 'Lmp lemen ta t ion-’ respons i b Mit1 es«;be'tweenw.peasant~*»^-« 
associations and the central bureaucracy, a d iv i s ion ,wh:jch largely bypasses 
local administrators serving within the Ministry of interior that had 
been hitherto dominated by rural and traditional elites (see Chapter 
Three), As balabats, chi kashums, etc, were usually landowners as well 
as unpaid local administrators, land reform, particularly In the South, 
put an end to the lower levels of administration as wel 1 as to landlord** 
ism|t As in.many other.. Th.l rd W o r ld  s.tates, the,Ethiopian.bureaucracy ist 
Lmani feS^l^H'nca-pable^of^copl ng^ '-wl't-b^ many-of'^ fehe d^emandstT'a-nd'iG.ha.lleagesi 
'is'6frtdeVeT ojDfn'&W1 Chapter “F i ve)-.’- ■ the":eve,'ofT the *land? reform*
Ministry of Land Reform had only 200-300 employees with eight to twelve 
years of education; most of these had been recruited direct from school 
during the previous two years,, Additional manpower (including zemecha 
students) was therefore requisitioned immediately, From the outset, it 
was realised that the detailed implementation of an Ethiopian land reform 
could not proceed .from-the top downwards-; It had to be given over to . . 
local organisations like the peasant associations,^ For the most part, 
the Proclamations are structured so as to create few of. the additional 
burdens that land reforms have placed upon administrators in other states.
Under Proclamation 31, the Ministry of Land Reform “shall notify 
■ and explain to the*-public the provisions and aims" of the. Proclamation 
“shall, with the cooperation of the Ministry of interior, help in the
JPWifwr
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.formation of peasant assoc | at ions • at every level'1; sha 11 es tabl i sh woreda- 
and awraja-level land registers, assigning surveyors to help In this task; 
and shall assign at least one Land Reform Officer to each of the 550 
woredas to explain the purposes of the Proclamation and to advise peasant 
associations (Arts, 12-13, 15), The performance of these mandatory func­
tions vastly increases the scope of the Ministry’s operations but, based 
on the previous experiences of rural Community Development Officers for 
example, the purely advisory functions of-the L'and Reform Officer mu'st - 
be more carefully structured and formalised, Sound advice has its de- ' 
sired impact in Ethiopia only if it comes from a person with a great deal 
of-authority-., A-merger of the* M i n-i’Stries -bf A'grTcul ftife a'ffd'Xa'ffd "Re'fdfm 
.apparent 1 y. occurred, in 1976, but-further- Information* l*s >unava-11 ab»4e*ernd 
no law to that effect was published.
Reform functions given to the Government as a whole include the'
punishment of offenses against the Proclamation, and the expropriation
of peasant association land "for public purposes such a$ schools, hospi­
tals, roads, offices, military bases and agricultural projects” . The 
Government "shall make good such damage'as it may cause", and its powers 
of intervention for "public purposes", regardless of the views of peasant 
associations, may indicate an intention to "fence them out" from these 
activities. But the Government makes no explicit promise to promote 
rural development apart from settling nomads and the landless for farm*' 
ing purposes, establishing cottage industries, improving nomadic grazing 
areas, and.digging wells in arid areas1 (Proc, 31, Arts, 10(1), (6), 16-7, 
27),
A Compensation Commission has been established (see Chapter Seven),
but land reform administrators do not have to concern themselves with
this issue, which occupies so much of the time of bureaucrats in many
other Third World states, No compensation is given for land, forests or ■
"tree crops" (including the coffee bushes that hitherto constituted ex*’
tremely-profitable investments),' but'"fair compensation" is promised for
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movables and "permanent works on the land", "Fair compensation" has no- 
legal meaning in Ethiopia, and there appears to be no reason to compensate 
on the basis of land values which reflect the political monopoly hitherto 
enjoyed by feudal landowners or commercial concessionaires, This is the
‘ 73approach adopted by courts in several other Third World states,.
The Minister of Land Reform decides whether a large-scale farm -
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obscurely defined as being mechanised, or engaging in modern animal
husbandry - is to be a state farm, a cooperative farm, or redistributed
as plots for individual tillers, Until this decision is made, the
Government supervises the farm and its former owners are required to run 
7k
it. The official Government position is that land from large-scale 
farms will be distributed to peasant associations’, collectivisation re­
mains a distant goal, This policy is a wise one, in the sense that It 
,-r — ^voids—ad.d-htronadr admi ni strat i ve burdens, “but 'many-"of Government’s
actions contradict it, For example, there has been a limited collecti- 
vfsec) resettlement of the"Tifnd 1 ess and the urban unemployed on large- 
scale farms and production may have declined, Many Ethiopian peasants
are violently opposed to col lecti've farmi'ngj’'according to Allan Hoben’,
75they dream of becoming kulaks ,
D, New Rural Policies and Projects
“Land to the tiller" can only be a first step, albeit an important 
one, towards an integrated rural development strategy, The Derg has 
certainly not been idle since the land reform decree of March 1975, and 
the kinds__pf institutional reforms.we analysed in this section are both 
necessary and cheap - in terms of scarce capital, foreign exchange, and 
highly-trained manpower - but costly from the standpoint of absorbing 
coercive resources. These institutional•reforms'cannot, however, mark­
edly improve rural development‘.prospects ffthe new institutions have no 
viable programmes to administer, We shall now describe the progress 
that has been made on this front, in the areas of rural taxation, the 
partial reorgani sat ion of agricultural 'projects’'and state farms, and the 
overhaul' of grain marketing arrangements - a crucial link between centres 
and peripheries, While the Derg has not promulgated a detailed develop­
ment plan.
it has , , , stated in a variety of contexts that increased 
- production of food grains i s ■ one. of ;'It$ hi gfrest priorities ■* T
for development in general and rural development In partlcu-
lar,76
Despite the defects in Haile Selassie's land, rental and agricultural 
income taxes that we discussed in Chapter Three, Eth: $35*5 millions was 
collected under them during fiscal 1973“7^ . Although the agricultural 
income tax survived«the land reform - as Income is not dependent on owner­
ship - peasants were exceedingly reluctant to pay it. In January 1976,
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a new "rural land use fee" and agricultural income tax were decreed, 
on the basis that it is the "national duty of every peasant*1, by virtue 
of his right to use land, to contribute to funds specifically earmarked 
_ for rural -development programmes,^ Peasant associations submit lists 
of farmers in their locality to a tax office which registers the lists - 
the beginnings, perhaps, of a more centralised control over land use.
Peasant association members then pay a land use fee of Eth. $3 annually, 
non-members pay and the tax liability of Government farms is assessed
70
at the rate of $2 per hectare,
In addition to this fee, the local peasant association (the "tax’ 
collector" - an important innovation), or the tax office, collects a tax 
on income derived from agricul-tiire^agf fcuftural processingcattle 
breeding or forestry. Peasant associations receive 2% of the sums col-' 
lected: while the shortage of honest and competent bureaucrats makes
colJecfjons^Jby associ.at ions a necessary-expedient; i t ’ai Sos'rapreggnt^ ’
effective means of funding them and a significant curb on corruption.
The tax payable on incomes below $1,200 ranges from $3 (on incomes below 
$■600, compared with $1,50 under Haile Selassie) to $6, Taxpayers earn­
ing more than $1,200 can deduct "necessary" expenses and depreciation on 
equipment (a vague provision) , and are subject* to a si iding,seale of from 
15% to 70% of net income. Government farms pay tax at a flat rate of
i 50%. Income is either declared by the-taxpayer or estimated by * t h e - t a x - -
ntr* i . e  -*?■■ r-c ’ ' ' w ' "f*ta k r'*' *•’ v  ^, -
. PpJ>|ecit;pr^1pin.;^oJff-l.ee->, whose, est imate- rema^n-s^of fhb-t i^-for-thefnhe^tr‘fHffeecArjE:f
^ s-.y.ea,r.sNo,..-sa-f eguards aga-Inst- corrupt- Os'tTmafes,cby "tSx'Wficfesp"major' 
problem under Haile Selassie, are mentioned. Where more than $6,000 is 
earned, the taxpayer must keep a set of books - an extremely optimistic- 
requirement (see Chapter Seven). As before, a taxpayer who is dissatis­
fied with the assessment can appeal to a Woreda Tax Assessment Committee,
after depositing 75% of the sum assessed, A further appeal, on questions'
79of law only, lies to the Awraja Court, * ..
The n e t ’effect of these taxes is to increase the'burden on the poor" 
est and wealthiest of peasants and markedly to reduce the rate payable in 
the middle, to the detriment to the national treasury, As the ten hectare 
ceiling imposed by the land reform Proclamation will keep the annual 
incomes of most taxpayers below $1,200, the new ■ 1 aw-serves ■ to sdmpl'rfy ; 
rural tax collection. Under the new Proclamation, $23-7 millions was 
raised In fiscal 137S~76 - a tribute to the effectiveness of peasant
associations, once the numerous rebellions that frustrated tax collections
in many areas are taken Into account, Several anomalies in rural taxa-
tion did arise, however, including a- report- that officials had seemingly
resurrected the traditional tithe and were demanding 10% of peasants'
80crops in parts of northern Ethiopia,
Under the Derg, the Minimum Package Project (MPP), admini ster-ed by 
EPID (supra), was extended to cover additional rural*areasj tentative 
contacts with peasant associations and coops were developed and the MPP 
■also expanded its programmes relating to livestock, During the 1974-5 
growing season, for example, C'ADU and the MPP nearly doubled their sales 
of agricultural inputs. There are still too. few extension agents however,
- and they a re ill -pa id, i 11 -1 ra triad Sod eqO i pjted i th Sh ' i OSdequa te pack- *
c * , 81age of 1 nputs,
A Settlement Authority was established In February 1976 and, by 
June, ittwas administering 21 settlements covering 12,000 hectares,- The - 
Authority coordinates programmes for the settlement of landless peasants' 
noma.ds and the urban unemployed, These settlements are designed to im­
plement land reforms, utilise Idle lands and resettle'those who are dis­
placed by the forest, soil and water conservation programmes that are, 
for the most part, still forthcoming, It is also expressly stated that;
"All Public Authorities shall cooperate with the Authority in matters
8 2
relating to settlement." The Authority is structured in a manner that. 
.I^ JaeCprfci ng^ommpnpj 3 ce. under.. E t h-topiart-a.dm \ n-i s t rat I ve~law * - i t *4-fr 
~,descr j£jed^&s, ajaJJautonomous" agencyv..w.ntKv7a-:Tu 1 Wsjudicial persona 14<tyW^- • 
under the djrection of a General Manager, The Manager is the "Chief 
executive officer": he "shall direct and supervise , * , operations and 
management subject to the general direction of the Board." In particular, 
the General Manager "shall": determine staffihgf draft work programmes
and budgets for the Board’s approval, Incur expenditures, and "to the 
extent necessary for , , t -efficient administration, delegate his author­
ity, . , The powers and duties of the Authorfty*actual 1y vest in the 
Board, which recommends the appointment of a Manager to. the Derg. The 
Board consists of the Ministers of Lands, Agriculture, Interior and Labour 
and the Commissioners of Planning and of Relief and Rehabilitation,
Serious problems could artse-concerning what constitutes a "general 
direction of the Board" and at what point a manager sha11 delegate his 
authority, in view of a traditional reluctance to delegate (see Chapter
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Three),
In April 1976, a Rural Projects Agency was created to plan, con­
struct and maintain "buildings and projects" for educational, health or 
agricultural purposes, Its powers include designing buildings or pro­
mulgating construction standards and ensuring conformity with plans and 
standards. The Agency can contract out onlelegate its duties, and it 
is identical structurally to the Settlement Authority, except that the 
Board consists of the Ministers of-PublJc Works, Education, Health,
Agriculture, Interior and Finance or their representatives - and the 
8A
Gneral Manager, Haile Selas«sie!s Ministers, some of whom were over- 
worked, usually sent powerless subordinates to an endless procession of 
board meetings, at..which nothi rig 'ever "got 'doneT The Derg is' perpetuating*
these practices, and the number of boards is growing exponentially, The
likely result is that* functional autonomy will continue to be little 
.JUQxe. than, an,.excuse .for. ..inaction and, for--an«inab-i 1 j ty* to-fntroduce *•
direct but meaningful controls over policy-making within the Agencies,
The only means of circumventing these tendencies under existing adminis- 
trative laws and practices would be toconfer real authority upon sub- 
ordinates with regard to particular agencies, and to then hold them
strictly accountable for its exercise (see Chapter Five),
"V
A Horticultural Development Agency was set up in April 1976 "to pro­
mote, encourage and coordinate, horti,cu]i tyral development", In order to -  r - -
*,”ti : ......... * ' ’i
* ***»?«« JppmYAJr-he abffd - of Aslowt* cos t^ food s tu f f s~f ^p r 6 m m * a g Pictif f & ™
export&h &bcL>4Borease* ernpToyernenty«'-The«Agencyi r n6 'fid\dd e f *******■^ T **'*** 
Vising the Ministry of Commerce concerning the licensing of -traders; ‘ ~ '
with regard to exports, establishing cultivation practices, fixing and 
collecting levies (cess), and inspecting products'at the port of embarka-' * ’ 
tion; assisting the extension service in establishing storage and process­
ing facilities; and providing seeds and seedVi'ngs, The structure of this 
Agency is identical to thaf of the Projects .Agency, supra, except- that •
... ■ “ v- • * ■ .' 33s ■ *- ■*
the Board~is constituted by a different set of officials.
Six regional Agricultural Development Corporations were created in 
February and’ March 1976 by Regulations promulgated under the 1975 Public 
Enterprises Proclamation (see Chapter Seven)* The Upper, Middle and
(i. , ,fj  Lower ..Awash. VaJ 1 ey Corporations (mixed agr icul t-ure-and an imal husbandry') ^  ^
the Hararghe Province Corporation (largely coffee) and the Tendaho and
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Gewani Corporation's (mostly cotton) are to administer the commercial
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concessions and imperial farms that were nationalised in 1975-/ Be­
fore these Corporations were created, the nationalised plantations were 
run ad hoc by .the? r former managers and by the Ministries of Agriculture 
and National Resource Development,
These Development Corporations were apparently found wanting >• at 
least in the Awqsh Valley - and a-Valleys Agricultural Development Agency 
was instituted in July 1977. The Agency is to: foster irrigated agri­
cultural development through pianning-and-plan implementation; establish, 
coofd i na te and. supervj se development: agencies; establish conservation —  
and env.j ronmenta 1 protection programmes; build up the necessary infra­
structure:;* and- fsix and col 1 ect'’ f&0§ ' fdt'wat’er "User”’"The 'df^ahls'at:fBlv of-*1'"" 
the Agency is similar to that of the other new institutions; the powers 
of the Board are spelled out in greater detail, but little real specifi-
city is achieved, The Minister of Agriculture issues regulations on the-...
Board's recommendation, Under this Proclamation, Regulations were 
immediately issued which created an (1autonomousH Awash Valley Development 
Agency, In addition to the powers of its parent Agency, the Awash Agency 
is to coordinate activities of Government (arguably, an (ultra v i res'
proviso) and public bodies (including the three Awash Corporations) con-
*
cerning agricultural use and resource development and somewhat optimis­
tically - to control the flow of the Ayvash River* While this Agency, has 
# ,Genor^J r;.^ an^ ge;,r^  j,„t. .lacks ,a ,separate E?oard.„anci is responsibl-e-to-the-^- ^ ^^
" ' ’ gg
Board of the parent-Agency, - .  - ? •  * —
A brief review of gr»in marketing practices under Haile Selassie will 
be used to set the scene for an assessment of recent policy changes,
Prior to the Revolution, about 90% of grain marketing was in the hands
r
of 12,000-25,000 rural grain merchants and *1,000-8,000 in the towns. jn 
Addis Ababa, the' 25 largest dealers had a combined storage capacity of 
one mi-1 lion metric tons* -Merchants were’mostly Muslim, although Orthodox 
Christians began to overcome their aversion to commerce during the 1960s,
A merchant might act as wholesaler, retailer^ transporter or financier, 
depending on who the customer was. The virtual absence of organised 
marketing and orderly pricing arrangements have been cited as major rea-
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sons for the slow progress made by CADU and the MPP under Ha i l.e Selassie. - 
After the land reform, grain production by peasant smallholders - who 
supply roughly three-quarters of the marketed grain - increased by an
estimated 10-20% during the 1975 season, Nevertheless, there were 
periodic shortages of grain in the urban areas, particularly in Addis 
Ababa. Wh i1e there was~no acute hunger, grain was on occasion obtain­
able only on the black market, at prices 20% higher than the record 
price fixed by the Derg, The retail price index for food rose by 12% 
from March to April in 1975.’ Government could only enforce its pric­
ing policies at the point of a gun and, after seven merchants-were 
executed, grain quickly came out of storage and prices plunged to an 
all-time low. From mid-1975 to mid-1976, the Ethiopian Grain Corpora­
tion more than doubled its turnover, hand 1ingl.about 25% of the total 
volume marketed, The Cerporation also managed to accumulate urban, 
buffer stocks,^ : ' .
The Gra-i n- Corporat ion was established in I960, subject to the superr 
vision of the Grain Board that was created in 1950, The Corporation was 
'■ empowered1*topromote**htgh-qua 1 f ty^&emmod i-ty *■exponts ranet-to--buy^and».sel. —  
in-order to stabil ise the domestic market, . Criteria concerning more.
91explicit goals and the means of achieving them were, once again, lacking,
In November 1976 the Corporation was replaced by a new one, empowered 
to maintain emergency grain stocks and import grain when necessary, 
purchase and sel1 inputs, construct storage facilities, market the pro­
duce of state farms and "purchase, process, mill, transport, sell, or store 
agricultural products and i npups^wbet^F - Jlo ^ , pxo.fXt, or. ^ ptbieo^jse/^.Ten . 
jf&rd£fvt df&het''brof itsf arfe:S;to be^pafd- reserve- ftu-nd-ii4nfeU«*Ulr.^ a&aJtS.*->
' 2S%*'bf"''the'"capital(ftft i!ch' et ther';,refiePsJ‘-t-o -author Isad -Gapl-ta'1-o.F^t©.^-* .
initial capital), This fund is then to-be used to cover trading losses,
The organisational format of the new Corporation is like that of the 
Valleys Development Agency, save that the Corporation is subject to
"Government's policy guidelines" emanating from the Minister of Agriculture
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who is also the Chairman of the Board,
Urban grain shortages reflect the fact that landlords are no longer 
marketing grains acquired in the form of rent, that peasants have Increased 
their own grain consumption and are now able to hold back limited amounts 
for purposes of speculation, that the number of oxen available for thresh­
ing had declined, that merchants are reluctant to make purchases because
they fear confiscations-, that the ■ Derg-regularly; commandeers suppl. \ es to...
feed the military, and that military priorities and the attitudes of the 
lorry owners make for an accute shortage of trucking capacity (see Chapter
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Seven), All of this argues for a new market strategy, and the Declaration 
o’f Economic Policy, issued'by the Derg in February 1975, promises that 
the Grain Corporation-wi 1-1 -improve its price stabilisation measures and 
offer adequate production incentives - including higher prices paid to 
peasants, lower pricing margins and a larger fertilizer subsidy, These 
policles'would enable peasants to realise more of the benefits of increased 
production and to raise local levels of savings, investment and purchas­
ing power. If these policies are pursued consistently, the opportunity 
to extract additional Governmental revenue from marketing monopolies 
will be missed, but the payoff for the rural areas will be more immedi- 
ate: tax revenues would probably be invested in slow^yield assets such
~ : ■a5”'edLrcati'on ^ rtes'earcfr -arrd i nf rastructu re, and'the wastage represented 1 *
93by the incompetence of the bureaucracy will be avoided. Lurking in 
the background, however, is the political necessity of ensuring a con-'
_ tinuity of „gr.ai n supplies _to embatt led military units and to volatile_ 
xirban areas through a command ma'rket, ;j5~hts ,kind; o_f .mar.fcet;i,ng strategy: 
would seem to be more consistent with the tenets of Ethiopia Tikdem and 
notions of a ‘disciplined* economy than with the policies currently be­
ing pursued; as in the Soviet Union, a Stalinist collectivisation may be 
forced on the State by the low levels of political control exerted in 
most rural areas and by the growing organisational strength of peasant 
associations. Much remains to be done if grain marketing institutions 
^ape-cto^becGme .,e,f5fectlva^^,Pr ic,i,ng .andTmarketl ngTfopecastSv^must^sornehow < r * 
‘be'>xmadev»roo^<&iaea.M*s^ijcA ^ ^g-Tven.dhe, fundament a icrd-Tsequ*IJ4JDf la >that-.ex-i st* 
in isolated markets, decisions are currently made on the basis of ques­
tionable assumptions about the behaviour of peasants and their institu­
tions, In addition to improving transport, a rapid expansion of storage 
(and refrigeration) facilities is needed; it is currently cheaper for 
northern Ethiopia to import grain than to obtain it from the South,
Black marketeering must also be suppressed - an enormous task, The 
moriet i sed sector must be extended so as to discourage the investment of • 
local agricultural surpluses in livestock, which are valued for their 
numbers rather than for their age and condition and which contribute to  ^
soil erosion through overgrazing. The market-dependent population of 
Ethiopia is only ahout six .mi 11 ion, although it Is, growing at, an annual 
rate of 3-5% (1.5% faster than the rate of population growth). Ultimately,
monetisation can only be fostered through punitive taxation or- the wide
availability of reasonably-priced consumer necessities, Grain marketing
is only one side of agricultural production incentives andf in light of
the decline in manufacturing after the Revolution, certain consumer goods
may have to be imported, Finally, Ethiopian peasants should not "be
left hopelessly exposed to a. process in which they could lose on the
95market all they won in the revolution" the plight of peasants in
Mexico - or left in a position where they are at the ‘beck, and call of 
the bureaucracy, as in Egypt,
III, A Preliminary Evaluation
Although the evidence is incomplete and somewhat impressionistic, it 
points towards a successful implementation of land reform in southern 
and western Ethiopia. There was 1 ess<resisfence to- land reform than-ex­
pected, both by the Derg and by Western experts: peasants generally
continued to plant as before, and smallholder production expanded by an 
estimated 1Q% to 20%. While more favourable weather conditions must have 
accounted for much of this production increase, we should note that 
short-term production declines, which have resulted from less radical 
land reforms in other countries, have been avoided. The dark side of 
the picture is that, at any given time from 1973 to the present, some 
•8% of the population has experienced acute starvation and. some fifteen 
mfiii toff pr&fpi ewt f a o f t e n 5 gonevhdngry'r‘ 1 f sed- drough ts-' and *regf'onai^-
rebellions have caused basic economic^maintenance - a cardinal political 
goal and a precondition to more thoroughgoing forms of rural development 
- to elude the Derg. The magnitude of the problem of maintenance can 
be judged from the fact that, just prior to the Revolution, the average 
daily calorie intake in Ethiopia was 1,566. This compares extremely 
unfavourable with an African average of 2,455 and an Indian average of 
1,950, particularly when the cool climate and high altitudes of the 
Ethiopian highlands are taken into account. The fact that the urban 
Ethiopian calorie intake is roughly equivalent to the African average 
points up another important rural-urban differential. The volume of
agricultural exports declined after the land reform, although favourable
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international price trends have kept total revenues from falling.
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A, Politics
Catching the holders of traditional authority off guard, as it were,
and executing some (but by no means all) of them on 23 November 197^,
the Derg hopes to make its revolutionary changes irreversible by isolat-'
ing the peasants from those groups who could mount a counterrevolutIont 
While a socialist rhetoric is used to justify land reform* the simplistic 
verbal jugglery employed in Tanzania and some South Asian states - 'proofs* 
that socialism is immanent in traditional village organisation and philos­
ophy - has been dispensed with. The real problem has, on the other hand, 
been given a fair measure of prominence: how do attempts to legislate 
socialism into existence impinge upon ongoing social processes with deep 
roots in the past? The language of class conflict is employed’to a 
. - greater extent than social circumstances warrant, but European analyses
are deemed irrelevant to a situation in which the bourgeoisie and prole- 
" ^^tariaf are tiny minorities and the vast majority of the people'are'peasants ' ‘ 
and urban midd1e-income groups. As in China, a national reconstruction 
is viewed as providing-the major-development incentive, with the dis~. 
possession of feuda1-minded landlords as a prime mover of revolutionary 
changes in social structures. If Ethiopian peasants dream of becoming 
kulaks however, it may be difficult to incorporate them into a socialist 
system; like the leadership in China and the Soviet Union, the Derg may 
taa*Hu*M'sn***. t^the des‘parat>e*'aequ i s-ik wenes-s «oft*>tfee-Apea-sam-'t-prSOn 1iQ.Qg-a&'teig£j fcfcng si*-”. sbsbrrbs
on the brink of' penury, did not fit with' the IddiaTs of s o c i a l i s m" , -  : '  — ^ v  
A1 though the initial stages of the Revolution featured "sfop-start" ’ ' ':
tactics, the land reform Proclamation .is the cardinal example of the 
break-Jrr continuity with the previous regime. As in Mexico and Egypt, 
large landowners became temporarily powerless as a result of revolution, . 
and the emphasis was placed on policies which pose minimal bureaucratic 
and financial burdens and on achieving rural equity, even if this proved 
to be detrimental to crop production. The Derg's policy pronounements In
the Proclamations may in fact be too ideological, concentrating as they
98
do on form rather than on.substance and implementation problems. It 
is possible, for example, that the cooperatives and even the peasant 
associations themselves will be permanently forgotten as a result, of. the 
recur re'nce' of seemingly more pressing issues, such as urban opposition,',- -•*-
Eritrean separatism and invasions from Somalia,
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While a plethora of laws relat-ing, to., the .rural areas have-been promulgated
since the land reform Proclamation of 1975*- they revolve around its core
concepts; land reform is the cornerstone of rural development policies.
There are two possible rural development strategies *■* from the bottom up
and from the top down - and-the land reform Proclamation employs both.
Peasants are provided with an organ I sational framework and with a few
economic and still fewer political resources - through a combination of
mi 1 i tary-sty 1 e commands and power-de.l ega t i ng po.licies «■' in return for
99anticipated gains in the Derg's legitimacy. The Proclamation divided 
implementation responsibilities into vaguely-defined compartments be­
tween -peasant -association-s a-nd«.»t-be«-*-centra*l«-bu-pea>UGracy,-thereby*compJIetely-
bypassing- focal administrators..spry ing^unjder: .the Mi n Is try ..of Interior....__
Ambiguities in these and-other areas seem to be both unintended and 
intentional. A1though >united by the'felt need to dismantle feudal author­
ity, there has been considerable tension—  within the Derg, the military 
as a whole, trade unions, the university., and modernising elements in the 
bureaucracy - between the advocates of popular civilian rule and those 
who believe that socio-economic transformation, through soci a 1 i s'm ‘and 
nationalisation, necessarily precedes a "peoples' government,"
The latter group has won the field, yet the land reform Proclamations 
aim to accommodate the supporters of popular rule by providing, for ex­
ample, a potential basis for local political activity, Many vita4 pro- 
vTsions' cVea'te, i'n effect", blank* Cheques' subject .t6 “rel nterpreJtation Inf ­
light of changed circumstances inthe rural areas and shifts in the 
balance, of power withirr the Derg. Thus, the land reform Proclamation 
represents an attempt to bui Id atv-essent ial but minimal consensus within 
the modernising elite. Under Haile Selassie, the loyalty of the military, 
civil service, and rural elites was held through grants of land ownership. 
Genuine re-form therefore required that modernising elites place the in­
terests of the people above their own landholdings, and persistent rumors 
suggest that some were unable to-do this. Half of the Army - the Second 
Division in Asmara and the Third Division along the border with Somalia - 
apparently sent an ultimatum to the Derg which combined a demand that 
soldiers' land be exempted from the Proclamation with a call for civilian 
rule and negotiations with the Eritrean Liberation Front, These demands 
coincided, in April 1975, wi th.-.a, reported xountercoup ■ attempt by civilians 
and intelligence o f f i c e r s . T h e  commitment to removing the landlords'
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influence over rural events, while high, is therefore far from complete,
B. Peasants
it is quite likely that some of the ambiguities in the land reform 
"Proclamation are the unintended result of the Derg's ambiguous attitude 
towards peasants. On* the one hand, the Derg is ideologically committed 
to respecting toilers and tillers and must, of practical necessity, rely 
on peasants to implement vague but ambit.ious programmes locally, This 
is a refreshing contrast to the cynical realism of the Emperor's formal­
istic reforms, but there is another and conflicting view of peasants 
which5 arb’s'^ W'i th in the moderni s ing eIT te~pr ior- .to«the*,Re\*oUitlQfl., * ,P 
■ants-are seen as, problems rathe„p: than ^ assets, , as t pad it iqn^bound, un think­
ing and obdurate innocents who will react negatively to any new policy 
and who must be forcibly re-educated to understand their own best inter" 
ests. As in the Soviet Union, r*Ural reforms are pursued, by urban activ-- 
ists who are ignorant of the realities of rural life and unsympathetic 
towards peasants,^ This predisposition calls forth tactics * such as 
an arguably careless nationalisation of rural lands - which only serve 
to confirm the suspicions of some peasant groups; the circle Is completed 
when peasant revolt and apathy, particularly in northern and central 
Ethiopia, are regarded as affirming the preconceptions of elite groups.
The military wants to trust the peasantry but fears that It .cannot do so; 
it grants broad functions to peasant1 organisations5 but withholds the-re-* < - 
sources needed to make the exercise of power effective. As Martin 
Wool 1acott argues, the Ethiopian Government has yet to work out a func-
tfoning relation with its peasants, whether on the commercial-, -financial.
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or, ultimately, the political levels.
Despite these vaguenesses, the core of the land reform proclamation, 
particularly Article 10, confers a measure of local peasant enfranchise­
ment and some of the means- by which a peasant can begin to assert his 
control over life's circumstances, Given the paucity of Ethiopian de­
velopment resources and their high cost, in terms of interest or tax 
payments, to such-private or public bodies as are willing to supply them, 
rural development can only occur if local initiative is radically expanded 
in a Maoist fashion, the Derg is concerned with calling forth unused re­
sources, in addition to better a 1 loca.t ions of exi st i ng resources. Taken
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.to.ge.ther, peasant assoc i at i.ons, the.tr coops and courts, women's asso­
ciations, the people's militia and the revolutionary development committees 
give the most impoverished of peasants an opportunity to participate in 
local affairs, point towards decentralised forms of government, and.raise 
political consciousness - for good or ill, from the Derg1 s'standpoi nt -■ 
while promoting equity, These new institut ions -are well-adapted to the 
introduction of socialist agriculture: there is a great flexibility in
the size of organisations and the speed at which they depart from tradi- 
tional-modes of production and political practices and a dependence on 
agents of the centre; there is a (partially-unrealised) potential for
cooperat-i ve^marT:etd:ra.q->and - management. arrenoe.men.t s. wh i ch operate on a ... .
- large,enough scale .to.faster dev^lopmen^yj_and the new organisations pro- 
vide’an opportunity to introduce voluntarism and a* new vitality’ Into 
many rural areas.
The land reform experience of other countries suggests, however, 
that isolated and low-status peasants seldom break through the obstacles 
of subsistence economics, entrenched bureaucracyand !polItical pressures 
to forge links, on their own terms, with the modern!sing elite. In par­
ticular, people seldom succeed in modifying their material environment
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simply by organising themselves differently,
The future vitality of peasant organisations depends, .upon a variety 
of factors which have not been forthcoming as rapidly as have institu­
tional changes - a natural *sequericey h'WTght of the rapid pace of land 
reform. Leaders of peasant organisat ions must be trained effectively in 
such commonly-neglected topics as trading and, perhaps, speculation, 
Peasants must be stimulated to-generate loca 1 initiatives, as well as to 
respond -to sensible programmes promoted from the centre, This entails 
the acquisition of basic literacy, numeracy and such non-agricultural 
skills as are involved in the small-scale light manufacturing carried 
out by producer's coops in China. Initiative and response, in turn, de­
pend upon peasant perceptions of material and financial' incentives. The 
Derg has been rather dilatory in this area, particularly with regard to 
a rapid expansion of the MPP, although resources have been extremely 
scarce and new taxation and grain marketing policies provide some of the
necessary incentives. Continued assistance by zemecha students and im-
10A
proved admi.n i st rat ion from- the cenfre are| obv iousl y called for, but 
the nature of the political links that are emerging between peasants,
39A
administrators and the Derg ere one of the least satisfactory aspects 
of the land reform,
Peasant associations are effectively cut off from national politics 
- seemingly a major goal of the Derg - and higher-level committees and 
agencies are dominated by bureaucrats. These tendencies suggest that 
the Derg, -^tecks the interest to pursue a pol ? t i cal ly-i nteg rated ..rural _ _
development strategy, A failure to attend to the specifically politi­
cal aspects of peasant associations may be a major weakness of Ethiopian 
(and Tanzanian) land reform; since political motives are going to dominate 
anyway, they must be dealt with creatively rather than ignored. Like 
ujamaa coops and development committees in Tanzania, Ethiopian organist- ~
; t-ions--look-good orv gaper but the-r-eal i-ty- ks-of ten* otherwi se! — organi~&a^— - •- 
tions are manipulated by agents of the centre or former traditional 
elites, short-term programmes with politically-visible results receive 
an excessive emphasis, technical knowledge and national plans are seldom 
translated effectively into local action, and imbalances appear, both 
within and among organisations, which sometimes denote ethnic group con­
flicts or new differentiations in social status which are irrelevant to 
the achievement of economic development. Another example of how Ethiopia's 
reform strategy could go wrong is provided by the policies pursued by the 
populist regimes of Goulart in Brazil and Sukarno in Indonesia, Peasants 
profited from the measure of control left to them and began to organise 
themselves, but the organisations soon reverted to .trad11iona1 forms of 
patronage and the governments succumbed to the temptat tons .of. a.di.cta-
torial peasant mobilisation. Those who refused to participate were
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arrested, and right-wing regimes succeeded to populism,
The importance of a politicaIly-integrated rural development is also 
illustrated by Marx's analysis of peasants in nineteenth century France. 
Despite similarities in material living conditions, the peasantry did 
not enter into social or political relations at the regional and national 
levels, and did not therefore constitute a class (for itself), The "great 
mass of the French nation is formed by the simple addition of homologous 
magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes". Unable 
to speak for themselves, these peasants were 'represented' by those who 
were also their masters and who sent "rain and sunshine from above".
Ethiopian peasant associations can thus be thought of as '-‘potatoes" 
which have been insulated from national political life, Gunnar Myrdal
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shows how the stratification of groups within non-viable villages, each 
group having divergent interests and problems, is probably the greatest 
single hindrance to the implementation of reform programmes in South 
Asia,^^ This obstacle is even more marked in Ethiopia, with its multi­
plicity of slightly-differing traditional tenures and the absence, in 
some areas, of anything that could be termed a village, Many local 
problems requiring individualised treatment none the less have a national 
impact, exceed peasant resources and spill over the boundaries of peasant 
associations and coops: credit, marketing, transport^ communications,
social services, new inputs and technologies, and radical changes in i  - 
trad 11 ioh'aT'values and structures, ■ in this context,' Ethiopian "peasant^
; power- i s • an- i 11 us i o n , i n the absence of -channels ^ oT inf 1 uence^a.nd.. .negu^, 
lar agricultural surpluses,
The creation of farms which are too small from the standpoint of 
long-term economic development - no larger than 10 hectares and usually 
much smaller - means that present policies emphasise, -of necessity, 
economic maintenance and the satisfaction of land hunger at the expense 
of large productivity increases. Although the dignity, the fresh out­
look and the minor independent source of income that land confers on the 
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landless - and the importance of maintenance during periods of famine 
- ought not to be overlooked,.the absence of Integrated long-term stra­
tegies which need not conflict with maintenance tends to freeze Ethiopian 
agriculture at the subsistence level and leaves the peasants1 traditional 
attitudes towards land unchanged,. The Derg’s aggressive resettlement 
policy is the correct one: if more people continue to farm the same
land, fragmentation can be the only result, as rural unemployment becomes 
disguised unemployment or underemployment,
Further, the opportunity was missed to maximise the incentives 
created through land reform, The Proclamations do not, for example, 
ensure a secure right of occupancy and the ability to somehow recoup 
investments if occupancy terminates. Guarantees against the risks of 
adopting agricultural innovations are also lacking, The r-evolution has 
resulted in a land nationalisation of uncertain content; and peasants, 
reasonable pragmatists within a traditional frame of reference, will 
determine for themselves whether the Derg’s definition of new rural 
realities Is accurate, Peasants are not.interested in ideological 
purity, mere promises, or poorly implemented institutional changes,
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What do Ethiopian peasants think of the land reform? In the 
southern provinces a large measure of support for-reform exists, although 
local rulers in some areas initially convinced the people that it was not 
in their best interests. Some tenants assumed, as a result of ambiguous 
encouragement from the Derg, that they could evict their landlords before 
reforms were actually promulgated. Farmers came to provincial centres 
assuming that they could register their ownership of a -newly created 
10 hectare farm, but administrators were more interested in finding out 
how much land they had and in organising the collective working of the 
land, Disappointed, the peasants went home and continued to work their 
or i gina F-plots , Local -pol ice, who hitherto tooh the part of the' landlords, 
enforced land reform minimally, .if at all, and there were some localised 
battles organised by landlords and rich peasants, It is impossible to 
determine the precise extent to which armed resistance constituted oppo­
sition to land reform; government reports often spoke of the ’'surrender" 
of "bandits". Many disputes over the distribution of tools and oxen also • 
took place, The impact of land reform was stunted by the large pockets
of starvation that persisted in Wollo, Hararghe, Bale, Sidamo and Gemu 
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Gofa Provinces, by the ongoing revolt in Eritrea and by the Somali 
invasion.
In northern and central Ethiopia, the picture is not'encouraging;
the difficulty with [the Derg’s] , , , measures and particularly 
* Tand^reform is that they did ,notr.significant 1 y^affeet. the life 
of the lowland nomads in the Ogaden or Eritrea., or the hlghl-and 
peoples of the latter province, In the lowlands, where the 
Amharic [sic] nobility had never really penetrated, there was 
no great release from a past servitude. In Eritrea there was 
already a war going on which precluded proper implementation of 
.reforms,1^0
Every province has experienced serious armed opposition to land reform, 
led by royalists, former MPs and southern landlords with kinship ties in 
the North, Representative examples include; Sultan A1i Mirreh's rebellion 
against proposed changes in the tenure-system that led to the formation 
of the Afar Liberation Front in June 1975; the assassination of the 
Administrator (Governor) of Begemdir-Semien Province three months later; 
clashes with rebels in Wollo and Arussi Provinces in October 1975; and 
the defeat in Woldia, Wollo of an estimated force of 5,000 led by De“ 
jazmatch Berhane Maskal. The Ethiopian Democratic Union (see Chapter 
One) claimed to be organising and coordinating these attacks, but its
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actual influence is sl i g h t , ^  Although rebellions have continued to 
the present day, they ceased expressly to be directed against land re­
form by the beginning of 1976, Little is known of human rights viola­
tions in the rural areas. Amnesty International finds that many atroci­
ties have taken place - including the destruction of whole villages - 
and tha*t at least 10,000 people have been killed in the rural areas for 
political reasons through 1977, In October 1977, the Ethiopian News
Agency stated that over Eth, $40 millions of crops had rotted in fields
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as a result of rural disruptions,
The highly individualistic and conservative nature of Amhara-Tigre
smallholding peasants generated resistance to reform, and revolts-have--
b'eeff Caused by oppos i t ion to the Derg's treatment of the n.obj.l.ity_(who( _
retained the confidence of many people) as well as by land reform itself,
Among the most conservative of peasants are those Amhara who live in
Manze, where "the good man is one who defends the land of his fathers,
seeing that it is not sold to outsiders or that foreigners do not come 
113to take it," It has even been argued that local cohesiveness only 
forms in reaction to virtually synonymous threats to family livelihood 
or land. This conservatism can, perhaps, be explained in the terms 
adopted by - of all people- Stanley Baldwin: "If you want the people
11 k
to be conservative, then give them something to conserve," In the 
Amhara heartland, culture, lifestyle and status differentials are cher­
ished to an extent that few Westerners would find credible, and most 
peasants owned at least some of the land they farmed,
Inevitably, given previous legal and political manoeuvres, the 1975 
Proclamation is regarded by many Amhara-Ttgre peasants as an attempt to 
take their land by a "foreign" Government located in Addis Ababa; In 
place of absentee landlords collecting rents, an 'absentee1 Government 
will radically increase taxes, In 1973, Alan Hoben found that the 
Amhara of Gojjam Province opposed any land reform for a variety of rea­
sons, fearing that it would: become an instrument of Shoan Amahara dom­
ination and promote the spread of gult-type tenures; decrease social 
mobility, particularly for the young, by freezing existing land alloca­
tions or enabling t i1 Ii k sewoch (big men) to acquire more land; and re­
sult in confiscation of larger holdings and a revival of old boundary
115 •disputes, There is no need, despite the Revolution, to revise these.
f i nd i ngs,
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C , Admi n i strat ion
Although the centrally controlled bureaucracy acquires some impor­
tant new functions within the framework of land reform, the devolution 
of authority to peasant associations Is amazing in a country where, be­
ginning in 1930, the passion for centralisation has dictated that the 
exercise of effective rural authority sanctioned by state law be within 
the Ministry of Interior's rigid hierarchy* The Proclamation clearly 
refuses to compromise with those traditional rural elites who monopolised 
sources of local legitimacy, information concerning land boundaries and 
soi l • f ertTTTt-y and* an (a 1 be i t ..-minimal )^managecia 1 „.d.i r.ect J.QO..Q,f , „ R n . Q d «, 
tion and paternal provision of welfare services. These elites have been 
suppressed by force, and a political, social and economic vacuum has 
arisen.* Ideally, peasant associations-and coops would step into this 
vacuum, but it is unlikely that most of these organisations will have 
the resources to do so, The Derg obviously feels that it can serve as 
the proxy representative of rural people by stepping into this breach 
bearing the ideology of Ethiopia Tikdem, although no concrete basis for 
doing this is presented under the Proclamations and Marx's analysis of 
the French peasantry suggests that rural life cannot be fundamentally 
changed under such a policy. Perhaps the Derg wishes permanently to 
isolate the peasants from political power, but there are plenty of in­
dications to the contrary.
Traditional rural elites are, unfortunately, ideally placed to re­
tard land reform, since they dominate local administration from within
the Ministry of Interior and are, to a large extent, immune from central- 
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Tsed control. These officials could not be replaced in the short run, 
and the Derg has chosen to circumvent them wherever possible. The radi­
cal changes brought about by land reform point up the need for the ad­
ministrative law reforms and the resocialisation of existing bureaucrats 
that were discussed in Chapter Five.
It is clear that a centralised administration of Ethiopian agriculture 
would become hopelessly entangled in day-to-day decision making, creating 
a further administrative proliferation which would paralyse producers 
and generate plans that are ill-adapted to concrete local needs. This 
is what happened in post-independence- Algeria,, where agr: i cu 1 ture, was , g iven 
back to the farmers in 1966. The decentra 1 I sat Ion and partial autonomy
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represented by specialised agencies and regional deveTopmerit corporations 
in Ethiopia is thus a good idea in theory; in practice, technical man­
power may be spread too thinly and problems of coordination and meaning­
ful control may prove to be insurmountable. Finally, new marketing 
arrangements must be taken much further; socialist agriculture, as
envisaged by the Derg, can never be achieved through feudal cum capital -
11 7ist norms of resource allocation and income distribution.
D. In General
Land reform has, however, produced some significant changes In status 
patterns and i n the. distr Lbut ion. of incomes -the-raw-materials-of-po-U tics 
in Ethiopia and elsewhere. Under definitions elaborated in Chapter Two, 
the Derg is attempting to pursue policies of a broadly-based development, 
rather than those of an economic grov/tto which place on untoward emphasis 
on increases in production, thereby widening the gap between rich and 
poor. In other words, supply does not create its own demand where income 
distribution is highly skewed; development necessitates the restructuring 
of an economy catering to the needs of the very rich, a twisting of con­
sumption in favor of the rural areas (where most of the poor live) and 
towards food and, to a lesser extent, clothing, In Ethiopia, the costs 
of these policies are being borne by urban middle"income groups, traders, 
other businessmen, civil servants, unionised workers, students, teachers, 
and even the military, as reflected in a decline lrn their staridards'ofr *
living and socio-economic expectations, and in the availability of Western
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style food and consumer goods in the urban areas.
Under Haile Selassie, links between centres and.peripheries ran 
wholly’to the benefit of the centres and, initially, the Derg continued 
to attend to urban demands rather than the interests of peasants - more 
of a Russian than a Chinese strategy of revolution, Beginning in March 
1975, however, the nature of rural-urban links was altered in the peasants 
favour, by abolishing feudal tributes and lessening the burden imposed 
through taxation and grain marketing arrangements, While It should be 
obvious from the foregoing analyses that land reform is a unique product 
of the Ethiopian urban elite - in conception as well as misconception - 
there are some who would argue that the Derg used an entirely Maoist 
approach to the. reform- In some respectsreforms,.:,wo,u Id have., been more , 
effective if detailed materials concerning Chinese policies had been
koo
available in Addis Ababa and studied intensively, although much in
China's experience is unique, Rural rebellions and urban food shortages
in Ethiopia have certainly borne out Mao's dictum: "revolutionary villages
can encircle the cities, but revolutionary cities cannot detach themselves
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from the villages, , , „M The kind of links that will develop between 
centres and peripheries in the future is very much an open question; will, 
for example, city dwellers demand that the 'terms of trade' be readjusted 
in their favour, and will the Derg be willing and able to resist these 
demands? At this stage and given the Derg’s overriding desire to dis- 
mant-1 e a t  rad i t i onaT po-1 it ica 1 * *power based" oh l^htT aHd * rura l' area s’,
it seems that - to twist a.metaphor - the nature of the omeTette ’ to~be ' *
made is less important than the breaking of the eggs,
Returning to the arguments concerning political resources that were 
introduced at the end of Chapter Two, Ethiopian large landowners were 
extremely powerful and did not accpet radical changes willingly; a high 
level of rural violence and the potential for violence far into the future 
were voluntarily incurred by the Derg, The long-term solution to the 
problem of maintaining rural order is the firm establishment of viable 
political processes to replace the shattered traditional ones that are 
described in Chapters One and Three, Pending acquisition of the addi- 
tional resources by peasant organisations and the bureaucracy that are 
essential to ruralTnstitution-butiding, the demands placed upon coercion 
will be inordinately high. If other scarce resources are used effective­
ly, through the careful augmenting, communicating, propagandising, im­
plementing, and enforcing of land reform, the amount of coercion required 
in a particular district will be relatively small, Ethiopia is a vast 
country however; and disputes with Somalia, the Eritrean Liberation Front, 
and within the Derg itself will, as priority concerns, claim a large 
share of coercive resources. Reliance upon coercion has been an histori­
cal necessity in Ethiopia because Government policies have failed to 
penetrate most of the rural areas.
In Chapter Two, we argued that government is a two-way street; pene­
tration is fostered by public participation. In the absence of sanctioned 
channels, participation will nevertheless out when Ethiopian peasant sub­
vert or simply ignore Government pol i ci'es:.r NeW thanneVs'ha'Ve 'been created 
through the peasant organisat ions, but they function imperfectly at best.
401
Government has been unable to allocate sufficient material Incentives 
through them and genuine .power-sharing at the national level is not 
intended, at least at this stage, Peasant organisations offer an oppor­
tunity that should not be missed for overcoming ethnic conflicts and 
gross socio-economic inequalities, The enforcement of universal norms - 
by Government against local organisations and vice versa - would help to 
build a homogenous and modern society, providing fixed points around 
which new interests could coalesce.*.. The Derg's policies are only the 
beginnings of this quest for a mass involvement through decentralisation 
and the Derg seems overly-optImistic about the speed at which difficul- 
ties can be overcome. Nevertheless, an advance - astounding to those 
who visited the rural areas while" Haile Selassie was in power - has been
made: the politicisation of the peasantry, most of whom had hitherto
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responded only to manipulation by local elites,
ju ju ju
The development strategy that is unfolding in Ethiopia fs clearly 
one of Agriculture First, As we noted in Chapter Two, this basic choice 
Is a wise one: for many decades to come, an Ethiopian industrialisation
would create little additional employment for a rapidly-expanding populacej 
and, as in many other African countries, the shortage of labour is a 
greater constraint on increasing agricultural productivity than is any 
shortage of land, provided that aggressive resettlement policies are
pursued. and„Jthe. appropriate inputs and technology are made avai lable, ....
While we are still too close to the Ethiopian Revolution to provide a 
definitive assessment of its impact on the rural areas, the available 
evidence points towards a cautious optimism, In any event, such liberat­
ing effects as are generated through a revolution take a long time to
appear and "no fundamental reform can avoid errors at one stage or another; -
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and the more controversial the issues, the greater the risk of mistakes,"
It is clear that other, less radical land reform policies wi 1.1 not work
in Ethiopia, especially if the Derg's attachment to a revolutionary
socialism is taken into account:
if the existing social order is preserved it is the powerful 
members of the gentry f , , who will ultimately decide upon the
ways : the reform wi 11 be carried out, l.t is they who sit-on-the...... .
land tribunals; it ts they who interpret the law, allow all : 
kinds of circumventions and take care that the material inter­
ests of their peers will not be really affected,122
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The enactment of a vigorous and progressive taxation of landowners,
combined with rent and wage controls, would not have forced Ethiopian
landlords to expand production or quit; the paucity of administrative
competence and the tradition of tax evasion would have, made enforcement
impossible. The concentration of resources on improved agricultural
efficiency and technology rather than basic institutional changes was
tried, in a rather haphazard way, by Haile Selassie's regime and ignores
the centrality of feudal landholdings and the peasants1 subsistent and
subservient status, The Ethiopian bureaucracy is a pol i t ical ly'-unrel iable
instrument of land reform and is. mamifestLy Kncapable of assuming the.
additional administrative burdens that have arisen during land reforms
In other countries: policing ownership changes, issuing titles, compen-'
sating the dispossessed,. collecting payments from new purchasers and
adjudicating boundary and inheritance rights, The Ethiopian approach
is, rather, to rely on the peasants themselves in the short run and to
123hope to resolve technical problems over a longer period of time,-
Ethiopia's land reform is more ambitious than that of Tanzania or 
China and, unlike the Chinese reform, the Derg's was not preceeded by 
years of ideological preparation and the creation of disciplined cadres 
dedicated to the implementation of rural programmes. Whiles no single 
element of the Ethiopian reform is inherently unworkable, the difficulties 
encountered at every^S'tage ^ a r e ^ f © T m i d a b l ' e " N  it p&tterfrSr*lhaVB' 
nevertheless been altered permanently by the Revolution. Rural changes - 
particularly, in the West and the South - are the Derg's most enduring 
achievement, and they would certainly survive the collapse of military 
rule. Changes in tenures have had a once-and-’for-al 1 shock effect on 
traditional peasant attitudes. New institutions are capitalising this 
transformation and are beginning to alter the balance of aspirations, 
opportunities and the environment in a way that is much more effective 
than the indirect policies advocated by Western modernisation theorists 
(see Chapter Two),^^
Ultimately, however, these radical structural changes will not have 
their desired effect unless they are integrated with more ordinary 
approaches to development in a careful 1y-balanced strategy of implemen­
tation. While there Is no ’part.icu.l-ar virtue In -prudence, -the .Derg's 
initial imprudence resulted in a huge wastage of scarce resources. From 
mid-1975 onwards, however, there has been a growing realisation that land
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reform of Itself grows no crops; an Integrated rural development strategy 
has begun to emerge.
Additional peasant organisations, new tax, marketing and settlement 
policies, and new regional development corporations were started, but 
they remain vulnerable to the political needs of the moment and to com­
peting claims on scarce resources, Peasant organisations have succeeded 
to a remarkable degree in mobilising and allocating scarce resources and 
in achieving a reasonable balance albeit at a low level -■ between the 
partly conflicting goals of raising productivity and promoting welfare,
They have also made a start towards the localised political participation 
of'"the !unrder-endowed, * What is-lackt ng- -fs—a •rured-acoes-s-to- cap i tal ..that., ,. 
is sufficient to enable the wholesale,adoption of new inputs, technologies 
and services - which are also in short supply. There can be no doubt, 
however, that these defects can be remedied within the- coop framework 
devised by the Derg, and under proprietary rights which are much more 
limited than those commonly found in the West, But peasant organisations 
cannot succeed, on their own: the role of the centre is crucial in the 
areas of delivering new inputs and social services, overcoming the effects 
of recurring droughts, and stimulating small-scale rural industries, A 
more careful planning of social services is required: the needs are in­
finite and the resources scarce, so complex choices must be made on the 
basis of strict cost-benefit analyses which take account of the political 
dimensions of rural“ polIcies, Droughts have produced severe shortages 
of things that impoverished regions are unable to acquire for themselves 
- livestock., plow oxen and seed - and have demonstrated the need for 
vaccination programmes, clinics, additional sources of clean water, re­
forestation and soil and water conservation. Although there is an inter­
est in tackling each of these problems (except in Eritrea and the Ogaden, 
where much has been made of the fact that.Somali troops were using new 
irrigation ditches as trenches), a great deal remains to be done. In order 
to make all of these links between centres and peripheries effective, the 
capabilities of the Ethiopian bureaucracy must be radically expanded 
along the lines suggested in Chapter Five, in particular, technical 
skills and the ability fully to utilise resources locally must be expanded, 
The capacity to undertake efficient large-scale development programmes, 
to feed the urban areas' and to promote agricultural exports, must also be . 
devel oped,
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Lest the reader conclude that law has but a marginal impact on
rural development prospects in Ethiopia, we hasten to add that, while
the centre's law-as-norm plays only a small role in the peripheries,
law-as-institut ion is having a major influence on processes of rural
change. While this perspective may be unfamiliar to Western lawyers,
It is the one commonly adopted by socialist jurists: in the U,S,SfR, -
and In Ethiopia - 'kulaks' used obsolete customs and traditional laws for
counter-revolutionary agitation against land reform, The institutions
created under socialist law and guaranteed by state coercion attempt to
abrogate traditional laws and customs that have lost their meaning in
a changed society, and they utilise law-as-norm in an attempt to create
the "new socialist man" with new political loyalties,, This is what the
Derg seems to be doing in the rural areas. Compared with the land-
related laws of Haile Selassie, those of the Derg are not purely symbolic
an attempt has been made to avoid unenforceable provisos that caff
attention to the impunity with which the regime may be flouted; there
is a lively interest in implementation and enforcement; and there Is
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some genuine delegation of authority to peasants; although such dele­
gation is hardly so generous as to enable peasant organisations to deter­
mine the direction and pace of the rural Revolution,
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CHAPTER 7: The Centres
To assert that Agriculture First policies will serve to maximise 
Ethiopia's development potential is not to suggest that urban and other 
centres - and manufacturing and commerce in particular - should be -starved 
of resources and left to fend for themselves. The main reason for basing 
our analyses on an exploration of links between centres and peripheries— - 
is to emphasise the interrelatedness of sectoral processes of under­
development and development, as well as the interdepehdence-of the- 
political, economic, social and legal aspects of these processes. fn 
Chapter One, we.stressed the need for decr&asing the varying distances 
within and among centres and peripheries, and rejected the more common 
duaVistic" descriptions of the Ethiopian’economy that can only lead’to - *• 
unduly simplistic conclusions. There is no firm dichotomy of rural and 
urban areas in Ethiopia: each sector displays wide variations' in life- -
sty l es y a-nd-there a-re enc 1 aves - of .a~Wes-tern-style commercial .agriculture,.,, 
in several rural areas. Further, many urban people are engaged in some 
form of traditional service, commerce or administration, or are totally 
peripheral- -to economic activities, in a sense that the peasants in rural 
areas are not. We have adopted a fairly arbitrary definition of Ethiopian 
centres as having a concentrated population of more than 20,000 *■ account- 
ing for 6,5% of Ethiopia's total population - but it should be kept in 
mind that-medium-size towns funet Lop both.as centres and peripheries.
While they-are clearly centres in relation to their surrounding areas,-,.. , 
they are also peripheries from the standpoint of the influences exerted 
by Add 1s Ababa.
tn this Chapter, we will attempt to unravel the complexities of 
underdevelopment and development from a different vantage point than the 
one adopted in the previous Chapter. Business activities in the centres 
will be analysed in light of the laws governing them, the evolution of 
organised labour and the processes of urbanisation that have stimulated 
- but more often frustrated - industrialisation. While the Chapter thus 
focuses on economic matters, the social and political impact of the 
Derg's reforms and nationalisations will emerge during the course of 
d i scuss ion.
While the late 1960s saw a growth . in . Ethiopian industiral output .of, 
15% per year, manufacturing accounted for only 5-3% of Gross Domestic 
Product in fiscal 1969-70; the corresponding figure for mining was 0,3%
Ao6
of GDP, Another index of the.small size;of this manufaeturing•sector -i s - 
that it employs only 80,000 workers - 0,6% of Ethiopia's economically 
active population and 5% of the active population in the urban areas.
An annual increase of 3.3% in industrial employment failed to keep pace 
with a 7% increase in urban populations during the late 1960s and early 
1970s. Employment per industry actually declined by 3*5% while produc­
tion continued to increase rapidly - a logical outcome of a heavy depen­
dence on imported capital-intensive-technologies,  ^ 'Other aspects of the
foreign dependence of Ethiopian industry (see Chapter One) -are illustrated
2
by the statistics in the footnote,
  " I n *a'ddf 1 1 orr1 to** the’ mu Iti nat i onad firms1 Envoi ved Err* agr i husf-ness-tha t - -
were mentioned in the. previous.Chapterother.areas of the. Ethiopian..  .
economy dominated by the multinationals included; petrol distribution 
(Shell, Agip, Total and Mobil); oiV exploration (Tenneco an American 
firm which reportedly made a major discovery in a part of the "Ogaden 
claimed by Somalia); Leyland and Fiat lorry, bus and jeep assembly plants; 
Ethiopian Airlines (a daughter company of TWA); copper mining (a small 
Japanese concern operating in Eritrea); potash extraction (American); 
textiles (Japanese and Indian firms); major coffee plantations and forest 
try schemes owned by American shareholders; and drug manufacturing and 
meat packing concerns operated by British companies, Government held a 
substantial interest in *most of-these? companies prior to the national isa*^  * 
tions of 1975. American companies with a750% or more stake In. Ethiopian""' 
companies prior to 1975 include: American Life Insurance Co ,r Dean
Export (shipping), !,B.M., National Cas«h Register, Kalamazoo Spice Co*, 
and. Singer Sewing Machines. These companies were neither large nor, 
primarily, profit-orientated; for the most part, they were established 
to stake out a market position for the future.^
When compared to many other Black African countries, Ethiopia has a 
wide range of industries, but in so populous a country, industrial pro­
duction is very low when evaluated on a per cap i ta basis.’ While the high 
degree of industrial concentration - in Addis Ababa, its satellite towns . 
and, to a lesser extent, in Asmara - is similar to that found In surround­
ing countries, there is a smaller degree of foreign dependence in Ethiopia 
(for the reasons mentioned in Chapter One). Investments in industry and 
commerce had begun to displace the acqu.isi tion of ’ .1 and ■ as" the--basj'Svof- 
security and status for Ethiopian elites,- Broad managerial functions
^07
were usually delegated to intermediaries, who were often both foreigners 
and incompetent. Individual firms were often natural monopolies facing 
a small aggregate demand, artificial monopolies created by legislative 
fiat, or price leaders tolerating a small and often traditional competi­
tive fringe. As a result of the lack of competition, consumers have 
little choice among products-and pay- higher prices for..a_smal ler volume 
of goods, particularly as there is much excess capacity in plants, which 
are smaller than the optimum 'size dictated by Western technology,. Local 
businessmen remained merchants in essence, as much of manufacturing con­
stituted a license to engage in disguised importation; little more than 
a screwdriver was typically required to assemble knocked-down equipment.
’ Th'eT ■ s'car c t ty o f; wE t h top ian” entrepreneurs"4 has - b ee n *- a 11 r i b u t e d I n - par t-^ -to™ « ^ 
cultural traditions, and much business was in the hands of foreign groups, 
some of whom acquired Ethiopian citizenship: Yemeni Arabs and, to a
lesser extent, Armenians, 1 taljans.and Greeks. Perhaps three-quarters^ 
of the persons engaged in 'commerce’ are hawkers o f  market stall keepers 
who perform unsophisticated functions inefficiently - in a manner rem­
iniscent of the traditional bureaucratic processes described in Chapter 
Three, The Addis Ababa Mercato is at the hub of Ethiopian commerce,- with
a 1970 turnover estimated at Eth, $1,000 mi 11 ions, 'attributed to 7,100
Z|.
businesses employing some 13,^00 people (Eth, $2,08 = U.St $1),
Gunnar Myrdal's summary of the predicament of South Asian states' 
could well have been written in.Ethiopia: . . . _
. . . The industrial sector is small, particularly in organized 
large-scale industry. In all other sectors, but especially in - 
agriculture, crafts, and traditional industry, techniques of pro­
duction are primitive and capital intensity Is low. The ratio 
bf"savings to income is also low, Savings per head is lower 
still. There is little enterprise, particularly In long-term 
productive investments. The overhead capital in the form of 
roads, railways, ports, power plants, and so forth is inadequate, 
Labour utilization is low in regard to worker participation and
duration of work and also in labour efficiency.
These conditions are directly related to.each other in , . , .
[a] one-directional way, . , . Thus the low'savings ratio tends
to keep down the formation of capital. Crude production techniques 
• are partly the result of low capital per- man, The distribution
of labour is faulty, in that too many are occupied in. relatively
unproductive activities. In turn, low labour input and efficiency 
are in part a result of primitive techniques and lack of capital.
We have catalogued the low levels’of living for most* people- in-
the' countries of South Asia. These low levels man i f est spec if i c .
deficiencies: Insufficient food, bad housing, poor public and
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private hygiene and medical care, insufficient facilities for'' 
vocational and professional instruction, and education in gen^ 
eral . These low levels of living are caused mostly by low 
levels of productivity and income, and low levels of living 
cause low efficiency of labour,5
The second paragraph in the quotation from Myrdal effectively describes 
problems found both in Ethiopian centres and peripheries, but casts them, 
in the form of a "vicious cycle" - an analytical frame we criticised 
in Chapter Two. We can, however, note that Haile Selassie's policies 
had a negligible effect on this "cumulative circular causation",
import substitution by Western-managed enterprises « a Mhothouse 
capitalism" involving11ig*ht; manufacturing' iTra few* enclaves,•-economfc'- ■ 
-growth for the .few----beh4nd-fw-gfw--tar,i f.f. walls,,.,and. heavy-demands . . f o r ; . . ....
foreign exchange - is the strategy that was pursued rather than a Soviet 
type of self-reliance and emphasis on heavy industry,; New profits were ” 
not ploughed back into new and productive local activities and many 
traditional artisans were thrown out of work by a wider availability 
of Western-sty1e products. in other respects however, there was a 
peaceful coexistence of traditional institutions with the new businesses 
(a major reason why this particular strategy of industrialisation was. 
chosen), except when organised labour came to demand higher wages, Where 
the State chose to manage industrial and commercial concerns directly, 
a further bureaucratisat ion and entrenchment of authoritarian traditions 
took place. American 'experts' often praised the "stability" (strongly 
resembling inaction) that resulted from "free" Ethiopian enterprise (a 
rather primitive form of corporate syndicalism) and what was viewed as 
American-style industrial relations. The negligible impact of indus­
trialisation on the growth of the economy as a whole and the virtually 
non-existent effect of industrialisation on traditional politics meant 
that social stratifications continued to display their customary rigidity
i i 6.among most cultural groups.
The centres' business activities are conducted under varying mi.xtures 
of traditional practices, Western-style private laws, Government regula­
tions concerning private activities and rules concerning public enterprises. 
Many legal problems have resulted from the incompletness, internal con­
tradictions and confusing combinations of the public and private laws 
that are applied', li g n o r e d d  I storted and rejected. < While a mixed system 
of public and private enterprise logically entails a mixed legal system -
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and while the Der.g is hard at work'chang i ng the mix both of law and of 
enterprise - little thought has been given to the overall effect of law 
on the economies of rt he- cent res , either by the. Derg or under-Haile 
Selassie. Major enactments, the Civ? 1 ;and Commercial' Codes promul-" 
gated in I960 under the Emperor, draw largely on French sources whose 
cardinal postulate is a rigid segregation of private and public laws. 
While pragmatists deny the validity of such a separation in France (it 
certainly does not exist in Ethiopia) and Marxists vjew private laws as 
little more than delegations of the coercive power of the State, the 
segregation of public and private law is fundamental to the very opera­
tion of a legal system in the civilian mould. Rules from one sphere 
cease to be valid in the other.^
The nature of this dichotomy has been best expressed by an eight­
eenth century Scots jurist, John Erskine:
The public law is that which hath’more Immediately in view the -
public weal and the preservation and good order of society, . . .  
Private law is that which is chiefly intended for ascertaining 
the civil rights of individuals.
In other words, private law has its locus in relations and organisations 
which are subject to other, non-legal social controls and are relatively 
independent of the state; this locus is in one-to-one transactions, where 
ind i vidua! s * bring their wills and assets: to bear on narrow projects of - 
primary concern only to.themselves,.;Tbese.projects provide, in turn, 
the motivation and the means to invoke.-lega l processes , ~* Pub-U c l a w - , ... 
on the other hand, posits a failure of markets and other social controls 
to serve a public interest which diverges from that of the individuals 
directly involved. If markets and private business activities are re­
garded as basically wholesome, they are merely regulated under -public 
law; if fundamentally tainted, they are replaced. Public law generates 
changes in the ways in which production is organised, and these changes 
have a marked effect on other socia 1 .organi sat i ons., increasing. the need 
for more effective ways of legitimating the political system, A quasi­
political wage structure displaces the "invisible hand"i for example, 
and then serves as a focal point for• poj-iti-ca 1 conflicts between social
9strata.
Worldwide, socio-economic change calls forth legislative Interven­
tions and the growth of state power through administration. In. the .< .
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context of the present discussion, this process results in a constant 
penetration of private law by principles enacted in the public interest .
- as defined by those in-power. The legal system of the West failed to 
adequately anticipate this trend, and much analytical confusion has re­
sulted. The subordination of public to private law assumed by the common 
law (at-4east~ until recently) has proved no more adequate to the.jrask^ 
of incorporated legal change than has the rigid segregation adopted by. 
civilian jurisdictions,^ The only juristic technique that makes sense, 
under conditions in which active state interventions are both a politi- . 
cal inevitability and a prerequisite for development, is the subordina­
tion of private to public law. That this is the approach that"the Derg '
" Wi ji" continue'" to use i s re i nfoT-ced* by:'the; fact, that i it-is-the- prime,., 
juristic technique used in communist party-states, many of- which deny 
a separate existence to private law, We will, however, discuss Haiie 
Selassie's private laws in some detail;- to date the Derg has made only 
marginal change in the Codes (some of these were mentioned in the pre­
vious Chapter)J few changes have been projected for the foreseeable 
future, and other avowedly socialist regimes have learned to ’make do1 
without detailed revisions of the substantive rules of private law,
I, Private Laws^ ^------------  x
A discussion-of Government1 s private .1 aws has been relegated to a 
t^haptfeK‘KboVt the centred becauseV'as we saw-jn* Chapter Twoy-the-pene.* 
tration of these laws into subsistence rural areas has been negligible.-- 
The I960 Codes were a cornerstone of Haile Selassie's political strat­
egy; their utilitarian and instrumental rules will remain irrelevant....
to most-social situations for a long time to come, and they posed no 
threat to Imperial politics; they'estat)_l i sh a- wel 1 -def i ned and fairly 
rigid body of law (along with suggestions as to juristic technique) 
which satisfied the demands of some elites and served - for a-t.ime .c. ... 
to forestall demands for more radical changes; they do nothing to hinder 
the growth of a bureaucracy which was, and largely still is, incapable 
of an overall administration of the economy (see Chapters Three and 
piye); the Codes seem to confer property rights on Ethiopian elites 
while broadly permitting expropriation and an ongoing segregation of 
landed wealth and political power; and-they provided,a feci T. I ; f a f i y e ^ , 
framework familiar to Western businessmen, while their French orientation.
1 ?retarded -the growth of Amer I can-, i nf-1 uence over Ethiopian law. ■“
Apart from adaptations of the Fetha Negast (see Chapter One) found 
in Civil Code Title iV - Bonds of Consanguinity and Affinity - the I960 
Codes represent an almost complete break with the past. They also 
illustrate virtually all of the pitfalls that attend legal transplanta­
tions (some of which are mentioned in Chapter Two), Legal academics 
with experience in Ethiopia have nevertheless tended to follow uncriti­
cally the lead of Professor Rene David, the.Civil Code draftsman. The 
.thesis typically advanced prior to the Revolution was that-Ethiopia now 
has a moderately modernised legal system - one' which is moderately- ' *
• -welT adapted ’to Ethiopian society'and-which°wi l1-become,"through'moder---
 ate.lyrcr.eat.ive. jud.i.c.ia.l, leg I s.lafi ve.and. educational . efforts ,„accep±o~ -
13able to many Ethiopians of this generation or the next. Although the 
"moderate! ys" beg 'the* quest ion to some* extent, they-are utilised to' 
provide an accurate distillation of the minor qualifications found in , 
many pages of analysis. The viewpoint, impl.icitly adopted has been care­
fully summarised by Roberto Unger:
The growth of a formal legal system is inextricably associated 
with the rationalization of man's understanding that is at the 
core of 'development1, . . .  By providing for enforceable con­
tractual arrangements, equalizing the law of inheritance and 
structuring the law of property in accord with criteria of 
'efficient' resource* al location and I ncome “d Ts tr i but-ion, im­
posing duties of contribution to the public welare (taxation)
!•; * . r ®  ndr-:© rg a n- i z-Kn g- and-, p r.o mating. -1 a bo n^rtKhe i .1 aw-;: ca n op romofe * mo. r e anoratt vmmts
......~;d.irectdy .'social...interdependence.i..lachievement orientati.on.l^..,
and 'instrumental rationality,'!^
In this Sectl.on, we will examine the legal theories underlying these
 theses, in order~to discover the*nature of Ethiopian private~1 aw and
its relevance in an era of revolutionary change,
A. French Law Comes to Ethiopia
The predominant flavour of the Ethiopian Codes is French - in 
approach, style and, to a large extent, 'substance,- 'The French draftsmen, 
of the I960 Civil and Commercial Codes (David, Jauffret and Escarra) 
claim .to have used an eclectic approach based on comparative law method­
ologies, and consulted Western European, Middle Eastern, and North
1 5African Codes, as well as Anglo-American legal rules. Thetr approach 
appears less eclectic once we recall that -the other Codes that were 
consulted are heavily influenced by the French model, and that all' of 1
k \ l
the rules examined are' the products of a single (Western) legad culture,*
with a common core' of categories and history. Further, persons pursuing
a comparative approach must possess a sensitivity towards, what.Hoi mes -
would have termed the "inarticulate major premises" of Ethiopia's legal
system (see Chapter Two).^  There is ample evidence to suggest that
Ethiopia's draftsmen lacked this sensitivity. David, for example, argues
that Civil Code obligations rules will encounter no opposition since
"the Ethiopian society of yesterday did not know the concept of corv- 
17tract." Escarra remarks that:
until now there have not been local commercial customs in
Ethiopia.- . . .  18 • . - ..........
The business practices which came to my attention were generally 
not very significant. In fact, Ethiopian trade •*’ especial Vy 
foreign trade - is based legally , . on fa'irly poorly-defined 
Anglo-American practices to which have been grafted the business 
customs of each trading group. 19
These views mistake the-natune .of. pnerexistiflg.£thioplaa law by.„
finding its essence in form rather than function and by uncritically
transferring French assumptions in areas where the Ethiopian legal
environment is not understood, ‘Contract is obviously equated with
modern French obligations law, since even traditional forms of commerce
are contractually regulated, and notions of reciprocity, duty and the
bargained-for regulation of social and economic relations - elements of
a more relevant contract, definition - have. exi sted. j.n Ethiop ia. for many.
20
- * years . ■ - Inter alia., the Fetha -.Mega s t .which .has,..been.. a.ppj.ied^ si.DC,e,.   ..
at least the sixteenth century, states:*
The purchase is not valid unless the seller and buyer may 
dispose of their own property and unless they agree with 
knowledge [of the price] and unless they have been emanci­
pated, [The contract of] purchase and sale is completed by 
the transfer of the object from the seller to the buyer who 
receives it without violence and they shall not make a deal
in the absence of a third person acceptable to both. , , ,
As a general proposition the' rule is-that [the contract is 
concluded if] the buyer gives his consent— by.saying ‘yes’ and 
[is annulled] if he rescinds it,
Furthermore, historically significant commercial customs and practices
have existed in Ethiopia for thousands of years, and modernising codes
could have been drafted which take these practices into account,
David's and Escarra's statements are raveal-i.ng: examples'of an,. : 
approach to law similar to that found. in col oni al' 1ega1 thinking: i
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"good law in one place is good law any place el'sa11, since there Is-no-
need to consider interactions between law and social values and struc- 
22
tures. In this vein, David contends that Ethiopian development and 
modernisation
necessitate the adoption of a ’ready-made1 system; they
force the reception of a foreign system of law . . .
rather than a codification along such lines of legal—  — ---
development as can be identified.23 . .
As we argued in Chapter Two, development requires the establishment of
some rules and institutions on an a priori basis, yet codification is a
-serious matter and should be undertaken only after a deliberate choice
of objectives and an analysis of the actual and potential role of.law-
" in Ethiopian- society1. immense pol l ticar thanges ’have made i t'ddsifabfe-fif'"
to reformulate portions of the Codes after only nineteen years.
More fundamentally, David presupposes that the French legal model
,.t.and ;vhts.. related, assumptions* are ^ the.appropr late., ones .from the ..standpoint,,
of Ethiopian development. French private laws were not instrumental in
-securing a broadly-based development in their country or origin,-however, •
and it is unlikely that they will do so in Ethiopia,
The historical events that are relevant to the development of French
private law in the nineteenth century are alfen to Ethiopia's experience,
and have been characterised by Marx as comprising the era of Bonapartism:
The exercise by the state, through a strong executive, of ar­
bitration between classes and social forces, to assure the 
'necessary conditions of stability for the promotion of der 
velopment under the leadership of the bourgeoisie,24•
This process was interrupted by the Third Republic and has continued under
De Gaulle and his successors. That- the arbitration of interests was in
favour of the bourgeoisie (as that term is used in French-political- -
analysis) is shown by the fact that concern for the well-being of the
majority arrived quite late in France: a welfare state did not begin
to emerge until the income levels of the masses could support it, French
economic development was slow and empTTasTsed stability rather than
achievement. The peculiar inflexibility of the French .“bourgeois spirit11
made for little resource allocation and for an institutional "set" in
favour of small and timid businesses and farms, which are subject to
-inertia and are structured around.the family. Adaptations to. .new ..e,CQno_ . .
■ - nvic-ci rcumstdnces and soc ial conf 1 i cts were,,* i a other words , , j‘.nad,eqw.at>er?-5
h 1 h
The related French private laws which emerged "were merely the re­
flections of the social; political and economic philosophies character-
26 27
istic of the era", and "a prematurely ossified system of premises".
(While the latter assertion is applicable to the Codes as transplanted 
in Ethiopia, the former most certainly is not.) The original French 
codifications were a. sharp reaction against what were seen to be..the 
excesses of the Enlightenment and the Revolution. While Roman law pro­
vided the conceptual frame and some of the rules of obligations (con­
tract) and property laws, many rules were backward-1ooking, grounded as 
they were in customary law. While property was liberated from feudal 
privilege by the Civil Code (a tendency which never materialised under 
Ethiopia's Code - see Chapter-Six), the basis of a rural and increas­
ingly bourgeois society was the fierce protection of immovables within 
the family. French and Roman notions of a patriarchal family coincided 
and served legally to strengthen the role of the family posited by_a--‘ 
Mediterranean Catholicism. The power of other groups standing between 
the individual and the State (manors, guilds, the Church, provincial 
authorities and municipalities) was proscribed because, inter alia, 
they hindered attempts to achieve an Imperial absolutism - Napoleon's
or Haile Selassie's, In the name of an extreme- individual ism and free-
—  28 
dom of contract, the individual was left face to face with the State.
\
A'isstevf - w.* ; he^sRirench. -Codesc^ens-tmmedt. t,he«b.asTcep>tf.hncT^ plre. thatr.the^-S ta-fce *■©
not operate businesses so as to dfstort-market equality, an obsolete 
rule that causes many legal difficulties, in France today, Jf the .French 
courts ever served as effective arbiters of business transactions, they 
certainly ceased to do so in the .twentieth century., The French Commer­
cial Code was already old at its birth: designed as it was for shop-.- 
keepers and artisans, it largely re-enacted the Ordinances of 1673 and 
1681. it fails to take account of state intervention, nationalisation 
and .economic planning (problems-that plagued the legal system under 
Haile Sela-ssie) and it cannot be analysed as a logical entity since 
many of its basic principles are enshrined in the Civil Code, There
is some pressure towards a unification of the two Codes in France, and
29
there is little reason for separate Codes in Ethiopia,
' There have, of course, been changes Sn.the French.Codes since .they':, 
were promulgated early in the 19th century,. These changes took place
k] $
within a framework provided by the persistent social and economic re­
lations detailed above, which also exerted a major influence on the 
nature of juristic speculation (jurisprudence, doctrine), and legal 
- . -=-■ ■ .practice. Rural and Labour Codes were enacted to -supplement the Civil
Code, landed property and family cohesion became somewhat less important
30
----- " and group economic activity became-more-promtnent, Viewed--from the - —
vantage point of. France, these-changes were great- indeed, Viewed from
the outside - such as from Ethiopia - however, fhe* main outlines of the
■ law remained as stable as the social system they served-and important
Code reforms were not secured,.. .
Threr are a "few similarities between the codification'experiences-of- —
w-  ** Prance* fanth r£ tH fo p i av* Bay i t c h 1 s^cha ra c t e r f  sa thons*■can f * f© r  nexampJ-e?» ber**?* *  s#m
applied both to the Ethiopian and the French Codes:
a self-righteous remoteness from actual problems permeated by 
didactic overtones make such codes frequently showcases of
“* ..* "Ve'arrrihg rather than tools handed-'over to“ government-to- cope .............. - —
with everyday problems. , , . [The] most impressive codifica­
tions owe their existence to one form or another of authori­
tarian regime, denying free action to political, social or 
economic forces in favor of one guiding, all-embracing offi­
cial doctrine. Stich a doctrine may be personfied in an abso­
lute ruler or an ‘elite1 , , , permitting the creation and 
enforcement.. . . of the grand legal image of a uniform society,31
A superficial comparison of French and Ethiopian legal environments. dis- 
\ .closes some further similarities: the importance of the family, immov­
ables, individual economic activity,and Christian morality (albeit of 
different content) ,fal1 within the sphere of interests associated with^ 
a tiny, state-supporting, Westernised, urbanised and, usual 1y^ landed
.......  Ethiopian minority - the group that practiced a rudimentary capitalism..
and dominated Par-1 iament and the Codification Commission under Haile 
Selassie, When examined in detail, however, numerous value differences, 
emerge, and many of the interests that can be pursued through Ethiopia's 
Codes are not, in any event, even within the frame of reference of the 
Derg or of ordinary Ethiopians,
This isnot surprising since, notwithstanding the fairly minor 
modifications that have been enacted, the French Codes are designed to 
fit an early nineteenth century French “social field1' - that interplay . 
of institutional structures, physical constraints, ideologies, tradi- 
• v tions, values and a host of other forces that determine, the; realm of, , t.
kl6
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individual and judicial choice, The needs and demands represented
within that field are radically different from those of the Ethiopian
social field, and largely unmodified French (or Italian or Tunisian)
legal rules .will not-, except- by chance, result in the same behaviour
33when transplanted to an Ethiopian environment, Alan Watson argues 
that:
Variations in the political, moral, social and economic '7 ..
values which exist between any two societ-ifes make' i t hard 
to believe that many legal problems are the same for both 
except on a technical level.3^
Unlike Ethiopians, the French are, for example, "a law-minded, law-using
people, whose affairs were touched by legal processes at many points, ,; ,,35
High levels of indifference and deviance with regard to Ethiopia's 
Civil and Commerical Codes should therefore have been predicted prior 
„ to-theT-promu 1 gat i on and such : ha s i ndeed * been-the^ca se, -both < befone— -*■ > 
and after the Revoiutlori,' Acceptance or active support of the Codes by* 
more than a tiny minority can only be achieved by devising more Inclu­
sive legal values or - less realistically for Ethiopia, given the low 
levels of legal 'penetration and the Derg's political predilections ’- by 
absorbing more people into the existing system of private law,
Cod£s which do not respond to Ethiopian needs and demands will not 
.promote development. -Arguably, .Ethiopia needs— integration of, rather— .
TijTrf JT if If r t- >! ■i ■ t han- a r-b 11 ra t i on. among s t ra ta a nd- * e tfanTc <*g'-roupsvf i:,a s" wef 1 "as-' TegaT- ^ p ro w 1
T,v...r» •», vfsos which secure greater social- justice’ and-equaTtty ;for" 1 ai^ernTambersr^
of people. Instead of a crystallised inflexibility, tens ion, confl ict
and change must be dealt with explicitly and creatively (see Chapter
36
' One). Ethiopia's Codes fail to accomplish these goals. Although we -
 --------  have chosen to explore the difficulties arising from legal transpTanta~---
tions across social fields in relation to Ethiopian private law, the 
. . .same sorts of conclusions could, be drawn from analyses of the public
laws discussed in Chapter Three. These conclusions would be much more 
tentative and subject to qualification, however; as we noted, trans­
plantations were far less direct and wholesale in the area of public 
1 aw,
B. Ethiopia and Professor David •' ' •«. * ■' ■ * I- ‘ :
(f the Codes that were brought to Ethiopia are neither modern nor
A17
modernising - a subject we will return to infra - what, then, was the
purpose of codification?- The Codes effect, in Rene David's opinion,
a compromise between the present need for dispute settlement and the
introduction of a new model of social organisation:
They [Ethiopians] wish it to be a programme envisaging a 
total transformat ion of society and they demand that for 
the most part, it set out new rules appropriate for the 
society they wish to create,37
David urges that "Ethiopians" reject an assertion he associates with the 
historical and sociological schools of jurisprudence: a non-traditional
mode of conduct cannot be imposed upon people. The Codes are a new and 
Ideal Fetha Negast which, aims at social perfection, although it wi11 be 
imperfectly followed in practice. These questionable assumptions 
(which must be ascribed-to David rather than "Ethiopians", given the 
divergence of views that results from high levels*of social stratifica-- 
tion and'ethni c fragmentation)*underlie muctrof the Ethiopian "cadi fica-1 
tion process and raise numerous questions. Are the Codes an appropriate 
means of introducing a new social model? Do a majority of Ethiopians 
favour social change through law? Do particular legal rules serve to 
compromise essentially conflicting goals, providing both concrete, man­
datory solutions to present-day disputes and fluid statements of future 
good intentions? Beckstrom, for example, notes that:
.‘w-; . . * [EtWopia'sI Civi 1-Xode. hast. been:: pictured as a sophistic - vr 
cated body of law .lying dormant, waiting for the nation to „
grow into it, an inappropriate picture in instances such as 
this where the Code began to operate immediately upon an un­
prepared population.39
The models that compete with the one proposed by the Codes are con­
tained in the Fetha Negast and the customary laws of Ethiopian cultural 
groups which are outlined in Chapters One and Six, With incredible 
self-confidence, David purports to repeal these laws under Civil Code 
Article 33^7(1) - see Chapter One, Although he recognises that "customs' 
provide the substance of private law, he denies them the status of law, 
viewing them as "mores" which wi11 evolve under the pressure of modern 
education. For David, African custom "became the symbol of an imperfect 
society", in which "justice is barely distinguishable from conciliation" 
The authority of customs "ended the moment it was realised that there
ko
was another social and-moral order both different and s u p e r i o < v , .The.
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apparent reason for so arrogant an ethnocentrism is that the Codes are 
viewed as the "real11 law; they are to conquer Ethiopia as Roman law 
conquered Europe. Roman law backstopped the emergence of a market econ­
omy within feudal societies, and the same thing was to happen in Ethiopia 
The migratory idea whose time has come was thus to stimulate Ethiopian 
social development somehow. Further, David sees no place for traditional
laws as sueh'frra codification based solely on "national interest", as
41
discerned by draftsmen, Codification Commission and Parliament,
David goes on to explain why the incorporation of traditional rules
was fa i r1y rare:
If there is still some attachment to the Ethiopian custom, it
■...* i s* 'a1 ma tter- of sfent iment -or sel-f- rhterest-. *V . 'Ft -ha's 'no sa'cfred
character in the eyes of the population,^2
The Ethiopians have sorted out their customs, keeping only the 
necessary ones which either correspond to their profound senti-
 ... ment of-justjce., .or, el se, appear .too. ..genara-l l.y. and too pr. of aundl.y
rooted for one to hope to take them away from Ethiopians in the 
foreseeable future,^3
The first statement is clearly erroneous and both of them raise a number
of interesting questions: are "sentiment" and "self-interest" not major
driving forces in other legal systems? Who decided what is "profound
sentiment" and "too profoundly rooted"? On what basis? Who will take
traditional law away from Ethiopians in the future? HowwiTl they do so?
-.mw -sT-hew’trad^Huiona U  elements'that ■ we -^e•.*fjeifca#i<ned*t-by;*DavFd«i-n *fche G.lvhl ^God'e^n
will not necessarily foster i t’s "acceptance: "for many inhabitants of
the Empire, a few traditional norms kept in the Codes are utterly foreign
as they reflect the traditions of other politically more important
44
groups," ~ This disregard of the traditions of non-Amhara cultural 
groups will c-reate problems j_£ Code-norms ever-begin seriously to impinge 
upon customary laws in the rural areas,^5 Societal integration which 
promotes unity and stability requires that a national culture and legal
system evolve simultaneously, with selected values which best promote..
development being drawn from various cultural groups,
The theoretical repeal of traditional laws by the Civil Code epito­
mises Arthur Schiller's characterisation of Ethiopian private law as
46"fantasy law". William Harvey terms David's Code an illustration 
' s. "of overextended' expectations from legal modernisation, . , v" Despite.;
-' "able scholarship and imaginative design"',-, the’ Code'has made ho • - -
!it 19
significant contribution: "The critical deficiency f , , was the
failure to take sufficiently into account relevant social realities. . . 
kl
i - There is abundant evidence in Chapter One to support Schiller's
and Harvey's assertions. Many centuries of legal history are not turned
into a tabula rasa so easily, and David fundamentally misunderstood
Ethiopian traditional laws, the degree of popular attachment to them,
and the realities of Af r lean-customary 1 aw genera'lly, While~a cod ifi- '
cation of private laws is a fresh start, it cannot be invented out of
the blue; it must be kept within the stream of continuity of pre-existing 
A8
laws, especially in long-established areas such as Ethiopian commerce, 
Further, David displayed a manifest ignorance of traditional Ethiopian
po lit? c s , ’ soc i a 1 St rat if Tea ti oh and‘~e t h;n i c - f ragmenta t ion s che-“ ass umed,....
for example, that he was dealing with the Ethiopian people while present­
ing his Drafts to the Codification Commission, c 1 ’ i<r‘i •
The only indication—that David ^ though t-i a bout v,some-of^the-^issues^we., 
have raised is his assertion that the Code was drafted for. the "mo.re
developed" highland population, and that its application elsewhere in
if 9
the near future is unlikely. This sounds like the conscious invigoura- 
tion of a legal dualism (like those which some lawyers have discovered 
in Anglophonic Africa), but a more accurate characterisation would be 
of a 'class' legislation manipulated by those who gain from it * includ­
ing lawyers in particular, Brun-Otto Bryde notes.that; ,
In a legal sense, eve ny^-Et hie plan..4 e subject-to-the mies.-aboJUt«~~ .
driving motor vehicles, or writing cheques. In practice, the 
law is in both cases of relevance only to a relatively small
group,50
At a deeper level, Robert Lee Hale adds:
Inequalities of fortune based ultimately on governmental assign­
ment of property rights and enforcement of contracts, are in­
equalities in individual liberty, Legal obligations to respect 
other people's property bear more heavily on those to whom the 
law assigns little property than on those to whom it assigns 
much. . . .  In assigning and enforcing property and contract 
rights, however, government f , , conceived itself as hewing 
to a narrow line of governmental activities, letting the chips 
fall where they may.51
Otto Kahn-Freund then picks up the story of the kind of transition between
traditional laws and Codes that was occurring in Ethiopia:
. , . The legal order: of feuda 1 i sm- deliberately :.-all.ocated the ’ . 
control of land- and. goods, .estab.fi sbed. the'hierarchy , of • power.",'.: : -?, 
and imposed the duty to work In accordance with the social
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. functions of possession, power and labour, The function of ■ • '
the legal institutions corresponded to their legal structure, - ...
Capitalist society,- however, pretended to be able to forego
the functional organisation of possession and of labour. It
covered the order of goods with a legal concept of property
defined in the abstract, , , . Society pretended to abdicate
in favour of the will of the individual, . , ,52 ' ,
, -—  r - • - —  If- the: broad definitions of contract and .property - use of- and xontroT ..   - •
.......-  over~ po l 111 cal and economic resources - which we argued for - in- Chapter—  --- — -—
Two are adopted, Ethiopian private laws are seen to be helping-to bolster
.the political status quo whi1e conferring licenses to acquire additional
wealth (and, ultimately,. political power) on Westernised elites, David's
r' --  stated desire to avoid fragmented legal systems has, temporarity at “ ~ *......  ’
ammesmvrie s-*t\n^eastedn-add'-ht4ona 1 ■ fragmentationy^andv.fche*ne xan-^ be-trro'«©q!isail
tection of the laws under these circumstances.
The Codification Commission and Parliament were composed of people
possessing a relative abundance of economic and political resources, ,
,
who could only deal with those issues they could perceive as social 
problems. The distances (see Chapter One) between them and the ordin­
ary people are much greater than between legislators and citizens in 
the West, Ethiopian elites are closer to their Western counterparts 
than to their own people, and it is therefore not surprising that what —
‘s.
is regarded-as- legal common sense by elites in the West ^ Yules relat- 
i‘ ing to property, contract, commercial law and business organisations i3r“"
...... should appeal to Ethiopian Parliamentarians, A Western conservat i vism, —  _
.... . combi ned wifh a few selected indigenous concepts (chiefly t n_the_area _  . ■..........
of family law and successions), was brought in to compete with tradi­
tional conservatisms, Several serious anomalies were also introduced, 
such as the deletion of David's transitional arrangements and the “sus­
pension" of provisions establishing the"Registries of immovables and
 ....  C i vi 1" Statu's which have never been implemented. The process of xondi'- ......  —  •
fication illustrates many of the characteristics of Ethiopian govern-- ' '
ment described in Chapter Three: secrecy and a lack of public discussion,
the rapid pace of enactment that was forced- by the Emperor, and an 
emphasis on the symbolic value of law rather than on its usefulness,
The clearest evidence of the symbolic nature of the Civil Code is that .
David's plan for commentaries and an expose des motifs was never carried 
v.i. . : out;.'the. Mini st ry of Justice also refused- to translate prior, cas.e . law r-.•d
for David's perusal. As a result, the practical impact of the Code was 
lessened substantially. Also, a consensus among David's'“EthlopiansM 
never came Into existence,53
Should the reader be sympathising with a Professor David who has 
been tricked by the wily Ethiopians and is being unfairly criticised 
here, we would point out that Third World lawmakers are at the merfy of----1.
a foreign expert; they can reject or alter rules in political 1y sens-i~----
tive areas, but they typically lack the expertise to challenge basic 
assumptions and technical ities, As Bryde notes, the Code could be viewed 
"as a -product, of the Ethiopian pari i ament-rather than of—Beae-David,
. [but] this would put the actual contribution to .the Code upside .down."5^
■ 11. » '.pf-pesi sTrably hereonciusi on* emerges't't%a"t r:Da v hd1' wa-s ^ najrve-- o »■
cal - or both. We would plump for naivety and for an ethnocentrism: 
like some other civilian jurists,*David was preoccupied-(whHe drafting 
the- Cod.e-.J n~ Pa.r.i s). wj th artificial .concepts and .systems .bear Lng .no ..reLa-_ 
tion to Ethiopian realities and with what he has te'rmed the "new univer- ~ 
sal ism" of a "legal science": The ways in which his preoccupations, were
dealt’ with invariably involved the French law. This is particularly 
worrying, since David is among the best-known of comparativists, Com­
mon lawyers can, however, take little comfort from his (and Ethiopia's) 
misfortunes. • For example, English draftsmen of land reforms in Kenya,
Sudan and Malawi came up with equally irrelevant - but English - con­
cepts; Coke's view of the common law as the ratio scri pta .has ...also come 
to. plague-processes .of legal tta.ns.plan.tatio.n5 ..._ ~ *
C . The Codes ?n Court
Any assessment of Ethiopian private law must take account of the
manner in which the courts apply the Codes: difficulties in developing
and-adminIstering the law often .reflect conflicts among laws, and social---
values. “'Prior to the adopt ion-of the Codes -(and the -related-£i vrl-Pro- '
57cedure Code), High Court judges of differing nattonalities-applied 
their own notions of justice and equity without being tied to the letter 
of the law. At the local level, judges were appointed by governors 
possessing an almost unlimited authority. Justice was thus an exten­
sion of individual authority, a function that was often turned to per- 
■Sonad" profit.' • A certain amount .of arbi trarine-ss resul ted f rom ’t h e ’ -
ih22
application of Individual perceptions, the undertainty of custom, and 
the adjudication of novel situations for which customary laws provided 
no answers. Although these practices were far from ideal, Vander 1 i nden ! s 
assetion that there was an absence of legal profession, legal education
and legal science In Ethiopia must be rejected out of hand as ethnocen-
58 ■ -
trie. There are specialised advocates and sophisticated principles
of legal philosophy, and customary laws are learned by listening to
cases and through discussions with judges and elders,
David envisaged the Codes as effecting the gradual implementation
of a minimal security in legal.relations by.limiting mistakes and ar- ' _
bitrariness, and by furnishing "a manual cutting [through] the uncertain
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contours “bf equity,” It can be argued that the further legal fragment - 
tation introduced by the Codes results in additional-mistakes and .arbi­
trariness; David seems to have transplanted the very French distrust of 
judges -that'1 is-’symbol ised by a Revolutionary slogan, • uGod-•save~ti's--from--• —~ —
the equity of the courts” , Aequitas. ( equite, Billigkeit) has always 
played a.leading rple in civil law.,..as a means of escape from narrow 
formalistic Interpretations ~ a more precise natural justice, More re­
cent codifications, require, as in Article h of the Russian (R,S.F.S,R5) 
and Article 1 of the Swiss Civil Codes, that judicial interpretations 
reflect the~spirit rather than the letter of the text, Rather than 
, adop^*tb-U« approaclv~.Da.vjd ornEtted vCano.nsu.of,, lotatpcetat ion,, a.l together:.,
•... and“'a,t'tempited''it'G!“ombody'the l eadTng "f ru i ts of ~F renoh-ju r i s p rudence - andk~• «-»«-
w' ' *   - -'doctri ne^  iTT'Code" m l e s v  ' Extracontractual”-1 i ab fi fty' (1 t o r t p f  or-ex--— *■ .
ample, Is dealt with in .151 Articles, compared with five in the French 
and seventeen in the Italian Codes,^ Throughout the Ethiopian Codes, 
the message is clear: judges are not to be trusted,
While High and Supreme Court decisions generally display an accurate- 
and effective application of the Codes, justice irr the lower courts has 
scarcely felt their impact. Despite a-theoretical centralisation of -The 
judiciary, local procedures and practices and traditional modes of 
proof survive. Argumentation continues to emphasis the persuasive 
presentation of facts rather than complex legal interpretations, If 
the applicability of the Codes Is recognised at all, judges typically 
-t-tv \ c  i te- i r-r-e 1 evan t provisions to 1 dress up-T .-the.i r iop i n ions ■ and? fa-M-■ t o m - . v 1 ' ’sr.;
. . : {.. explain -how. the Code, i s appl led to case Tacts, '.■■.Even .when-judges:atte;mp.tr. r r . : ; •^rrr.v-
2^3
to apply the Codes conscientiously, Articles tend to be viewed as situa­
tions rather than as principles, with the facts being fitted into the
t • . 61most relevant situation.
Another-common tendency in Ethiopia is.to utfl ise trad i t tonal -
arbitration or conciliation by local elders (shamagej11es) in preference 
to Government courts .— Urban- merchants , for example, use these devices 
to save time and expense end to-preserve business relations. Typically, 
there is-recourse to Government courts only if large amountsof money 
are at stake, the-issues are complex,-a forei'gner-rs— frrvcrWed'7 OT^a—  — —  —
criminal ca.se. or _v.eageance -i s being pursued-. -Disputes settled by elders
t
can be brought to court later but social pressures and settlement tech-
r  fquesy -such as--wri rten-agreements\t usua 11y i nduee' Compliance with the  -
elders’ decisions. Under Civil Code Article 3312, these compromises have
the effect of" 1 res--) udrcata 1 regardless of mistakes as to the rights —
compromised,, and, can.,onjy. be attacked on the ground of fraud or duress,  ....
The agreement constituting the compromise need not be written unless it
concerns an immovable. In a settlement analogous to a bankrupcy pro~
ceeding, for example, the shamageilles will destroy the evidence of the
debts in order to prevent creditors from later going to court, The
parties usually prefer this procedure to the punitive bankruptcy pro~
visions found in Commercial Code Articles 97^1153, which presuppose
that businesses are registered, books are kept, and sophisticated judi-
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cial administration of complex and delicate rules is available,
, .Arbj tra.tJoa and-concvi 1 iat-ion do, of-counse^-exist -in all legal
systems and are flexible procedures that decrease court caseloads, They" •-
should always be subordinate to state-^sanctioned adjudication however:
if, as in Ethiopia, they come.to constitute an alternate legal system,
the legitimacy of government and the uniformity of 1 aw-in^action will
suffer, While traditional conciliation usually fulfills the needs and
desires of the parties, there have to be winners and losers under the
new laws; under the Codes, of course, but In the Derg's new courts as
well, where a single, ideologically correct decision is expected,
The confused state of legal administration in Ethiopia supports
the contention that: "in a developing country the institutions and
procedures by which the law is administered may be more significant
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than the law itself". Law and order (properly defined -* see Part I!)
klk
is a necessary condition for development, yet we find that formal 
dispute settlement mechanisms In Ethiopia are Inadequate; case presen­
tations are confused, disorderly and delayed. A central problem of
Ethiopian law therefore becomes the recruitment, training and promotion
6A
of skilled personnel, Many excellent suggestions for improving the
quality of Ethiopian judicial administration can be found in articles
by Sedler and Geraghty^ and need not be reproduced here.
The judicial "style1’ emerging in relation to Ethiopian private 1 aw
is a product of conflicting currents: civilian substantive rules, a
codi f icat-ion .of the English procedural -ruTes applied in India, and~the....
Derg's socialist policies that are elaborated during judicial conferences.
While, for example, Western lawyers occasionaliy speak- of rights without
remedies, the converse is also possible in Ethiopia: procedural pules
vindicate rights which are unknown to the civil law, particularly when
the Amer i-can-s ty le -class-action-provTsos-that-wete added- to theC-i-vif -■
Procedure Code are taken into account (’balance of convenience* when
'enjoining nuisance', etc.), Thus, substantive similarities between
French and Ethiopian Codes can easily be nullified, for no good reason,
by procedural divergences which impair the functioning of the Ethiopian
Civil Code, as a system. Anglo-Indian (-American) models are no more
relevant to Ethiopia than the French ones, save that much of traditional
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litigation tends to be adversarial^rather than inquisitorial,
  An-unnecessary amount-of confusion-has-surrounded the-quest ion-of —
• whet-her-’' Bt+i top i an courts - ought -to-T foj-d bw^the-doctri ne :o f'sta r e!:d ee rs -is,' ^  
Owing to the influence of English procedural law and American Law 
Faculty instructors, an attenuated theory of stare decisis has entered 
Ethiopian legal thinking. While it is possible to apply stare decisis 
to the interpretation of a code, continental jurists have reasoned that 
Ethiopia has imported civil law techniques along with Civil and Commer-- 
cial Codes, Rather than stare decisis, ''judicial custom" |s to be of 
"overriding persuasive force , f , since judges will not easily risk
contradicting the known settled views of the higher courts, or their
h 67 own",
There are no objective differences between this "judicial custom" 
and a modern or liberal view of staredecis i s : .in the common, law world, 
only the-lower courts of England :cling terror .'are forced to retain) a t; 
strict view of stare decisis; most common lawyers would accept the
Continental jurist's description as an appropriate means of statutory*.*, ..
!nterpretation * An appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of 
both systems has led to a (perhaps unconscious) convergence in civilian 
and common law judicial thinking: precedent is accorded ’respect* but.
not a servile obedience; case rules are app1ied_on1y so. long as judges 
consider them useful; there is an awareness that merely "logical" in­
ferences from codes lead to fortuitous and arbitrary results; and the 
French view of the jurisprudence, of-an explanation and demonstration
of the law by judges, is increasingly accepted as a proper role for
68 ^
common law judges.
■ ■ There -is," in other words, no danger that-a. few.,.! 1 l.-cons id.ered.casejs .
will prematurely crystallise Ethiopian law under either approach, or 
that a slavish colt of judicial authority will emerge. Numerous, sub- . 
jective differences exist, of course, in the ways common law and Ccnti- 
nental courts approach legal problems, The techniques used in these 
jurisdictions (as well as those of other Third World and socialist 
states) must be carefully examined with a veiw toward assisting Ethiopian 
judges in the enormously difficult task of interpreting their Codes. 
Deciding cases is not an act of mechanical deduction; contra H,L,A,
Hart, it is a (political) act of will:
As Kant said, there is no rule for applying a rule. It is
'the specific quality of the so-called mother--wi t, * &9
- --Ethiopian judicial decision .maf\9cJna<1&JWW5 .d-Lff.tcuIt b-YvACt 
acLTte shortage of clear case reports-and-a-sett 1 ed -system-of-appea 1 - s —  
prefeqiii si t’e's' of a successful system of stare Jdec is-is , j Tri kewi*sef-~ 
doctrine (academic opinions which are of great importance to* civilian- 
case decisions) is fragmented, No general rules of interpretation are 
to be found in the Codes, although it is possible broadly to apply rules 
of contract interpretation found in Civil Code Articles 1733-,7 to other 
areas of private law, The Amharic is the official version of the Codes, 
while the English verions have some standing, owing to-their publica±ion 
in the Negarit Gazeta, The French originals have no official status, 
however. Even if careful translations are assumed, the meaning of legal 
concepts differs radically in different languages, and there is a vast 
potential for ambiguity where a few words, which have numerous referents, 
must bcappTied to a wide variety of-legal; si tatuions ? Added,to these, .> 
problems are-the numerous avoidable, ambigud ties,, errors ati-d. Co.ntradj-ct-Lobs ■
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that resulted from hasty drafts and translations of the Codes, Amharic 
legal concepts are “quite loose", and much m i st-rans 1 a t Ion , non-translation 
or too-literal translation of the Codes occurred. Many legal concepts 
have been forced into ill-fitting Amharic moulds, and the -break with 
Ethiopia's previous legal culture means that judges are playing a game 
where the rules are not completely understood,^
—  - When-aTb of these factors interact, they create numerous instances- 
of genuine Code vagueness. Coming to grips with an interpretation prob- ‘
lent,- a creative judge could ascertain the relevant Code principles,
apply -them-ten.tatively and. predict the resul-t, if the result—Is absurd,..
manifestly unjust or contrary to specific tenets of Ethiopian Socialism,
■hes-cou Td^ -f asMo'rr^air *a*l te mate** w l  e^ba s'edf* pe rha ps, *-vU p© n r a ■conofete? ^  ^
political pronouncement or a rule of traditional lav/, Recourse to cus­
tomary and traditional~laws is appropriate in areas where Code principles 
.atie vague,,,.,.a,3 though,a.-,r.eturn to,, .the,.,subject i ve a ppl.ication of-.d i verse ~ ^
customs and subtle changes in express Code language must*be avoided., -
Seller's contention that, on the whole, Ethiopian judges are not sophis-
71
ttcated enough to engage in-this type of reasoning can only be*accepted 
if sophistication is equated with a knowledge of the Codes and appro­
priately-chosen Ethiopian judicia1 techniques,
In order to develop these techniques, there must be a widespread 
recognition .that judicial decision-ma_king_is not a mechanical process,
that there ere strengths~and weaknesses . inherent in the j ud i c La 1 ..process : .
v,a:n.d:^ thaitu£hes-mter.es.ts%--press 1 ng;:»fon7j<udicj.aI7.re.cagn i.t Lon ..mus>t,be ri nves.c.7.7 * 7;,.^  
tigated with care and insight, These perceptions, in turn, dependuipon 
appropriate judicial education and socialisation, by fellow judges and 
new political institutions, and on a sensitivity towards- the public —
generally. The courts-will inevitably refuse to follow the Codes where 
they conflict with pronouncements from the Derg, but a measure of judi-1 
cial independence ought to coexist with this inevitability: the courts
ought sensibly to adapt the Codes to changed crrcumstances on their* own- - 
account, and to explain the broad issues involved (as well as the legal
technicalities) in order to build the public confidence that constitutes
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the basis of a court's legitimacy,
D , Brief Commentaries: Property ; 7 ' r
The outstanding characteristics of Ethiopian privatelaw are its ' '
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orientation towards nineteenth century capitalism and the absence of 
socialist provisos, meliorating provisions associated with the welfare 
state or rules related to a broadly-based development, Both property 
and capital - one of the uses to which property is put, through con­
tract - fall back on organised state power and form one of the most 
confused areas of economic and legal theory, Property is the corner­
stone of Western private laws, Complementary institutions based on 
contracts of, for example, employment and association ( including com­
panies - discussed infra) do not change the legal structure or social 
function of property, which is an entitlement to power, as well as to 
rent, interest and profits. For the Western economist, the test of the 
effectiveness of property law is "whether it provides a secure founda­
tion, so far as the law can do it, for the acquisition, enjoyment and
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disposal of wealth,"
At first glance^thTS'*fs-what'-'Ethiopie's'*private 1 a w  doest for ■ ..
those who have the means to acquire wealth, Articles 1204 and 1205(1)
of the Civil Code state that: .
Ownership is the widest right that may be had jin a corporeal 
thing [i.e,, 'incorporeal hereditaments1 and 'choses in action' 
are not included], Such right may neither be divided nor re­
stricted except in accordance with the law, x
, Without prejudice to such jestrictions as are prescribed by 
law, the owner may use his property and dispose of it as he 
thi nks fit, ■ . .
These provisions convey the substance of Article 544 of the French 
Civil Code, and the Ethiopian Codification Commission made only marginal 
changes in David's draft (except for the deletion of the Kolkoze pro­
visos "-see Chapter Six), Under French and Ethiopian law, property is 
the exclusive, perpetual and all but absolute Roman domi nium, an invio­
late extension of personality which is rigidly segregated from the state 
(i mper j urn), Property rights may be exercised for no economic benefit, 
even though another will be injured; as in all relations seen a s 'sub­
sisting .between man and nature, what a man does with his property is of 
no concern to the law. These legal concepts are inconsistent with a 
public interest in broadly-based development, They are inappropriate 
In a country where non-legal social controls fostering the beneficial 
use of property continued to constitute the basis of a feudal' exploita­
tion and rule (see ChapterfSix), David missed the opportunity to
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introduce a broad "abuse of rights" proviso like those found in more 
modern codifications, such as Article 8 of the Dutch and Article 2 of 
the Swiss Civil Codes, although rules like the ones found in Anglo- 
American nuisance law were promulgated (see Art, 1225).^
The fierce protection of property that derived from the fight 
against feudal burdens and restrictions in France soon gave way to a 
recognition of the State's right of expropriation, which was initially 
treated as an embodiment of Rousseau's belief that property rights are 
limited by community needs and rationalised as an "accidental" incursion 
which posed no threat to the segregation of private and public law,
Broad expropriation powers were transplanted to Ethiopia: all that is
.required is a declaration that- expropr iat ion serves the "public inter­
est", defined vaguely as something other than a purely financial bene­
fit; and a public inquiry should be held where it "appears to be neces­
sary" (Civi'l Colde Arts, 1463-5)/' As we saw in Chapter Three, Articles 
43 and 44. of the 1955 Constitution did not effectively protect vague 
property rights either. The net effect of these rules was, in fact, 
a simple restatement of broad traditional powers of expropriation ex­
cept that, as another index of centralisation, rapacious local officials
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could no longer exercise ,them as of right/ x
At the Emperor's pleasure, therefore, property law provided a 
■ fpamewo r h <w itfchT a^ -wh Feb ^wealsfchy • \bu t^commenofall y*' unsop hi s c* i cat ed*"#ttf Topi a n a 
could earn a profit‘with little risk or effort, The d e ta i ls ‘of*this 
process revolve around rural and urban land ownership practices (dis­
cussed in the previous Chapter and i n fra) which have been abolished by 
the Derg* It therefore seems only logical that the Derg would wish 
fundamentally to revise many Civil Code provisions. The socialist's 
concern over the living conditions of those with little or no property 
typically leads to the conclusion that freedom is attained in and through 
the state rather than through private property ownership, Surprisingly, 
however, socialist property laws do not differe markedly from Western 
ones. Article 58 of the Russian (R,S.F,SfR,) Civil Code, for example, 
provides that: "Within the limits set by law, the owner has the right
to possess, use, and dispose of his property" - language similar to that 
in the Ethiopian Code, Under the 1954 Chinese Constitution (soon to be 
. replaced) the. right to lawful Incomes, houses and inheri tances : i s
b2S
protected, as Is the title to-village land for-thirty*years, After-
nationalisations or under a sta-te soc I al i sm, a political institution
succeeds to private rights in property for, as Marx noted; '‘Appropria-
tion which appropriates nothing is a contradiction in t e r m s . H e  ■
took the view that property - but not necessarily private property -
Is inevitable: , _ -
All production Is appropriation of.nature by the individual 
and through a definite form of society. In that sense it Is 
a tautology to say that property (appropriation) is a condi­
tion of product ion,77
Hans Kelsen uses this quotation to rebut the doctrine of the withering
away of law and State, arguing that, since property presupposes a legal
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order, society must have law,  ^ . ...
Under socialist legal systeins, the distinction between private and 
public law breaks down; property lawacquires a public character and 
is then used to buttress new forms of political power and social organ­
isation* A liberal (Western) concept of ownership is nevertheless re­
tained, although the range of objects to which it attaches is more re­
stricted,' Private property continues to exist in those things deemed . 
necessary for the satisfaction of what are termed the cultural and ma­
terial needs of individuals while individual ownership of the means of
production - particularly those which confer a power to command others 
79- is prohibited. We therefore conclude that Code property rules could 
be adapted to serve the Derg's purposeswithout a massive revision,. •
E. Obi igations- •• . . .......
. Taken alone, property law cannot endow, its object.with the nature 
of capital; it must be assisted by complementary institutions such as 
those found in the Ethiopian Commercial Code and Books Four and Five of 
the Civil Code dealing with obligations ('contracts1), The most imporp’ 
tant contracts, of loan, association and e m p l o y m e n t a r e  discussed 
infra. A common characteristIc of the Code rules in this area Is that 
they purport to be only facilitative or power-creating, A sharp dis­
continuity between state action and inaction - the private sphere,
where government?s role is limited to dispute resolution - is presupposed,
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and law delegates the power to create enforceable norms to individuals.
Article 1711 of-the Ethiopian Civil Code enshrines the Western. -; c 
ideology of; freedom of con tract n-• l-ts' purest- f o cm r . ','T.he -o.b j-ec fe. of < t he-,. .,
strictions and prohibitions as are provided by law," Familiarly, con­
tracts are given effect unless the obligation is unlawful or immoral, 
or there is a defect In the consent or capacity of one of the parties 
(Arts, 1716, 1808), Restrict ions and prohibitions are few in number 
because, David argues, "contractual freedom , , , is fundamental to a
society and an economy that wants to leave considerable scope to pri- 
8?
vate -4n-i tta-t i vedf ” -The T dea™-bo r-rowed f rormri neteetrth-~cent^r^H-;fberaT - 
economics, is that the total autonomy of persons and mobility of the 
factors of production will, through an obligations law of unlimited 
pliability and with a minimum of ceremony, ensure an efficient and 
continuous‘flow of goods and services. Obligations law imposes no
value_Judjjements; the exercise of ?ndivjdua 1_ preferences is j^espected
once the phenomena of !offer and acceptance1 are detected (‘considera- 
,tlQrL* J &.UQ.t„I.equi red).• and the sum total of these preferences const \~v 
tutes the free markets with which obligations law is roughly coextensive 
The terms of contracts are determined by the Invisible Hand which, along 
with a multiplicity of parties to transactions, eliminates the possibil­
ity of abuses of and imbalances in power. It is therefore presumed 
that those agreements which are not narrowly illegal or immoral are 
fully consistent with society’s interests, that one-to-one dea1ings
Q 2
encompass all of the factors that the law ought to reckon with,
T h e x l se, .tc l prominence of this^legal concept is fairly recent; 
Bl,ajcks,tone,fo„r example.,, makes scant reference to it. It has, however., 
come to dominate Western legal thinking, causing David to opt "pour une 
solution transactionel1e" for Ethiopia, This is unfortunate; such 
a value-neutral^ law is a practical impossibility (see Chapter Two); It 
assumes a high degree of social consensus which has never materialised 
in Ethiopia (see Chapter One); and development^oriented rules can be 
blind neither to persons nor to their purposes (see Chapter Two), There 
can be no free bargaining where there are gross inequalities in the 
distribution of the major subject matter of contracts - property rights, 
Abuses tend to be cumulative rather than to cancel one another out, and 
the mobility of factors of production is hindered by rigid social strati 
fications, the fragmentation of markets and ethnic groups, the displace­
ment of economic motivations by traditional political ones, and consumer 
inexperience, Freedom of contract thus becomes an inefficient and often
exploitative device in Ethiopia, concealing acts of submission which
arise in the course of power relations;
Feudal relations, domestic relations (such as master and 
servant), trust relations, have been converted at the magic 
touch of business into contractural relations,^5
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- Behind the Invisible Hand' there is a thumb on the scales,
Hopefully, the preceeding paragraph makes out a good (albeit brief)
case for the revision of obligations rules, particularly since the Derg
rejects a 1 a i ssez fa ? re out of hand. As in our discussion of property
provisos, however, a wholesale revision iS 'unnecessary, White" there are""
significant restrictions on the kinds of things private individuals can
contract about in socialist coUTVrries', many'Code provlstons read" the
same as they do in the WesT since, i nter alia, economic relations with -
Westerners must increasingly be taken Into account. Certain additions
ar-e -made,--however, such as- Art-fde"’<8*2'-of• •ttie',P,o 1 js+r Code of ’Obl igat ions :”'"
An impossible condition and a condition contrary to the law 
or principles of common social life in the People’s State 
nullifies the transaction if it is a condition subsequent,
These kinds of provisos are not held to result in a “ legal nihilism” , 
and they serve to make an impersonal obligations law more directive, 
placing a greater emphasis on contract as a device for social coopera^ 
tion.. As we argued in Chapter Six, the State potentia 1.1 y-.has the power- 
*• of- command''Over a-H of'prop’ertyy d I hfe'r^eng^moTe^cr^a'f Tv^ l’y*''1^
by recognising only those individual and organisational relations which 
do not hinder a broadly-based development and by providing incentives 
for those transact tons which acti vely-fos-ter-development * T-hi-s- can be 
done on -the basis that a person who accepts the benefit of Code provi­
sions also accepts such regulation of the transaction as exists, In 
this way, a formerly private law can become an integral part of a sen­
sible development planning, provided•that manycareful choices are made:
1'faci1itative law manipulates the weaker party, as does planning law or
social engineering. The principle difference lies in who does the man- 
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ipulating” and for what purpose.
Despite the 1975 nationalisations (i nfra), private business activi­
ties will continue far into the future, in Ethiopia and an urgent need 
, for a more modernising framework of obiigatfons ]aw<remainsy-particu1 ar- 
ly one that'can be understood by the smaMer'~pfoducer • and" trader5;' " Wfda-' 
scale socio-economic relations require wide-scale law, and customary
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'obligations’ laws, must be made uniform and emptied of their reliance 
on the status of the parties and terms prescribed by tradition, Need­
less to say, such a resource-consuming exercise would only be under­
taken by the Derg if it were seen to further its intentions; obligations 
law could, for example, usefully regulate relations within and among 
city dwellers' associations (infra) and peasant organisations,
Inevitably-, in a-more intensively planned economy with a large 
measure of state ownership, certain types of contracts become subject 
to a more detailed regulation, Where an activity is vital to the 
achievement-of -plan--targetsfor example, an obi igabion to contract , i s . . 
often imposed on enterprises and 'specific performance' and an admin is-' 
trativeaCtbtintab'i 1 ity a’he^read i I y available, — ft--is, -however, wise t-o-.* 
leave the methods and details of performance to a bargaining among 
parties who have some choice as to who they deal with, if an unbiased 
-arbitration i-s-a-l-so avai lable,.. these kinds of contracts can provide an ., 
index of exchange values that is extremely useful, given market imper-
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fections and the impossibility of rational price fixing In many sectors, 
The basis for these kinds of contracts can arguably be found in Ethiopian 
Civil Code Articles 3131 to 3306 relating to administrative contracts.
F . Commercial Law
\
Many of the provisions found in a commercial code are more specific
applications of civil codeJobiigat ions rules, Escarra, the primary
Ethiopian Commerical Code draftsmen, believed that:
the future Commercial Code must tend to encourage Ethiopians 
to take an active part in the economic development of their 
country and so the Code should include institutions which 
will help in obtaining this result,^9
A laudable ambition, but he tried to fulfill it by designing an extremely
complex and severe set of provisions designed for a large-scale Western,
capitalist-type business sector, David asserts that, under Escarra’s
Code, "the need * to attract foreign capital often prevailed over consid-
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erations of what was humane or even just". The French Commercial 
Code manages to be inegalitarian while serving to implement an extreme 
economic liberalism, and these characteristics were faithfully repro­
duced for Ethiopia, Except in bankruptcy proceedings., "traders". (Arts, 
5-10) are treated differently from "business organisations" (Arts, 227- 
560). Farmers, fishermen and artisans cannot take advantage of Commercial
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Code provisions (Arts, 5-8); a separate Code which never materialised 
was to govern 'their transactions, Escarra justifies the severity of 
his Code as follows: "although it will inhibit some peVsons, [it]
nevertheless will assure the prosperity of the greatest number,
Instead of adopting an inability to manipulate an extremely technical 
Code as the criterion for i nh i bi t i ng a”Ct i vi ty, the draftsman’s goal 
should have been to create simple- economic inventives while protecting 
the legitimate interests both of society and of individual businessmen.
In France, and hence in Ethiopia too, there has been so little 
.hand. t.h i nki.ng a-bout business object i ves and respons i b i H  11 es' that' 1 "ega 1 *“ 
priorities are unclear and often contradictory, Article 5 of the 
Ethiopian- Commercial - Code vaguely1 h’equ i f es!"Wddefs : to^bbrsUe' t'He'i f ’acfi v-'" 
ities "for gain". The position of business organisations seems to be 
the same, except that certain partnerships are not required to act 
"commercially" (see Arts,, 5, 10(1,) .and. 213) ; >under Article 3^6; for 
example, any action which does not narro.wly benefit a company renders 
the directors liable to the shareholders. The theory seems to be that 
individuals can augment their capabilities, thrpugh collective action- 
private planni ng) , by utilising neutral contracts of association, and 
while remaining substantially immune to public interference. Inter-’ 
ventions are, nonetheless, introduced by the public laws that consti­
tute a potential basis for a thoroughgoing„publjc planning in Eth.iopia 
and that represent a . marked departure fr.omt.the French model , Many 
,-Xqmmercial,,Cpde provisions are simply' ignored because 'judges and’ bureau-' 
crats are lax in the enforcement of complex requirements. For example, 
Article 100 requires that businesses be registered, and non-registration 
is a penal offense (Art, 115); only 8,000 businesses had been registered
In all of Ethiopia by 1989, while there are 7,100 buinesses in the Addis
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Ababa Mercato (the main quasi-traditiona1 marketplace) alone.
Many of the complexities found in the Commercial Code can be traced 
to the numerous provisions governing the six types of business organ­
izations permitted: ordinary partnerships, joint ventures, general
partnerships, limited partnerships, share companies and private limited 
companies (Art, 212), The existence of four types of partnership can 
only be attributed to a direct transfer of French and German l.egal ex­
periences, The joint venture (Arts-, 271-9).’ has proved a particularly
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dangerous institution, since wealthy Ethiopians used it to conceal the 
nature of their business dealings - partners and assets can be kept 
secret and the organisation cannot be sued, The "severe" provisions 
concerning private limited companies (Arts, 510-43) are not severe 
enough, since these organisations can engage in wide-ranging activities 
on a very thin capitalisation,
Complex share company provisions (Arts, 304-509) suffer in compari­
son with those drafted by Gower for Ghana, Notably absent are Code 
rules detailing any kind of socia-l responsibility. They reflect, rather 
a primacy of"property * relations between shareholders and managers over. . 
the public interest that, contra laissez fa ire theories, often conflicts 
with pr i vate' ones'. Share companies possess'substantial advantages, i n ­
terms of continuity, secrecy, internal discipline and attracting small 
bits of capital from people who need not trust each other, yet the Code 
requires precious little in the way-of a ^ qu-i-d,pro .quo wh ich reflects 
public interests. In line with unreformed French and German patterns, 
Code requirements concerning disclosure of annual account and of busi­
ness activities generally were minimal in Ethiopia, and groups that 
supported Haile Selassie politically - the multinationals and conserva­
tive urban elites - thus escaped public scrutiny, Certainly the econo­
mic performance of Ethiopian business did not warrant so high a degree 
of trust and, under changed pojj^t j pal iClTP^stances ,_a ireater degree 
of managerial accountability - to-shar-ehoTders,--consumers and employees,
i n add i tion to ‘ the State - becomes possible-in-theory-These..a re...the. .. .
93kinds of reforms that are being increasingly demanded in the West, and 
the inability to hold politically and economically unreliable groups 
accountable in Ethiopia was probably a major reason for the swiftness 
and breadth of the Derg's 1975 bus i ness nationa1isat ions, discussed in 
the next Section,
Civil and Commercial Code provisions concerning commercial instru­
ments are exceedingly complex, The Commercial Code is based on the 
formalities and technical distinctions found In the Uniform Law of the 
Geneva Convention on Negotiable Instruments, and these provisions, 
combined with share financing rules and conservative banking practices, 
operated unduly to favour big business in the money market - _a Third 
World version of the "Macmi1lanfGap"-. .Business assets can be pledged
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(with the “thing" being delivered to the creditor), sold with a right' *'
of redemption within two years, or mortgaged, In the latter case, the
mortgage must be registered and covers those parts of the "business"
that are specified. Owing to an anomaly in the English translation, a
"business" consists mainly of goodwill and does not normally include
tangible assets. Another anomaly is that a busdfiess is defined as an”"
incorporeal immovable (incorporeal hereditament would be the closest
English equivalent), which cannot be mortgaged under‘French or'German" ~
‘law. Documentary and open credits can be obtained and warehouse receipts
and vouchers are negotiable, . a.l though-there-, t s- no-express -1ncent i-v-e~to---■ - •
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use these devices as financing techniques.
-> r.-t These* rnanc rng -procedures are comber somef and -the"' re-1'a ted »ba 
laws that are anticipated by the Commercial Code have never been pro­
mulgated, As a result of the state of the law and banking■practice, 
small businessmen can obtain, at least prior to 1975? only .short-term,. - .
credit by using post-dated cheques, despite the fact that writing a 
cheque without cover gives rise to severe penalties under Penal Code 
Article 647. Rather than issue their customers with bill of exchange 
forms, banks refuse presentment of post-dated cheques until the date
shown, contra Commercial Code Article 854, Many Ethiopians are extremely
95 'suspicious of banks, and bank accounts are little used, The Derg has 
opted forjdirect regulation of financjaL institutions (?nfra) rather
than for "changes in the Commerical Code, but much remains to be'done,....
Although,-a.complex, law may. be needed..to-*.govern the,commercial--paperv^-,lo­
used in international transactions, domestic capital mobilisation re­
quires that an extremely simple set of provisions be enacted,
In an empirical study of small businessmen in Addis Ababa, Ross 
and Zemariam show that the Civil and Commercial Codes fail to solve 
major problems creatively; obtaining payment in customer credit trans­
actions, disputes over the quality of goods with customers and suppliers, 
partnership disputes where a written agreement does not usually exist, 
securing timely deliveries from suppliers, and failures to abide by 
price fixing agreements (which are illegal). As a result, there is 
extensive recourse to traditional dispute settlement practices in which
the Commercial Code is seldom applied. These are,, of course, recurrent
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problems ■ i n- other Third World states, too, . A d i st i net 1 y ■ E th hop tan ■ ■ ■
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problem is that the Codes' do Pot ’facil i tate. the -act i v 1tJ es 6f trad i t i onaT '
voluntary associations (equbs, i d ? rs , etc*) '•— the major indigenous- attempts
at cooperative business activity. While many of these associations are
being absorbed by city dwellers' associations and peasant organisations
created by the Derg, the balance-of them-are in.need.of a new.law: neither
Civil Code Articles 404-82 which regulate "associations".nor the Coopera-
37tive Societies Proclamation provide a congenial framework for voluntary
associations, or discourage dishonesty among association leaders, ensure
that members make timely contributions and understand their rights, and
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provide constructive- supervision by a Ministry. .
in the face of this evidence, Ross and Zemarian nevertheless con-„ •
eluded in 1972 that:
Little, if any, evidence of resistance to these laws on the 
basis that they are foreign to the customary way of doing 
things was detected. . . .  It seems likely that, with a 
growing awareness on the part of businessmen, they can be 
f ul 1y implemented and uti 1 t-zed-. 99 - '..........  - - .
If this conclusion is accurate, it can, following D.ror and Chambliss,
be cited as an instance of law promoting social change in an area that ts 
emotionally neutral (business) and a merely instrumental means to a de­
sirable personal end (acquiring wealth and power). Jauffret, the other 
Commerical Code draftsmen, must have had this in mind when he equated the 
Ethiopian situation with the gradual adjustments that French businessmen 
made*-to- oompjex Commercfa 1. C o d e ^ p r o y f s s  .more..XtkeXy,* 
evet, thatr a” 1 ack of res i stance to the ■ Commer ica 1 Code may -sImp1-y - ref 1 ©c-t —  
a^  lacR of unde rs tandi hg or’1 knowledge of its' provisions, and-that the -Code 
may fall permanently into disuse by all but the few Western-style business­
es that have not been nationalised. There is also evidence that suggests, 
a widespread misunderstanding of the effects of the Codes^among these 
businessmen: banks draft invalid surety agreements, automobile dealers
fail to waive Code warranties, and insurance companies repeatedly lose 
cases on questions of form and the wording of-exclustonary- clauses,
Ethiopian law has had little civilising influence on business organ­
isations, and the emerging "corporate conscience" that is associated with
a sensitivity towards the public interest in the West is virtually non­
existent. Western experiences demonstrate the futility of company 
law reform as a means of fostering this sensitivity:- business ...
organisations are able to adjust rapidly to legal changes without alter­
ing their behavrour markedly, and this facility leads to public demands 
for a continuous official supervision. By way of contrast, there are no 
commercial law concepts in socialist states, as they are wholly replaced 
by what is termed economic law, in Ethiopia, the Derg has added to the 
latter without abolishing the former, although, as we shall see in the'" 
next Section, new share companies, or partnerships with more*than"*f\ve 
partners, can no longer be created, Although economists might doubt 
the wisdom of the Derg's new policies, the political will to carry them 
•*ou-t •*~and'-to-nati-ona-14-se- the- major manufacturers: -and t r a d e r s r s ’'"C‘fear‘ 
and must be dealt with as a given. These business nationalisations 
are, paradoxicaTly, made easier'by the^sepafat ion Of■'enjoyrfieiit^ f 
control that is accomplished through contracts of loan and of associa~-- 
tion. Instead of attaching things to men, Western concepts of property 
effect .-an-as 5 fgnment. of, powers, over- th i ngs to- -adm i nj s t ra-tors r-*-th-R>ugh“ ® ^  
the medium of contract. Nationalisation then simply shifts the locus 
of decision-making from private administrators to public ones. When 
this happened in Ethiopia, there was little public outcry: the separa­
tion of ownership from control calls forth the need for a political 
legitimation, and large Ethiopian companies had acquired little legiti­
macy while coming to dominate a large share of economic resource allo-
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cations in the centres,
G. The"Impact of the Codes
If, as Holmes contended, the inarticulate major premise of every - 
rule ought to be its social utility, this premise has never been more 
mute than in Ethiopian private law. Local problems and the role of Haile 
Selassie's regime in economic affairs were misunderstood by ethnocentric 
draftsmen who were, in any event, interested in the internal logic of 
abstract legal concepts rather than in the social effect - or, rather,* 
the lack of it - that the Codes were going to have, The academic analyst 
spawned by the draftsmen have been similarly predisposed towards tracing 
an' austere analytical order rather than the careful analysis of the 
rough-and-tumble of business practices and judicial administration.
The Codes became little more than showcases for an arid learning, lack­
ing the means of self-renewa1, Those whose interests the.Codes served;-:
3^8
Westernised- supporters of th-e Throne, are now- in political eeTipse; - 
and the interests of the Derg and of ’ordinary’ Ethiopians are not 
furthered by Codes which are oriented neither towards traditional laws 
nor development, William Shack has even suggested that the lowly status 
ascribed to lawyers by students "reflects in part the general ambiva- . 
lence of the wider [urban] society” towards the CodesJ
The questions of whether and when to codify lack anything like de-1 
finitive legal answers; they fall almost entire-ly within the realm of 
political choice. The Derg's choices are not congruent with those of 
Haile Selassie in other areas, and there._j_s no reason why. preferences 
in the area of ’private' law ought-to coincide-, For a-variety of- rea­
sons, however, an Ethiopian recodjfication (one could amost say a first- 
time codification) would be premature* While Stjepanovic, for example, 
argues persuasively for new Yugoslav codifications to mark the end of 
one era and the beginning of another, she notes that many legal concepts 
would have to be clarified, including the role of old institutions under 
changed circumstances, Ethiopia has clearly not reached this stage; 
new legal relations are continually emerging, and the time and inclina­
tion for the mature reflection needed for a codification are lacking, 
Ethiopia will obviously have to 'make do' with the Codes for the fore­
seeable future or risk a legal vacuum, and. this is the approach the Derg 
has adopted, • We-have also .argued that whales,a.LeuXha,nges^are probably 
unnecessary," LiYtlV mohe"'than a provision such as Article 1.;of the USSR 
Civil Code - "Civil rights must be exercised in accordance with their 
economic and social purpose in order to secure protection" - is needed 
at the momentthere are no clausulae generahes to—eonf--1 i ct--w-i t-h -such—  
a directive. After that, a more wide-ranging comparative approach is 
needed to fashion solutions to pressing legal problems. Third World 
sources are particularly relevant because of the analogous problems 
faced, The somewhat similar nature of the legal system in other "mixed" 
civilian jurisdictions - Scotland, Sri Lanka, Quebec, Louisiana and the 
Philippines - make them potentially useful sources, The most relevant 
source, however, may be Eastern European codifications, since they, 
attempt to combine the stabilizing idea of Codes in the civilian tradi­
tion with the extensive discretionary powers of economi c*^admi nist rat i ve
105agencies, - ,
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Ultimately, revision of the Codes Is not enough; a precond-i-t i on to 
the effectiveness of a legal rule is that it be communicated to and com­
prehended by those affected by.it (see Chapter Two), A survey carried 
out in the early 1970s indicated that the vast majority of literate 
litigants in Addis Ababa had never heard of the Civil Code, Ignorance 
of the law is widespread in Western countries too; if anything., Ethiopians
know their customary laws better than Europeans know. - theirs, -. The.„ point__
is that, if customary laws are supplanted, an Ethio-pian will interest 
himself in the new laws only to the extent that they touch on matters 
with which he- i-s personal ly concerned ,. ,T-o. the.extent, that Jaws, r®lY.on„ 
private initiative, they will not, of themselves, change behaviour 
h poi n't" David - et ai, -failed-to ^gr-a-sp* ^Even if -the .f a w s ^ n e . q u A r ^ - t h s . - »• 
citizen to do something, publication in Ethiopia’s Negarit Gazeta does 
not trigger the high degree of conforming behaviour observed in the West,
A traditional juraj postulate - the, non1-interference^of central Govern- 
ment in day-to-day life in the rural areas - is also at work and can 
only be overcome by legal penetration (see Chapter Two) through the mass 
media, direct political or bureaucratic channels and Indirectly through 
peasant associations, It is likely that the Derg wil 1 be unwi 11 i ng and/or 
unable to do this (except in selected areas, such as land reform); a 
potentially valuable link between centres and peripheries will be slow 
to materialise, as the Codes continue to be phenomena of the centres; 
and David’s "social model" wilj, in national terms and happily so, re- _ 
main a mere modelr Conceived -of,byjnost Frenchmen (at. leastjurjt 1|ire­
cently) as apolitical, this model is singularly inappropriate for-the - 
Third World, where ail of law is highly political and an active partici­
pant in struggles for power, stability and development,
!|. Business Regulations and Public Enterprise
The political character of Ethiopian law emerges with a greater 
clarity from the changing public law context of business activ1ty, All 
mixed economies display some degree of a socialisation of production and 
distribution; in accordance with political priorities and through state- 
owned enterprises, state participation in business activity, and controls 
over private enterprises, The latter include: fiscal and monetary poli­
cies; loan guarantees; business 1icensing; price, wage, dividend, tariff.
hkO
currency and profit repatriation controls; monopolies regulation; and 
quotas on production, delivery, Import and export. Even the so-called 
free enterprise sectors of an economy are subject to legally-prescribed 
minimum performance standards, designed to prevent exploitation by the 
incompetent or dishonest. From the vantage point of private law, all 
of these policies and controls constitute an interference with freedom 
of property or of contract; certain contracts or objectives are pro­
hibited or made subject to administrative authorisation; other contracts, 
terms or activities are made mandatory; and economic activity is sub­
jected to overall bureaucratic supervision or undertaken directly by 
the state on such terms as it sees Tit,^^ Regulations proliferate on 
the boundaries of private law codes in an ad hoc fashion when an extreme 
economic liberalism is rejected or deemed iinadequate, and the formal 
beauty of -the codes is thus destroyed, While government's economic 
actions must satisfy constitutional standards in some countries, notably 
in the U,S, and Germany,'such was noT the 'case'in Ethiopia (see Chapter 
Three),
Regulations and public enterprises both effect a redistribution of 
rights and duties within an everchanging business community, to make it 
more amenable - for good or ill - to governmental policies. They can 
be distinguished on the basis that regulations speak to the^manageria 1 
functions of private property and leave the beneficial enjoyment of it 
A'fev1faTi vely “uriWutjfed7’ wh rfe ?puh W &  enterpH sep and- the na11 onal i§.a£,1.9 n 
of private businesses in particular, 'confer both of these functions of • 
property on the state, The impact of these'poTicTes on development - *
-prospects- depends, of course, almost entirely on^ their content and on 
the efficiacy of private and public administration and pricing and market 
mechanisms. Under Haile.Selassie, a chaos of rules and forms of organ­
isation and supervision responded to traditional politics and fragmented 
markets; the almost total absence of a legal or political accountability
(except, In a rough way, to an Emperor who was preoccupied with other
matters) meant that no coherent policy was pursued, much less a develop­
ment-oriented one, While the public enterprises of every state form
intricate systems which reflect historical, philosophical and legal 
differences, Ethiopia's are, perhaps, among the most chaotic in the
world: the lack of accouhfability and coordination echoes the "wilder-
v 1 OS * ~
ness of sI ng 1 es lTh!stahces'":,i:' ' tllht Tenriy'sort'found i n. the cgmmpr}; law,. .
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A. Private Businesses under Haile Selassie
While governments may characterise their economic policies as pro- ‘ 
motional, facilitative or indicative, they are all regulatory in nature.
In theory, they are designed to foster changes in behaviour; under Haile 
Selassie and in line with the symbolic nature of his laws that has been 
•mentioned at various junctures, they served to mask the perpetuation of 
traditional arrangements by other means and i-n—new-areas, Enforcement 
of regulations was sporadic and arbi t r a r y w i  th a view towards securing 
bribes and ensuring personal loyalty rather than towards compliance. As
- i-n- Kenya-there was-a-great- dea l of- -compet-i t-i-on -w-i th i n -and -between...^ _
Westernised Ethiopians and foreigners for access to favourable bureau- 
'crwtj-c" attcion-; ■ bureauorat^v d n -frr bed- to max i mi se-the>i r own-powervrw-
and opportunities for corruption. As a result, statutory policies (which
are often vague anyway) lost their cutting edge through a variety of
p-lacations -and accommodat ions , . . . . . .
Until about the mid-1960s, business In Ethiopia was at what might 
be termed a buccaneering stage, A vague and incomplete jumble of legis­
lative standards allowed businessmen, if they were not too ambitious, 
to bribe their way towards a moderate degree of freedom of action, If
they overreached themselves, however, they were brought back into line
X
by forcing them into Government service or through arbitrary fines, 
property confiscations or, what amounts to the same thing, licence 
-revocations, Ethiopian businessmen, r.etal iated by instal 1 ing. foreigners .
as-nominal -heads of the i r businesses,— ^ - More detailed regulat joos^--....
were gradually introduced, yet there was little noticeable change in 
business and administrative practices.
In 1963, an Exchange Control Proclamation^^ replaced narrower 
Proclamations of 1942 and 1948, set up a system of authorised banks, 
and broadly empowered the National Bank to promulgate regulations, As 
the Bank's employees were among the most honest and efficient of Ethiopia 
administrators, and as Ethiopian exchange rates were relatively realis­
tic, the system worked fairly well, The same could not be said for the
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Price Control Proclamations and Regulations, introduced from 1965 to 
1969 and repealing outdated Proclamations of 1944 and 1952, The law 
was changed yet again by the 1972 Trade and Price Regulation Proclama-
1 n




regulate the distribution of all goods by public notice (Arts, A, 6).
Unfair trade practices  ^ agreements or tacit understandings causing a -
direct or indirect injury to trade or free competition ~ are prohibited,
although the Minister can authorise them if they increase employment or
exports, reduce business costs, economise on the use of scarce resources,
or protect~izher“"publ ic (Art* Art icle 14(1) states that; "No person
may carry orl"a trade in a manner contrary to-honest and commercial ..... .
practice." It is unclear whether the narrow definition of "trader" in
the Commerical Code (Art, 5) should be applied, and the fertile grounds
for corrupt ion-can be-imag i ned-. - — ... . .. ..... _  ......
One of the major barriers to entry into an Ethiopian market (condu-'
'"'’'" dive' t'OWdrd§; mohopo1 y^ori!o H^OpoTy) *?•*! s»-a^ pest-rvi.ct ive* 1 icens i ng,rs.ys.fcefti
The rules relating to industrial and domestic and foreign trade licences
were clarified somewhat, consolidated and updated in 1971. These rules
- - had barely been-put into effect... before, the, Derg .modified them^substan-
tially in 1975 (infra), There is little in the 1971 Proclamations that
relates to development: the Minister shal1 grant licences, subject to
regulations he makes and which can be changed at any time, and subject,
in the case of new industries, to his approval of feasibility studies,
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blueprints and health and safety measures. In practice, the mandatory 
language was ignored and the approval of licence applications was based 
on bribes and t.h.e political needs of the time. Vague standards admin- 
istered in a tradi t ional fashion.left.traders and„manufacturers in the 
'‘ dark concern!ng-t-he *extent ^ to..whfch. government .was going to.
in their affairs, and this uncertainty had the effect of retarding busi- 
ness activity.
On the face of it, the 1966 Investment Decree served to promote 
Western-style economic activity. An Investment Committee, composed of 
five ministers and the National Bank Chairman (or their nominees), could 
exempt the payment of income taxes for five years by foreign companies 
investing Eth. $200,000 or more, and grant relief from import duties on 
agricultural and industrial machines and from export duties. Foreign 
exchange was made available for the repatriation of profits, the earn-
11
tngs of foreign employees and, on sale or liquidation, the net proceeds,
In many other countries, wel1-conceived investment laws are regarded as 
a legal counterpart of development planning, since they enumerate and.
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cla-ssify projects according to'government1 s priorities. Under Et-h-rop ia 's--. 
Proclamation, however, objectives .were not stated clarly, a-nd the-de­
cision-making-process was not described in detail. In reality, projects 
were approved or rejected - after extremely long delays - as outcomes of 
bureaucratic power struggles rather than as reflections of planning 
priorities; -the Investment Committee was often circumvented-by .direct-- 
appeals to the Emperor; and condi.tions commonLy .Imposed in jatjie.r.. count rles 
- the Africani sation' of management* and raising a certain proportion of 
■capital in the host country - were almost never, employed, -There were, 
even a few instances in which an approval by the Investment Committee • 
was negated by a refusal to issue the relevant licences, Analysing 
vEth i opl a-hs. Investment Proc 1 amatUM)vW& 1-oog ,w,1bh., .those,of^MexIcp.,,.^ u^ rto,.., t-rr 
Rico and the Phi1ippines, Timothy Bodman-argues that tax incentives are 
a marginal factor in a company’s investment decision, when comparea co 
labour costs,, the availability of raw materia 1s, and the distance between
production and marketing areas. Bodman concludes that Ethiopia's Procla-
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mation was little more than an expensive form of advertisement, Its
quiet death under the Derg was not mourTie'd by the Ethiopians, and there 
is a growing reluctance among development theorists to countenance the- 
.many types of direct foreign investments that serve only to prop—up 
conservative politicians and to generate.further inequalities in the 
distribution of income.
■ B, The Emperor's Public Enterprises-  ..  -... ■    ~ ....
While the number and size of public enterprises cont.i nues . to increase 
- worldwide,- there- is also a - growi ng~.d t senchantment. wi.t.h them, --p.ar.ticul.acl.y_.. 
among-Western lawyers, Their performance, in terms of initiative, public 
service and_profitabi1ity, is exceedingly uneven - as is that of private- 
enterprises. Economists are coming increasingly to doubt that profit­
ability rs the sole aim of private enterpr-ise, and public ownership is, 
Ideally, expected to blend the best features of private organisetIons - 
flexibility and initiative - with politically-prescribed goals. These 
include: undertaki ng-high-risk act ivi ties-, where private oapi.tal Is lack­
ing, providing essential services', redistributing income-, smoothing out • 
regional imbalances and, of course, an acting out of an ideology, Most 
legal analyses emphasise structural cons i derat i o n s a s  to v^hethe.r an .
‘ enterpri s’e'-'i s’organ i sed as1 a government department, a: pu.bl ic--corporat iop*.
bhk
or a share company under the*private law; Lawyers tend' to regard'a -
separate legal personality as almost indispensib1e t This view stresses
form at the expense of function and is based on assumptions that are
probably false; that public business administrat1 on can be segregated
from overall policy formulation and that this segregation will eliminate
1 1 7the vi ces~.o.f . bureaucrat tc organi sat i.o.ns , For Yash. Gha.I , the. better.....
view is that since public enterprise is regarded as a key instrument of 
government policy,‘its autonomy-has 1ittle constitutiona1‘or economic 
justification. The case for autonomy has to be based on considerations 
of efficiency and responsiveness to policy,^^ " - -
 While-most Ethiopian public enterprises are described legally -as -
11 a ut o nomo us"- (see, . e.g., those. d.es cr i„b.e.d.. J n the .p rev i ou s Cha p te.rj...t..h.e  _
little autonomy that exists in practIce serves primarily to conceal in­
action, the inability -to coordinate economic policies effectively, and 
the pursuit of personal wealth and power through the bureaucracy, There 
was little consistent Government economic policy for bureaucrats to 
respond to under Haile Selassie - another reason for inaction. Like 
the Emp«ror, the Derg has shown a greater interest in applying political
(and punitive) sanctions to secure compliance than in developing concrete
and detailed policies to be complied with.
The structure of Ethiopian public enterprises defies attempts at
a neat but detailed classification. Unlike EthiopFan law^* the common- 
law does not have to distinguish between legal persons in public and in 
private law and, as France supplies the model for Ethiopia's substantive 
Codes, we will .base our analyses on French classifications, While there 
is little direct business administration~by Government departments (regies) 
in Ethiopia, most of her enterprises are either concess iona i res perform­
ing public services under public laws or profit-oriented establ1ssements 
publics, organised under the Commercial Code but involving varying degrees 
of'public ownership and sometimes possessing special privileges noted in 
company ’byelaws1. The conclusions reached in France by the authors of 
the 1968 Nora Report can also-be applied in Ethiopia: the opportunities
for irrelevant political interference in the activities of the concession-- 
a i res (chartered corporations in Ethiopia) should be reduced, while 
establissements publics (public companies) should be made more respon-




There are no general laws specifically addressed 'to chartered cor­
porations or public companies in Ethiopia, The Codification Commission
1 20
decided to defer consideration of such provisions and, to date, none
have been promulgated. While public companies in the West are often
created as the result of an emergency (such as the rapid decline of an
essential industry in private hand's*) , EtteNjp-ian-publ ic- companies-were • de-• ■
signed from the outset to augment.-po.Lit-leal control and -Governmental. . _ ,
revenues, Unlike in Britain and France, for example, Government -seldom
supplied capital or expertise in return for public participation, which
was just another, bus.iness tax .(payaJbjjs as. d i y.idends. to. Government,as
shareholder), plus an (often fragile) assurance of prompt and favourable
-^bureaucraterc decisions;' -*-do reasedapoj j . t d - c a t a J U  OVOfc «
enterprises ensures greater access to commercial information for govern-’
ment, influence over low-level decisions, and fewer'tax evasions and
exchange control violations, but there is no evidence to suggest that
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control was used for these purposes in Ethiopia,
• The Commercial Code provides an exceedingly inappropriate framework 
for public sector economic activity; it does.not allow public companies 
to provide subsidised social services or effect a redistribution of in­
come, since activities must be Mfor gain"; It does not ensure coherent 
deciston-making, since the possibi 1 ity of irrelevant bureaucratic inter­
ventions Is not taken into account; and it does not provide concrete 
means by which conflicts■between state interests and the rights of pri­
vate shareholders can ,be resolved, _,,D,a,ta.,coJjected ,by..a. x.esef,C£b assj.s
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tant in 197^? summarised in the footnote, shows that, of the 68 public 
companies organised under the Ethiopian Commercial Code, 21 were wholly 
owned by Government, which had a 50% or more stake in fourteen others, 
a 20%-50% stake in ten, and less than 20% of the shares in 23, income 
tax returns (which probably understate Incomes but provide the-only 
available data) show a rough balance in each category for any given 
year between firms reporting a profit and those recording a loss. The. 
paid-up -capital of companies in which Government had a majority inter-- 
est totalled Eth, $272 millions in 197^: 53% of the companies were in­
volved in industry, 35% in commerce and 12% in commercial1y-unprofitable 
but development-oriented activities, The authorised capital in companies 
where Government was a minority shareholder totalled EtK,>, $^8 millions,.;,,
khG
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.and the correspond i ng percentages wer'e 67%, 11% and 22%, ■ At the*
very least, therefore., some 15% of Ethiopian public companies should
not have been organised under the Commercial Code,
What are termed chartered corporations in Ethiopia were created in
one of three ways; by a proclamation (approved by Parliament), by a
ministerial regulation promulgated under the authority of a proclamation,
or by an executive order, The latter type of chartered corporation was
based on the Ernperor's exercise of a 'Crown prerogative' under Articles
27 and 36 of the (suspended) 1955 Constitution—  like the one exercised
12k
by Eng 1 ish monarchs duri ng-Tudor -1 imes, The standard of legal drafts-’ 
manship displayed by these brief charters is-very low (see, e-.-g-j -the 
Derg's adaptations of these forms discussed in Chapter Six); and if, as 
often happens, a dispute cannot be resolved within the terms of the char­
ter, there- is~no relevant law to be applied, The 28 major Ethiopian,
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chartered corporations existing in }S7k are described in the footnote.
The fundamental problem of Ethiopian public enterpr ises "i s'-a *poMtJ- *' 
cal arid bureaucratic interference which does not amount to coherent and 
continuous accountability, Phis is understandable, since politics per­
meate Ethiopian economic activity and the virtual absence of controls 
over public enterprises mirrors the weakness of controls over Government 
itself. Creating economic regulations under such circumstances is not 
so simple a process as many lawyers might think. For example, the dis- 
-* tTffttTbYT rniatte' Ji n many' Commonwea V-th -‘Sta tes-^between^-m-i n IsitetM a^ L - c o n t r o . W „» 
over policy formulation and a manager ial autonomy i h “day«to«-day matters —  
is an empty one; these kinds, of decisions are interdependent and they 
also exist.on a continuum, and_ the functions of controller and controlled 
must therefore be defined .with great specificity and enforced rigorously,
As a control device, boards of directors ©f Ethiopian public enter_pr uses 
have less expertise and commitment than do the boards of private companies, 
•and political rewards usually went to the "yesmen". Some Ethiopian 
chartered corporations have vague responsibilities towards a minister 
but, as we saw in Chapter Three, running an efficient•mlnistry attracted 
no particular rewards in the past and ministers were usually able to .
1 c’i rciffiwent a responsibility to Parliament, Leg is.lation-was .not required * 
to authorise expenditures by public enterprises, and expenditures usually 
did not fall within the standard headings of annual budgets -Aud i ts by
kk7
the Auditor General were in the discretion of the Prime Minister and
seldom took place, Parliament thus lacked the information;, expertise
and, often, the inclination to examine public business activities, as
well as the incentives to develop these capabilities, ■ Par-Wament, min-^
isters and boards were unwilling and unable to coordinate the public
sector economic activity that is unduly fragmented by the legal forms
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used to organise it and by the nature of Ethiopian markets, --
The courts of most countries - and Ethiopia’s in particular - have
been unable to police adequately the borderlands of private and public
law an*d'enTeTpri'se'For example, publ ic ~oraprlva te-shareho1 der-s 'in- — —
Eth iop i an publ ic compan ies have not, to my knowledge, brought— a-n 1 ul t ra .
vires 1 su’i ty prd'babl y ifel;:aVse*! ftrtyasr reaH'sed’ that1 a - court- wou l d’ not-— - -
deal with it adequately, Since 1961, the Conseil d'Etat has introduced
interesting innovations with regard to the control of French concess ion-1
a i res: I n add ft io-rr to-error-of Vaw (including l u 11 ra vi res-1) , -i'man i f es£„.
error11 (including errors of fact) and, of course, detournement depouvoir
('abuse of power1) have also been used, The absence of a French pub 1ic
law tradition in Ethiopia would, however, make it difficult to introduce
these kinds of changes, Under Haile Selassie, well-founded complaints
of unconstitutional actions by chartered corporations *■ the Imperial
Highway Authority and the Telecommunications Board r» were not upheld
by the-courts (see. Chapjrer, Three) ,. The. language i n Eth iopian^ corpora^
t ion charters is— so broad -and subj-ect-ive-that provi sos do not,.gave. rise,..
to jtrdi cfaT'Ty^Cor,!? f0T-rtfHfcT- ' 'bureaucrat real ly) enforceabl e.,cons
trols, More specific directives are not made public or even circulated
widely within the bureaucracy, and, if a dispute arises, the -typical
1 27
outcome is some ad hoc and secret accommodation,
The result, In legal terms and politically, is that each bureaucrat 
tends his own garden - a dangerous tendency. In Ethiopia, The growth of 
public enterprises has been.largely responsible for an ever^expanding 
army of bureaucrats - the educated elites whom Haile Selassie attempted 
to co-opt through offers of relatively well-paid jobs (see Chapter Three), 
There is a large gap between the value of their productivity and the 
volume of public funds they absorb and, to the extent of this gap, the 
bureaucracy is a parasite on economi-c activity, The public i.nterest 
becomes a cloak;for privat^-competitions through the machinery of .
kkS
Government, and most-'-of- the-^reasons for establishing public enterprises
♦ a 128 'are negated,
C , The Derg's Nationalisations
There is, therefore, a need for an Ethiopian Public Commercial Code, 
which promotes a convergence in the organisational forms of public enter­
prise and replaces the patchwork of narrow rules that breed economic 
inefficiency and mi sa 1 1 ocat-ions of resources. This need acquired a 
greater urgency early in 1975, when the first concrete steps to implement 
Ethiopian Socialism (apart from the zemecha) were instituted. On 1 
January, all banks, financial organisations.and insurance companies were 
nationalised and transferred to the Ministry of Commerce and industry -■ 
rather than Finance, as might have been expected. "Appropriate compen- 
sation" was promised. This was followed, on 3 Februrary, by the nation­
alisation (with— -fair compensation") of 11 of Ethiopia's largest com­
panies, and Government's acquisition of majority interests in 29 other 
companies. These companies represent all phases of Ethiopian "industrial 
and commercial ‘ activity, Initial forumlations of nationalisation poli­
cies stressed that a government-appointed manager would, along with a 
workers' committee, run each company in an independent fashion and trans­
form profits into socially-necessary investments. The subsequent 
Proclamation deleted references to these Yuogslav-sty1e workers' cpmmit- 
‘th e sy 'ho$eVe r •"the po 1 I tTcSfl 'b'a*l a nee* w i Th frr the Derg may ha Ve*shift ed > orw^ 
the statements may have been intended merely to symbolise a transfer of 
ownership to 'workers', In the end, a tight central control was opted 
for, li ke -that util i sed in the Soviet Union during the 1.950sThe. stated 
purpose of the nationalisations is to take control of the'"commanding 
‘heights" to avoid the alternating booms and-depress ions that lead to 
waste and exploitation in capitalist economies, although it was admitted
that, in the short run, production may decrease and economic dislocations
129result,
These policy declarations were partly Implemented by Proclamations 
creating a Ministry of National Resources Development, This Ministry 
absorbed the nationalised companies, businesses formerly belonging to 
the nobility and nationalised in 197^» and the National Resources 
Commission, The latter was set up after World War il to manqge the 
property’'of ‘Ttalians and political prisoners,'control led b y ‘-the Emperor^
If
kk3
and used to help finance the favours he granted, The new Minister is 
empowered to promote, establish, direct, supervise^ safeguard, coordinate 
amalgamate and dissolve public enterprises. His ancillary powers over 
each enterprise include: adopting work programmes and budgets; requiring
audits and annual reports; employing and supervising general managers: 
issuing regulations and directives; establishing~~levels of reserve funds 
and capital expenditure; and remitting earnings to, or requesting addi­
tional funding from, the Minister of Finance,^0 When compared to pre­
vious laws, ministerial powers of supervision and control are both 
broader and more specific, but the Proclamation is still hopelessly 
vague,
Under Proclamation 26 of 1975, the.following sectors of the economy
are reserved for exclusive State control: "basic industries", precious
minerals, large-scale salt mining; petroleum; textiles; leather and
rubber products; fertilizer; drugs; tobacco; glass and bottles; large-
scale printing; rail, air and sea transport; and the mass media. The
participation of private investors in joint ventures with Government is
invited in certain areas: the mining of coal, non-precious metals,
potash, phosphate and sulphur; the export-oriented processing and canning
of foodstuffs; paper and pulp industries; large-scale construction; and
tourism, The remaining types of economic activity are supposedly left
to private businessmen, although some nationalisations have occurred in
areas' such as domestic_food prbc'eVsihg "and the "manufacture of wood and 
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metal products,
The nationalisat ions of 1 January and 3 February are deemed to have - 
been made..under Proclamat ion 26^~ whicfr provides that fa I r'compensation 
shall be provided by -law, and that managers of national ised enterprises 
cannot resign until they "satisfy the Public Authority" (presumably the 
newly-created Ministry) that the transfer of authority to' a state- 
appointed manager has been completed, Article 10(1) of the Proclamation 
adds that those who commit acts against nationalised enterpises which 
fall within the scope of the Special Penal Code (see Chapter Five) - 
breach of .trust., malversion and receipt of ill-gotten gains (Art,* 12) , •
misuse or waste of government property (Art, 13), and forgery of govern­
mental or public documents (Art, 16) - "shall be punishable thereunder," 
Article 10(2). of Proclamation 26- notes that " i nc i t i ng disturbance’ of 
industrial peace" falls within' the defihitidh of'"such other acts" which
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1 32constitute an offense under Article 12 of the Special Penal Code,...
Changes in the mining law provisos found in Proclamation 26 were
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made under Proclamation 39 of 1975. The requirement that agreements 
with foreign governments or companies concerning joint mineral exploi­
tation reserve a 51% ownership for the Ethiopian Government was abolished, 
The terms of existing leases will remain in effect, although the Derg 
reserves the right to renegotiate those leases which do not provide for 
present or future Ethiopian participation. The Mining Proclamation of 
1971 and related Regulations remain In force to the extent that they 
are consistent with these new provisions,
Prior to the enactment of, these.new Proclamations, the supervision 
of most public enterprsies was assigned ad hoc to various ministries.
With the acquisition of the Emperor's enterprises and properties and 
the recently-nationa3ised companies* t*he old system broke down completely, 
The new Proclamations represent a first step towards the rationalisation 
and coordination of public sector business. In May 1976, the workload 
of the Ministry of National Resources Development w a s :1ightened somewhat: 
supervision of the importing, exporting, wholesaling and retailing of 
some goods - through the newly-created Import-Export, Domestic Distri­
bution, and Ethiopian Department Stores Corporations (infra) - was trans-
134ferred to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Manufacturing and 
commerce are thus, in a rough way, dealt with by separate Ministries,
Add i t ior>ai~ rebrganisat Dotys , TnvolVih^ "the" hi Vi ng ; of f of public enter-; - ----
prises to other ministries, were apparently effected in August 1976, but
further information is unobtainable.
In December 1975j a-Compensation Commission was established to
negotiate the amounts payable as a result of the nationalisation of
private schools, rural lands, urban lands and extra houses (i nfra), and
135 .private sector businesses. A Commissioner and four Associates are
appointed by the Derg and empowered boradly to obtain evidence from per­
sons, organisations and governmental agencies (Arts, 4, 7). The Minis­
try of Finance makes the payments stipulated in compensation agreements 
reached with individuals and private enterprises (Art. 8). This Procla­
mation does not clarify the meaning of the various types of compensation
1 36
called for under the Civil Code or the Proclamations discussed supra, 
and does not entail what; shou.] d . happen- if, agreement Is not forthcoming. .
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it is. however, stated that a failure to obey the orders of the 
Commission (or an attempt to suborn, deceive or insult the Commission)
Is punishable by imprisonment up to seven years and/or a fine of Eth, 
$10,000 (Art, 11), Agreement is thus encouraged by the threat of an 
order that can be enforced through penal. sanctIons and, in any event, 
no agreement, means no compensation, The Commission's decision is pre­
sumably final, although the brief Proclamation is s \) ent-~on —tb f-s— I ssue,
In comparison with its land reforms, the Derg's business nationali­
sations place huge and immediate new burdens on the bureaucracy,
Analyses* in Chapters Three and.„F.i ve~ suggest that the bureaucracy wi 11- -
be incapable of fulfilling thses tasks with even-a moderate degree of 
efficiency in the near future, but the business nationalisations are 
clearly a political 'given', The development■potentia^ of Ethiopian - 
publ ic-enterprise-s-can-therefore be reaHsed only if eacfr~adTnirristrator- 
is forced to reach his maximum potential, through a carefully-designed 
network of accountability, Since the lines of a political accountabil­
ity run to the Derg, most legal controls must also do so if a fantasy 
law of public enterprises is to be avoided, The evolution of new 
political practices is at least as important as legal reforms, however. 
The problem is that few useful models are available; although socialist 
and cap!talist- countries use public enterprises for radically different 
purposes*,- -ins-td t-ut-ionaT forms-'dfspfay^basie1^imi iartties^and • o f -~“*'* 
function poorly,* In the U.S.S.-R.-, for example, no legal limitations 
on interference by planners or politicians in the management of enter­
prises are recog rused,^ This is-a-rather unsafi sfactory s i-tua-tion, - and - 
language like that In the Israeli Commodities and'Services (Control) Law 
of 1957 could be adopted; the Minister may intervene in private or ’. 
public business where he has "reasonable grounds for believing that it 
is necessary so to do for the maintenance of an essential activity or 
the prevention of profiteering and speculation", Additional grounds 
for interference, such as the fulfillment of Plan targets, could be 
added and the.exercise of discretion would be restricted somewhat, yet 
the .language "reas.onabl e . grounds for believing" would not bar -a deter--- 
mined intervention (see, e,g,, Liversjdge v, Anderson). As the Derg is 
far too preoccupied, to -be capable of ..a, cont i nuous and.-detail ed super-- -. 
vision, dn termed i a te bod i es r w i th* i mmed i a te access'to'- the" Derg "shot! Id 'be *
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strengthened. The Auditor General’s functions could be expanded for
example (this has already been done to some extent - see Chapter Five),
and complemented by an 'administrative tribunal' like the Cour des Comptes
(Corte d? Contt in Italy), There is also a need to better coordinate
the activities of public enterprises with policies reflected through.  .
regulatory controls: fiscal and monetary policies, investments in in-
137frastructure and the licensing of private businesses.
D • The Changing Structure of Business
Proclamation 76 of December 1975 empowers the Minister of Commerce 
and industry to licence wholesalers, ‘retailers; 'importers% exporters, ■ 
domestic or foreign trade "auxiliaries" and industrialjsts in thepri- 
* va'te sector,’ While the Prologue-speaks'o'f the rieed ' to "regulate ■ com- 1 
mercial‘activities which remain in the private sector (after the nation­
alisations under Proclamation 26), Article 2(1) of the Proclamation 
states that it "shall not apply to , , . any individual enterprise-or- --- 
business organization which lawfully carries on commercial activity.on 
the effective date of this Proclamation. . . in other words, licences
granted under the 1971 Proclamations(supra) remain valid,, and this is 
the apparent reason for not repealing these enactments, Little is left 
of them, however, and the Minister Is given* scant guidance as to the 
relationship between policies designed to promote development and his 
•1 i cens-i ng. .powers, under Proc I amat i.o.ru. 7 6,.., .rTJie,Mi nis..ter . cq.nugranf „n;ew...,r , 
licences -ter-"individual enterprisersluonfy (new-she-re companies-op- 
'fb'r't'neT^ hl'p’S' With' more than fi ve 'partnfers^cannot"be-created) ; •-and^onFy**- —  
one licence per person wi H  - be issued, No one may obtain a licence--if 
he "has a permanent job" - a provision aimed against civil servants - 
and the Minister may assess the-qualificat ions of applicants .and limit 
the number of licences, to ensure "the proper distribution of goods and 
services" (Arts. A, 9). Licences will not be issued to retail estab­
lishments with a-capita1isat ion of more than Eth, $200,000, to whole­
salers with more than $300,000 in capital or to an "industry" having 
more than $500,000 worth of capital (Arts, 5~6, 9)» Capital is defined 
as "cash used for carrying out commercial activity, the value of trade 
receivable, of stocks and of fixed assets, but does not include bulld- 
i ngs" (Art-3(1)). ' ■ / • •
I n ■ a-ddi t i on to the reorgani sat i.on of ithe Housing and., Sav i ngs * bank.,,
(jjrfraJ , the powers of the National Coffee Boards were clarified and
those of the Agricultural Marketing Corporation (see Chapter Six)
were expanded in 1975-6, Eleven new public corporations were also
created by charter to manage some of the newly nationalised business
assets; the Housing Construction Corporation (infra); the National
Transport Corporation (infra)the import-Export, Domestic Distribution,
1 39
and Department Stores Corporations; the Salt, Natural Gum and Build-
1A0 lAl
ing Materials Corporations; the Hotels and Tourism Corporation;
1A2 l M
The Addis Bank; and the Ethiopian Insurance Corporation, ‘ While
a management structure consisting of a general manager and a board - 
similar to those of the new rural .development corporations discussed 
in Chapter Six - is elaborated for the Bank and the insurance, Housing 
and Gum Corporations, managerial arrangements are not specified for the 
Hotels, Building Materials and Salt Corporations or for the three mer­
chandising corporations, all of which are managed directly by a ministry.
The Insurance Corporation acquired the assets of thirteen nation­
alised companies, has the rights and duties one would associate with a 
company handling "all classes of insurance business", and must pay 
taxes, The Corporation must "ensure that insurance services reach the 
broad masses" and help to mobilise and utilise resources. Commercial
Code provisions dealing with insurance, brokers and agents .are declared
1A A
applicable to the Corporation, The. Addis Bank acquires the nation-
&Ti s“ed-sssets* fanth- the ? 1 Tab H  sAddd^ Ababat Barky ithe^Banca^-;*.
di Roma (Ethiopia)- and the Banco di Napol i (EthPopia) and "competes"
with another public enterprise - the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia - under
the supervision of the' Nat ional. Bank-.. The .new Bank js accorded all of
the functions of a commercial bank, must "disseminate banking habits"
by expanding branches- eq-uitably, and follow guidelines laid down by the
1A5
National Bank when granting loans, A directive issued by the National 
Bank in mid-1976 requires the banks to give lending priority to public 
enterprises', cooperatives and cottage industries, in. order to mobilise 
resources and to speed the socialisat ion of the economy,
An interesting innovation was introduced in November 1976, in the 
field of road transport, The largest company had been nationalised in 
February 1975 but smaller ones were left in. private hands, primari1y 
because ft was feared that vital transport .networks would otherwise -. 
r cease' tB ’fdhct ion. ■ ■ I n 1376 a new- .Road- Trans-po-nt Authori ty was. ..created-,rf:,.r
hsk
to manage nationalised transport- assets and intensively-t o .regulate.... -
private operators, who are termed "associates". The "operation and 
control" of these associates is severed from the beneficial enjoyment 
of their property and transferred to a public National Transport Corpor­
ation. The-Authority, which has a general manager responsible to the 
Minister of Transport (there is no board), is empowered to: licence
associates; fix trip quotas, fees, fares and schedules; compel opera­
tions in areas lacking in transport; and exercise powers of eminent 
domain without paying compensation,- Both the Minister and.the Authority 
may issue regulations. Associates may; use the Corporation’s repair,
k- spares, fuel --and' insurance facH4t4*es -on payment-of- the‘-appropriate
charges, inspect the Corporation’s books at any time, and withdraw any 
amount of money "necessary for own operation", Depending on how this 
vague phrase is interpreted, compulsory membership'Hr the- Corporation i- ~
may constitute a nationa1isat ion'of the associates’ beneficial enjoy­
ment (ability to realise a profit) as well. Associates bear the respond 
sibility for the non-provision of services required under the Corpora­
tion's schedules, and associates must cooperate with district comptrollers 
observe work directives, repair vehicles as directed and ensure driver 
courtesy. The Corporation may not discriminate in the deployment of 
vehicles and may suspend an associate or Impose other penalties to be
•specified by the Minister, A violation of the Proclamation constitutes 
- - 1A6
~a penal* Offense''/ “' 1 A:s" can~ be* imag i n'edp^'there'hbVe "been' -a ^ variety -of--* - 
disputes under this scheme and a vital sector of the economy has been 
periodically disrupted,
—  —  The' legal-forms- and style used -in chartering ^-Hai 1 e-Selassf^-'-s-pub 1 le 
' corporations have been adopted wholesale by the Derg, apart from: ref­
erences to socialism in the prologues of the proclamations, the innova-
- tions adopted for the Transport Author Ity and Corporation, the applica­
tion of porfions of the fommeTc ial Code to Ther act i v i t ies of the-new 
Bank and the I nsurance Corporations, and a si ight-ly .higher proportion 
of enterprises managed directly by a ministry, The apparent intention 
is to create thirteen "sector corporations" covering manufacturing, 
agribusiness and commerce and under the supervisI on of different min­
istries, but this scheme has only been partly implemented and many of 
the I ega 1 ■ ar rangements have not , been- pnomu!g.ato-dv. : Most,,of ,thel,tdefec,ts.,.iV *;
; introduced‘'ckrri hg Hai le Selassle’^s--reign^ have 'been perpetuated, by.r-t-he-**
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Derg, and there is a definite need for a clarification of public enter­
prise concepts and institut ionsr Many other governments use public 
enterprises as a means of avoiding difficult political choices, and 
these choices cannot long be postponed in Ethiopia, What are the pre­
cise objectives of the various businesses going to be? What role 
should be played by older institutions which are not going to be re­
formed radically? How can law be reformed, based on Eastern European 
and Yugoslavian experiences in particular, to reflect the suppression 
.of certain private economic interests and the emergence - i f  that is 
the Derg’s intention - of new group and public interests? How can the 
- latter •rnterests” be- defined more" prec ts^edy’f-g'uaTa’niree’d '■nTore"ful fy-and- 
linked with those of the peasants? While it is clearly too early for 
the introduction of an Ethiopian welfare state, can strategic humani­
tarian interventions-be made throughf^ubl ic enterprises without depriv­
ing the rural areas of essential resources? Despite the nationalisations 
a need for fairness in the process of private business regulation re­
mains. As the many private businesses that remain are smaller and less 
Westernised than formerly, the complex and technical Commercial Code 
should be modified to serve new needs, How is power to be organised 
and allocated through public enterprises? Some type of semi-autonomous 
framework can be the only solution; one that balances the needs for 
overall planning and the satisfaction of political demands with those 
of decentral i sat ion, efficiency’"an'd a mope Yapfd adjustment to reliable 
market signals. It is clear that better tools of managerial decision 
making are needed, but can enterprise forms and networks of account­
ability errsure adequate decisions even -rf-asr- Tsrthe carse - "bureau- ~ 
crats are often not wise or public-spirited? Can a separate commercial 
public service, with a different training, socialisation and legal
regime, circumvent some of the problems that have been mentioned ^ in 
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the long run? These unresolved questions illustrate the problem- 
matic future of business in Ethiopia,
III, Labour Relations
Labour stands at the meeting points of production and distribution 
in the-centres, and the nature of Ethiopia's labour markets and the 
Derg's labour policies therefore, have a major impact on development 
p'rospe'ctisj,' t Ethiopian labour markets-vd-Jsplay/'C'hanactdrrs'tiics common to - t
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most underdeveloped countries: paid employment accounts for only a
small proporation of the economically active; many workers lack exper­
ience of complex machinery and factory routine; and a shortage of 
specialised skills necessitates a reliance on foreigners, many of 
whom reside permanently in Ethiopia, Meagre employment opportunities 
in the centres are the result of, inter alia, factors that are consid­
ered elsewhere In this study: retarded processes of urbanisation and 
foreign economic penetration, the low productivity of traditional ser­
vices and commerce, and the small size of the manufacturing sector,
Whlle a ’’target income.mentality" undoubtedly influences a few workers; 
it is not widespread; there are no backward-bending supply curves of 
labour tn Ethiopia, Like some analyses by European colonialists and 
of workers during the Industrial Revolution, some Ethiopianists depict­
ed workers as 'happy natives’ tending towards laziness (or a strong 
leisure preference) and limited economic horizons, This picture is no 
more accurate than that of an Ethiopian peasant fatalism, True, manual 
labour is despised by some Ethiopian ethnic groups, and levels of work 
discipline, alertness and a readiness to change work practices are often 
quite low. Many of these tendenecies do, however, represent the ration­
al reactions of proud peoples to the dehumanising effects of servile 
occupations or work on a Western-sty 1 e assembly 1 ine.,.- Workers are often 
..uohea Ijthy - weak through poor nutfri t i on',* -jjoo r Ty - organ iVecT Tilt'd pa t roh 
client work relations which are translations of traditional rural prac­
tices, Low levels of productivity and incomes reflect the low levels
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of living among the work force, and vice versa, ---
A c • Under Haile Selassie
A trade union movement could play a vital role in changing these 
patterns of underdevelopment, The membership of the Confederation of 
Ethiopian Labour Unions (CELU) did not perform such a function, however, 
and the legislative framework of labour relations created under Haile 
Selassie did not encourage it to do so, Gross income differentials 
emerged between unionised workers and non-union workers or peasants. 
These differences bore no necessary relation to differences In produc­
tivity; organised labour secured for itself a* privileged position in 
relation to most Ethiopian social groups,' CELU functioned primari ly--■
but not exclusively - as a pressure group for a small stratum whose in-
' ' - f,. . ... - i A g
ter-ests conf 1 icted with those of the vast majority of Ethiopians. It
is not excessively cynical to note that the main beneficiaries of the
democratic rights demanded by CELU in September 1975 (see Chapter Four)
would have been the unions themselves,
Ethiopian trade unions were c r ea ted " ill trl^lTy through grassroots
actfvity without the partjcjpation of educated elites, and many unions
evolved from voluntary self-help associations,' Government has always
been extremely suspicious of organisations capable of chal1 enging.politXn
cal authority, particularly as_]inks between unionists and student
activists grew. Strikes are viewed as acts of rebellion, even after
-the righ'ts - to organ i sey ba-rga i n and- str t ke were accordejd^a.^Ximlted rec-og*^
nit ion under the 1962 Labour Relations Decree (unions were legalised in
 ^CQ .- ..... “
Eritrea fn~t958)v Und'er*~T+re^962" B-ecree, employees of an enterprise
could "establish and join" their own union, except that the union they 
joined had to be. a "general" (pre-exist]ngKunjon where thei f erTfeTpTis'e' 
had less than 50 employees' (Arty 20(a), (c)-)y to guards aparinst -'ttre-pro^- 
liferation of unions, Political a[ms and activities were prohibited 
(Art. 22(c)), Collective bargaining had to be" peaceabfe' and~~in good "" 
faith and, except as otherwise atjree*d“ ~cofleetive agreements- could not -
"s
be challenged for three years (Arts, 24(a), 26-7). Strikes were a 
species of prohibited unfair labour practices, unless initiated peace­
ably by a union acting in good faith where -ess^ntfaLipubJ f.c services 
were not disrupted,• Strikes could not commence until-sixty days after * 
the dispute was submittedto the. LabowiI'Rel-a.tix>ns Board, or i rf v i o I at ion 
of a final decision of the Board (.Arts, 2(5),-28),' While unions won 
many wage battles and spread an American^style ideology of unionism
among their members, membership did'not expand rapidly arid*'certain ' unions
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were regarded as subservient to the Labour Relations Board,--.---— An-Ameri­
can model-of-labour law was followed, except for a closer supervision and 
control By Government, and American Federation of Labor experts advised 
CELU off i c ia 1s .
Holidays, hours of work, severance pay, the’ protection of minors,
1 52
equal pay "for women and safety standards were regulated, and a Labour
. . 1 r - j  . . . . . . . .
Inspection Service was created, Enforcement of these standards.was 
haphazard, however, and there was no legally-enforced minimum wa'ge, In 
the absence of a union, the customary wage of Eth. $1 per day for
458
unskilled workers, and $3-$5 for the semi-skilled, was usually paid 
(U,$, $1 - Eth, $2.08), .This wage remained stable for many years 
depite inflation, although there were variations: for example, unskilled
workers in Assab received $2,50 while coffee pickers in Kaffa Province 
were paid $0,75. Other agricultural labourers in the rural areas earned 
from $0,30 to $0.70 per dayy ‘“These wages- bare!y--enabled- an— unmarr i-ed - -' - 
man to survive, particularly as the availability of work was usually 
seasonal or irregular. Annual wage increases during the 1960s and early 
1970s averaged 4,7%, but these increases largely reflected the replace­
ment of unskilled workers by those with a few skills and failed to keep
1 54
pace with inflation. There are no Civil Code rules devoted specifi­
cally to emp1oym~enty and mo'st'x>f our cr rtdci sms of'the general ‘obl i ga---.
tions law can thus be applied in the area of labour relations. The 
Ethiopian employment contract never became objective and impersonal:
traditional criteria such as those underpinning patron-client relations
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continued to dominate, Neither private law nor "consIstentVy-enforced '
public regulations came to the aid of the worker, whose grossly inferior 
socio-economic position ensured that he would be exploited thoroughly, 
in the absence of a union or, occasionally, despite it, Most workers 
could not afford to purchase the things they produced, and the smallness 
of markets constrained increases in production, productivity and em­
ployment , . . . ,____
B, Under the Derg
CELU was one of the most pol i tical ly-'Conservat i ve of trades union- 
organisations In the Third World: repudiating the union practices and
class antagonisms found in many European states, CELU followed an Ameri­
can model and largely restricted its activities to striking more favour­
able bargains in the marketplace, All of this changed abruptly after 
February 1974, when CELU’s leadership became heavily involved in the 
creeping coup, The ensuing search for a broad political power and for 
an alternative to Ethiopia Tikdem displaced CELU’s narrowly economic
goals and, more significantly, direct mass action was used in an attempt
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to achieve non-industria1 objectives,
As the major organised force in civilian society, unions expected 
to play a major role in a civilian government, and they were particularly 
disappointed when their authority was ultimately circumvented during the'
5^9
1975 business nationalisations. Workers were s.Imply told .to ."continue
1 57to work as before in accordance with the directives issued to them" 
by the Derg and the Ministry of National Resource Development, Early 
in 1977, for example, employees who arrested the senior managers of 
their oil company were warned by the Derg not to use "revolutionary
measures" to settle personal grudges, Other workers' groups have re-
. I * m  * 153ceived similar warnings,
Relations between the Derg and trade unions have been in a continual 
state of tension since the Revolution, and the International Labour Or­
ganisation has repeatedly complained about detentions of union officials. 
Government salaries we,re_frazen.Jn mid-197^, those in pub 1 ic enterprises 
were frozen - but at a higher level than under Haile Selassie - in mid- 
1975? and the private sector generally followed suit. Wages and salaries-
have also been subject -to—substantia 1 "voluntary" deductions for famine.
1 59relief and war efforts, - Through "collective bargaining", employees 
of nationalised industries were given moderate wage .increases in August 
1976, to take effect over three years and favouring those with lower 
salaries,
A comprehensive Labour Proclamation^^ was promulgated by the Derg
In December 1975 in an attempt to augment Governmental control over the
trades unions, although the overall structure of the Proclamation and
many of its rules are reminiscent of Haile Selassie's labour laws, The
•statuVtff ^ he'-E^pl^oyTrfehT^'E^haTigeiJ was" ;regu Tar i sed-. (Arts; 3~5) * a 1 though, ..
as unemployment benefits-are not paid, there is little incentive to
register. Minimum labour conditions are largely restated (discussed in 
161
the footnote-- ) and rules concerning the employment of Ethiopians abroad
1 62
and of foreigners In Ethiopia have been revised (see the footnote ).
For the first time, contracts of employment and apprenticeship are regu- 
1ated i n deta i1.
Persons fourteen years and older may enter, into an employment con­
tract, which must stipulate the duration (including indefinite) of a 
specific job and the remuneration, but need not be in writing, Relevant 
collective agreements constitute implied terms (Arts, 6, 7(l)~(2), 8), 
Except in extreme circumstances, the worker cannot be required to perform 
a job not stipulated in the contract, and the employer must pay the costs 
of transport and a-hardship' al lowance if the worker is transferred to
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another place of work (Arts. 10-11), Implied obligations of employees 
include: to work diligently to increase production, to observe health
and safety rules, to use carefully and return tools and equipment, and 
to provide assistance in the event of an accident (Art, 12(2)r(6)), 
Employers agree to provide training, tools, raw materials and health 
and safety protection, and to pay the stipulated wages (Art, 13(2)-(5), 
(7)). Both employer and employee constructively promise to obey the 
Proclamation and any relevant collective agreements (Arts, 12(l), 13(1)). 
Once a probation period of up to 90 days has passed, the employment con­
tract may only be cancelled as a'result of mutual 'agreement, natural 
disaster or war, bankruptcy, redudancy, the death .of the worRer'or his 
•absence for more than six months, "res i gnat iorT, a "fa! lure to display 
reasonable diligence, or other causes specified in a collective agree­
ment (Art, 1A), Conditions similar to those found in the contract of 
employment are applicable to apprenticeships, save that a def\hite dura-' 
tion is stipulated, The employer also promises to provide the stipulated 
traning, and an apprentice is obliged to follow this training programme 
diligently (Arts. 2 5 (2 ), 28(l), 29(2)), While these provisions serve 
substantially to redress an inequality of bargaining power, they are 
very much in the Western mould; radical critiques of contracts of em­
ployment, such as Karl Renner's, seem to have been ignored,
"Workers s ha 1.1 have the right to .organised and-Jo in* a trade unions-'* • 
(Art, A9(l)). This right is immediately qualified by Article A9(2): .
.a union can only be formed in an- "undertaking11, 'def^rhe’das'ihcludrhg'*” 
public enterprises engaged in production, distribution or, where the 
enterprise possesses a separate juridical personality, the provision of 
services. In other words-, unions cannot be formed by employees of 
"Ministries which directly participate in the administration of the 
State and all agencies which are under their supervision" (Art, 2(21), 
(25))« . These-defin11ions are confusing when-applied to concrete admin­
istrative activities, but suggest that a greater number of public em­
ployees can now "organise" than under Haile Selassie. Unions at the 
"undertaking" level and general unions - composed of employees of sev­
eral undertakings with twenty (compared to 50 under Haile Selassie) 
workers or less -."may" form i ndustry-wide-unions and help to 'const i- 
. tute. the. new, All-Eth 1 op ia Trade-tlnion-■ (AETUl ■ wi thout' af-f ectt rig ' t’-Hetr ’ ^ 4 '* i
legal status (Arts, A9(3)-(A), 51), While the language of the Proclama­
tion is permissive rather than mandatory, it seems that union membership 
in the AETU is compulsory. There are no 'closed shop* provisions and 
no checks on the proliferation of small unions, other than prohibitions 
on individuals joining more than one union and on there being more than 
one union in an undertaking (Art, AS (1) *'(2)) ,
The elected leadership of a union is accountable to a general
assembly of its members and, in the event of " irregularities", to "the
public" (Art, 50), Unions must: "promote the collaboration of workers
with their allies", the "strict discipline" of union members and their
"economic, social and moral well-being"; accelerate national development
and cooperate with government and private'organisations in raising the
level of skills and education among workers and union leaders; encourage
conscientiousness and voluntary community activities; and participate
in the formulation of new labour legislation and the enforcement of 
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existing rules. Unions formed prior to the Proclamation had 90 days 
in which "to'reorganise, elect new leaders and register (Art,- llA(l)).
The All-Ethiopia Trade Union has a new leadership and, unlike CELU, 
its functions are expressly regulated by law, In addition to the rights 
and duties shared by its member unions,-the AETU guides and supervises 
the labour movement "in line with socialist principles", negotiates in- 
-ter-natjonaj agreements, and accepts.,forejgn, as?j stance-under„goyer.nme.ata.1 
supervision, and cooperates "in the formulation of political directives 
arid 'social and etohbmic plans of Jthe country" (Art.’52(3))• ~'An'”organ^- 
ization must be registered before it can carry out "union activities", 
and it "shall" be registered if certain technical requirements are com­
plied with. The registrar's refusal to register an organisation can be 
appealed to the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs (discussed infra), 
and there is a further appeal to one of the newly-created Labour.Divisions 
of the+iigh Court (Arts. 53“A).
Collective agreements must also be registered and, although the 
Minister must indicate the reasons for a refusal of registration, his 
refusal "shall be final" (Art, 70(3), (5)), Article 73(1) provides:
"Any collective agreement shall be legal after its registration" and, 
presumably, an unregistered agreement is either void or voidable. There, 
are no express-’pena-1 • prov ts ions.*-concerning* a failure to register*.,.. ..
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Agreements are to last from one to three years (Art, 72(0) and their
contents are left to the.parties, although the threat of a refusal of
registration is undoubtedly an adequate safeguard against agreements
of which Government disapproves. -The parties are empowered to bargain
over, for example, the means of fulfilling targets in the enterprise's
''production plan" - a forecast, perhaps, of r I'g6rdus” ceirf r'aT^pl ann i ng ,
and the "safeguarding of property under socialist ownership principles",
Another collective bargaining topic, "worker's participation in manage-
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ment", was deleted in March 1976,
Labour disputes are intially considered by trade cffBpUte committee
composed of workers elected by all employees and appointees of the em-
16^
ployer In equal numbers, ' The committee shal1 1 conei]iate1 collectrve 
disputes and "adjudicate" individual disputes (with police assistance 
if necesary), or procure the services of "a conciliator or an expert" 
from the Ministry for either type of dispute (Art, 85(1) t (2)), Agree­
ments resolving disputes are registered by the Minister, whose refusal 
to register is, once again, final (Art. 86(1)), although the signifi­
cance of non-registration is not expressed. When a conciliator appointed 
by the Minister to hear a collective dispute fails to resolve that dis­
pute, either of the disputants "may take the case to the High Court"
(Art, 94), A party who is dissatisfied with the committee's decision 
in an individual dispute (pay appeal to an Awraja Court (Art, 87),- —  -
Additionally, the parties to a collective dispute may appoint up to 
three arbi trators-or request the Minister to do so, - ■ Afbi traf decisions—  
must be registered under Article 86(1) (see Arts, 101-4), The require­
ment of registration recurs throughout the Proclamation and is presumably 
the major device through which government intends to control labour 
relations.
Unfair labour practices by employers and unions are accorded nebulous 
definitions: the failure "to execute immediateXy, an agreement, decision,
or order given at any level"; the obstruction of or delays In the settle­
ment of a labour dispute; and the use of undue influence with regard to 
joining a union or during collective bargaining, Employers may not in­
terfere in union affairs, change the status quo ante during collective 
barganing, discriminate among workers on the basis of union membership, 
"race., ' tri.be., re.lig>on: or. sex", or. engage in "an'-unlawful lock-out" ;' 
unions "may not commence an unlawful strike" (Arts, 107-8), Strikes and
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lock-outs are Illegal' if they are not based on a collective labour 
dispute, where less than 50 days has lapsed since a collective dispute 
has been referred to a Labour Division of the High Court, where the 
strike or lock-out is contrary to a decision of an Awraja or High Court, 
and where the strike violates the union’s constitution (Arts, 105"6),
These provisions would seem effectively to outlaw strikes and lock-outs 
at the pleasure of-the Derg, since courts function largely as administra­
tive appendages of Government and often prohibited strikes in the past.
The new Court Divisions merely step into the shoes of Haile Selassie's 
Labour Relations Board, Unfair labour practices are punishable by 
imprisonment up to one year and/or a fine of Eth, $1,200 (Art, 113(4)),
Although- regulatory insti tutions .are g i ven .new.. names, and. JtunjctJons..,  ..... „
unfair labour practice provisions merely expand upon those found in 
Article 2(5) of the 1963 Labour Relat ions Proclamation,
The Ministry of. National Community Development and Social Affairs
was first empowered to regulate certain aspects of labour relations in 
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1963. Under the 1975 Proclamation, a Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs acquires these functions, as well as broad new ones, The new 
Minister shall: establish and supervise labour exchanges; appoint a
registrar of unions and hear appeals against refusals to register; Im­
pose a collective agreement on a party refusing to negotiate in good 
faith and alter agreements in accordance with Government's economic 
plans; prepare model collective agreements and union constitutions; 
regulate vocational training,., wotkex. part icj pat ion, _ the foreI,g,n ,yela.- t  ^
tions of the AETU and the employment of Ethiopians aborad; and under-take- 
studies of manpower needs and working conditions (Art, 109),
The Labour Proclamation displays a much higher standard of drafts­
manship and represents an attempt to regulate the subject-matter In 
detail, when compared to the other of the Derg’s Proclamations discussed 
in this and the previous Chapter, It seems that a Continental social 
democratic type of labour law has been grafted onto pre-existing Ameri­
can rules; the socialist thrust of the Proclamation Is subdued, The 
lengthy Prologue to the Proclamation does, however, mention "the right 
and obligation to work", workers contributing "their share in building 
socialism", and the achievement of harmonious labour relations "through 
the strict observance of socialist legality". We suspect that this 
Proclamation was lying on the shelf at the end of Haile Selassie's
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reign and imperfectly revised in an attempt to take account of recent ' *
political changes. The vagueness and inconsistencies we have mentioned, 
along with an 1 ideological 1 incompatibi1i ty of the Proclamation wi th 
other new l a w s w i  11 - presumably render the-future development of Ethiopian 
labour laws more difficult,
If the Derg had wished to introduce Innovations in the centres 
which exactly paralleled those adopted for peasants, a Yucjoslav-sty 1 e 
worker participation would have been opted for* The.virtual absence 
of employee participation in Ethiopia Is reflected by the totally sepa­
rate development of new public enterprise and labour laws, Enterprises 
have been nationalised but not socialised; even if an ideological assertion 
that'Ethropda1 s workers-are now in power under~a>■socialist regime,. Is 
accepted, the fact remains that Government is now able to exercise a 
greater measure of control over workers than were private employers 
prior to the Revolution,. There has been an attempt to force unions into 
a radically different political orientation without major changes in 
organisational forms; they have not become more effective representatives 
either of their own or the public's interests. This Is not an altogether 
bad thing: Ethiopian unions are small and extremely privileged fish in
a large pond. The application of the conventional criterion for the 
evaluation of labour legislation - the achievement of social justice
by and for large groups of unionised workers - would thus distort an
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analysis of Ethiopian law and development.
 The labour discipl ine required by an industrial, society is lacking__
in Ethiopia, and some degree of compulsion is required, particularly if 
patron-client relations are to be eliminated. The Derg is increasingly 
replacing Implicit coercion, through market mechanisms and the threat 
of unemployment, with an explicit exercise of the police power. The 
levels of compulsion adopted totally exceed anything that could be de­
scribed as 'strategic' in relation to economic development, however 
(see Chapter Two), since the Derg is concerned almost entirely with the 
political threats posed by unions, The Derg's policies have the effect 
of a more extreme form of Haile Selassie's paternalism and repression; 
a high degree of social change Is therefore not a likely result. There 
is a desire to 'squeeze* workers in order to free more resources for 
iuse -in the peripheries., but Ethiopian workers..are . patent ly unwjl 1 i ng
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"to contribute the sel f-deny I ng -"labour i nvestments" that have • pi ayed so
important a- role in Chinese development. One effect of the Derg's
policies Is that the AETU has served as a focal point for violent
political opposition: both the first Chairman of the AETU and his .
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successor were assassinated during 1977,
IVf The Urban Centres
Many social scientists in—the Third World have been preoccupied 
with.the urban context of underdevelopment and development, yet analyses 
of this topic are particularly unsatisfactory, For example, there seems 
to be a rough correlation between -the extent, of a . nat Ion J s . Tndustr.i a 1 Isa- — 
tion andthe numbers of people living in cities with a population of 
more than 100,000, but the precise reasons for this are unclearr Only 
about 6.5% of Ethiopians live in townswith a population of more thani 
20,000, and Addis Ababa accounts for about one-third of them, Ethiopia 
is thus an overwhelmingly rural (and non-industrial) country, even when 
compared to other Third World states with similar populations (see Chap­
ter One). Urban areas are supposed to facilitate the organisation of 
industry and the distribution of social services, to foster social 
changes, and to serve as centres for the diffusion of administration 
and innovations, but the realities are often otherwise in the Third 
World, “in Ethiopia and elsewhere, cities and towns fail to generate --
high levels" of‘production or social -change,- having -established a •para---
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sitic relationship with the peripheries. Under such circumstances, 
the expansion of urban enclaves along, existing lines - the policy pres­
cript ion--of-,-— for -examp!e^ the s-urplus-labour -model (see Chapter -One)- -...
can only perpetuate and intensify political instability, foreign depen­
dence and underdevelopment in general.
Ethiopian traditions of a decentralised political and Church ad­
ministration-, the enforced mobility of Imperial headquarters, and the 
absence of large-scale trade and a European colonialism have-meant that, 
urbanisation came relatively late to Ethiopia (see Chapter One), When 
low-levels of industrial isation are -taken into account, the net effect 
(with a couple of notable exceptions) is that towns have either been 
founded or fundamentally restructured fairly recently, to serve as centres 
of administration - the most important-source, of low wage i and .low.p.ro- w 
ductivity employment ~ and, to a lesser extent, education. Small-scale
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trade Is the'prjncipa 1 commercial activity and, along with'the-service' 
sector, it absorbs many urban newcomers into patterns of a disguised 
unemployment, ~ The productivity ifi these sector's is low, liVing condi­
tions are appa1li ng and the provi s ion of soci al servi ces is mi nima1, 
even when compared to neighbouring states (see- Chapter One), Neverthe- 
less, Ethiopian urban areas have grossly inflated infrastructures and 
costs of maintaining facilities, In 210 municipalities (excluding Addis 
Ababa and Eritrean towns) in 1971, salaries and pensions accounted for 
k0%. of Government expenditures earmarked for municipalities and the main­
tenance of electricity and water supplies for 11%, as against 3% for 
expand i ng'these facilities (capital expenditures). The only'major ex-' •-■
• pans-ions. concerned,, roads and br-idges.„(.l5%) *.,wh,i-Le-’.'welfare" accounted 
for 2X and fire protection for
These expenditure patterns did not, in other words, confer even 
moderate benefits on the lower urban strata; in addition to persons re­
ceiving municipal salaries and pensions, the prime beneficiaries were. 
Westernised elites, particularly the middle income groups who had man­
aged to carve out a tenuous position far themselves under Haile Selassie, 
Towns and cities constitute- expensive and relatively privileged enclaves, 
in which the receipt of benefits was dictated by the rural stratifica­
tions and ethnic antagonisms that have been translated into a different 
context; burglar-proofed fancy houses exist alonside unbearable housing 
conditions ~ a physical manifestation of malformations in the towns and 
in the economy as a whole, The absence of the white reserves that are 
an urban legacy of European colonialism in other countries, the.virtual 
non-existence of city planning, and the rapid "growth of urban populations 
make for chaotic housing and commercial arrangements in urban Ethiopia, 
High rates of migration from the peripheries - the population of Addis 
grows annually as a result of Inmigration - combined with the fact
that traditional elites owned large chunks of urban land prior to 1975, 
led to land speculation and rent gouging, The “shuttle pattern" of 
migration back and forth between urban and rural areas, which constitutes 
an important cent re/periphery link in many other African countries, is 
much less prevalent in Ethiopia, There are, however, a few reciprocal 
relations,of -differing intensity, InvoIving-traders, churchmen, lorry . 
and bus drivers, and a few members of the military and bureaucracy. • ■
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Many Ethiopian migrants are landless peasants,divorced women, or those
with a modicum of education, and these groups have neither a measure
of economic security in the rural areas nor a desire to return there.
The male-female ratio in urban Ethiopia is 9 2 ;100, compared with 103:
100 in the rural areas an an approximate average for urban Africa of
108:100, Women in urban-Ethiopia became involved in a varieTy"‘6T_"sefv ":~''
vice occupations, including those which have been described as perform-
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ing wifely services for hire,
Ethiopian urbanisation has also generated the kinds of tensions 
that foster a political instabi1\ty■ —  as events since 1974 bear witness, 
City dwellers had less of the reverence for the Emperor noted in the 
'Amhara heartTahds,--and adopted--a mo-re; jpragmat ic assessment of-the cosfes~- 
and benefits of urban life, discovered through shared experiences and 
the often covert channels of communication that spread a variety of 
viewpoints, Elite responses to the~attitudes and actions of city dwell­
ers mirror those adopted with regard to peasants - an oscillation be­
tween regarding them as rustics (migrated peasants) requiring little 
attention and the need to repress an anonymous mass embodying a great 
explosive force, Under Haile Selassie, policies were oriented towards 
giving the appearance of modernity in the urban areas, to attempt to 
placate rising expectations and to gain international respectibi1ity 
through an Addis Ababa showcase - what Galbraith terms the “ediface 
complex11. As Peter Koehn argues: “Lack of commitment to change at
the center of the- E*t-h4opjan* po*U.t4-ca4-s-ys-fcem~const.i-tuted a pervas.4v-e*..
obstacle to social and economic progress in urban settings,*1 The com­
mon element linking traditional politics and urban problems is an in­
equitable distribution of political and economic resources, as reflect­
ed and reinforced by urban land ownership patterns, regressive forms
of urban taxation, inflation and the perpetual state of collapse in
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public services.
A , Under Haile Selassie
The concept of urban social welfare prevailing under Haile Selassie 
paralleled the one he' adopted for the rural areas: • families were ex­
pected to care for their own, occasionally with the help of a few local 
self-help projects which sometimes received small- sums from Government
or the Haile Selassie i Foundation* The Foundation also supported 
modest programmes .for the employment of the disabled, the upkeep of 
churches, and the support of theology students and favoured authors 
and artists - the kinds of patronage a traditional monarch is expected 
to dispense, Foreign charities and international welfare agencies 
were probably hindered more than they were helped by Government, given 
the bureaucratic snares that were laid, The subordinate Department of 
the Ministry'of Interior dealing with urban social welfare is new ‘and" 
insignificant, Daniel Lerner’s view of African city dwellers character­
ises Ethiopia 1s nice1y ; . . .
They are neither housed, nor trained, nor employed, nor 
• serviced. They languish on the-urban-perrphery -without 
entering into any productive relationship with its-in­
dustrial operations,*73
Urban areas thus generate too many costs for too few benefits, especially 
when compared to relatively inexpensive and labour-intensive rural in­
vestments that have a short gestation period and serve to mobilise larger 
portions of the population,
Malcolm Norris describes urban administration under Haile Selassie - 
in the following manner:
Notwithstanding the potentially wide functions offered to 
municipalities, inadequate revenues and lack of expertise . 
forced many, and indeed nearly all the smaller, to carry out
 little more than regulatory duti.es., ~ These had cons, id.erahl a  _
importance in the daily lives of the public, but could not 
be regarded as a positive contribution to social welfare or 
amend t y y  * No-twi th standi ng,' sucfr-admrm s tratn on- dfd '•r eg T s t e r * «•
an improvement on the arbitrary administration of the coun- .... --
• -  try-side exercised by the traditional -funct lonar-ies-, *-7&- _ .... —
He goes on to spell out defects in municipalities law which echo our
analyses in Chapters Three and Five:
The Municipalities Proclamation [of 19^5 ~ the relevant sub­
stantive legislation until 1975, when it was modified sub­
stantial 1y].was a perfunctory document, imprecise in its re­
quirements and penalties for non-'compl iance, Planning control 
suffered from a lack of legal authority, Regulations relating 
to operations were inadequate, and 1-ittle reference was made 
to.tho*se issued. By-laws were not enforced. Government itself- 
disregarded- its own laws, either fpr. copven i.ence or# f rom. i ner ti a.^ „
, , , Only when court cases proliferated was any action taken, , „ ,
In practice these deficiencies had less effect than might be 
expected, Author i ty 'was not widely, .regarded in 1 ega 1. o'r .i ns t i.~
■ ! : tutu o-na*]" forms , . They--nevertheless. ••urrderrnTned the 'estab.lf ahmep/t * -.e;*,
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of clear procedures, facilitating ad hoc decisions and 
preferences. No legal force, however, could compensate 
for administrative 'weaknesses; , ,
Except for the chartered municipalities - Addis Ababa, Asmara and 
Gondar - towns have no inherent legal powers and,rather, derive them 
from central Government, The supervisory Municipalities Department of 
the Ministry of Interior is preoccupied, like other Departments of that 
Ministry, with- the maintenance of order, and displayed an indifference 
towards low revenues and shortages of manpower, leadership and relevant 
regulations, Non-chartered municipalities have little of the financial 
autonomy necessary for independent policymaking, their revenue sources- 
are not incpme-elastic, and they tend to fare poorly in competitions for 
resources distributed by the Ministry of Finance. Smaller towns lack 
permanent planning staffs, spend less per capita and have a smaller tax 
base: in the early -1970s, per capita municipal revenues varied from •
Eth, $0,6^ per year in Elyas, Gojjam to $\ h, h2 \n Nazareth, a Vesort1 
near Addis Ababa., While there was some transfer of revenues from rela­
tively rich to poor municipalities, most transfers served to drain re­
sources away from municipalities generally and were accomplished in 
accordance with the political priorities of the moment, Little revenue 
was realised through static and income-regressive property rates, owing 
to the lack of accurate plot boundaries and competent personnel, and 
-Co * fcher a4>i H  .ty -of ~1 a r-ger I a ndownef to ~ i nf 1 oenc'e' rat VrTg ';da'o-Ts"f<3ds:' 0 r 
evade payment, The little revenue that was collected was seldom spent 
In its entirety: the approval of budgets was delayed, often intention­
ally,,. ,a„nd .bureaucrats, who planned expenditure patterns were even ti ess- 
efficient than the tax collectors. Exploitation of the public typically
took the forms of delays in and refusals to carry out services or cor-
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ruption in.the granting of licences and in the-acquisition of land.
Elaborate statutory classifications of Ethiopian municipalities 
are irrelevant in practice, save as they- reflected -attempts ■. by land­
owners to boost the value of their land by upgrading the status of 
their town. In the smaller towns, the town officer was hired and fired 
by a provincial governor, and much of municipal administration thus 
represents an extension of the practices discussed in Chapter Three and 
.was largely Immune.to central control, The town officer is empowered 
'to divide-towns lands, .licence merchants, and supervise socia 1*sehvices
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and health and s-anitary arrangements-'- -He^was assisted by-a- Mun I c + pa 1 •- 
Council and sefer shums (roughly, informal ward officers) who, like 
chika shums in the rural areas, mediated between the bureaucracy and 
the people, The councils were supposed to authorise expenditures, or­
ganise social services and promulgate by-laws in accordance with regu­
lations drafted by the Ministry of Interior, but the Ministry often 
intervened more directly in these processes, such as by ordering a
council’s dissolution, There-were many IrreguTarities in council
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elections, and a low voter turnout, The councils did not reflect 
organised public pressures or demands and, in October 197A, the Derg 
ordered1 the^transfer of their powers-and--duties-to the'town ©fffeeF'Sy—  
although, a Proclamation to that-.effect was not ..promulgated . upti. 1 „ 
February 1976,^^
The chartered municipalities possessed a considerable autonomy 
but budgets and large projects remained subject to approval by the 
Ministry, which could also compel performance of legal duties, Except 
in Asmara, Eritrea, which is under martial law, the town officer of 
a chartered municipality (kantiba or ma-yor) is elected and is an im­
portant official, Addis Ababa has 1,800 employees (as against sixteen 
in Arba Minch,- -the capital- of-Gemu Gofa province) and impressive 
administrative offices,-but bureaucratic performance is far from im­
pressive, As in so much of Ethiopian administration, internal. fri.ctions 
dlcta'te tb'e course of policy or,' more" commonly, inaction * there is a - 
shortage of qualified personnel; and such problem-solving as occurs is 
usually outside the framework of administrative routine, Prior to the 
197A escaTat ion 'in the guerri11a war, Asmara bad- a-more -coherent -and -—  
efficient administration, based on patterns established by the Italians 
in the 1930s, Regularised schemes of accountability within municipal­
ities were either non-existent or grossly inadequate. For example,
budgets are often not made public and, owing to shortages of staff,
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only one-third of the municipalities receive an audit each year,
Urban officialdom in Ethiopia was thus neither a stabilising nor^
a dynamic factor; neither competent nor dedicated, bureaucrats applied
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traditional methods to pressing urban needs. This can be seen most
clearly with regard to city planning, or rather, the lack of it- The 
MUnic i pa l1 i:ties P-roclamat ion empowers the-counci-1 s to-cons Ider a. few.,
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matters relating to planning in an extremely vague manner. This was 
supplemented, in I960, by Civil Code Articles 1535^7, which dealt with 
planning from the standpoint of a qualification on private law rights.
A town planning area is defined by decree and the relevant municipality 
"shall draw up a plan", which takes effect on publication in the 
Negarit Gazeta (Arts. 1535(1), 1536)* Careful research has failed to 
uncover any such plans, although informal plans have been prepared for 
major towns, usually by foreign planners. These plans are fairly good, 
given that radical changes running contrary to the interests of large 
landowners were not contemplated, but they were promptly filed away and 
forgotten* "In carrying out the plan", the rights of landowners could 
be "restricted" or expropriated, and "compensation" is to be paid (Arts, 
1538-9.), Building permits are required to "construct a building" (Art. 
I5A0) - a fertile source of corruption, Permission can be denied, 
granted or granted subject to conditions (Arts, 15AA-6) ,  much as under 
English law, In theory, Ethiopian planning processes are quite similar 
to those of England, If public participation devices there are equated 
with the consultative functions of associations composed of Ethiopians 
who own land in the planning area, which are created under  Civil Code 
Articles 1550 and 1552. x
To take but one, not untypical, example of how planning processes 
operated, ithe desfendanfMunieiparTi-by of AddisTAbaba had demolished some 
of the plaintiff’s houses and had ordered the demolition of others.
The defendent admitted Tiabi1ity for compensation but resisted an In­
junction of additional demolitions by citing Article A ( i i i )  of the 
Municipalities Proclamation: "A Municipal Council shall have power
to , . .[do] anything likely to contribute to the embellishment and the 
cleanliness of the town. . . ." The defendent was totally unable to 
justify its actions and the High Court refused to allow this extremely 
nebulous provision to prevail over property rights granted under Articles 
A3 and AA of the 1955 Constitution, The buildings could not be demol­
ished unless they constituted a health hazard or the plaintiff volun-
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tarily accepted compensation. In many other cases, however, the
courts freely permitted Government to override individual rights (see 
Chapter Three), and most of those injured by planning decisions - which 
were of ten dd'tt'l e'‘m'ore Than 'soli ci ations for a bribe - would-not have
U l l
challenged' them in court, Vague planning criteria were seldom applied -
in a development-oriented fashion, and the tendency was to use them in
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a traditional fashion, as just another licensing system,’
B , Urban Land Nationalisations
Ethiopian patterns of underdeveloped municipal administration are 
found in many parts of the Third World, and it is interesting to note 
that the Derg has chosen gradually to replace rather than to reform 
them; for the present, higher officials are supervised directly by 
members of the military. For example, the nationalisation of urban
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lands under-Proclamation 47 of July 1975 - has.removed a major con-... 
straint on sensible city planning - land ownership by powerful tradi­
tional elites - yet planning laws and practices have not been changed, 
The majo'r effect of the Proclamation fs -one *of an even-handed treatment 
of urban and rural areas; as in the peripheries, the Derg recognises 
that urban land ownership patterns (along with other factors) have 
retarded the development of Ethiopian municipalities.
Urban land ownership records were chaotic in the extreme; under 
an old decree, urban lands were owned ’freehold' if dispositions were 
registered, but this was seldom done and courts ignored the requirement, 
Even in Addis Ababa, It was impossible to determine the appropriate 
boundaries and who the tenants, ‘vendors and heirs were, The Codifi- 
cat ion Commi ssion-' s reject ion of- a-farrd-T'egtstry and "adequate -preS^-^ 
cription rules as a part of the Civil Code enabled 1itigants to con­
tinue to challenge titles in a traditional fashion, after the lapse of
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many years, — ......  ......
The rapid growth of Ethiopian urban areas and, in Addis Ababa, the 
diplomatic activities associated with the Organisation of African Unity 
and the U-.N, Economic Commission for Africa, meant that urban land 
ownership and the construction of vi1 las,-apartments and offices were 
secure and extremely profitable investments, Foreigners could not own 
land without Imperial warrant, and prominent Ethiopians owned huge 
chunks of the major urban areas and exploited their monopoly ruthlessly. 
In Addis Ababa, 5% of the population owned an estimated 95% of the 
land; seven members of Haile Selassie’s family owned eight million 
square meters (sq, mtrs,); one ari stocrat, owned twe.l v.e ,mi 1 1 i op ,.sq , mtrs; 
and ten officials owned 3,8 mi 11 ton sq, mtrs, ' Some of this land -was <.
leased to city dwellers who built their own houses, but 60% of the
housing in Addis Ababa was rented from private landlords., Housing
conditions reflected, on the one hand, what poor and exploited people
could afford and, on the other, the luxuries demanded by traditional
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and Westernised elites and foreign diplomats,
Investment In land and 'houses had the effect of denying indigen­
ous capital to industry and agriculture. Profits from urban land­
holdings remained in private hands and were dissipated by luxury con­
sumption or reinvested in land and houses, Low income and land taxes 
and widespread tax evasion by the powerful reduced the amount of ' ’
revenue available for improving urban services and living conditions.
Proclamation 47 of 1975 provides that all ’’urban lands”'and "trees1 
(wi t-hin-^bhisr-vaguely-demareated boundaries of a *mun i c i pa IT ty-or town) —  
are nationalised without compensation (Arts. 2(1), 3, 10), "Any per­
son or family" may continue to "own" one "dwelling house , , , of his
choice" in any one urban area (but not the land under it), and is em­
powered to repossess this house from a tenant or occupant (Arts, 11(1), 
16(1)), Business houses ("spaces" used for "running a business" ) will 
continue in private ownership in such numbers and sizes as Government 
shall determine, presumably by granting, denying or cancelling business 
licences (Arts, 2(5), 11(3), and see Art, 16(2)), Houses "used for 
. condqct lng. 4*e.l iglous. se.rv.ices.lh.or.owned .by,-"diplomat ic and. cons.uXap. . .
representatives and international organisations" are exempted from 
national rsation ’*(jArtsv4-3'-4-)v The recurrence of "house"’in the - Procfa- 
mation is probably the result of an overly-1iteral translation of the 
Amharic bet, There is a retroactive invalidation of land transfers by 
sale, mortgage, antichresis (a security arrangement roughly analogous 
to an American land contract), succession "or otherwise" (Art, 4),
Where continued ownership of a dwelling or business house is valid 
ated by the Proclamation, taxes must be paid and the building may be 
transferred by succession, barter or sale, although Government has a 
right of pre-emption in the event of a sale (Arts. 11(4), 12(1)), All 
"extra houses" become Government property and must be handed over with­
in thirty days, "Fair compensation" will be paid, unless the house was 
"enemy property" or built with public funds (Arts, 13, 14(1), 18 (1)) -. 
Government*\may . aT so ■•"expropri a>te' for pub-Tfc purpose an urban ..house’-!.* r, .
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"by paying compensation" (Art, 19), Presumably no distinction is 
drawn between "compensation" and "fair compensation" by the Compensa- 
t ion Comm i ss ion (supra),
Persons or families who do not own a house under Proclamation 47 
may acquire a "possessory right" in up to 500 square meters of the land 
(not merely the house) which he or it holds (Arts* 5(1), 70))? Similar 
rights are granted to "organisations" (including the Ethiopian Orthodox 
Church) which hitherto owned land, and the appropriate size of an or­
ganisation's holding will be determined by the Ministry, A U.N, Depart­
ment of Economic and Social Affairs Report cited by John Cohen and 
Peter Koehn suggests that, given a shortage of surveyors and the expense
of land surveys, the easiest way to accomplish land reforms in the Third
World is to confer "possessory titles" with Inexact: boundaries, These 
rights are to be presumed valid until challenged, with the contestant 
bearing the onus of proof. This seems to be the approach adopted by
the Derg in both urban and rural land reforms. Many difficult redistri-
butive decisions which require the assessment of relative land values 
are thus avoided, save where compensation "in kind" is offered after 
expropriation. Government may "expropriate for public purpose" possess- 
ory rights in urban land, "giving compensation in kind," -Where urban 
land is not utilised within a period to be specified, however, expro­
priation of- pos:ses-sory--r-i-g’bt-s-*iV-apfpar-ervt^ -y without-cumpensation (Artr->8)-w-. •* 
It is uncertain from the Proclamation whether vague Civil Code defini­
tions of expropriation in the public interest (supra) are to be deemed 
relevant. ....... . .
Although the "relationship between landowners and tenants is . , . 
abolished", the urban landholder "shall pay rent to be fixed by the 
Government" (Arts, 6(1), 9)? The rent initially payable was the sum 
previously paid to the owner, except that monthly rents of Eth, $300 or 
less are reduced on a sliding scale which favours the most impoverished 
of city dwellers (Art. 20(4)), This was a fairly successful attempt to 
mobilise public support: for the reform; a typical annual urban income 
is $420, and 60% of this has to be pretty firmly committed to expendi­
tures on food. The rapid increases in rents during the late 1960s and
early 1970s had thus cut deeply into the money available for‘c 1Qthing,
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fuel, public transport and tax payments. - „ •
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The Derg fixed new urban land rents and house taxes under Proc­
lamation 80 in March 1976, reasoning that, as "the number of urban 
dwellers increases and their standard of living improves [J] from year
to year", they must pay for expanded services which match an increased 
1 87
demand, The Proclamation is brought into effect for a particular 
municipality by issuing regulations (Art, 17 “ a technique not in com­
mon use in Ethiopia), and the only ones issued to date concern Addis 
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Ababa, Land Is divided into three grades, and ‘ground* rent is pay­
able under scales ranging from $0,02 to 0.16 per square meter for dwell­
ing houses and $0.02 to 0,06 for businesses, Separate rents on "extra 
houses" will, of course, continue to be paid, Taxes on urban houses 
(dwellings and businesses) are payable on a sliding scale of'from ]% 
to A ,$% of the estimated annual rental value (Arts. A, 1A(2), and Sched,
2 and 3), Sports centres, cemeteries, religious institutions, non­
profit schools and hospitals, other charities, and centraTly^admfnistered 
Government institutions are exempted from the payment of these rents 
and taxes; the position with regard to diplomatic holdings will be de­
termined in the future (Arts, 1A(1), 15), Rent and tax assessments 
are made by an agent of the Minister of Public Works and Housing, and 
payments are made to the municipality (Arts, 5(1), 6) . Anvassessment 
may be appealed to a municipality tax appeal committee within 30 days, 
vW.J th a further -appeaT to, a^ awraja * court (Ar-t«n,y-9-J»l4>'#-*-'A-PtT'CTe^ -12^  -v re­
states that the court "shall make corrections" where "an error in the
interpretat ion o~f theHaw" i 5 discovered? thisrianguage does - not~ ex-  *
pressly preclude appeals against errors in fact-finding, although such 
a construction would be consistent with other Ethiopian tax laws and is 
therefore likely, When the Proclamation takes effect in a municipality, 
its rates and Government's income taxes on rents and transaction and 
education are abrogated (Art. 3).
Rents on "extra houses" of up to Eth, $100 per month are collected 
by the local urban cooperative societies (discussed j nfra) , and are 
"utilised for purposes beneficial to the dwellers" (Art, 30(5)~,(6) of 
Proc, A7) f Higher rentals are collected by the Ministry of Public V/orks 
and Housing, "for the improvement of the lives of all urban dwellers 
and of urban areas" (Art, 20(5), (7)), As a 1967 Housing Survey showed 
that 93%' of montfrly rental s nvAdd i s-Ababa we r-en be Low -Eth „\"$51 jQO^ -e an?’
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extremely heavy administrative burden has been placed on the urban 
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coops. Where a nationalisation causes "special hardship" to per­
sons, families and organisations which formerly owned urban land, they 
can receive discretionary payments from the rents collected, but these 
payments are deducted when compensation is assessed (Art, 21),
All urban land cases "pending in the ordinary courts of law" are 
annulled, and suits challenging the legality of actions taken under 
Proclamation A7 are prohibited (Art, AO), Tampering with houses or 
property, disturbing the peace or obstructing the implementation of the 
Proclamation become, by Article 41’"'offenses under the 1974 Special Pena 
Code (see Chapter Five), In addition to broad powers to ‘subpoena* 
documents, issue regulations, implement the Proclamation, supervise 
urban coops and establish their boundaries, the Ministry may seek the 
cooperation of other ministries in establishing urban coops, promoting 
housing loans, and spending its rental income'on house construction and 
the provision of essential services, in accordance with "comprehensive 
urban development plans and directives" 'which have not yet come into 
being (Arts, 3l~,3, 35~7> 4$), The Ministry's functions have thus been 
expanded enormously, and the Derg assigned a large number of zemecha 
students (see Chapter Six) to the Ministry, in an attempt to resolve 
manpower problems, Between 1,200 and 1,A00 of these students were, 
howe;yer,. arrested, at the end of August-1974,' and'900 ciyif sdr^ants and 
soldiers were then transferred to the Ministry, The *ievel of intra- 
governmental coordination assumed' &9 'the ProcTamatfoh has not yet been
attained in Ethiopia, and the removal of the Minister in February 1976
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is indicative, perhaps, of the Ministry's failings in this regard,
The Ministry became so overworked that the Agency for the Adminis-
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tration of Rented Houses was created in November 1975* The Agency 
acquires and maintains house renting for more than Eth, $100 a month, 
revises rent- schedules, and can sell, buy, lease, exchange or build 
houses "in accordance with Government policy"(Art, 5), The Agency is 
"autonomous" and has a General Manager and Board -.the kind of struc­
ture that was favoured by Haile Selassie's regime and is criticised 
supra and in Chapter Six (see Arts. 7~10).
C . Urban Coops
Urban coops were first established under extremely vague provisions
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Articles 22-6 of Proclamation 47, Any city dweller may join his local 
coop, although former landlords are initially bar red. from standjng for 
office and from electing coop officials (Art, 23), These provisos were' 
fleshed out by Proclamation 104 of October 1976, designed to "consolidate 
the foundations laid" by Proclamation 47, to make coops "more conscious 
and organised", and to enable coops "to directly take over , , , munici­
pal administration" so as to "remove bureaucratic red-tape and further
facilitate the direct involvement of the people in the revolutionary 
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process. T. . ," In addition to the powers and duties already men­
tioned, urban coops are to: enhance community development by "making
the^-people participate"; foster shops, cottage industries, women's and 
other associations; and construct and rent houses, while encouraging 
self-help construction (Art. 6), While each coop has a distinct legal 
personality, they subscribe to model internal regulations and find their 
place in a hierarchical framework of '"democrat ic'central i s m ^ f o l  lowing 
an "economical, simple, efficient, trustworthy and public service 
oriented revolutionary method of work . . (Arts*. 3, 7). The image 
of a revolutionary Boy Scouts is hard to resist and, like the balance 
of the Proclamation, these provisions are long on ideology and short 
on practical guidance. \
In addition to collecting rents, local urban coops (kebeles); co- 
.oxcUnat.e,-th^i.r-ac:ti:v-ift-i-e-s .through Twgher^and centra!,J>assOOjat‘TOn’£'"ttfHtllr  - 
bujld roads; protect public property) register*houses and the births, 
marriages and deaths of residents'O h  place of“Tnst!tutions whose oper­
ation is "suspended" under the Ci_vU_Cod&) ; and establish health, recre-- 
ational, postal and educational facilities, and price control, reforesta­
tion,. lit.eracy and hygiene programmes (Aft, 9 of Proc, 104), Kebel es 
are run by policy committees composed of at least fifteen members elected 
"from the broad masses", who subscribe to the Derg's Revolutionary Pro­
gramme of -Apri1 1976 (Arts, 4, 13), in practice, however, most kebele'"
officials are appointed by the Derg,- In April 1977 it was announced
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that 1,500 kebeles had been formed, 291 of them m  Addis Ababa, Sub­
sidiary functions of kebeles are .performed by judicial tribunals and the 
ominously-named public safety committees which, like those of the French 
Revolution, enforce tribunal decisions, catch-:cr I m i rial s in flagrante- 
del ie.tO;,. .arx-est under warrant-,1 ‘and* perform' the^gdard 1 nd[' and * ke'cdr tty! * * * -
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functions specified by the Ministry of Interior (Art, 10), These com­
mittees formed the nucleus of the 70,000 to 200,000-strong People's 
Militia that performed so poorly during fighting along the Eritrean 
border in 1978 and during the 1977 invasion from Somalia, While there 
is a clear need for a localised maintenance of order in the urban areas 
of Ethiopia, it has been persuasively argued that some of the committees 
have acted as "assassination squads", both on their own initiative and 
on instructions from the Derg,
Kebele judicial tribunals hear the cases referred to them by their 
kebeles, Their jurisdiction is exclusive in most civil disputes up to 
a value of Eth,-$50-0-and ^ over the 'mi nor1 crimina1 matters not heard by 
Special Courts-Martial and military tribunals (Arts, 11, 27, 40), They 
have, however, been imposing death penalties, which are sometimes carried 
out on the spot- by the safety committees; the theoretical right oF appeal 
to a higher urban coop tribunal can thus be negated in practice, Vague 
offenses relating to the "revolutionary struggle" are among those pun­
ished, including failures to attend Government rallies. Procedural 
rules are so vague and incomplete (see Arts, 28-39) that they could 
hardly be held to create a judicial process, As In Tanzania and in the 
peoples' courts found in many socialist states, adjudicators who are 
not legally trained apply flexible standards and ideological pronounce­
ments rather than strict legal rules. While the reactions of academics 
of these kd nds— b F “c6uTts>:Tn-’other states are-mixed; ■ i t -i s -certaI n “that ■ - - 
Ethiopian tribunal- decisions do not accord with the sense of justice
possessed by most city dwellers, and that the tribunals will not,
-therefore, succeed-in-redefining sociaI roles* recone-M i ng many - new- - 
conflicts or diffusing new political norms widely.
The opportunities for corruption and other forms of the abuse of
power within the kebeles is enormous: for example, Girma Kebede was
executed in April-1977, accused of murdering 24 people and torturing 
many others while Chairman of the Arat Kilo Kebelle in Addis Ababa,
Some of these murders resulted from uncorroborated denunciations eight- 
months prior to the event. While the Derg argues that Girma1s abuse 
of office is an isolated instance. Amnesty International concludes that
194
his activities are "not untypical of several kebelle leaders."
Higher and central urban coops have structures and functions which -
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parallel those of the woreda and awraja peasant associations (see Arts,
13"lS of Proc, 104 and Chapter Six), and a central coop is to coordinate
activities in each municipality and possesses the combined powers of
municipal councils and town officers. Pending the promulgation of an
urban self-administration proclamation some time In the future, the
restructured Ministry of Urban Development and Housing issues regulations
and undertakes supervisory and planning tasks with regard to municipal
administration (Art, 40(l))t In July 1975, a Coordinating Committee of
735 ed1rs (traditional voluntary associations - see Chapter Six) in Addis
Ababa, representing 200,000 members, associated itself with the urban
coops, arguing that edirs were natural centres of self-administration
195and development activities, ....................  —
D t Housing Pol ?c?es
In November 1975 the Derg attempted to increase the availability
of credit for the construction or urban housing by establishing the
Housing and Savings Bank that succeeds to the assets and liabilities
of the imperial Savings and Ownership Public Association and the Savings
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and Mortgage Corporation under Proclamation 60t While the demand for 
urban housing far outstripped the supply under Haile Selassie, these 
liquidated associations were providing credit for luxury consumption 
and for the construction of elaborate houses, largely in Addis Ababa.
The :new "Bank' has a-pa id - in capitaVof* Efhr $'6;*mHTtort^%nd*”N ,^ r e c ' 
to mobilise domestic resources and decrease the wastage of resources; 
accelerate the construction of houses and, generally, to coordinate and
central ise -housing development -pel icies -in- relation-to- the financial-----
needs-of other sectors (Prologue, Arts, 5, 17).
In addition to powers and liabilities consistent with an independent 
"juridical personality", the Bank and its branches accept savings and 
time deposits - including insurance and pension funds - and grant long­
term purchase or construction, and short-term maintenance, loans for 
"dwellings, buildings, infra-structure and community facilities". Loans 
.may-be,granted to. i ndividuals, to "cooperative hogsirig programmes" ("on 
.easy terms") and to firms i n—the.- const ruction -Industry which-have been 
approved by the Ministry (Arts. 6, 7 and 18(1)). The management of the 
Bank follows a pattern common to many Ethiopian autonomous agerrcies: *-•
a General Manager is to "carryout the "activities of the' bank"''"subject"
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to the general direction of the Board" of Management that is, in turn, 
"respons«ble" to the National Bank and, perhaps, to the Ministry,*^
The Bank must give priority to coops and "low income groups" when 
granting loans, but the chief criterion is a conventional "capacity to 
repay", and the Bank "may require collateral" (Arts, 22(1), 23(1)).
For individuals and coops, "the lower the income of the borrower the 
longer the duration of payment" up to thirty years, while public hous­
ing ("designed for low income groups") loansywill be .repaid over a period 
of at least thirty years (Arts. 2(7), 24), Monthly repayments cannot 
exceed 25% of an individual's or coop's monthly income, and interest 
rates will favour coops and4ow income groups (Arts, 25(l), 26(2))T  
While serious problems concerning the„management of the Bank and the 
coordination of its activities can be foreseen, it ought to prove a 
useful adjunct to urban land reforms,
A Housing Construction Corporation was established in March 1976,
■ m a n  attempt to alleviate housing shortages- and avoid the exorbitant
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charges of private and foreign contractors. The familiar management 
structure of Board and General Manager is opted for, but the Proclamation 
is vague on the specific functions of the Corporation (see Art, 4), 
even when compared to simifar Ethiopian legislation, A policy direc­
tive issued at about the same time did, however, call for the construc­
tion of 44,000 units per year (the type of housing was not specified), 
.p4-us. 30,,AQP^Mn^ts:;4o repl^Ge substandard housing, ffhe shortage-of low—  
income housing continues; while houses renting for more than $300 per 
month are once again available, the homeless cannot afford them. Addi­
tional housing is urgently required, and the Derg has taken the first 
step - but no more than that - to meet th-i-s^need,  :~
E• The Urban Revolution
It is only natural that the locii of most of the significant events
of the Revolution - and Addis Ababa in particular - should have claimed
so much of the Derg's attention. As Fred Burke argues: "Both the
problem and the promise of the African Revolution are sharply posed In
the life and complexities of its mushrooming cities" - "the home of 
199political ideas". So it is in Ethiopia - notwithstanding the rural
orientation of many of the Derg's policies - where struggles for econo­
mic subs i stence.and. even, physical survival (against, for example,.the
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Red Terror) continue to inhibit development-related social changes in 
urban areas.
Urban elites offered no overt resistance to the Derg's land and 
institutional reforms, and Cohen and Koehn correctly conclude that, 
depite the enormous confusion generated, the Proclamations strengthen 
state control over property,- Trtcomes and urban physcial planning, pre­
vent the acquisition of large landholdings, foster socio-economic equal­
isation and encourage a fuller utilisation of urban resources. We 
would, however, disagree with their characterisation of Proclamation 47 
as "a carefully designed s c h e m e , M a n y  of the criticisms levelled 
against rural land reforms can also be applied to urban measures: 
cri ticaT rules are nebulous, insuff ic ient-pol j tical and economic re-- -■ •'•• 
sources and organisational foundations are conferred upon important, 
institutions, and attempts to coordinate the activities of various in­
stitutions.are grossly inadequate.,. . Most.of the criticisms Malcolm., .. .
Norris levelled against the Munici.pal ities Proclamation (supra) can 
also be applied to the Derg's legislation for the urban areas,
it is clear that traditional urban (and, for that matter, rural) 
leaders in Ethiopia lack initiative and have supported the status quo, 
They had to be replaced and, ideally, the new forms of municipal admin­
istration should promote flexible responses to local problems and a
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mobilisation of local energies for collective action. This sometimes 
proves to be the case, but there have been many 'teething' difficulties 
and a virtual absence of corrd inat ion- or.an overall planni ng-.of_a.„moi:e 
centralised administration, The "democratic centralism" at work with­
in the hierarchies of urban coops looks towards a political rather than 
a legal accountability, and the evidence suggests that there is no 
continuous overall political supervision of the coops, A more sensi­
ble and less easily evaded revenue base has, however, been established 
in Addis Ababa and, to a lesser extent, in other towns, but it is still 
not particularly income-elastic,
V , The Revolution in the Centres
There is a conjunction of low levels of living, labour productivity, 
IndustrIalisation and urbanisation In Ethiopia's centres, where business 
act i vi t i es-' have not escaped traditional strictures and are pursued .. 
through uncongenial legal forms. The costs of these centres, in terms
482
of the amounts of political and economic resources absorbed, far out­
weigh the benefits conferred on the bulk of the population. The Derg 
has wisely chosen to attempt to bring these wasteful and parasitic
entities under control and then to restructure them, rather than con-
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tinuing to expand them along existing lines, In theory, the emerg­
ing patchwork of policy represents a series of sensible first steps, 
but a lack of overall planning is manifest, particularly with regard 
to municipal administration and the many forms of business activity, 
while policy implementation is sporadic, haphazard and motivated - to 
a much greater extent than in the rural areas - by the desire to pre­
serve a short-term political stability.
In Chapter Two and Part II we remarked on the many inherent con­
tradictions between policies fostering stability In the short run and 
those conducive to establishing a regime's long-term legitimacy, The 
Derg may yet overcome these contradictions in'a“”fai rly novel fa^hioni ' 
while maintaining a short-run stability through repression in the cen­
tres, political power can be shifted gradually to the peripheries, 
where a hoped-for rural development would help to confer a long-term 
legitimacy. This reorientation of links between centres and peripheries 
certainly has its dangers, as evidenced by the rapidity wi.th which the 
Derg dissipated the fund or urban goodwill that was built up during 
the creeping coup, --- . . ~ i.
.-The Derg's .overall-.strategy for the centres emerges, fairly .clearly 
from the laws "discussed in the last two Chapters: insfead of exploi t­
ing the peripheries, the centres are, to a limited extent, being .ex­
ploited in the interest of a rural development. Within the centres, 
income-level 1ing measures have been combined with the acquisition of 
state control over urban and agribusiness lands, The precise tactics 
that city dwellers and bureaucrats are expected to adopt are unclear,
however. " WhiTe~the*Tdeological thrust of Proclamations-governmg ...  —
business national Istions and urban (and rural) land reforms is spelt
out, implementation procedures are either not stated or remain extremely 
203vague, Like those discussed in Chapter Six, it is likely that these 
kinds of Proclamations are designed to serve as 'blank cheques', sub­
ject to re'interpretation's 'based upon shifts of-power wi thfir the--Derg ■■ 
■and'■ o.thteTv modemLslngVei j tes , The Labour. Proelatetron, -ourrfch-a^ afchepv- ,. te 
hand, is fairly clear on the means of enforcement, while conveying an
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uncertain ideological content, ~ 11.? like the Proclamations dealing with 
new chartered business corporations and the licensing of private busi­
nesses, displays a continuity with laws promulgated under Haile Selasie, 
and the latter Proclamations are vague both as to the detailed regula­
tion of the subject matter and the underlying ideology. The ad hoc 
proliferation of laws has continued apace, and Ethiopia is no nearer _ 
to establishing a coherent legal system, As in the rural areas, law- 
as-institution-wi11 play an increasingly important role in the centres, 
with regard to urban coops and the radical restructuring of public en­
terprises that is far from complete. Law-as-norm will, however, play a 
relatively larger role in the urban areas: i n 1 abour Tel art ions~appli— ■
cations of the remnants of private laws, the regulation of private 
businesses and, we can only hope, in an overall code for public business 
whictr prescrIbes new standards of performance and of accountability;
What remains to be done *in the centres is a massive restructuring 
of commerce and industry, the introduction of policies designed to 
foster a planned development of urban facilities and social changes - 
especially those which promote increases in the productivity of labour, 
a diffusion of innovations through improved links with the peripheries 
and, generally, a consolidating and integrating of steps already taken 
- along with a relaxation of political repression, An evident feature 
of such a programme is that it would impose additional strains on 
bureaucratic systems, Cohen and Koehn argue, for example, that the
administrative overload experienced by . , .[the Ministries 
of Land Reform and Urban Development] In the period immediately 
subsequent to the 1974 coup d'etat is one-important indication 
of the limits of a strategy that emphasizes the role of central 
government bureaucracy in social change and economic g r o w t h . ^04
We would add that the 1975 business nationalisations will constitute an 
ever greater bureaucratic bottleneck in the longer run, Given the 
Derg’s commitment to anactivist intervention, these kinds of bottle­
necks cannoT" be"eliminated, but they can be minimised considerably (see1 
Chapter Five): rigid performance criteria must be rigorously enforced
to reduce the amount of 'goal displacement' - corruption and irrelevant 
bureaucratic power struggles; administrators should be utilised in more 
of a technical rather than a general supervisory capacity, after such 
retraining as is necessary; the general and more political aspects of 
admj ni stra-tTon' shoul d devolve on urban and peasant- 'as'soci'ati ons •a'S1 soon
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as possible - to augment such politica1 - resources as participation, 
communication and legitimacy, as_ wel1 as to relieve an inefficient 
bureaucracy; retain as much business activity as possible in private 
hands; and transfer such nationalised businesses as the bureaucracy 
cannot manage to groups in the regulated private sector, such as urban 
associations or-a new type of business coop’ which leaves room for gen­
uine worker participation, The expansion of this kind of private sec­
tor could only be made compatible with the Derg's overall aims if 
development-oriented activities which pose no political threat can be 
fostered, under Ethiopian Codes which have been thoughtfully modified..’
It is precisely the low levels of industrialisation and urbanisa­
tion in Ethiopia that make theradieal restructuring of Ethiopians 
centres possible: cultural definitions of how things ought to be or­
ganised are far less rigid at the centres than in-the peripheries; and 
those with a vested interest in an urban status quo have either been 
neutralised or liquidated. City and regional planning can be used with 
marked effect where existing patterns are still fluid, but-the Derg 
has failed, as yet, to take advantage of this fact, There is also a 
need for ruthless enterpreneurs who will not simply attempt to pull 
levers provided by the old regime. Members of this group, who are a 
small minority in any society, must be identified, loosely controlled 
and placed in positions of power in the bureaucarcy and the private 
sector. This inevitably requires sensitive combinations of economic 
incentives and coercion - as It does . in the rural areas. Further,
"entry into industrial civilization is as a general rule bound up with the
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access to power to the new industrial and urban masses," Urban 
coops may gradually help to secure such a transition, but it is clear 
that trade unions, as presently constituted, will not, The Derg seems 
to view the new unions as nothing more than a device for exercising 
control over an elite, An important segment of the centres' population 
will remain disgruntled and elitist, unwilling and unable to improve 
labour productivity and discipline (when the Derg's back is turned) or 
to promote social changes, The Labour Proclamation is particularly 
unsuitable and ought to be recast immediately, so as to guarantee worker 
participation in the management of a more decentralised system of public 
enterprises.
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A * Restructuring Business Activity • •
As things stand, larger-scale factories are located in a few cen­
tres, Despite the fact that plants are much smaller than an optimum 
size, they operate at below-capacity -■* textile factories produce at 
about half of their capacity for example - yet maintain monopoly posi­
tions in their markets,-— A varietr^rof factors -are responsible for this 
state of affairs: 1ow 1abour productivity, managerial incompetence,
shortages of raw materials, the adoption of inappropriate technologies 
and small market size. Land nationalisations have resulted in a redis­
tribution of incomes which, has created new markets, in turn, by twist­
ing demand towards lower-cost consumer necessaries and rudimentary in­
frastructures, it is possrLbl e-t-o apply a_ Labour-- jntpns j v p technology 
to the satisfaction of these demands, thus providing badly-needed 
productive employment opportunities and economising on scarce capital 
and managerial expertise, in areas such as irrigation, road building, 
building construction, briek making, the a-ssembly of goods hike bicycles
and radios, and an upgrading of handicrafts such as weaving, woodwork-
206
ing and making leather goods. These small-scale and labour-intensive 
activities can be established in the smaller towns and in the rural 
areas - under the aegis of urban and peasant associations, which can 
provide the impetus for the mob.il i.sat ion of local resources - so as to 
form the basis for new and localised networks of production and distri­
bution. Such a policy would help to circumvent another Ethiopian de­
velopmental bottleneck, the primitive transport and marketing arrange­
ments that are still largely in private hands but increasingly influ­
enced by the Derg's policies through the Agricultural Marketing Corpora­
tion (see Chapter Six) and the Road Transport Agency,
While these kinds of policies would serve to forge numerous and
strong links between and among centres and peripheries, the Derg has
• •
done little more than talk about them, although some of the means of
implementation are to be found in the nationalisat ion Proclama'tions and 
in the low capital ceilings set by the private business licensing Proc­
lamation. Basically, the Derg has elected to carry on with production 
functions established under Halle Selassie, Although the statistics 
are hopelessly muddled, it seems that the economic performance of the 
centres under the Derg is creditable: small increases in manufacturing
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output have been registered in spite'of radica] -industria 1 reorgani­
sations, trade union opposition., transport disruptions and wars in 
Eritrea and the Ogaden, Changes in the structure of Ethiopian industry 
are, however, inevitable if Ethiopian Socialism is indeed to go forward 
(T i kdem), The manufacture of import substitutes for the relatively well- 
off has come to a dead end, and the leading sectors of the Ethiopian 
economy - textiles, food processing, cattle breeding, cotton and coffee
- have a very limited number of backward and forward linkages in the
j u • 2°7production chain.
The most- fruitful 1ines of expans ion, through a decentralised light
manufacturing and construction, are open to a fundamental objection:
inevitably, they would be pursued at the expense of creating the capital
and intermediate goods industries (e.g., iron, steel and chemicals)
which some economists see as preconditions to the structural changes
necessary for economic development.
these industries are, unfortunately, cap!tal-}ntensive and possess
large economies of scale; the recent experiences of most Third World
states suggest that, in the absence of a large-scale customs union,
small market size acts as a barrier to efficiency in these industries.
Ethiopia’s Akaki Steel Mills and the Assab Refinery have certainly 
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borne this out, Assab has, in the recent past, utilised its excess 
capacity by refining oil for Saudi Arabia at bargain prices - a modern- 
day" examp'Fe“lof'"seriiTTngfcob IT^  to^NewcastTe;~' d* Therefore be
well-advised to continue to rely on an agricultural “revolution to gen­
erate the structural changes necessary for development, Expansions in 
manufactures could, in fact, be linked to agricultural improvements and 
with urban housing needs: through fertiliser plants and the fabrication
of steel wire, fencing, nails, piping and corrugated sheets, for example 
While capital demands tend to be fairly high in these areas, efficient 
plants can be built on a smaller scale and intermediate technologies 
are becoming jnereis fngly available. The centres would, of course, 
continue to facilitate the exchange of goods and services and the diffu­
sion of innovations, supply specialised skills and foster the large- 
scale accumulation of capital.
? r Remoulding Ethiopian Laws
-JThe* 1 ega 1 ebas.r.sufor- the-:-refo^ms ;werh$v^suggested .-.similar to
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reforms advocated in the Third World by the World Bank's Robert McNamara 
- revolves around an overarching concept of social ownership, It would 
serve to pin down precisely who is to manage Ethiopian enterprises and 
how - the central concerns of economic law in socialist countries - and 
how and by whom the fruits of private and public ownership are to be 
enjoyed - the material right's found in many modern constitutions.20^ 
Needless to say, the evolution of such a concept presupposes a clarifi- 
cation of the spheres of influence of what may still be termed Ethiopian 
private and public laws. This, in turn, entails basic political choices 
with regard to economic activities. The patchwork of laws presently 
applied in the centres, especially with regard to public enterprises, 
probably reflects a desire to postpone these kinds of decisions, with 
i nef f t c I e-ney— and i-nco her e nee a S" »t hg=Tfe 5TH' eTTTP^oV'eTa T 1" j? fan hi n g 
and bureaucratic coordination, those perennial Ethiopian shortcomings, 
would serve es -stop—gap measures, but the legal regime of the centres 
is unmanageable in the long run.
The kind of wide-ranging comparative approach that is explored in 
the first section of this Chapter ought to play a leading role in the 
reform of Ethiopian laws. Our analyses of David's transplantations 
illustrate many of the pitfalls to be avoided. Reforms should display 
an understanding of and, where possible, links with the past, New laws
must,, to. state the jabvl.aus, JaeJboth ^ concrete-and aermuisdy intended,
avoiding the excessively s_ymbolic or fantasy aspects of law which 
plagued Ethiopia in the past and which is poised to stage a return under 
the banner of Ethiopian Tikdemr More people should be absorbed into the 
centres’ legal system. More all-embracing ~ but not necessarjly tradi­
tional - legal values should be devised and made a part of the simultan-1 
eous evolution of a national culture and legal system (see Chapter Two). 
While the most relevant focal point for this reform Is a careful adapta­
tion of the exper fences -of Eastern Europe-, firm guarantees of material 
rights iri a 'constitutional* law should also be offered by Government: 
as a qu 'd pro quo for the kinds of economic and social innovations that 
the Derg would like to see adopted, and to spur the emergence of the kind
of political system foretold by the establishment of urban and peasant
/
associations.
Such a system assumes a meaningful transition from a manipulation
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of legislation by the tiny elites benefit ting from it to the utilisation 
of law by the many, that politics will not be frozen at the stage where 
the legal system is operated solely by the Derg, as the self-appointed 
representatives of the people, At the very least, this transition 
requires some form of bureaucratic accountability (see Chapter Five) 
and constitutional types of guarantees which, in turn, entail the evolu­
tion of new and specifically Ethiopian juristic techniques. This is a 
factor sorely neglected by the Derg, with its emphasis on isolated 
'mi 1itary-type commands and laws drafted like ideological slogans, As 
a plethora of uncoord-fnated peasant and urban association tribunals and 
military tribunals, composed of adjudicators with no legal training,
• come- to hear more and more cases,* the- uni form i ty--and pred ietahM Ti!t"f 
assoc Iated. with a modern legal system (properly defined - see Chapter 
Two) continue to be unrealised in Ethiopia,
 Bas.ic.,.pol i tica.l. choices must, be jna.de,. ..and. .soon.regard i.ng -the- strojcru,
tures and functions of economic markets in Ethiopia, These choices will 
also have political repercussions, as business nationalisations and an 
ongoing socialisation of* ~the economy (through urban and peasant associa­
tions) call forth an increased need for a political legitimation of 
business activities, |t is certain that a purely private law will not 
be used to help give effect to market forces, owing to market imperfec­
tions, the Derg’s predilections, and both the inevitability of and the 
need for broad state intervention in Third World development processes
• (see,■.Chapter Two) . The i r choi ces.cw.tl 1 .thus %invol ve .some ,m i.xtttre *of w  . 
market-correcting policies - including new forms of business organisa­
tions, banking, taxation and an indicative planning - which integrate 
aspects of private-and public laws,and market-replacing actions purely
within the realm of public law - ultimately a rigid centralised plan- 
21 0ning, The dilemma faced by the Derg is that many of the macro-level
benefits gained by replacing markets will never materialtse in the 
hands of an incompetent bureaucracy, while the micro-scale efficiencies 
realised from regulated markets are purchased at the expense of retard­
ing radical changes in social stratifications and modes of production 
(see Chapter Two).
As In all other states, the Derg will attempt its version of 
securing the best, of both these worlds and., . In .some .a r.eas at J east;,..... ... .
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attain the best of neither. Conflicts are already arising between laws 
fostering a decentralised self-reliance and those which point toward a 
thorough-planned economy and polity; the least we can say is that, for 
the next decade or so, political and economic markets in the peripheries 
can only be corrected rather than replaced by central Government, owing 
to a lack of penetration (see Chapter Two), Despite these immense diffi­
culties, a remarkable thing has happened: the Derg has been able vir­
tual 1 y„. to .ignore demands for compensat-ion by those whose inter-est-in the- 
scarcity of economic resources is being sacrificed to the general inter­
est of an abundance. Once private property rights are no longer recog- 
... n is ed.I.n-.^ . things not produced by.man, land.,, natural resources and-unearned 
incomes generally, it becomes possible for each individual to obtain a 
share of his society’s output which roughly equals his input - a simul­
taneous solution to the problems of production and distribution. -While 
numerous practical difficulties loom large in any subsequent policy 
calculus, the point is that each person - in the peripheries and the
. centres - can be encouraged to use his or her own resources to .the-
211
fullest extent'possible, a major goal of development.
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CHAPTER 8; Conclusion
At the end of her excellent book Freedom and Necessity, Joan
Robinson argues that
[a]nyone who writes a book, however gloomy its message may 
be, is necessarily an optimist. If the pessimists really 
believed what they were saying there would be no point in 
saying it,^
Barrington Moore, Jr, elaborates on this theme:
A sombre view is not , , , a passive and fatalist one,
One task of human thought is to try to perceive what, the 
range of possibilities may be in a future that always 
carries on its back the burden of the present and the 
past,2
We have kept—these.-dicta . i..n -mind whi le prepari-ng thi.s-^st-udy,--Jfhe -b-r-i.gh.t 
prospect that was apparent during the early stages of the Ethiopian 
Revolution has given way to a deepening gloom, a gloom relieved only 
by the success of rural land reforms in the South and by a few partial 
victories in the areas of domestic resource mobilisation and commercial, 
industrial and administrative reorganisation. Whi le-much has undoubt­
edly changed as a result of the Revolution, much also remains the same:* 
while the military regime is in_large measure a prisoner of~Ethiopia's- 
rich history and its own traditional foundations, it also has some room 
for manoeuvre as an agent for conscious change, The Derg has chosen, 
not always consistently, a most difficult path towards development - 
the wholesale transformation of social structures thtoagh a"'nati-ettaT'- 
istic socialiam - which nevertheless offers the best chances for a
long-term development in Ethiopia’s present circumstance, ..- - -
Our study pursues a (necessarily incomplete) understanding of the 
theoretical and factual bases for decisions which the Derg must make: 
all governments inevitably take a leading role in the allocation of 
scarce resources, if for no other reason than a refusal to intervene 
amounts to a decision in favour of the status quo where the power exists 
to change it. While knowledge about Ethiopia and the impact of her 
■laws is remarkably meagre, incomplete and unsystematic, the urgent 
need for development does* not permit a leisurely a-ccumulation of addi- • 
tional data, The overwhelming impression conveyed by the all-but- 
intractable subject matter is one of unevenness: in the highly strati­
fied and ethnically fragmented soci et ies* which'are - the legacy of cen­
turies of underdevelopment under imperial rule; in the policies devised
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sineeithe Revolution; and in the fragmented theories of law, of' de- ' " 
velopment and of the interrelation of' law and development. Reviews 
of previous theorising concerning these topics, offered at various 
junctures in this study, indicate which lines of policy are unpromis­
ing and point the way towards a synthesis of this “rather varied i n- 
tel 1 ectual.-p-recipItate“ - a-synthesis which- is all the more necessary * ■
in “an age of unavoidable specialization and scarcely less avoidable 
3
rancor. . . This cult of a specialised professionalism notwith­
standing, a genuinely interdisciplinary approach is demanded by the 
complex problems of Ethiopian-underdevelopment, an~approach in which
the various breeds of social scientist “have nothing to"lose But their
it
-deductiye-chains.h The f ru i t-s- af this synthesizing are- presen ted: 4 n  - • 
Chapter Two as a series of middle-range hypotheses. While analyses 
in subsequent chapters do not establish these hypotheses as a univer­
sally valid General Theory, they prove to be the most sensible and 
comprehensive set of policy prescriptions devised to date in response 
to the development constraints and potentials found in post-Revolutionary 
Ethiopia. The lengthy analyses that are grounded in these hypotheses 
lack the theoretical elegance associated with classical positivism 
or Marxism for, as Rene Dumont found while thinking through his 
Sod a 1i sms and Development, “the reality 1 try to grasp is too complex
to be schematized overmuch, without distorting it out o f ‘all recogni-
g , .
tion".
I, Summary of Analyses 1 ' "'" *'   ~
Development involves the progressive-derivation of an “ought---.... —
(chosen-from among many other “oughts11 in ways which reflect cultural 
and political preferences) from the “ is“ ,’the existing constraints im­
posed by underdevelopment in a particular country (see infra) . In 
Ethiopia, these include the multiple layers of public and private laws 
co-existing both under'Ha*i le 'Selassie and the Derg, as well as most of 
the development constraints that have been identified in other Third 
World States. The kinds of value judgments a theorist makes with re­
gard to the various “oughts" erf development mus"t~be evaluated critically, 
for they predetermine to a large extent the means and ends which are 
recommended.. Our adoption of. the: values. embod i'ed -1 nGun'naT Myrd.al'ts 
As ran Drama 1 s defended in Chaffer .Two ;■%.The r fg rd- seg regat i dnn'of'1 the
bS2
.,!is" and "ought11 attempted »by pas 11 i v I sts (e.g.-, in Hans Kelsen's- " 
analyses - see Chapter Five) only serves seriously to misrepresent’-* 
the nature of development processes, Development can only be under­
stood dynamically, as the broadening of subsistence and small-scale • 
economic, political*, legal' and so*cial 'markets' that effects a cumu­
lative growth in a wide variety..of resources. -Inevitably,-gwen — ... .
Ethiopia's stratified and fragmented socieitiesi such a process in­
volves a social, economic and political equal i sat ton and i n~te*g ra t ion '
- a decreasing of many different kinds of 'distances1, chiefly by""" ' '
linking centres and peripheries. These development criteria contrast
- sha rp ! y* wi th the ones advocated'-by "many Western “social scientists'" —
whose..,.t.heor i es appear, excess i velysJmpl i st ic .when appl ied . to -the -.com- - >. - 
plex and harsh realities of Ethiopian underdevelopment. New processes 
of stratification and differentiation would undoubtedly emerge in the 
course of development,- but they should serve to reward those economic­
ally productive people whose interests were not embodied in law under 
Haile Selassie - enabling them to start asserting control over life's
circumstances - while penalising traditional elites, whose political
6
and military productivity was not conducive to development.
The magnitude of this structural transformation, the manifest 
need for an extensive and Intensive development planning and, above - 
all, the Derg's nationalisation of the means of production and cffstrw 
but ion5 make i t imposs i bl e to segregate' economf c™aetfvfty ■MVariri'mrtrfi” ' "
differentiated mass of law, politics and administration. State inter­
vention in the economy has become.a worIdwide Inevj tabi-1 i ty^-and~.thIs— ..
intervention will be particularly massive' in Ethiopia, given the mag­
nitude of her underdevelopment and the socialist predilections of her 
present rulers. Development is thus significantly constrained.by an 
Ethiopian "soft state", in which’ the expectation of obedience to co­
herent laws is little more than a pious hope:
the inability'of governments to perform adequately the neces­
sary functions in economic institutions represents the larg­
est single proximate bottleneck to achieving rapid economic
growth.7
Government's capacity to perform the economic roles of planner, regula­
tor, entrepreneur, change inifciator,•provider and umpire must be expand­
ed radically along lines suggested by Jurgen Habermas, socas rt.o ci norea'se-
493
the volume of goods and services, (especially those essential to basic 
maintenance -food, clothing and shelter), economic incentives, “action 
motivating meanings" (presumably, political mobilisation through par­
ticipation, the dissemination of a persuasive ideology, etc.), and
g
rational administrative decisions.
Political development is thus closely~5ound up with economic 
development, particularly as political interests (many of which concern 
a short-term poli t i ca1 survi val - see i nfra and Part II) will be pre­
ferred over attempts to promote development where the two come into 
conflict. - It -is -un f-o r-t-una t e -tha t, under-* both He i le Selassie and the 
Derg, little if aciy pel i t+cal-^devel*opment has been registered and pol Hr 
ical survival through the appdMtratloTrtrf^c0FFcron""bas (perhaps inevit­
ably) been pursued at the expense of the more efficient and effective 
use of other-pol i tica-f resources . ‘ Under ~cri1*efta suggested by Roberta 
linger,. .consensus-,, sta.b-i 11 ty and., order iiave—not emerged within conf I i ct~ 
prone societies-; power has not been legitimated and institutionalised;--- 
and most policies have neither been coordinated rationalIy nor justi­
fied persuasively to the intended beneficiaries. Political communities
in Ethiopia still lack faith in the capacity of nascent institutions
g
and procedures to reduce xonf 1 i*ct or to confer other benef its, ~and 
public suspicions have been abundantly justified by the outcomes of 
political controversies since the Revolution, The most that can be 
said is .-that the- Derg -has xepudiated many symbolic, purely formalistic, 
We s ter rr—s-t-y le i ns tfrate-frrns^ aTi'd ra-s be gti n^to lay the-groundwork for 
political development by establishing peasant- and—oity dweller's asso­
ciations and through rudimentary* reforms within a traditrf~on*roriented 
bureaucracy. ' ---
Many of Ha i 1 d Selassie *‘s~ pol rttcaI •practices have been-perpetuated 
under .the Derg-: a paternal i s-tIe-t-ut-e.lage by.-el i tes-of what -are- seen
as the ignorant masses; divide et imperla, shum-shur and other manipu­
lations which' reflect a distrust of Western-style polltteal processes 
and an attachment to traditional proprietary notions of the state; a 
spontaneous opportunism In the use of laws - isolated orders backed 
by threats formulated in a rough-and-ready fashion - rather than the 
even-handed enfoce-emen-L-af--a • j^-Cfo-e-based, on abstract principles; a 
ready resort to coercion a-nd,, *more recentiy, to a crude, terror where
k s k
manipulation fails; and the predominance of secrecy, intrigue, politics 
conducted - through patron-cllent relations and, to a lesser extent,' 
corruption. This state of affairs is not particularly surprising since 
the political style of a regime is fundamentally coloured-by the 
country1s-social structures, and Ethiopia's have not yet changed 
..f U.ndament§Xsl y.. .While political style rema i ns-4-arged y- unchanged-,'- -the - 
substance of many of the Derg's policies represents a radical departure 
-from policies (and the lack thereof) under Haile Selassie, '"hr "Cbh’t ra“S‘t" 
to the phased implementation of more made“St reforms which occurred in,
for example, Kemal's Turkey,.'*0 the Derg has forced the pace of the.....
Revolution- through-al l of the means'*which came"‘to hand ." - ••- .
Whi 1 e„,the. Revolution has clearly outpaced the ability of the "D,er-g-.r 
and the bureaucracy to consolidate the gains realised, events reflect 
the exercise of what is, for Ethiopia, an unprecedented choice: tb
build a modern nation-state through a militant, autarchic (apart from 
an acute dependence on foreign weaponry) and all but autochthonous 
socialism. Any analysis must take account of this fundamental fact, 
and much of the journalistic handwringing about the incompetence and 
intransigence of a Derg seen as the handmaiden of the Soviets is thus 
somewhat misleading. The Derg came to power without mass support 
(except, initially, in Addis Ababa) in a hostile domestic and inter­
national -envi ronment. Since then, it has managed" to conserve* i'ts owrt —
-power' and -to- begT n^  to- imp! emenir radi cai1 c'harifcpass* iff "the"*fb’cenof *vffarl*efft 
conflicts and other events which would have caused the collapse of 
governments:, i n most other countries.. The. question -remainsof course.* —  
whether'the-remed i es applied by "the- Derg are worse tha~n the suffer m g  
under such symptoms of underdevelopment as hunger and political insta­
bility (see infra). In any event and as we demonstrate infra and in 
Chapters Five through Seven, the-Derg missed many opportunities simul-- —  
taneously to promote long-term development and its" own narrow, "short-" 
term political interests.
The Derg's approach to development (through the more comprehensive 
s-t r a teg y=’of radical social change)* is' an-uti-faifii 1 iar dnd tb'most'-We’sfer n “
theorists: a new type of political ferment and ideology are having the
effect of loosening men's minds, making them more receptive to change; 
al terat i ons - ,i n power relations are relaxing1 the change-infti b i ting "r ' ?■; •*
Factors in societies otherwise predisposed’ towards change;' and an"
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emphasis on collective economic activity festers' mobi 1 -i sat ion , soc i a 1 • 
control and, ultimately, the regime's power and legitimacy, as well as 
social change.^ While this approach to change, in which law plays a 
major role, is both interesting and fruitful, it is unfortunate that 
the humanistic kinds of socialist policies advocated by E.F. Schumacher, 
Guanar Myrda.1 , Ju 1-i-us— Nye.eere and .Rene,Dumo.nt~obtai n. scant-recogn it ion— . 
In Ethiopia and many other countries. As these theorists note, develop­
ment begins wi th-people; -improvements in the 4-eve 1s o*f thei r heal'thy —  
nutrition, education, dignity, self-reliance, organisat ion and disci­
pline are vital preconditions to the efficient and effective utilisa-
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t i on of po 1 i t i ca 1' 'and 'exrorromrc -resources.*’ * “ There "are^-for e*xamp I e 
too few benefits and too .many costs associated. wj.th a.rb_Ltra.ry in.ter.r._. .. 
ventions in the daily lives of Ethiopians by an incompetent bureaucracy 
which is not rea1ly accountable to anyone under incoherent and under­
developed systems of law and politics. Most theorists of law and of 
the other social sciences, whether of the positivist, the Marxian or 
some other persuasion, do not address themselves adequately to these 
kinds of issues which require that many delicate and programmatic 
balances be struck among competing considerations while the basic form 
and content of legal and political systems remain in dispute. Our study 
represents a step towards repairing this defect. Sv
I *• Human Misery and Social J u s t i c e  __________ ________
If Ethiopian law and politics do not consistently amount to the
"capricious orders of a crazy despot", neither do they operate in “the
perceived interest of the majority (at the centre, they represent what
revolutionary sokdiers think workers and peasant ought to want and have)
nor can they be used to justify persuasively the gross truncations of
the right to life which have occurred. The difficulties inherent in
an outright condemnation of the Derg's performance since the Revolution
are similar to "those~drscoverexf' by, of all people, Mark Twain:
There were two ‘Reigns of Terror* if we could but remember it 
and consider it; the one wrought murder in hot passion, the 
other in heartless cold blood, . . . with lifelong death from 
hunger, cold insult, cruelty and heartbreak. . . .  A city 
cemetery could contain the coffins filled by that brief Terror 
which we have all been so diligently taught to shiver at and 
mourn over; but all France could'hardly contain the coffins 
filled by that older and real Terror, ..  ^3 ..........
Relief from that older Terror constitutes an obvious part of those
kSG
attempts at achieving political, social and economic justice which we
1 A
have defined as forming the core of development processes. In light 
of rigid social stratifications and acute ethnic fragmentations, how­
ever, it is more accurate to say that Ethiopians (and many other peoples)
share a sense of injustice rather than of those overarching conceptions
15of happiness, the good or the just which form the basis of convention­
al theories of'natural law. ■
People are scandalised and their passions aroused when avoidable 
injustices - species of human misery - are added to by government or 
when government does nothing to ameliorate them. In his thoughtful 
Reflections on the Gausesof Human Misery . , Barrington Moore, Jr. 
generalises these miseries, which are '‘hardly ever rea11y enjoyed" for 
their own sakey-^fnto fo'or^at^o-pi?©siaoiff''*r!©tig:lTlYv‘eqtia-l- *- imports nce-r- *- ' —  • 
poverty, hunger and disease; oppressive socio-economic relations;
governmental persecution for dissident beliefs; and war, both in its
16
conventional .and.guerr ilia - f o r m s , . The.most.defensi ble definition .of.-. . 
Ethiopian justice is thus one of the progressive elimination of these 
miseries, all of which are avoidable through the development-oriented 
policies of an activist state (see Chapter Two). While the Derg has 
recorded significant successes with regard to the amelioration of the
first two categories, persecution has increased markedly, as has a
\
broadly-defined war - for reasons only partly beyond the Derg's control.
For those Ethiopians who have felt the reach of the Derg's power, life
continues to be nasty, brutish and (cut) short,^ but some of the
causes under lyings the i n^Jrsepy^ha^evchanged .marked 1 y . v c
Once again, our conception of justice lacks the formal elegance
of many of the theories which have been propounded since Aristotle. We
would, however, apply Kenneth Boulding's critique of Rawls broadly to
these theories: “the discourse of philosophers is like the stars; it
18
sheds little light because it is so high." The meaning of justice 
changes over time and the ways in which it is sought changes its mean­
ing. Marxism and contemporary Western theories of justice discuss 
distributional issues in the context of an economy presently capable, 
with fairly minor adjustments, of producing an abundance - an assumption 
which cannot be applied in Ethiopia for the foreseeable future. There 
and elsewhere in the Third.World, mere survival must be accorded a high 
pr ior i ty through, the Vpo.l.i t ics,. of,,.regulated , conf 1 let ,.and: thev soc lo-
economics of maximising individual [and group-] 1 I f e-chances"; ^  cri­
teria of justice must be "capable of coping with men intoxicated with
the prospect of almost unlimited power and also with the apathy of the 
20
powerless." Initially, the Ethiopian Revolution markedly reduced 
apathy (but not powerlessness) in the urban areas and in those rural
21
areas in the South where the Derg's policies came to be implemented.
While "no social organisation will ever fail to leave much to be desired
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from the standpoint of absolute justice",—  the-Derg 1 S’ subsequent'brutal' 
repression of its critics served to dissipate its initial fund of good­
will, provoked the violent opposition of some and the return of apathy
. among., at hens, and ..co.nt-i.nues- to-fores ta-H■* 'the- growtfr of ■* the • reglmer1 S---
leg i t imacy.
While the Derg's nationalisations of lands and businesses aim at 
a distributive justice based primarily-on the value of"labour expended 
and involving an extensive use of public law, much of the balance of its 
policies reflects a penal model of law and politics, a corrective jus­
tice which does not entail the use of private law, the ordinary courts 
or (contra Aristotle) the restoration of the status quo ante. Penal
laws and policies are the formal means by which control and order are
maintained in most centralised socieities, especially during periods 
of rapid change, when families, religious institutions, schools and 
commun i t ies_are unable to exerc-i-se- thei r stabM-i-sing influence effec- - 
_ y .* th. i-op la,,* re voTu b I bnary> c ha ng es-1**etrdeT^ impos sT brlWJ*t§ I'SW***"*'
and subtle constitutional process designed to frustrate the punitive 
alms of politicians; initially-enacted laws fluctuate wildly and ignore 
-Western canons of legality in -a—‘-'might-makes rightJI ~situation. 'Even if' 
economic development were to be achieved in Ethiopia in the future, it
would fail to satisfy the demands of all sectors of society, for the
political and economic resources described in Chapter Two are (by defin­
ition) scarce in relation to the potentially unlimited desires for them, 
Realising this, the Derg has attempted, somewhat erratically, to state 
authoritatively a radical redistribution of access to power and wealth, 
and to force the acceptance of it upon dissident individuals and groups.
As this redistribution is, at base, conducive to development, and 
as any conceivable distribution of political and economic resources 
would be violently opposed by some segment of strat i f i ed,; fragmented' -■ 
and conflict-prone Ethiopian st>'£ietyy': governmental f coercion 'i£ justified
within narrow limits, The point was,- however,-soon- reached- dur ■] ng tire-, 
course of the Revolution ■■ perhaps as-early as the end of 197*1 - when 
coercion was no longer utilised primarily to sweep aside the ancien
2h
regime and the effects of its policies. Many "little people" came 
to suffer from being arbitrarily labelled deviants, and penal policies 
fa.i 1 ed to..secure one of the.Ir primary.goals.-.ensuring a ..secure. _U fe J.n .. 
society (see Chapter Five). Clearly, the Derg is exercising poor polit­
ical judgement: the state of the Ethiopian "class struggle"-does not*.-
.warrant massive doses of the terror that has led only to temporary 
victories and to antagonisms fueled by injustice; the need is, rather,
•for integrative poTitical strategies'. -■ • ..............
The sorry state of human rights in..Ethjopia, while unjustifiable,, 
is at least understandable. There is a long tradition of violating 
such basic rights as the right to life- in Ethiopia, and the Derg saw a 
self-proclaimed state of emergency deteriorate further as a result of 
guerrilla rebellions, armed urban opposition and international confla­
gration - the effects of which were exacerbated by its own policies. - 
it is difficult to apply conventional legal criteria under such circum­
stances; even so libertarian an agency as the U.S. Supreme Court has 
condoned massive human rights violations directed against "subversion" 
during wartime, and the-Derg has, in any event, rejected the formal is­
tic libertarian ethos embodied in Haile Selass ie1 s-*l 955 Constitution. 
'The3 wo rd"*WsH  g h-t<sWri i rs'”:a p p rop-r i at fed --by -dlftesr'' rn^ea eh^cou nt r y 
principles they believe in, and the primary use of (Western-style) 
individual pol i tical . rights in, the Third V/orld ..(including. India., the...
"showcase'of democracy") is as "a-slogan and--rallying cry to help -
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assimilate the upwardly mobile . . , into the small political elite," 
Such a policy does little to advance the cause of development, but 
Ethiopians have fared little better since the Derg espoused socialist- 
inspired material "rights: individual and group claims to positive com­
munity actions (rather than to freedom from public interference) which 
correlate with State duties that have yet to materialise in Ethiopia. 
Western 'idediog fes hotwithstariding,'rights are hot ' i nhererif but’ are 
granted to people by their governments for predetermined purposes.
Few such lasting concessions have been wrung from Haile Selassie or 
the Derg; ddttle attention has been* paid »tjo-a <• hitherto diffuse public 
opinion in Ethiopia, a 1 though rebel 1ioh of 'the threat of T t has resulted
kS9
in temporary moderations in some governmental policies,*^ -
Widely adopted legal criteria of justice - the-Rule of Law in its 
various formulations in the West and socialist 1 egaJ.i tyj.n-communi st 
party-states - offer little guidance for an evaluation of the Ethiopian 
Revolution. Reca11ing that the most relevant definition of justice for 
underdevel oped ^ &thi opja^fnvo.1 ves the~ prog-ressfve^i inr m a  t‘ion* of foui— ~ 
equal 1 y-debi 1 i tat i ng types of misery, the Rule-of Law-,— as applied, 
prefers freedom from governmental persecution to the amelioration of 
poverty, hunger, disease and oppressive socio-economic relations; and 
socialist legality reverses these preferences.--The - bureaucratic canons.- 
of so-called weTfafe States have, to date, offered the'woFstfof loth 
•these wo rid s .■ Nelteher. - the....Rule..of law; 'nor *, soevle^ l i 1 ega 1 Ifeyr-s t res ses^ -* -• 
the reduction of apathy, of subtler forms of tyranny or of the fissipa- 
rous tendencies which supply the temptation to wage guerri 11 a ~ w r .
Both criteria fail to deal with what is becoming readily apparent in 
the areas of, for example, race relations and welfare entitlements in 
the West: the private goals associated with "liberty" and the collec­
tivist goals of "equality" are' mutual.ly exclusive at many points.-and
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ultimately irreconcilable. One way out of this dilemma Is to argue 
that, since Ethiopian governments have hitherto made no attempt to re­
duce the level of any kind of misery, Ethiopians have nothing to lose. 
Progress by the Derg towards*elimInatFng any one category of misery is
thus to he applauded. The difficulty with this argument' is’that any....
such progress has its ‘opportunity costs1, bolh inrterms,of a tradeoff.
of -1 i berty foT^equafity^and1 a ^ senseless" persecuti-on^--' whfchHmlfs—
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secure additional equalities.
We will therefore proceed to assemble more appropriate legal cri­
teria of justice in a pragmatic fashion, recognising - as other criteria 
do not - that politicians will act to alleviate misery only to the 
extent that it is in their interest to do so. The enlightened self- 
interest of politicians and bureaucrats is not, of course, the loftiest 
of promptings towards justice (development), but- it is the only realis­
tic one where development inescapably requires the activist intervention 
of a state run by persons whose altruism is severely limited. Politi­
cal and administrative interests are often narrow, personal and occupy 
short time horizons, reflecting 1 imi ted * capac i t ies as welil as'an . under--■ 
standable desire for the survival Iri office that, in Ethiopia, can
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amount to physical survival as well. The maintenance of order through 
commands backed by threats, the prime concern of most species of posi­
tivism, thus, becomes. ..of. _such overweaning, importance ..that, a-.g.enui ne. effort
is required to stand back from day-to-day preoccupations in order to
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pursue the longer-term policies associated with justice.
The Derg may be in the grip of some collective paranoia, but this 
group of soldiers has become a fixture in Ethiopian politics without a 
tenable, less repressive replacement, and it has many very real enemies 
too. Until its short-term survival is assured - inevitably through a 
strong state, given its political predilections and the nature of 
Ethiopian societies - no one will be able to devote anything like the . 
efforts which the development process so obviously requires. Paradox­
ically, a strong state is the 7 irst step (but no more than that) towards 
the achievement of socio-economic just ice through apoliteal develop­
ment. If and when the Derg's short-term goals are fulfilled, prudence 
and moderation would progressively replace overreaction, as politicians 
become more and more preoccupied with the long-term survival of their 
regime and their place in history. While a revolutionary regime in­
evitably uses the violent politics of a repressive state to establish 
itself, such a regime carries the seeds of its own destruction and is 
capable of enduring for a generation at most, unless it d e y e l o p e s  it­
self politically. Rousseau puts it thus:
df 7 0:rxe..;jcreate.s right., the jeffeet"changes-:wi:th rthie-tcause.. crrccr. u:.cr~
Every force that is greater than the first succeeds to its
right. As soon as it is possible to disobey with impunity,
disobedience is legitimate; and the strongest being always
in the right, the only thing that matters is t o  become the
most strong, . . . The strongest is never strong enough unless
he. succeeds in turning might into right and obedience into
duty.30
An analogous justification for moderation is offered by Shakespeare:
Force should be right; or rather right and wrong,
Between whose end 1 ess jars justice resides,
Should lose their names and so should justice too.
Then everything includes itself in power,
Power into will, will into appetite;
And appetite, an universal wolf,
So doubly seconded with will and power,
Must make perforce an universal prey,
And last eat up himself.31
Assertions such as these do not acquire their force through eloquence 
alone: apathy and the threat of -rebel 1 ton constantly reinforce them,' -
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among politicians who have something to 1ose, Each new programme es­
tablished by the.Derg carries with it an increased commitment to the 
perpetuation of institutions which are growing too strong and complex 
to be ruled directly. While bureaucracies and armies can enforce 
temporary decisions, long term socio-political arrangements require 
the cooperation of large numbers of producers, most of whom are small 
and isolated in Ethiopia. Public predispositions towards apathy and 
rebellion thus play a significant role In the struggle for social jus­
tice. As the Black American abolitionist Frederick Douglass argued in
1857,
power concedes riothi*ng without a demand. , . , Find out just 
what"people will submit to and you have'found the exact amount 
of injustice and wrong which will be imposed on them. , . ,
, v . The JLtmi t,s of' tyrants are prescr.i bedrby. .the endurance of ,:those :. 
whom they oppress. . . ,32
Isolated acts of governmental injustice may not provoke rebellion, but 
individuals and groups rational1y balance the (sometimes irrationally 
perceived) costs and benefits of governmental arrangements as a whole. 
They first ignore and then move towards dissolving these arrangements 
in the face of prolonged injustice, in self-defense aga'inst arbitrari­
ness and to compel politicians to listen to grievances. The balance 
Is struck on the basis of judgements about the purposes of suffering, 
the competence of those imposing or perpetuating it (the degree of 
certainty of future benefits arising from present miseries), and the 
time scale and aftereffects of suffering (the '"discount rate1 applied 
to future, benef it.s) . The Revolution -has made many Ethiopians more 
consc i ous- of * governmental - a r ra ngement-S‘iand possibLe *a 1 terriaLi vesy -™and * 
many of them have found the Derg's policies seriously wanting,
Whether or not morality can exist independent of society, it Is 
clear that politics cannot. Laws, concrete rights and notions of jus­
tice - the stuff of public morality - are thus dependent upon the 
choices, potentials and constraints found in a given society, grounded 
as they are In particular political controversies rather than the ab­
stract universal (s) devised by some natural lawfyer, None of the numer 
ous, fuzzy and mystical definitions of justice found in theories of 
natural law have had a significant impact on contemporary politics, 
for they require men to love others as they love themselves, without 
regard to possible rewards. Theories of justice which attempt to
reconcile positivism with the natural law tradition - H rL,A, Hart's
and Lon Fuller's, for example - suffer from a familiar affliction as
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they rely on the empathy and benevolence of politicians,
There is, nevertheless, a manifest need to counteract the posltiv- 
ists1 (express, implied or constructive) assertion that law can have 
any given content, We have examined the sterility of this self-defeating 
approach at several junctures, particularly in an examination of Kelsen’s 
“pure" theory in Chapter Five, .The unmaski.ng of the ideological nature 
of these kinds of theories by Marx and others has, paradoxically, re­
vitalised demands for just laws and given rise to passionate debates 
over values and nominative preferences^ . The aggregation, allocation 
and delegation of political and economic resources (see Chapter Two) 
can no longer be freely relegated to some met'a 1 egal "'sphere; "imcreafg’^ "^" 
Ingly, the goals pursued by means of a legal e.fficiency and efficacy „ 
(e.g f , within Weber's construct of a legal-rational legitimacy - see 
Chapter Five) are being evaluated and questioned, Under these new 
theories, it is no longer enough for law merely to implement a few in­
terests (e fg ., through a social engineering which does not entail com­
prehensive planning - see Chapter Two); laws and legal analyses must 
also contribute towards an understanding, broadening and deepening of
these interests which, in Ethiopia, Involves a creative regulation of
35a wide variety of serious social conflicts,
•c I n: Chapter. Five., we 'found the cornerstone :of, J,nqui rd;es-.rj nto;.. 
and politics to be the tension between efficacy, the locus of power to 
issue and enforce commands, and validity, the authority (leg\timated ^  
power) to do so. This tension constitutes a major 11 is"/"ought" di.cho- . 
tomy, variously described as existing between certurn (authority) and 
verum (reason) by Vico, between arbitrary commands and rational 
authority by Jerome Hall, and between efficacy and morality by Lord 
Lloyd, H.L,A, Hart, Lon Fuller .and. stricter positivists such as Hans 
Kelsen have so multiplied the terminological confusion and so muddled 
their analyses of this tension as to render Western jurisprudence in­
capable of. explaining anything other than incremental socio-legal 
change in the West, It has therefore become necessary to build bridges 
over the chasm between "is" and "ought" which they (and other social 
sc Ientists) have created, utilising developmental concepts and a more
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pragmatic theory of law, one which takes account of aggressiveness,
greed and irrationality, as well as love, cooperation and righteous-
36
ness.
Species of "is" and "ought" obviously cannot be aligned in an
absolute sense through any exercise in strict logic. They can, however,
be brought gradually into harmony through an almost dialectical process:
the daily exercise of power In ways which are designed to legitimate
that power. Power and legitimacy sometimes converge (creating authority)
and often diverge, but they exercise a constant influence over each
other. For example, power encompasses an efficacious arbitrariness,
which is almost-excl usively devoted to the pursuit of the short-term
goal of order s implici ter. Vested political interests dictate the joint
pursuit of :a:r1'g'OQd;i,-:;:Qrder;,' however, promptedJay fearsrfor the reg.Ime ' S
37future and the consequent need to win support for good government, 
it is at this point that the developmental dimension offers an impoi—  
tant link between the "is" and "ought" of order arid legitimacy; the ■ ■ 
orderly application of (more or less sensible) policies in the short 
run is a precondition to long term economic and political development 
because it helps to avoid the rapid policy swings and alternation of 
elites in power which perpetuate the "soft state" that is far from soft 
on the poor and powerless. Realistic development planning also bridges 
the "is" and "ought", as well as differing political timescales; this 
pursuit of_„a particular "ought" of development takes into account the 
"is" of existing markets, political preferences, etc. and the "can" of 
resources avarlabie- to be mobilisedPlanning^,'or-any other political 
act which involves more than the temporary enforcement of isolated com­
mands, requires at least a minimal clarity and orderliness in public
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organisations (see Chapter Five). A commitment to bureaucratic 
legality in Ethiopia would help to secure this aim and to confer a 
significant legitimacy on the regime as well, but these benefits must 
seem remote and indirect.to the beleaguered D-erg. Bureaucratic legality 
could nevertheless be ‘sold1 to the Derg on the basis of the vital short­
term benefit of helping to bring the bureaucracy under control in order 
that it might serve as an effective tool for the Derg's policies.
Theories of law and development must become more pragmatic than 
those which have hitherto dominated jurisprudence, comparativ-e law and 
soc i o log y of; -1 aw.. The f i c a cy of -law s ho u Id ■ be s <t reced' fn relation Co. - •*.;
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a main purpose: in our view, achieving justice programmatically, in
accordance with definitions relative to time, place and such other 
givens as cultural and political preferences. Recognising that several, 
equally valid alternatives will always be available, it is nevertheless 
possible to identify ’bad1 laws where they are based on public policies 
adjudged 'bad1 under criteria which are periodically redefined. In' 
order to make these kinds of judgements, a middle ground between the 
rival rigidities of the positivist segregation of "is" and "ought" and 
the natural law fusion of the two has to be found. We must, in other 
words, move away from abstractions, a priori reasons (such as are found 
in a "natural law with a changing content"), closed systems and pretend­
ed absolutes, and towards concreteness, a consideration of cost and 
1 con-ven i enee», fact-—and act ion-or rented -bebav roirp"a,n'di, ^ m o s 1 * 
a coming to terms with the realities of power. The endproduct is a 
process of interpretation which would play a decisive role in adapting 
positive laws to changing conditions, much as the ?us naturaTe, oper­
ated in conjunction with the ius gentium, functioned in the Roman 
Empire. Having discarded an assumed perfectibi1ity and the ultimate 
perfection of human nature, the most that can be expected is that worth­
while policies will be embodied in laws and actually followed in a large 
majority of situations, and that the many doubtful issues.which remain 
will be resolved in good faith. Rules governing criminal trials can-, 
r o t f o r  example, give rise to a perfect—procedure 1 just ice ^ -Tbe fa.I rr.-?-
ness of the rules can only be "determined entirely by the!r conducibi1 -
39 ..........
’ ty in general to just results.' . f ."
Imperfectly, then, we can derive complex legal criteria of justice 
along lines suggested by Phillip Selznick. They would be-based on the 
recognition that shortrterm political decisions to intervene in socie.ty 
and the economy have long-term consequences: while the ways in which
political power are exercised may force the suspension of a legal judge- 
- mervt, the' -arbitrary a nd/or I ncoherent— exercrse of* power i s "never - f rn-arl-" 
in law. Most laws represent some kind of attempt to bridge the gap 
between naked power and a power legitimated through a discursive justi- . 
fication .(in relation to the regime's ideology, etc.), to try to win • 
the consent and support of the governed. These instances of legitimated 
power are then generalised a-nd classified by a legal system capable of ‘ 
“doing so, ' i n order more" readily' to “i dent if y arbitrary d i s'e'rrm’i nation's - ’
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which contradic,t political choices,, to foster a greater certainty and
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predictability in political acts. Sir Ernest Barker (in his defini­
tion of the Rule of Law) describes the requisite act of political 
prudence in the following way:
The purpose of the state is . . .  a specific purpose of law.
Other purposes, so far as they concern or affect this purpose 
must^nece.ssa.r .i 1 y be-&qua.reiw*l.th-T-.t-~.J>u-t .t be-*a4j«u-&fcmen t 
is not a matter of discretion, and it is not absolute: it is
controlled by the purpose of the State. . ,
The purposes enunciated by the Derg, in Ethiopia Tikdem and many
of its other policy pronouncements, and embodied in some (but by no means
all) of its laws c&n-be made cons i s tent- wi-th our def i pi t fon of j us t j c-e---
(supra) -Inevitably-^ justice and equality must remain wholly synonymous,
up . to jthe^pojnt. where the bas ic ueeds b ^ ^ ^ l r£ithTo,pba,n's are fulfilled.
Beyond that point - far into the future in Ethiopia - distributional
justice entails an explicit recognition of the contributions and efforts
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of individuals and groups,- Even -before- t hi s -point is— reached, how­
ever, the desire to acquire more than one's equal share would serve as 
a motivation towards development activities. in order~adequately to—  —  
reflect these goals, Ethiopian laws and ideologies must be infused with 
a greater concern for a people-centred development. This concern was 
given its most fervent expression by Martin Luther King, Jr..in his 
'Letter from the Birmingham City Jail': "Any law that uplifts human
personality is just. Any law that degrades human personality is un- 
just.1'*13
- WhiTe'-this call for disobedienee te-u njust !aws bad some political 
impact .iri the U.S., it reflects'a simpJTSTTic view of the interrelations 
of law and politics: the justice-enhancing and -reducing aspects of
law are not mutually exclusive. They combine in various ways in systems 
of law and politics which are inevitably imperfect and which respond but 
sluggishly to apathy and violent or nonviolent rebellion. People must 
be manipulated and compelled to live up_to their potential excellence 
in order to achieve development within a reasonable time span and, in­
variably, some will rebel. The compulsions used by the Derg reflect 
poor political judgement, however, offering too few discursively justi­
fiable 'carrots' and too many 'sticks': exhaustive experiments demon­
strate that the only cheap and effective way to control individuals and 
groups for particular purposes is to offer ..Inducements,mak i ng it to
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their advantage to perform the acts required. Economically, this can 
be done through the kinds of Incentives that were discussed in Chapters 
Six and Seven. The requisite pollt icaT "carrots1 include government1s 
sufferance of a continuing sphere of private activity which is large 
enough to ensure individual and group self-respect, as well as a pro­
gressive’augmenting of the legal-'Statuses"of-c It!z-enship and a limited*-
group autonomy with uniform conditions of equality concerning economic
A A
opportunity and, later, a meaningful political participation."
III. A Speculative Postscript
In 1628, Sir Edward Coke wrote: "reason is the life of the law,
nay the common law is nothing else but reason. . . , [It] is the per-
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fec’tion of reason." The rules Coke announced d i d'a ^ good deal Of damage
for several hundred years and they provide much entertainment today; 
will the theories presently cherished by Western social scientists es­
cape a similar condemnation from our successors? Possessing Coke's 
kind of self-confidence (ethnocentrism or arrogance might be a better 
word), Western lawyers such as Rene David, and other ‘experts', set out 
to ‘develop1 the people of what came to be known as the Third World.
It is quite likely that this favour will be repaid some day. A small
beginning was made during the English summer drought of 1976: a mission
ary in the State of Madras, known for its climatic vicissitudes, raised
.h-A00* from^mOng -hi s parl shioner& Jto . a r£4tfQ tight,,recovery...,»?■, 
What supreme irony if development studies and a developmental approach 
to law in particular, created by Westerners for the Third World, were 
to turn in upon themselves and help to-develop those .who thought them- . 
selves already developed.
While the constraints on an Ethiopian development are unique in 
their combination, the analyses in this study can, with careful modifi­
cations, be made relevant to the problems faced in many other countries. 
There is an obvious interdependence of national development efforts on 
what ecologists have termed Spaceship Earth: "world poverty Is primaril
'a problem-of two million villages, and' thus a problem o h -2,000 mi 1 1 i on 
vi11agers. Further, the problems of nation building described in 
this study periodically re-emerge in the so-called developed states, 
as problems of national repair or reconstruction. How many countries 
today maintain desired levels of investment and productivity in all
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sectors of the economy, avoid intense ethnic and regional' differences 
and disputes over the distribution of wealth and power,-and are blessed 
with citizens who cooperate' wl th and respect each o t h e r w h i  le respect­
ing themselves? Development is a highly relativistic concept, a fact
that is highlighted by what Oscar Lewis has termed a worldwide culture 
A7
of poverty. . „ .....  -
In much of the Third World, poverty dominates, while it is almost
a dev i-ant subculture in the wealthiest of "countr i es . " Despair,'apathy---
and low levels of group organisation are the main characteristics of
this culture, which is both an adaptation and a reaction by the poor
to the improbability of their attaining the successes def i ned ' by fel 1 teS'"'
in stratified and. individualisitc societies.. Clearly, "it is more- ...
A8difficult to undo the culture of poverty than to cure poverty itself"; 
policies promoting a narrowly-economic growth or those of a welfare
t
state leave untouched many of the conditions which perpetuate under­
development. No country can be termed developed until it succeeds in 
eliminating the culture of poverty within its boundaries, a process 
which entails major structural transformations. Theories of law and
development thus have much to say that is of interest to the First and
A9




1 E.g., in Zapata and the Mexican Revolution, John Womack takes the
view that "The truth of the revolution in Morelos is in the feeling 
of it." A metaphysical notion perhaps, but much of the origin, 
content and impact of revolutions is highly metaphysical. Albert 
Hirschman praises Womack’s superior cognitive style: his respect
for the revolution and for the Mexican people counteracts an 
academic's propensity to see gloom and failure everywhere, stemming 
from simplistic historical and statistical projections into the 
future and the desire to reprove regimes which are felt to be 
repressive or unjust. We have tried to give the Ethiopian revolution 
a similar balanced treatment. See A. Hirschman, ’The Search for 
Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding1 in N. Uphoff and W. Ilchman, 
eds., ThePolitical Economy of Development 6^ , at Gk (1972).
2 Speaking of the First and Second Worlds (Western and Communist 
party-states), Half Dahrendorf (The New Liberty 8?, 1975) argues 
that
making medium-term thinking relevant for short-term action is 
one of the great unresolved problems of contemporary life, 
and. • .. we pay heavily for not having solved it*
We would add that the preoccupation of governments with short-run 
political problems tends to be at the expense of a consideration of 
ipulti-faceted, long-term developmental problems. We therefore 
attempt to link ’’medium-term thinking” about development with "short­
term action” and with the political preoccupations of Ethiopian 
governments.
Our r&ther complex topic has been revised several times in order 
to provide a meaningful analysis of what are felt to be the relevant 
issues. Obviously, all aspects of the topic cannot receive exhaustive 
treatment: the aim is to leave no major questions unanswered
within the chosen framework of an interdisciplinary exploration of 
domestic Ethiopian development prospects. Ethiopia's foreign trade 
and relations and the various guerrilla wars in progress constitute 
separate topics which are being dealt with by others, and receive 
only brief treatment in Chapter 1. Portions of the study detail 
revolutionary events which began in 197^ in Ethiopia, and they 
suffer from the inherent drawback of the author being ’just another 
witness', lacking abundant documentation and reliable critical 
studies written long after the events. Media reports, personal 
experiences and interpretations are combined with the efforts of 
research student's and reliable informants - those persons with 
good sources of information whose reports were consistent with 
other information and whose other information had proved reliable. 
Wherever possible the information obtained was compared with pub­
lished studies, many of which, unfortunately, contain implicit 
biases. Every opportunity was taken to convert subjective impres­
sions into objective judgements, after testing them in all possible 
ways, and to present balanced assessments.
Many facets of Ethiopian underdevelopment are not within the 
author’s personal experience, and the research of others is therefore 
cited extensively. As in so much of social science research, case 




hypotheses and overall surveys tend to be superficial and too 
abstract. We therefore attempt to strike a balance between theor­
etical substance and the tendency to over-generalise. It is virtually 
axiomatic among contemporary students of Ethiopia that the conventional 
criteria employed in the analysis of other societies are highly 
suspect when applied to atypical Ethiopia. On the other hand, no 
nation in an interdependent world is sui generis, and Ethiopia faces 
many of the problems experienced by other underdeveloped states. A 
good set of theories ought to be applicable to specific problems in )
other countries, albeit in a general fashion and subject to further 
research. Induction and deduction have been used alternately, in 
order to achieve a better fit between theories and the facts. This 
study is basically fact-oriented: theorising grew out of facts
about Ethiopia; facts were not forced into preconceived theories.
The compulsion to theorise in a mindless fashion - Flaubert’s la rage 
de vouloir conelure - has been resisted.
Of course, no one collects data and descriptions without theor­
etical preconceptions, and’letting the facts speak for themselves' can 
lead to an ahistoric acceptance of the status quo as unproblematic.
This tendency has been suppressed through a continual reformulation 
of theory and by focusing upon the historical nature of Ethiopian 
development choices and constraints. A careful formulation of the 
issues raised by development and revolution is, in any event, an 
adequate safeguard against a reification of the status quo. To the 
best of the author's ability, the theories elaborated herein create 
truth as well as simply finding it, are falsifiable, general, empir­
ically valid, parsimonious and focus upon developmental variables 
that can be manipulated. Variables which are not manipulable 
should be treated as a choice or even as a constraint, a ’given' which 
cannot be manipulated such as extreme views of a peasant fatalism 
(see Chapter One)*
See: J. Barzun and H. Graff, The Modern Researcher 20, 126, 140-1,
*145 (1962); J. Markakis, Ethiopia 2 (1974); N. Mouzelis, Organization 
and Bureaucracy 66 (1967); H. Brookfield, Interdependent Development 
195 T'1975) ; G . Myrdal, ’Objectivity in Social Research', in D. Lloyd, 
ed., Introduction to Jurisprudence 3d Ed. 6, at 6 (1975); B. Smart,
Sociology, Phenomenology and Marxian Analysis, xi (1976); Hirschman, 
op.cit. 64, 70; G. Lenski, Power and Privilege 448 (1966); and 





X. D* Crummey, 'Ethiopia: New Approaches' t 9 Canadian J. of Af. Studs
3^ -0, at 3*fO (1975)* G. Huntingford (The Galla of Ethiopia: The
Kingdoms of Kaffa and Janjero 9 (1969) adds that:
In spite of the large and varied literature dealing with 
Ethiopia, this country remains one of the least known regions 
of Africa to this. day.
In 19385 Margery Perham (The Government of Ethiopia, 2d Ed., 138 
(1969) first wrote that "Ethiopia still awaits comprehensive 
investigation of her law and custom". This statement remains true 
today, despite the passage of time. John Cohen and Sileshi Sisaye 
('Research Problems in Describing and Explaining Ethiopia's Socio­
economic Development' 35 197§> cite a study which demonstrates 
that only 2% of the research projects registered with the African 
Studies Association concern Ethiopia. Likewise, only 3*7% of 
American and Canadian Ph.D. theses about Africa are devoted to 
Ethiopia and only 37% of these discuss development-related topics. 
Similar analyses of research in the U.K. have never been undertaken, 
but we would predict - on the basis of the colonial orientations 
Crummey mentions - that there is even less interest in Ethiopia 
among scholars in the U.K. A small amount of valuable research 
has been carried out by Swedes, Germans and Yugoslavs, and several 
older Italian anthropological studies retain their value. Much of 
the relevant contemporary research is by Ethiopian scholars, al­
though they have naturally turned to more active pursuits, in support 
of or, more typically, in opposition to the post-Revolutionary 
military Government.
2. 1^*1 1-2 and J. Markakis, Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity
2 (197*0 • Perham (op.cit. xiii) argues that Ethiopia’s economic 
backwardness is peculiar to itself; the conservatism of an ancient 
religion and political system makes the Ethiopian economy less amen­
able to change than most 'tribal' economies. Gedamu Abraha ('Wax 
and Gold', 11 Ethiopian Observer 226, at 226, 19&7) adds that "Truth 
. . .  is an elusive quarry In Ethiopian studies"; conjecture becomes 
attractive and to some extent unavoidable in the absence of detailed 
information. Markakis's book, P. Gilkes's The Dying Lion (1975) 
and D. Levine’s Greater Ethiopia (197*0 - the leading fruits of 
recent Ethiopian scholarship - are criticised heavily by Crummey, 
op.cit. Gilkes's book, like M. Stahl's Contradictions in Agricultural 
Development: Three Minimum Package Projects in Ethiopia (1973)
offer partial and simplified "Marxian" views of Ethiopia, while 
Levine's book offers a similar Parsonian treatment that is, para­
doxically, metasociological, metahistorical and obscurely metaphysical. 
Stahl and Levine display the failings common to much of Ethiopian.' 
scholarship: ethnic stereotyping and an emphasis on cultural
adaptation at the expense of analyses of economic relations and 
political domination (Crummey, op.cit. 3**l-3 and Cohen and Sileshi 
op.cit. 13 - an excellent critical survey of recent research)• It is 
important to note, however, that Gilkes's and Markakis's books 
contain numerous important insights which will be utilised throughout 
this study. It was only after reading Cohen and Sileshi's study 
that v/e grasped the need to stress the interrelatedness of centres and 
peripheries in Ethiopia (see Part III).
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5* See, e«g,, H. Marcus, The Life and Times of Menelik II; Ethiopia l8Vf-
1915, 193-5 (1975)* discussed in the next Section, and S. Waldron 
'Revolution in Ethiopia* (1976):
The system of relationships between local tenant and outsider- 
landlord, initiated by Menelik II and perpetuated during the 
reign of Haile Selassie was a clear-cut case of ethnic strat­
ification. The expression of ethnic resentment which has 
accompanied the land reform is part of the heritage of the 
monarchy, a kind of internal colonialism.
Traditional Ethiopian land tenures are discussed briefly in Chapter 6.
*f. M. Ottaway, 'Social Classes and Corporate Interests in the Ethiopian
Revolution' , lk J. Mod. Af. Studs (forthcoming) ; T. Farer, War 
Clouds on the Horn of Africa 2 (1976) ; J. Markakis and Asmelash 
Beyene, 'Representative Institutions in Ethiopia*, 5 J* Mod. Af.
Studs 1931 at 193-^ (1967); Assefa Bequele and Eshetu Chole, A Profile 
of the Ethiopian Economy 3 (1969) ; and L. Bondestam, 'Notes on 
Multinational Corporations in Ethiopia' 5 Af. Rev. 535» at 5^9
(1975)- V/e do not argue that foreign interests were absent in 
Ethiopia; rather, they influenced events in enclaves which are 
extremely small and which emerged late, in comparison with those in 
former European colonies (id.) European colonialism never gained a 
foothold in Ethiopia: the authority exercised by Italian invaders
from 1935 to 19^1 was only temporary and superficial. Nevertheless, 
Ethiopia - like Thailand - lived in the shadow of European colonial­
ism and contemporary Ethiopian events are very much influenced by. 
previous colonial interventions in Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti and 
the Province of Eritrea. These factors are discussed in Section V, 
infra. Gunnar Myrdal (Asian Drama 19i Abridged Ed., 1977 ) 
states that European colonialism was of "such duration and intensity 
as to leave a definite imprint on almost every aspect of. • . 
existence". For reasons to be detailed in Chapter 2, comparisons 
between Ethiopia and some South Asian states are fruitful. Com­
parisons with several Latin American countries, based on structural 
transformation theories of development, are also analysed in 
Chapter 2. Seyoum Gebregziabher ('The Structure and Functions of 
the Civil Service in Ethiopian Public Administration1 8, i960) 
argues that:
For purposes of practical analysis, comparisons between 
Ethiopia and other African countries have only a limited utility. I 
• The structure and legitimacy of the government has more 
parallels with such countries as Japan, Thailand and Iran 
(though with a wholly different trend and level of culture) 
than with the Congo or the Cameroons.
Comparisons between Ethiopia and Etirope prior to the Industrial 
Revolution (see, e.g., Goody, Note 29, infra.) are, of course, made more 
difficult by the fact that the poor countries of today exist in a 
world where many countries have gone far beyond the Industrial 
Revolution. D. Levine ('Amhara Culture and Ethiopian Politics', 
n.d.) supports the dictum that Ethiopia is " in Africa but not of 
Africa" by citing numerous non-African cultural influences:
Sabean language, script, religion and architecture; Judaic 
dietary and ritual observances; Greek literature,^philosophy7 
and loan words; Syriac theology and religious terminology; 
Byzantine iconography; Arabic literature; Muslim conversions; 
Portuguese masonry and viniculture.
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These influences are, to some extent, counterbalanced by Cushitic 
components, indigenous adaptations of methods of agricultural 
production ^ hich probably evolved from Mediterranean production 
modes and land tenures - see Chapter 6/, elements of paganism,
African methods of house construction and localised clitoridictomy 
practices.
5. C. Furtado, Development and Underdevelopment 1 (196?)5 J* Barzun
and H. de Graaf, The Modern Researcher l*f9 (1962); and Schumpeter, 
quoted in H. Brookfield, Interdependent Development 87 (1975)•
Markakis (op.cit. 5) describes the Ethiopian "historical moment" 
in terms of the convergence of living traditions, territorial 
expansions and the commencement of modernisation.
6* See; S. Finer, Comparative Government 589-90 (1970) and J. Holmberg,
•Pricing Strategies. . . in Ethiopia1, 16 (1976). Clive Thomas
(Dependence and Transformation 286, 197*0 argues that: ,!Even in
revolutionary situations, it seems that men cannot act very far 
outside their historical traditions". He concludes that a con­
sciousness of the relevant issues is therefore the best means of 
guaranteeing that the right choices - in terms of promoting 
development - will be made. Etniopian political history is discussed 
infra and in Chapter 3i and historic problems of resource allocation
receive a fuller discussion infra, and in Chapter 2.
7* Gibbon, Decline and Fail of the Roman Emmre, Ch. xlvii, quoted by, 
e.g., R. Greenfield, Ethiopia ix (1969)*
8. Toynbee, quoted by, e.g.., S* Rubenson, The Survival of Ethiopian
Independence 1 (19765* This book, and Harold MarcustsrLife and 
Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia 184^-1913 (1975) offer excellent
analyses of nineteenth and early twentieth century Ethiopian 
history: sources are used creatively and marshalled carefully, and
conclusions are conservative, in that they are fully supported by 
the facts adduced. A broader but less careful view of Ethiopian 
history is offered by J. Doresse, Ethiopia (1959) and by Greenfield, 
op.cit.
9. Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia: from Autocracy to Revolution 15-6 (1975);
C. Claphara, •Centralization and Local Rgsponse in Southern Ethiopia*, 
7k Af. Affairs 72 , at 72 (1975); Assefa and Eshetu, op.cit. *f-6; 
Perham, op.cit. xiii; and Rubenson, op.cit. 2, ^07* Richard Hess 
('Ethiopia', in G. Carter, ed., National Unity and Regionalism in 
Eight African States 4*fl, at *f711 1986) argues that:
Ethiopia is a land -of diversity. The variety of climatic 
conditions, land forms, ethnic groups, languages, religions, 
and historical experiences have contributed to the development 
of regional loyalties, localized economies, and generally weak 
national bonds.
Other factors contributing to the complex course of Ethiopian 
history and to processes of underdevelopment could (and have been) 
listed, but the point - familiar to historians - is that it is 
impossible to ascertain a single cause for any sequence of events and, 
in many cases, even the relative importance of several causal factors 
cannot be confidently ascertained.
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Europe-centred histories of Ethiopia relying on European sources 
gave rise to what is arguably a myth of Ethiopian xenophobia* The 
complexities of Ethiopian politics and European motives make 
generalisation difficult, but it was the Europeans who initiated 
many of the contacts and who wanted the same kinds of things from 
Ethiopia that were obtained through colonialism in other parts of 
the world, plus new markets for the ©.le of arms. To cite but one 
example, in 1808 Lord Valentia advocated gunboat diplomacy and 
British trading monopolies in Ethiopia, projecting profit margins 
of up to bOff/o and arguing that ’’this may be done without the 
violation of one principle of right, and not only without loss, but 
with an incalculable profit” (Rubenson, op*cit. bj>\ see Id,, 53i 165)- 
This is a familiar policy but, unlike the many other parts of the 
Third World that succumbed to it, Ethiopia possessed a military 
strength, a cultural tenacity, a vague and intangible national 
identity, and a marked aptitude for international balance of power 
politics. Nineteenth and twentieth century emperors hoped to gain 
recognition, support and cooperation from Europe, but were often 
disappointed, particularly with Europe’s reactions to the Italian 
invasions of the late nineteenth century and the 1930s (see Id., 239) *
10. Kyrdal, op.cit. 8, 355-6-
11. Literally, morphology means the science of form, but we adopt the 
usage of Donald Black and Maureen Mileski (’Introduction', in
Black and Mileski, ed., The Social Organization of Law 1, at 8, 1973)* 
who define morphology as encompassing demography, communications 
structures and various links and networks. They argue (Id.) that:
Legal actions radiate into a network of social relations, and 
how this network is woven together determines the speed and 
distance of lav/'s movements /and the movement of many other 
social, political and economic factors as well/.
One of our purposes is to analyse these factors in relation to 
Ethiopian underdevelopment and development prospects: see, e.g.,
the concept of penetration, discussed in Chapter 2, section iv.
12. Farer, op.cit. 1, and 6.
13. Id., 6; I. Kaplan, et al-, Area Handbook for Ethiopia, 2d Ed., 168
Tl97l) ; Hess, op.cit. 53A; and M- Frankland, 'An Idea to End World
Poverty', Observer V*9/77,6. Farer gives a per capita income of
less than U.S. $90 per year, while J. Spencer('’Haile Selassie: Triumph
and Tragedy*, 18 Orbis 1129, at 1139 (1975)) mentions $79- These 
are little more than guesses, as the last reliable measurement is 
that found in the 1968 U.N. Africa Survey, which derived an annual 
per capita GDP of $59-6 and analysed Ethiopia's deteriorating 
position in relation to the rest of Africa. R. Disney ('Notes on 
the National Accounts of Ethiopia', in G. Gill, ed., Readings on the
Ethiopian Economy 17, at 22, 26, 197^) reminds us that Third World
national income accounts are subject to large margins of error.
He calculates that 5 3 of Ethiopia's GDP is non-monetary and imputed 
largely on the basis of questionable household consumption surveys. 
Disney derives a margin of error of plus or minus 15 to 1?% of GDP. 
Despite these problems, Disney concludes that the reliability of 
Ethiopian statistics is above average when compared to those of
other African countries! Detlev Karsten, in (Ethiopian) 'Economy*, 
in Africa South of the Sahara 30** i at 30^-5 (1976), mentions another 
problem:
Since they came into power, the military rulers have embarked 
on a number of reforms. The contents of these reforms are 
not very clear, and their actual and future consequences are 
difficult to assess. Some of the following description, 
therefore, may conflict with information from other sources.
The statistics presented in this study are the latest reliable ones 
a diligent researcher could obtain. Jack Shepherd (The Politics of 
Starvation 72, 1975) estimates that a national calorie deficit of 
10% could only be cured through an expansion in agricultural pro­
duction of 30-i^ *
P. Brietzke, ed., 'A Source-Book of Ethiopian Law and Development' 36 
(197*0 ; G. Gill, 'Major Economic Indicators', in Gill, op.cit. 1, at 
1; Gill, ' Introduction to Demographic and Urban Studies', in Id. *f23 
at *f23; Karsten, op.cit. 305? and Kaplan et al., op.cit. 9, 75*
Id., 1,9,11-12; S. Gryziewicz, 'Main Determinants of Ethiopian 
Economic Development Policy', 8 Ethiopian Observer 192, at 193 
(196*0; Shepherd, op.cit. 10; Karsten, op.cit. 304—5 5 Gill, 'Major 
Economic Indicators', 1; Assefa and Eshetu, op.cit. 2; and Farer, 
op.cit. 3- Disney (op.cit. 17) adds that agricultural production 
accounted for 52% of Ethiopian GDP in 1972, compared to 62% in 
1961, with crop production accounting for about 2/3 of the former 
figure. Ethiopia's surface area can be divided into: pasture,
5*$; cultivated or fallow land, 10.*$; deserts and swamps, 21%; 
forests, *$; and miscellaneous, 10.6%. On a different calculation,
69% of the land is classed as agricultural, although only 16% 
is cultivated. Whatever the exact figures, it is clear that vast 
areas of unutilised or underutilised land exist in all climatic 
zones. An average of 3 Ha. (roughly, 7*5 acres) of farmland per 
family conceals the fact that most holdings are much smaller and 
excessively fragmented (Brietzke, up.cit. and Karsten, op.cit. 304). 
Agriculture, rural development, traditional land tenures and land 
reforms are discussed in Chapter 6.
Gill, 'Improving Traditional Ethiopian Farming Methods', Rural 
AfricanaNo. 28, 107, at 110 (1975)- See Note 87, infra.
P. Koehn, 'Urban Origins and Consequences of National and Local 
Political Transformations in Ethiopia', in J. Walton and L. Masotti, 
eds., The City in Comparative Perspective 155» at 157-8, 175n 
(1976); Assefa and Eshetu, op.cit. 7; and Kaplan, et al., op. cit.
26, 73, 156. In 1972, the populations of principal Ethiopian 
cities and towns were: Addis Ababa, 912,090, Asmara, 2*t9\100,
Dire Dawa,66,570, Dessie, *f9» 360, Harar, 48,440, Jimma, 4-7,360,
Nazeret, 4-5,280 and Gondar, 38,600 (Karsten, op.cit. 310). Koehn 
(op.cit. 159) notes that
in 1963 only 21 of the 210 municipalities had piped water supplies 
6 had fire protection, 5 possessed slaughterhouses, 6 
had sanitation facilities, *f contained parks for recreation, 
and 57 had electricity schemes. The situation improved 
only slightly in the next decade. . . .
Despite these evident drawbacks, John Harbeson ('Socialist Politics 
in Revolutionary Ethiopia' 9 (1976)) correctly points out that:
"Urban Ethiopia, primarily Addis Ababa, symbolized the appearance 
of modernization in Ethiopia and monopolized its fruits". Despite
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the manifest inadequacy of its facilities, Addis accounts for a 
wholly disproportionate share of, e.g., doctors, hospital beds, 
teachers and schools. As in many Third World states, the rural 
areas are thus deprived of government-sponsored services and facil­
ities, both absolutely and in relation to what is available in 
Addis. Development problems associated with the processes of 
Ethiopian urbanisation are discussed in Chapter 7-
18 Gill, *'Introduction to the Manufacturing Sector', 11^, at 11^ and 
'Basic Economic Indicators 1, at 1, in Gill, op.cit.; J. Cohen and 
D. Weintraub, Land and Peasants in Imperial Ethiopia 5 (1975);
Karsten, op.cit. 507; and Brietzke, op.cit. 57. Industries other 
than food and textiles, in order of importance, are: metal products,
leather products, refined oil products, cement, and bricks and 
tiles. Manufacturing employed only 59*000 people in 19^9* 
including 19*000 in the Addis Ababa - Akaki area, 12,000 in Asmara 
and 10,000 on rural sugar estates. Fifteen companies accounted for 
more than 50% of employment, and only lO^ f of the *+89 manufacturing 
firms were both owned and managed by Ethiopians (id.) Legal rules 
concerning Ethiopian manufacturing and commerce and problems related 
to industrial development are described in Chapter 7*
19 Gill, 'Introduction to Trade', 200, at 200-5* in Gill, op.cit.
In 1972, *f2% of Ethiopia's exports went to the U.S., 30%~~ to Europe 
(especially to Italy and West Germany) 2Cf/o to "Asia" (mostly 
Saudi Arabia and Japan) and 7% to Africa. In comparison, 9% of 
imports come from thsU.S., 55% from Europe (especially from Italy, 
West Germany and the U.K. in that order), 3'1% from Asia (particularly 
Iran (oil) and Japan); and 3% from Africa. In 1971* coffee 
accounted for almost 60% of exports, and other important exports 
were oilseeds, 10%, fruit and vegetables, 8% and hides and skins,
9%. Import patterns reflect the growth of import-substitution 
industries in Ethiopia; they display a clear shift towards machinery, 
transport equipment and partly-finished and raw materials (Id. 
and Karsten, op.cit. 309). Although oil price increases and export 
marketing disruptions caused by the Revolution may make for problems 
in the future, Ethiopia's foreign exchange reserves have continued 
to rise. Some reorientation of exports and imports towards social­
ist countries is obviously to be expected. Tourism Is an important 
potential source of foreign exchange, although it has generated 
little employment or income in the past and Is unlikely to do so in 
the near future. Cultural and scenic attractions could be used to 
'capture' tourists on their way to Kenya (Brietzke, op.cit. 38)
20 Karsten, op.cit. 30.A, 307; Assefa and Eshetu, op.cit. 22; Gill,
'Major Economic Indicators', 1; Kaplan, et al., op.cit. 10, and 
Brietzke, op.cit. 38. As gold and platinum mining was a secretive 
monopoly d'x the Emperor prior to 197^, there is good reason to 
believe that earnings from mining were deliberately understated.
Gill (loc. cit.) estimates that mining accounted for 1% of GDP. 
Evidence suggests that the bullion mined by the Emperor is still 
being stored in Swiss Bank vaults, to the (over-optimistic) estimated 
value of Eth. $3000 millions. The Swiss have refused to comment and 
the Swiss Ambassador's car has been repeatedly stoned by residents of 
Addis Ababa (see Chapter Four).* During the 1960s, the production of 
electricity increased 15*5% annually.
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21 Gill, 'Introduction' to 'Transport and Communications', in Gill, 
op.cit. 447, at 447; Karsten, op.cit. 306; and Kaplan, et al., op.cit. 
107^13-1^ Ethiopian Highway Authority design standards are too 
high and therefore too costly in relation to the volume of traffic. 
Feasibility studies and planning are poorly coordinated and road 
transport licensing systems are corrupt and fail to achieve their 
stated aims (at least until 1976 - see Chap. 7 and Brietzke, op.cit. 36).
22 Karsten, op.cit. 306-7; Markalcis, on.cit. 322; and Kaplan, et al., 
op.cit. 321* 3^0-1.
23 Budget Proclamation, No. 101 of 1976, Negarit Gazeta (official 
legislative journal) year 36, No. 2 (Neg. G^z. 36/2T, 7 Oct.;
Karsten, op.cit. 308-9; Brietzke, op.cit. 38; and Gill, 'Major 
Economic Indicators',- at 2. For purposes of comparison, 5&/o of 
domestic revenue was obtained through indirect taxes in 1969-70.
24 Hess, op.cit. 514; Karsten, op.cit. 305; Perham, op.cit. Ixx;
Brietzke, op.cit.t and Kaplan et al., op.cit. 185-71 201. During 
the late 1960s, \2?/o of Ethiopian primary students left school 
between the first and second grades, and 68% left without completing 
the sixth grade (id., 190)•
25 G. Lipsky, Ethiopia 148-50 (1962) ; Shepherd, op.cit. 4; Kaplan 
et al., op.cit. viii, 167-72; and Assefa and Eshetu, op.cit. 22.
26 R. Greenfield, 'The Eritreans, the Somalis and the Powers',
West Africa 17/10/77» 2115, at 2116. See Note 3 supra and M. Smith, 
•Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralism', in L. Kuper 
and M. Smith, eds. Pluralism in Africa 27, at 60 (1969)t where 
Ethiopia and Liberia are cited as combining "two modes of social 
cleavage" analogous to stratification and ethnicity as we describe 
them. We are not looking for a sine qua non of Ethiopian under­
development but are, rather, searching for factors which relate 
social processes to the existing iacts of underdevelopment, as we 
describe them supra and in Chap. 2. In this study, social systems 
are viewed as the products of ongoing processes of social inter­
action, which can generate both stability and change. The focus ig 
on processes which create social structures - the means by which 
wealth and power are distributed - rather than on the structures 
themselves. Although social structures in the abstract may be 
empty forms applying social pressure, any given set of structures 
applies these pressures for specific purposes; our aim is to examine 
these purposes from the perspective of development. See: G. Lenski,
- Power and Privilege 2 (1966); M. Ginsberg, 'Social Change', in 
S# Eizenstadt, ed., Readings in Social Evolution and Development 
37, at 41-2 (1970); and B. Barber, Social Stratification 47 o (1957)«
But see G. and M. Wilson, The Analysis of Social Change 49 (1968). 
"Ethnicity" is a shorthand characterisation of those feelings of 
group separateness that are based on perceived linguistic, religious, 
social and cultural differences. Our approach to Ethiopian 
stratification and ethnicity parallels that of William Shack, but 
there are significant differences, too. See Shack, 'Occupational 
Prestige, Status and Social Change in Modern Ethiopia*, 46 Africa 
166 (1976). See Note 28, infra.
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27 Kaplan, et alM  op.cit, 7, 8l, 97; Assefa and Eshetu, op.cit. 18-19;
Hess, p-p.cit. ^79-7; and Huntingford, op.cit. 16. Kap'lan (op.cit. 
121-2) terms Ethiopian pariah groups "hereditary occupational 
specialists", one result of a caste-like division of labour which 
arose in response to the modes of production and distribution. Lipsky 
(op.cit. 51-2) contends that Ethiopians see Armenians as "moneybags" 
and "idolators" and feel that Italians can be "managed" and are 
"docile"•
28 See H. Johnson,' stability and Change in Ethnic Group Relations', in
B. Barker and A. Inkeles, eds., Stability and Social Change 311, at 
312-l*f (1971) and Finer, op.cit.^ 5^9-90* Following Huntington Cairns 
(Lav/ and the Social Sciences 163, 19&9)» we define culture broadly, 
as
that complex whole which includes knowledge, beliefs, art, 
morals, law, custom and many other capabilities and habits 
acquired by man as a member of society.
We follow Johnson (op.cit.) in analysing ethnicity rather than, e.g., 
tribalism: it is doubtful that most Ethiopian groups constitute
tribes, in the sense in which that term is used in Bantu Africa. 
"Plural" and "pluralism" are used in their popular rather than their 
social scientific sense - see infra.
29 S. Messing, The Target of Health in Ethiopia 77 (1972), D. Levine,
Wax and G old 5 (1972) sMarkakis", op.cit. 88; Hess, op.cit. V?5;
and Kaplan, et al., op.cit. 5- See: B. Barber, op.cit. 7;
S. Eisenstadt, 'Contimities and Changes in Systems of Stratification', 
in Barker and Inkeles, op.cit. 61, at 6l~2; and P. Stirling, 'Con 
Men and Dupes?1, Times Higher Educ. Supp. 9/12/77» 17* Although 
Kaplan et al. (op.cit. at 51) state that Amharas constitute kO% 
of the Ethiopian population, we believe Hess's figure of 29/6 to 
be more accurate. Markakis (op.cit. 1) views Orthodox Christianity 
as the Weltanschauung of the Amhara-Tigre. Levine (1 Amhara Culture 
. . .') contends that "dichotomies" of superior and inferior, man 
and woman, elder and youth, Amhara and non-Amhara, Christian and 
non-Christian, freeman and slave, well-born and poor make for an 
inegalitarian society lacking in humanistic values. Kaplan et al. 
(op.cit. 102-3) argue that, among the Amhara-Tigre:
The patron-client relationship is the strongest organizing 
f force on any level, local or national* The sense of belonging 
to a community with shared values and privileges is virtually 
non-existent.
They add (id. 26l) that patron-client relations retard social 
disintegration in Ethiopia, a tendency which is otherwise fostered 
by the absence of stable horizontal relationships among peers. 
Exceptional and ad hoc cooperative v/ork arrangements are, however, 
employed when certain specific problems arise. D. Korten (Planned 
Change in a Traditional Society: Psychological Problems of Modern­
ization inEthiopia 51. 57.' 1972) sees 'an^ nneas'v Ethiopian social 
equilibrium resulting from the interaction of the forces of social 
integration and disintegration* The integrative forces are char­
acterised as: rigid conventions of etiquette and hospitality, a
respect for privacy, strong social pressures which suppress indiv­
iduality and foster conformity, a strict reciprocity in social 
relations, and a predisposition towards a hierarchical social 
structure and an unquestioning acceptance of authority. Disintegrative
forces include
the idealization of physical and verbal aggression, the belief 
in the basically evil nature of man, the pervasive seeking of 
short-run self interest, and the securing of rewards through 
the manipulation of others.
We argue in Sec. IV, infra that psychological/value analyses of. 
Ethiopian groups arrive at some dubious conclusions, although 
Korten is more careful than most Ethiopianists. Dan Bauer ('For 
Want of an Ox. . Land, Capital and Social Stratification in 
Tigre*, in H. Marcus, ed., Proceedings of the First U.S. Conference 
on Ethiopian Studies 235, at 236, 1975) adds that:
Inequality is manifest in an emphasis on ranking in nearly 
all social situations and a tendency to make all significant 
social ties vertical. . . .  The weakness of corporate groups 
is manifest in that few activities are carried out through the 
medium of corporations and those corporate groups which do 
exist tend to show little solidarity*
Jack Goody (cited by A. Hoben, 'Family, Land and Class in Northwest 
Europe and Northern Highland Ethiopia', in Id. 157? at 157) argues that 
the Amhara and traditional European societies have certain elements 
in common: a plow-based agriculture which supports culturally-
differentiated church and state elites; an intensive use of land, 
which means that control over land (rather than over kin or labour) is 
the basis of social stratification; and a devolution of property 
rights thhough children of both sexes, which leads to arranged 
marriages between families of equal wealth and status. Kaplan 
et al. (op.cit. 83) point out that, while Tigrinya is spoken-by 
about two million Orthodox Christians in South Tigre Province, a 
related Semitic language - Tigre - is spoken by a largely Muslim 
and ethnically mixed population in Eritrea.
D. Levine, 'Class Consciousness and Class Solidarity in the New 
Ethiopian Elites', in P. Lloyd, ed., The New Elites of Tropical 
Africa 312, at 312-13 (196*0; Shack, Note %>,1 infra; and kapian, 
et all, op.cit. 6, 102. See Smith, op.cit. 58-9;' and L. Failers, 
TSocTal Stratificat!on and Economic Processes in Africa', in R.
Bendix and S. Lipset, eds., Class, Status and Power lAl, at lAl 
(1966) , who suggests that a Marxian analysis is irrelevant to an 
understanding of social stratification in Black Africa. Class 
formation is rudimentary, the growth of bourgeoisies and prole­
tariats is stunted, and peasants are powerless (R. First, The 
Barrel of a Gun 951 **55-9 (1972)). As Mao suggested (cited in 
B'rook'fieid , op. cit. 127) , a Marxist analysis of class conflict 
has little relevance in countries whose proletariat and landlords/ 
big bourgeoisie constitute only a small minority - where most of the 
people are part of the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie or 
other "intermediate" classes. Feudal and imperial societies contain 
a large number of basic social categories (see Uphoff and Ilchman's 
"suggestive inventory" in the text follov/inglTote 50, infra)
and the Marxian dichotomy of bourgeoisie and proletariat suffers 
from the same defects as any other dualistic model (see Section 
IV, infra). In The Eighteenth Brumaire. • • (discussed in Chs.
**,6)7 Marx recognised the existence of differentiation and substrata 
within class categories for the purpose of analysing specific hist­
orical events, yet the main thrust of Marxian analysis ignores these 
complications. In any event, applications of the concept of class 
often result in stereotyping, oversimplification and the
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introduction .of ideological biases. It is interesting to note that 
Western lav; reflects and reinforces the interests and demands of 
many kinds of social groups other than classes. ,lClass,, has 
different meanings for different purposes, and can mean little 
more than a group of persons who stand in a similar position in 
relation to others, (j. Hildebrand, 'The Sociology of Soviet 
Law1, 22 Case Western Reserve L. Rev. 157* at 173* 1971; Eisenstadt, 
op.cit. 68; Barber, op.cit. 82; Lenski, op.cit. 7^ -; and Black and 
Mileski, op.cit. 7)• It is, of course, possible that Ethiopian 
social groups v/ill organise themselves into classes in the future, 
based on common perceptions of interests which are largely latent 
at present, but we would agree with Ginzburg (op.cit. 5-9) that:
The Marxists have concentrated on the contradictions that 
arise between the forces of production and the relations of 
production. But it seems clear that the sources of strain/with 
. in social structures^7 are many and varied, and indeed hardly' 
reducible to system.
Marxists might see this assertion as an example of C. Wright Mills's 
"safe, colorless, 'multiple-!actor* viev; of causation", and as a 
hindrance to radical change, but it is also an appreciation of the 
complexity of social systems, and of the ways in which societies 
resist the reduction necessary to fit them into tidy models 
(see Ch. 2, Sec. III).
■ 31 See: Levine, Wax and Gold 275; Hess, op.cit. ^96; and Markakis
op.cit.32. The nature of the Ethiopian state is discussed in this 
Section, infra and in Chaps. 3-5* Separatist groups are analysed 
in Sec. V, infra.
32 J. Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia 213 (1952); Kaplan et al., op.cit.
831 229t 2^9, 252; Hess, op.cit. V76; Lipsky, op.cit. 35-6; 
and Herbert Lewis, 'Neighbors, Friends and Kinsmen', in Marcus, 
Proceedings . . .  1931 at 203. Lewis studied Galla groups in 
Ethiopia (Konso and Dassanetch) and in Tanzania (Iraqu) , and found 
that these groups reflect both pastoral and sedentary Islamised, 
Amharicised and pagan lifestyles. He found that the character­
istics of social life we cited in the text were common to all of 
these peoples and predicts that, more often than not, Ethiopian 
peoples for whom detailed information is lacking will have a similar 
lifestyle.
Kaplan et al. (op.cit. 2^9-53) point out that, among Ethiopia's 
Muslims, only the Shahada - "There is no God but Allah and Mohammed 
is his Prophet" - must be observed. The other four Pillars of the 
Faith - prayer, fasting, almsgiving and pilgrimmage to Mecca - can 
be modified in accordance v/ith the believer's situation. Mosques 
are found only in the larger towns, and it is therefore uncertain 
whether most professed Muslims pray daily. Traditionally, Gallas 
believe in a sky god (Wok) and a pantheon of minor deities. Other 
Ethiopian 'tribal' religions have been analysed as fertility cults.
The 500,000 Gurages who live in Southern Ethiopia have been 
classified as both Semitic and Cushitic peoples, although the latter 
classification is probably correct. Their social life is closer 
to that of the Gallas than the Amharas. See: V/. Shack, The Gurage
(1966) ; Hess, op.cit. 4-75; and Greenfield, op.cit. 99*
Hess» op.cit. 4-77; Kaplan et al., op.cit. 83, 92-3 , 95; and Lipsky, 
op.cit. 3'6*
Gilkes, op.cit. 260 and Waldron, op.cit. See: J. Robinson,
Freedom and Necessity 39 (1970); G. Myrdal, 1 Asian Drama 569
(1967); W. Wertheim,Evolution and Revolution 238-9.(197^);
Fallers, op.cit. 14-5; E. Wolf, Peasant Wars in the Twentieth Century 
xiii (1969)"; NT Uphoff and V/. Ilchman, ’Development in the Per­
spective of Political Development1, in Id., eds., The Political 
Economy of Development 75, at 85 (1972); T. Shanin, 'Introduction' 
in Id., ed., Peasants and Peasant Societies 11, at 14—5 (1971);
Lenski, op.cit. 241, 272; Barber, op.cit. 93; and J.Kautsky,
'An Essay on the Politics of Development', in Id., ed., Political 
Change in Underdeveloped Countries 15 (1962). Kautsky (id.) notes that 
the peasant, simply because he id a peasant in a wholly 
agrarian society,is generally poor and always ignorant - 
by the standards not only of industrialized societies but 
also of his own aristocracy. He is likely to be poor because 
of his primitive technology, because of population pressure, 
and because the aristocracy may take from him whatever he 
produces in excess of his basic needs.
There is little class consciousness among Ethiopian peasants, as 
the precondition to its emergence is lacking:
Consciousness requires distance, the capacity to imagine 
onesself outside a circumstance and to wonder about how one 
ought to deal with it. (R. Unger, Law in Modern Society 172
(1976)).
Christopher Clapham (Haile Selassie's Government 79i 1969)
argued that the conventions governing legitimate political activity 
in Ethiopia are severely limited. Farmers are left with the alter­
natives of quietism, partial assimilation into the dominant Amhara 
political system or revolt, although political consciousness is 
growing (especially in urban areas), as a result of education, 
external influences /and, more recently, the Revolution/.
See K. Deutsch, 'The Growth of Nations', in R. Jackson and M. Stein, 
eds., Issues in .Comparative Politics 129, at 129 (1971).
G. Mosca (The Ruling Class 70, 1939) argues that:
in fairly populous societies that have attained a certain 
level of civilization, ruling classes do not justify their 
power exclusively by de facto possession of it, but try and 
find a moral and legal basis for it, representing it as the 
logical and necessary consequence of doctrines and beliefs 
that are generally recognised and accepted. . . .  This legal 
and moral basis . . .  on which the power of the political 
class rests, is what we . • . call the "political formula" 
jT- what jurists call the"principle of sovereignty^/.
This view parallels the tendency,noted in pre-industrial societies 
by A. Touraine ('Sociology of Development’, in S* Eisenstadt,
Readings in Social Evolution and Development 3371 at 345» 1970), 
for profoundly legitimating: and meta-socialguarantees of the social 
order to override fundamental opposition between groups. People do 
not view society as the fruits of their own labour; traditional rulers 
seem to be the upholders of society and the beneficiaries of a natural
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order of things. Rubenson (op.cit. 2) argues that the obvious 
contrast between settled highland agriculture and the surrounding 
arid areas produced feelings of an Amhara-Tigre separateness which, 
when combined with the legendary roots of the monarchy and the 
common faith and culture of the Church, led to the formation of 
a j/fairly rainimal7 national and political consciousness essential 
to survival.
37 Doresse, op.cit. 90, 1151 180; Hess, op.cit. 447-9; Greenfield,
'The Ogaden - Province or Colony? 1: Before the Scramble', West
Africa 26/9/77, 1965» 1968; and Greenfield, Ethiopia 52-6^ The
era of the Judges (Zamena Mesafent) refers to the last verse in the 
Old Testament Book of Judges: "In those days there was no king in
Israel: every- man did what was right in his own eyes" (id. 70) •
See Rubenson, Note 36, supra. Kaplan et al. (op.cit. 37) argue that, 
during the mediaeval period:
The writ-.-of the Emperor did not depend fundamentally upon 
force but, rather, upon the obedience rendered to a monarch 
ordained by God to rule the country. Forces supplied by 
subordinates were the major determinant of the scope and 
extent of power, but at the center was an idea rather than a 
physical force.
3®* See: Mosca, op.cit. 50-1; H* Williams, Jr., 'Change and Stability
in Values and Value Systems', in Barker and Inkeles, op.cit. 123, at 
158; E. Charle, 'Political Systems and Economic Performance in 
Some African Societies', 18 Ec. Development and Cult. Change 575i 
at 581 (1970); C. Furtado, Development and Underdevelopment 4l (1967) 
Lenski, op.cit. 44-5; sm-d Addis~Hxwet, "op.cxtj'l8.
39 Markakis.and Asmelash, op.cit. 195 and Kaplan et al., op.cit. 32*
40 Prologue, No. 31 of 1975t Neg. Gaz. 34/26, discussed in Ch. 6. Other
sources referred to are: A. Hoben, 'Social Anthropology and Develop­
ment Planning - a. Case Study in Ethiopian Land Reform Policy',
10 J. Mod. Af. Studs 582 (1972); H. Dunning, 'Land Reform in 
Ethiopia', 18 U.C.L.A. Law Rev. 271 (1970); P. Schwab, 'Haile 
Selassie: Leadership in Ethiopia', 6 Plural Societies 19* at
21 (1975); 0. Sawer, Law in Society 50 (1965); F. Ganshoff, Feudalism 
xv (1964); Unger, op.cit. 1o2; Perham, op.cit. 277-8 and Gilkes, 
op.cit. 101-2,170, 255. As Amhara and Tigre peasants were not 
legally bound to the land, they cannot technically be termed serfs 
(Id. at 121-2), although economic pressures usually made it extremely 
difficult for peasants to leave their land (See Maurice Dobb, 
quoted in Addis Hiwet, op.cit. 25). A. H o b e n ~ T L a n d  Tenure Among the 
Amhara of Ethiopia 243-6, 1973) describes a "competitive and fluid 
feudal polity" established by the Amhara, in which numerous inter­
mediary gradations between lord and peasant existed.
We argue that the following five descriptions of feudalism can 
be validly applied to the Amhara-Tigre Empire (but see Addis Hiwet, 
op.cit. 24-6 on descriptions one and two)•
1. M. Block, Feudal Society (quoted in ]Cd., 25):
A subject peasantry; widespread use of the service tenement 
(i.e. the fief) instead of a salary, which was out of the 
question; the supremacy of a class of specialised warriors; 
ties of obedience and protection which bind man'to man and, 




/The features of feudalism^ may be summarized as follows: a
development pushed to extremes of the element of personal de­
pendence in society. • an extreme subdivision of the rights 
over. . ./land and7 a graded system of rights . . . created by 
this subdivision and corresponding in broad outline to the grades of 
personal dependence just referred to ; and a dispersal of political 
authority amongst a hierarchy of persons. . • •
This characterisation is analogous to Hoben's "competitive and fluid 
feudal polity"•
3* Interesting parallels can be drawn between the emergence of feudal­
ism within the Amhara-Tigre Empire and in Poland, Russia, India (see 
Mosca, op.cit. 53-6) and Western Europe generally (Furtado, op.cit. 95)•
Feudalism had become the most practical way of maintaining collective 
security after the collapse of Roman power. In the stationary 
feudal world social relationships developed within a clearly cir­
cumscribed field which reduced to the minimum the need for govern­
ment exercising power capable of establishing norms suitable for 
new occasions.
*f. Sawer, op.cit. 50, 52:
Of all the historical societies, the one in which social structure 
and legal structure have the most obvious relation is the feudal 
one.
^Feudalism]? tended to be regressive. • . because the dignity 
and passions of feudal chiefs would not brook containment in a 
system of fair judgement based on objective laws and rational 
evidence. . . .
5. 0. Kahn-Freund, 'Introduction* in K. Renner, The Institutions of
Private Law 1, at 7 (19^ 9);
The legal order of feudalism deliberately allocated the control 
of land and goods, established the hierarchy of power and imposed 
the duty to work. » • • The function of the legal institutions 
corresponded to their normative structure. Capitalist society, 
however, pretended to be able to forego a functional organisation 
of possession and of labour. It covered the order of goods with a 
legal concept of property defined in the abstract, it avoided, in 
the name of personal freedom, a legal formulation of the duty to 
work. . . .  Society pretended to abdicate in favour of the will of 
the individual. • • •
In Chap. 7 we shall argue that, during the 1960s and as a result of 
the importation of foreign laws, Ethiopian national laws were 
undergoing a transition between these two legal orders.
On the basis of the evidence cited, we confidently reject 
the main thrust of arguments such as those of Gene Ellis 
(*The Feudal Paradigm as a Hindrance to Understanding Ethiopia*,
1^ J. Mod. Af. Studs. 291 (1976)), without taking refuge in the many 
over-generalised descriptions of feudalism (e.g., G. Sjqberg,
’Folk and Feudal Societies', 58 Am. J. of Sociology'235- (1952)).
523
•^1 jRubenson, op.cit. 172; Greenfield op.cit. 72-9; Hess, op.cit.
436; Baro Tumsa, 'Decentralisation and Nation-Building in Ethiopia'
36 (1973); Doresse, op.cit. 90; Markakis, op.cit* *1-7-8; and Marcus, 
Menelik 1-2, 6Lf. See K. Griffin, Underdevelopment in Latin America 
34 (1969)? for comparisons with European colonialism. Brookfield 
(op.cit. 3i 13) suggests that the objective of all empires is the 
enrichment of the metropole and, more particularly, its rulers. This 
objective was only barely concealed by a civilising and; proselytizing 
mission based on a racial arrogance which implied the crudest form 
of hypocrisy. This viewpoint finds some support in Marcus's des­
criptions:
Naftanna /soldier-settlers left in place while Menelik's armies 
pressed on/, whether or not Amhara in origin, saw the Amhara as 
honest, frank people, more religious than others, more constant 
in allegiance,'braver and more ambitious than, for example, 
Gallas, and more constructive. . . .  The subject peoples in 
the empire were generally seen as primitive, without culture 
or effective government, and lazy, dirty or warlike; they 
were naked or dressed in skins; they were heathen who needed 
the word of God. The naftanna also tended to have paternal- 
listic attitudes towards their wards. . . .  In their isolation 
from their homeland, the settlers felt more common cultural 
identity than ever before (Menelik 193-*0 .
. . .  Excluding Jimma and Harar, where taxes were obtained 
from commerce, the revenues returned to Addis Ababa were 
apparently derived largely from the asrat, a 10 per cent 
charge in kind on crop yields* Some of this produce was 
stored in local granaries against famine, but most was sold 
to obtain money or other goods. . . .  An additional tax, to 
support the garrisons in the south, was paid by the local 
peasantry directly to the military, (id. 191)
Marcus (Id. at 193) concludes that this harsh and demanding system 
was probably the only way to_govern late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century Ethiopia /a reflection of low levels of political 
development/. "
*f2 J. Cohen and P. Koehn, 'Local Government in Ethiopia' 1 (197*0 ;
J. Hamer, 'Cultural Diversity and National Integration in Ethiopia: 
the Sidamo Case' (1966); Markakis, op.cit. 36, 325-6, 337$ 373?
Baro Tumsa, op.cit. 47? Shack, The Gurage 199-200, 203; Farer, 
op.cit. 7; and Claphara, Note 3*N supra. That there was an important 
but limited amount of assimilation (Gilkes, op.cit. 15) is commented 
upon by Marcus (Menelik, 19*+):
Politically and socially ambitious people became Christian, 
took appropriate names, learnt Amharic and began to dress and 
even to eat like Shoans • . Further assimilation occurred
frequently as a result of /intermarriage and analogous 
'irregular' unions/.
Kaplan et al., op.cit. 96 add that, while there was an initial 
awareness of the need for a working partnership between Amharas and 
Gallas, this policy was seemingly forgotten during the twentieth 
century (prior to the devolution).
There are similarities between the experiences of the conquered 
peoples of Ethiopia and those of other countries:
52*t
In general, a conquered population on its 11 own” territory 
is slov; to take over the culture of the conquerors or to 
accept its subordinate position gracefully. Although its 
culture and social system may be badly disrupted they do re­
main as sources of solidarity . . . .  (Johnson, op.cit. 319)•
^3 H. Wheeler, Democracy in a Revolutionary Era 20,2k,27 (1971)•
See Cohen and Weintraub, op.cit. Ik.''Despotism" connotes the 
exercise of an absolute" authority which Haile Selassie never possessed. 
Wheeler is probably using this word in its figurative sense.
^  See: Id., at 12-13; Addis Hiwet, op.cit. 77; Clapham, Haile
Selassie's Government 66, 91$ 112; H. Scholler, 'Ethiopian Constit­
utional Development’, 25 Jahrbuch Des Offenteichen Rechts der 
Gegenwart *1-99$ at 526 (1976) ;Markakis, op.cit. 32; Kaplan et al., 
op.cit. 301; Marcus, Menelik 199; and Eisenstadt, Modernization,
Protest and Change 76-7 (1966). Kaplan et al. (opTcit. Ilk) note 
that the hereditary landholdings and the provincial power base of a 
noble could be used to obtain an important position in Addis Ababa - 
where he had an opportunity, which others lacked, to display 
political prowess.
In Wax and Gold (160,167), Levine remarks that the overlapping of 
the titles used among the Ethiopian nobility indicates the unspecial­
ised nature of their roles. The nobility constitutes "a plurality 
of proud centres of rank - partly inherited, partly achieved - 
enjoying virtual autonomy". Clapham (Haile Selassie-1 s Government 65) 
describes a "transitional elite", a fusion of an old-style entourage 
with a small group of better-educated bureaucrats. There are simil­
arities between Haile Selassie's regime and the centralising mon­
archies of France at the end of the feudal period: see Barber, op.cit.
3k. Haile Selassie's distaste for cultural pluralism was in evidence 
in 1956 when, while visiting the Ogaden, he expressed dissatis­
faction with using a Somali interpreter and urged his listeners tc 
learn Amharic (Farer, op.cit. 83).
k5 E.g., W. Shack, 'Occupational Prestige, Status and Social Change in 
Modern Ethiopia', k6 Africa 166, at 174 (1976): "Social classes
and formal political alignments" have "yet to be fully crystallized 
in urban Ethiopia . . . ."
k6 Bondestam, op.cit. 5^9$ Gilkes, op.cit. 170; Assefa and Eshetu, 
op.cit. l4; and Clapham, Haile Selassie's Government 186-7.
See: B. Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
xiii (1973) ; J.Kautsky, 'An Essay in the Politics of Development', 
in Id.., ed., Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries 3$~~'&t 
23$ 59 (1962); R. Seidman, 'Constitutions in Anglophonic Sub- 
Saharan Africa', 1969 Wisconsin Law Rev. 83, at 12k (1969) ;
Unger, op.cit. 151; and Furtado, op.cit. 96. Greenfield (Ethiopia 
3) notes a marked gulf between young ‘"and old ("radical" and' conser- 
vative) members of the Ethiopian elite, the result of the systematic 
assassination of many of the 'first fruits' of Western education by 
the Italian Invaders. There are, in other words, few elderly, 
educated and less conservative ("liberal") Ethiopian elites.
Farer (op.cit. 11) argues for the existence of a "small but 
critically positioned middle class of industrial workers, civil
525
servants and soldiers”, Markakis (op.cit. 182) defines an Ethiopian 
middle class as consisting of those persons who have completed 
secondary school, and contends that this
emerging middle class is performing a familiar.historical 
role in seeking to fashion instruments of government which 
itself alone can dominate. (Id. 351)*
For reasons expressed in the text, supra and infra, we are unable 
to accept these views. A more accurate characterisation is offered 
by J. Cunningham (’So V/ho are the Trots?1, Guardian, h Feb. 1977?
9):
Trotsky1s picture of nineteenth century Russia is remarkably 
similar to the one many people have of certain Third World 
countries today. He depicted a strong centralist state, 
borrowing heavily from abroad, following protectionist 
policies and encouraging the development of (state) capitalism 
. . .  As Deutscher summarises it, "the economic preponderance 
of the state, the numerical weakness of the middle class, the 
predominance of foreign capital in industry, the absence of 
a middle class tradition --all combined to make Russian 
bourgeois liberalism still-born.
/In/ the Third World today,the middle class is firmly on 
the side of autocracy and reaction.
We have chosen to analyse an "emerging" or numerically weak middle 
class as not constituting a middle class at all, in the sense in 
which that concept is used by V/estern political scientists.
A-7 P. Schwab, Decision-Making in Ethiopia 1^8 (1972); B. Thomson, 
Ethiopia 24 (1975)V Clapham, Halle Selassie’s Government 91?
K o e h n op.cit. 165-6; Gilkes, op.cit. 250; and Markakis, op.cit.
6, 358-^0. See Kautsky, loc. cit. Writing of the tiny educated 
Ethiopian elite in 19^7? David Mathew (Ethiopia 24? 19^7)' found that
"Before them and their companions there stretches out under a leaden 
sky a great wide prospect". Despite changes in people and circum­
stances, this image still retains its validity. Ethiopian students 
are more radical and revolutionary than students in most -other 
African states: see R. Dumont, False St.art in Africa 252-^ f
(1966). Modernising intellectuals display a fair degree of group 
solidarity, in Ethiopia (but see Ch. 4) and many other Third World 
states:
Above all, they are an urbanised group, showing distinctive 
styles, sets of values ardsymbols, and views of the future.
The consciousness of corporate distinctiveness gives them a 
certain coherence, solidarity, and facility for rapid commun­
ication. (M. Esman, TThe Politics of Development Adminis­
tration’, in J. Montgomery and V/. Stiffen, eds., Approaches to 
Development 59? at 68, 1966).
/In/agrarian societies,young people were largely integrated 
into the adult world and separated from one another, while in 
advanced industrial societies, owing to the spread of public 
education, young people tend to be . . . thrown into a narrower 





/The/intellectual of underdeveloped countries retains the - 
need for incorporation into some self-transcending authori-- 
tative entity. Indeed, the greater his struggle for emanci­
pation from the traditional collectivity,the greater his need 
for incorporation into a new, alternative collectivity.
Intense politicization meets this need. (Edward Shils, 
quoted by E. Wolf, Peasant Wars in the Twentieth Century 289? 
1969 - see Chap. 4)•
*i-8 See Lenski,op.cit. 210-29? snd .S. Eisenstadt, ’Processes of Change
and Institutionalization of the Political Systems of Centralized 
Empires', in G. Zollschan and W. Hirsh, eds., Explorations in 
Social Change, *02? at *02-*t-5 (196*0, who indicates similarities 
between the Ethiopian-Empire and the Ancient Chinese, Persian, Byzan­
tine Ottoman, Hindu and Mogul Empires, Ethiopia could also be said 
to be undergoing a transition from Jurgei Habermas’s "primitive 
social formation" to his "traditional social formation": see
Legitimation Crisis 18 (1976).
*1-9 See: Eisenstadt, loc. cit. *f*0; Lenski, op.cit. 210-1 *f, 229? 2*f*f;
and Kautsky, loc. cit. 13-15-
50 See N. Uphoff and V/. Ilchman, The Political Economy of Change AO 
TT969). Their category of moneylenders can be applied meaningfully 
in Ethiopia if moneylenders are thought of as middlemen and crop 
wholesalers who advance credit to peasants.
51 B.-0. Bryde, The Sociology of African Legal Development *f0 (1976).
See G. Soares, ’Economic Development and Class Structure', in 
Bendix and Lipset, op.cit. 190? at 190-2. Unger, op.cit. 156 notes 
the existence of two basic cleavages in feudal societies: between
mass and elite, and between different social ranks within the elite 
on the one hand and princely power on the other.
52 See: D.Lane, The Socialist Industrial State l8*f, 210 (1976);
W. Schwab, 'Social Stratification inGwelo*, in A. Southall, edv, 
Social Change in Modern Africa 128, at 138 (1969); Shack, ’Occu­
pational Prestige 7 T' 173-4; and Barber, op.cit. 268. Bauer (op. 
cit. 237) finds additional status criteria among Tigreans: 
"spirituality", effectiveness in litigation, age, generosity and 
self-suf fici ency.
5*5 E.g., E*. Lefever, Spear and Sceptor, 132 (1970), who argues that —
nation-building problems in Ethiopia are similar to those of newly-
independent states. J. LaPalombara ('Values and Indolog^'es. • .’, 
in R* Bribanti, ed., Political and Administrative Development 166, 
at 183? 1969) argues that "developed" states were never troubled 
by "the simultaneous onset of all nation-building problems, 
including identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation and 
distribution". The meaning of these terms and their significance 
in the context of development are discussed in Chap. 2.
See: Markakis, op.cit. 38-9; A. Mazrui, 'Current Socio-political
Trends’, in F. Arkhurst, ed., Africa in the Seventies and Eighties 
*f8, at 58 (1970); and Note 66, infra. Lane, op.cit. 177? argu.es that
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"the acceptance of manifest inequality is more characteristic of 
human society than is a rejection of it”, but inequalities do not 
necessarily lead to ”conflictua,l relations*” Typical ratios of 
maximum to average industrial earnings are 15 or 20 to 1, even in 
Eastern Europe and China (Id., 178).
55 R* Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society 157“
61 (1959); L. Warshay, The Current State of Sociological Theory 60,
134 (1975); B. Smart, Sociology, Phenomenology and Marxian Analysis 
58-9 (1976); R. Applebaum, Theories of S0cial Change 65-7 '
'(1970); W. Lamouse-Smith, 'Complexity and African Development 
Administration', in E. Morgan, ed., The Administration of Change 131, 
at 156 (197*0 i R» Jackson 'and M. Stein, Issues in Comparative Politics 
120 (l97l)i Lenski, op.cit. 16-17; and Unger, op.cit. 31i 33* On the 
relevance of ^arsons' theory to legal analysis, see: L. Mayhew,
'Stability and Change in Legal Systems', in B. Barker and A. Inkeles, 
eds., Stability and Social Change 187 (1971); J* Stone, Lav; and the 
Social Sciences 39-4l (1986); and Chap. 5» infra. There are many 
other models of society (see, e.g., Smart and Warshay,passim) but they 
have not gained sufficient prominence to warrant discussion in our 
brief survey. Examples of the application of uhe consensus model 
include John Horton's argument (cited in Warshay, op.cit. 6l) 
that deviance, riot and poverty can be defined as the inability to 
realise social values, and Godfrey and Monica Wilson's The Analysis 
of Social Change, Based on Observations in Central Africa '(196ft); 
e.g., at 132, 1 3 4 : ''Diseauilibriu^is both a state ^of society and 
a force of change • • • • /It7 must always press towards its own -- 
resolution, towards equilibrium”,unless further changes are intro­
duced prior to this resolution. Disequilibrium results in cultural 
maladjustment, unavoidable inefficiency, immorality, heresy and 
ugliness. The fullest elaboration of Parson's schema., is found in 
The Social System (1951)
56 Stone, op.pit. 4l,
57 Dahrendorf, op.cit.; Lenski, op.cit.; Applebaum, op.cit. 82; and 
Wertheim, op.cit. 96.
58 H. Jaguribe, Economic and Political Development 19 (19&8).
See: W. Moore, 'A Reconsideration of Theories of Social Change-*-,
in S. Eisenstadt, ed., Readings in Social Evolution and Develop­
ment 123i at 131 (1970); Unger, op.cit. 30; Wertheim, op.cit. 105; 
and Alvin Goulder, cited in Smart, op.cit. 10.
59 Myrdal, Asian Drama 360 (1977)* See Assefa and Eshetu, op.cit. 3*
60 Unger, op.cit. 175* See: Id. l43q C. Dodd, Political Development 34
(1972); and Barber, op.cit. 7, 259-60.
61 See-L. Friedman, The Legal System 163 (1975)» and Barber, op.cit. — 
228-30• Many of the types' of conflicts and class relations Dahren-
d.orf (op.cit., 173 > 237-9 and passim) describes as characteristn c- of 
industrial societies are absent "in Ethiopia. This should not sur­
prise us, as it is yet another, not altogether unfavourable, aspect 
of Ethiopian underdevelopment. The group conflicts that Griffin 
(op.cit. 65) found in many Latin American countries can also be 
founcTih Ethiopia: landless tenants versus "latifundistas",
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minifundistas" versus monopsonistic middlemen, unemployed city- 
dwellers versus a relatively privileged organised labour, and 
agricultural exporters versus domestic industrialists v/ho demand 
tariff protection for their products. A list of conflicts in 
post-Revolutionary Ethiopia would include those between
high-pitched aspirations and the bitter experience of a harsh 
reality, between the desire for change and improvement and 
the mental reservations end inhibitions about accepting the 
consequences and paying the price. (Myrdal, Asian Drama
15-16 (1977))
These conflicts occur both within and among individuals and groups. 
Ethiopian voluntary associations are discussed in Chaps. 6-7.
62 See: T. Parsons, 'A Paradigm for the Analysis of Social Systems
and Change’, in N. Demrath, III and P. Peterson, eds., System,
Change and Conflict 189, at 197 (1967)5 Coser, ’The Functions of 
Conflict’, in Id. 307, at 307; L. Kuper, ’Plural Societies', in 
Kuper and Smith, op.cit. 7, at 17, 20; and Friedman, op.cit. 169.
63 Dahrendorf, op.cit. 163. See: Id., 164; <T. Hurst, Lav/ and Social
Order in the United States 224, 267 (1977) ; end Wertheim, op.cit.
106',' 108. Lenski ’ s (op .'cit.) and Van den Berghe’s attempted 
syntheses of the conflict—and consensus models are discussed by,
e.g., Warshay, op.cit. 60-5 and Smart, op.cit. 56 and passim.
While a few of the criticisms of Dahrendorf's theories are well 
taken, they do not affect the substance-of his approach as we
apply it to Ethiopia (see, e.g., Id. 46-52 and Wertheim, op.cit. 105-8).
8^ See: I. Horowitz, "Consensus, Conflict and Cooperation", in
Demrath and Peterson, op.cit. 265t at 268, citing Hobbes, Socrates 
and Plato (*!-); Lenski, op.cit. 24-5; Warshay, op.cit. 63; Wertheim, 
op.cit. 106-7; and TTnger, op.cit. 167.
85 See: D. Black, ’The Boundaries of Legal Sociology*, in Black and
M. Mileski, eds., The Social Organization of Lav/ 4l, at 48 (1973)’,
R. Tucker, The Marxian Revolutionary Idea 93 (1970) ; Lamouse-Smith, 
op.cit. 156;and 'Dahrendorf, op.cit. 284.
88 ' See: K. Lov/enstein, ’Reflections on the Value of Constitutions in
Our Revolutionary Age', in A. Zurcher, ed., Constitutions and 
Constitutional Trends Since World War II 191, at 208 (1951);
F. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries 184 (1964);
C. Anderson, et al.,Issues of Political Development 91 (1987);
Uphoff and Ilchman, The Political Economy of Change 25, 2l6; 
and Dahrendorf, op.cit. 318^ Asliosca (in Lenski, op.cit. 13) *" 
argues, human societies cannot function without political organ­
isations, which necessarily require inequalities in the distribution 
of political power. These inequalities give rise to what Mosca 
terms the "ruling class". G. Heeger (The Politics of Underdevelop­
ment 80, 1974) adds:
The real question Is not whether social cleavages will manifest 
themselves but, rather,along which lines of cleavage will 
salient political divisions appear.
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67 Clapham, Haile Selassie’s Government SO; W.-Weisslender, 'The 
Political Ecology of Amhara Domination* 324-6 (1965); Markakis,
op .-cit. 335; Levine, Wax and Gold 57 and 'Class Consciousness . . .’ 
314-15; and Kaplan, et al., op.cit. 389-90* See: F. Hayek,l Lav/, —
Legislation and Morality 8 "0-973)'? M. Medler, 'Stability and Instab- * 
ilirty’, in Jackson and Stein, op.cit. 212, at 212-13; Finer, op.cit. 
20-1; and Heeger, op.cit. 8-9* Many governments, including that of 
the U.S.,—attempt to deal with conflict by suppressing some demands 
and under-representing others: see Hurst, op.cit. 227*
68 See: E. Hagen, On the- Theory of Social Change 183 (1982) ;
Wertheim, op.cit. 134-5; Lane, 0-p.cit. i98;' and Smith, op.cit. 38. 
Citing Moore, Eisenstadt ('Social Change and Development', in 
Eisenstadt, Readings in Social Evolution and Development 3i at 4) 
argues that all societies are inherently predisposed to change 
because of fundamental, "problems” which lack overall and continuous 
solutions. These problems include the uncertainties of social­
isation, the scarcity of resources relative to aspirations, and the 
contrasting types of social orientation or principles of social 
organisation coexisting within society.
89 See: A.Diamant, ’Political Development* in J. Montgomery and W.
Siffen, eds., Approaches to Development 15, at 35 (1966); G. and 
M.' Wilson, op.cit* 168-9; W. Hield, ’The Study of Change in, Social 
Science’, in Demrath and Peterson, op.cit. 251, at 251-2; Smart, 
op.cit. 22: and Medler, op.cit. 215. Wertheim (op.cit. 9) 
suggests that, when social phenomena, are interpreted as functions of 
a system in equilibrium, it is difficu.lt to imagine how radical 
change can come about; conflict becomes a part of existing systems. 
Paradoxically, this seems to have been the state of affairs in 
Ethiopia prior to the Revolution.
70 See: T. Ocran, 'Lav;, African Development and Social Engineering' ,
3-4 Zambia Lav; Rev. 16, at 24 (1971-2); Unger, op.cit. 254; and 
Note 7'1» infra. For examples of the kinds of analyses of Ethiopian 
peasants discussed in the text, see Assefa and Eshetu, op.cit.
10-13 and Levine, Wax and Gold, nassim, and 'Amhara Culture. . .':
"its fatalism, its patriarchalism and its "realistic humanism" ~~ 
dispose people to look askance at innovation." For development- -- 
oriented analyses of the relationship betv/een the values of indiv­
iduals and social change which have little overall relevance to 
Ethiopia, see, e.g.: G. and M. Wilson, op.cit.; D. McClelland
and D. Winter, Motivating Economic Achievement (1969); and Hagen, 
op.cit., v/hcr^ argues, at 56, that 'a "traditional society . . .  tends 
to be custom-bound, hierarchical, ascriptive end unproductive." 
Peasants lack the capital, knowledge and personality necessary for 
innovation (Id., 6l)•
The most extreme view of the "peasant fatalism" thesis to gain 
some credence is the one promoted by E. Rogers ('Motivations, Values 
and Attitudes of Subsistence Farmers’, in C. Wharton, Jr., ed. 
Subsistence Agriculture and Economic Development 112, I969). In 
this study, "psychological tests" were 'administered to Luo, Ganda and 
Zulu tribesmen, and these tests supposedly established the existence 
of a "peasant subculture". (The Luo and Zulu peoples should not 
be classified as peasants: see Note 34 and the text following Note 33,
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supra). Rogers's subculture consists of mutual distrust, lack of 
"innovativeness, fatalism ("lack of aspiration"), an inability to 
defer gratification, limited time perspective, familism, dependence 
on government authority, "localiteness" and "lack of empathy".
This study is a perfect example of the fact that the choice of 
methodology can predetermine virtually any result. The dangers, of 
basing policy recommendations on these kinds of findings are 
enormous. It is doubtful that peasants possess many of these 
personality traits, assuming that the complex personalities of 
numerous individuals can be meaningfully generalised in this fashion. 
Would v/e accept findings concerning the personalities of American 
or English farmers which v/e re grounded on this kind of methodology?
Careful observers of Amharas and Tigreans - Alan Hoben and Dan 
Bauer - have noted that social mobility is both an ideal and a 
reality in these societies, where social status is both ascribed 
and achieved (Hoben, Land Tenure Among the Amhara, passim, and 
'Family, Land and Class. . .' , 161; and Bauer,' op.cit. 237)* Bauer 
adds that a "poor man once headed one of the richest households in 
the village and now works as a plowman for his son-in-law."
(Id.) While Ethiopian peasants may perceive the likelihood of an 
upward mobility, the overall reality must be otherwise, at least 
in economic terms, for declining living standards, rapid population . 
increases and the fragmentation of landholdings (see Sec. I, supra 
and Chap. 6) mean that an 'average' peasant is unlikely to live as 
well as his father or his grandfather. The numbers of poor and/or 
landless people have been growing rapidly during the past 20 
years, and an increasing socio-economic inequality and generally 
downward social mobility have not been conducive to social change 
and development. Upward socio-economic mobility for large numbers 
of people can only come about through economic growth, an expansion 
in the "scale" of social relations away from isolated communities, 
a growth in the number of positions in the upper strata, technical 
and organisational advances and/or effective contraception. These 
conditions do not obtain in Ethiopia, although the Revolution has 
altered the situation somewhat. Under the Emperor, there was a 
fairly rapid expansion of positions available to urbanised educated 
elites, but access to these positions was monopolised by children 
of existing elites. Perceptions of upward mobility based on a few 
prominent local examples are significant, however, as people tend 
to defend a system from which they expect to benefit. As Stanley 
Baldwin said, if you want people to be conservative, give them 
something to conserve. See; Lenski,op.cit. 4-13; Myrdal, Asian 
Drama 62 (1977); Bryde, op.cit. 4-5; G. and M. V/ilson, op.cit. 96,
105; and A. Southall, 'Introduction', in Id., ed., Social Change in 
Modern Africa 2, at 21 (1969).
71 C. Hutton and R. Cohen, 'African Peasants and Resistance to Change'
(1973)* See; Levine, V/ax and Gold 51; Lane, op.cit. 46-7; 
and Myrdal"," Asian Drama-42, pbl-p U977) . As 'in South Asia, an 
Ethiopian stereotype of a spiritual, less materialistic and fatalistic 
people bears little resemblance to reality. The popularity of 
litigation and an observed propensity for a narrow materialism in 
all strata is not surprising, in light of a general poverty and 
inequality (see Id. 39)•
531
If
72 K. Renner, The Instttvitions of Private Law 3~k (19**9) • See:
Unger, op.cit. 49; Wertheim, op,cit. 119V and Barber, op.cit* 55-7*
73 M. Barkun, TLaw and Social Revolution’ , 6 Lav/ and Soc. Rev. 113» at 
120 (1971); T. Parsons, ’The Lav/ and Social Control',, in W. Evan, ed.,
Lav/ and Sociology 56, at 71 (1962); A. Podgorecki, 'Law and Social 
Engineering1, in R. Seidman, ed., 'Law and Modernization in the 
Developing World' 1:55* at 1:36-7 (1971); Mayhew, op.cit.* Dahrendorf,
op.cit. 291j and Renner, op.cit. *f8. For an interesting discussion J
of the ways in which American law deals with the issues posed by
consensus and conflict, see Hurst, op.cit. 216-27* Ieon Duguit
('The Lav; and the State' in e.g., D. Lloyd, ed.. Introduction to
Jurisprudence, 3d Ed., 1051 at 105-6, 1972), an influential
Continental jurist, argued that the jural principle (la regie de
droit) is not anterior to society but rests on Durkheim's social
solidarity. The similarity of individual needs creates bases of
solidarity through mechanical interdependence or similitude.
Differences in needs and aptitudes gave rise to the necessity for an 
exchange of services, and social solidarity came to be based on an 
organic interdependence - a division of labour. Lav/ must therefore 
be used to foster this social interdependence. Similar views are 
brought more firmly within the ambit of consensus theories and 
modern sociology of lav; concepts by Jerome Hall (Comparative Law and 
Social Policy 791 1963) :
Certain important sectors of social action reflect wide 
agreement on basic values from which many of the state's rules 
can be derived, and still others are found as logical impli­
cations or extensions from them. There are also lacunae 
filled by creative legislators and judges, influenced in 
varying degrees by social conditions. There are the technical 
rules and so on.
Under such a legal sjrstem, however,
it is all too easy to sanctify the existing order rather than
to reveal those interests that are pressing for recognition.
Identification of the two presupposes a social structure which 
enables the legislative and judicial arena to be used as 
fora for the legitimation of claims without let or hindrance.
(M. Freeman, The Legal Structure 71, 197*0*
7k These tendencies are also found in Western legal systems; See:
P. Stein and J. Shand, Legal Values in Western Society 27, 52 
(197*0; Z. Bankov;ski and G. Munghara, Images of Law 9, 80-2 (1976);
Habermas, op.cit. 20-1; and Friedman, op.cit. 285. The concept of a 
"positivised" legal system is discussed in Ch. 2.
75 Id. l*f7-8; Stein and Shand, op.cit. 2k; J. Finnis, 'Revolutions and
Continuity of Law', in A. Simpson, ed., Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 
2d Series kk, at 66 (1973); and F. Davis, et al., Society and the
Law 71 (1962).
76 K. Boyle, et al.,Law and State: The Case of Northern Ireland 1 
(1975)* See: Id/,' passim.
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77 H* Bredemeier, 'Law as an Integrative Mechanism', in Evan, op.cit,
731 at 74; J* Goldthorpe, ’Social Stratification in Industrial 
Society', in Bendix and Lipset, op.cit. 648, at 648-9; Davis
et al., op.cit. 73? Griffin, op.cit. 6£>; and Friedman, op.cit. 1S6.
78 Dahrendorf, op.cit. 211-13) 223-39 and Mazrui, op.cit. 335- See:
L. Coser, op.cit. 309 and ’The Termination of Conflict', in Eisen­
stadt, Social Evolution . . .  l4l, at 142-3; H. Such, 'Main Lines in 
the Development of Economic Law in East Germany', in G. Eorsi and
A. Harmathy, eds., Lav; and Economic Reform in Socialist Countries 
167» at 172-3 (1971); and Boyle et al., op.cit. 101 Dahrendorf 
(op.cit. 217) argues that, in some parts of the Third V/orld, the 
violence of conflict increases when social conditions fall below a 
physiological subsistence, but such conflicts are eventually 
replaced by apathy and lethargy - the symptoms of bodily weakness. 
Mazrui (op.cit.) adds:
the whole experience of Jointly looking for a way out of a 
crisis, of seeing your own mutual hostility subside to a 
level of mutual tolerance, of being intensely conscious of 
each other's positions and yet sensing the need to bridge 
the gulf - these are experiences which, over a period of 
time, should help two groups of people move forward"into 
a relationship of deeper integration.
The regulation of conflict becomes possible through the cumulative 
power of precedent and experience in overcoming crises, the aware­
ness of mutual dependence and the formulation of a shared ideology 
(Id. 336).
79 Shack, The Gurage 204 and Assefa and Eshetu, op.cit. 4. See: L.
Fallers, 'Social Stratification and Economic Processes in Africa',
in Bendix and Lipset, op. cit. l4l, at 146-7; Fallers, cited in J.
Coleman, 'The Resurrection of Political Economy1, in Uphoff and 
Ilchman, The Political Economy of Development 30* at 35; Furtado, 
op.cit. 79-Si, 89; Robinson, op.cit. 4?; and Griffen, op.cit. 53*
80 Markakis, op.cit. 335 and Shack, 'Occupational Prestige. . .' 174. 
See: Fallers, op.cit. 148-9; Furtado, op.cit. 85-6 ; and Myrdal, 
Asian Drama 22 (1977)• The beginnings of a transition from closed 
and inclusive social hierarchies to a variety of open and partial 
hierarchies can be observed in Ethiopia, although there are few 
points of contact between these two types of social structure 
(see Unger,op.cit. 171)•
81 See: L. Binder, 'Crises of Political Development', in Id., et al.,
eds., Crises and Sequences in Political Development 1, at 6l
(1971); B r y d e op.cit. 49; Smith, op.cit. 60; Dahrendorf, The New 
Liberty 25 (1975); Unger, op.cit. 173; and Lenski, op.cit. 3Q8«
82 J. Cohen, 'Ethiopian Provincial Elites and the Process of Change',
11 J. Ethiopian Studs. 93i at 93 (1973)-
83 Markakis, op.cit. 388.
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84 Assefa and Eshetu, op.cit. 14. Clapham (Haile Selassie's Government 
182) adds that traditional political activities continue undisturbed 
behind a modern institutional facade.
85 Karsten, op.cit. 3051 308. In Chapter 2 and supra, v/e argue that 
the "development11 perceived by Karsten amounted to a modest economic 
growth in small sectors rather than major alterations in processes 
of underdevelopment.
86 J. Boeke, Economics and Economic Policies of Dual Societies, quoted
by, e.g., Meier, op.cit. .126, at 126-7.
87 See: P. Cohen, 'Economic Analysis and Economic Man' , in R. Firth, 
ed., Themes in Economic Anthropology 95» at 112-3 (1970); H. Brook­
field, Interdependent Development 53-4 (1975); B. Higgins, 'A 
Critique of Boeke’s "Dualistic Theory1", in Meier, op.cit. 128, at 
128-38; and J. Furnivall, 'The Plural Society', in Meier, op.cit.
138, at l40-4l. Furtado (op.cit. l4l) offers a contemporary appli­
cation of Boeke's theory when he defines an "underdeveloped struc­
ture" as
one in which full utilization of available capital is not 
a sufficient condition for complete absorption of the working
force at a level of productivity corresponding to the tech­
nology prevailing in the dynamic sector of the system.
On the basis of Gill's assertion (see text accompanying Note 16, 
supra) , v/e could conclude that Ethiopia fulfills Furtado's criterion 
of underdevelopment, but what is "the dynamic sector" and how - if 
at all - does it relate to presumably non-dynamic sectors?
SB See: Meier, op.cit. 156^62 ; R. Nurkse, 'Labour Surplus on Land',
in Id. 146-9; J- Viner, 'The Concept of "Disguised Unemployment', 
in Id. 151-6; A. Seidman, in R. Seidman, lec<- cit. iv: 27-8;
Griffen, op.cit. 19-25; and Higgins, op.cit.
89 See J. Nettl, 'Strategies in the Study of Political Development', 
in C. Leys, ed.. Politics and Change in Developing Countries 13, at 
24-5 (1969) and A. Gunder Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or 
Revolution 5 (1969)*
90 Cohen and Sileshi, op.cit. 10. See: Uphoff and Ilchman, 'Development 
in the Perspective <f Political Development', 93; L.Kuper, 'Plural 
Societies', in Kuper and M. Smith, eds., Pluralism in Africa 7, at
11 (1969); C. Geertz, 'The Integrative Revolution', in Id., ed.,
Old Societies and New States 3.05, at 112-13, 119 (1963); H. Wriggens, 
'National Integration1, in M. Weiner, ed., Modern!zation l8l, at 
182-4 (1966) ; and Furnlval3., op.cit. 140-2." P.G, Casanova (cited in 
Brookfield, op.cit. 156-7) describes "internal colonialism" as a 
process through which "poles of growth" hold sway over and grow at 
the expense of more tradition-oriented areas. Emerging elite groups 
are tied to foreign consumption patterns and, as they only serve to 
implement the policies of more traditional rulers, a growth in the 
power of these elites augments the strength of the rulers. There is 
no identity of interest between urban workers and peasants, as the 
former gain higher incomes largely at the expense of the latter.
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The phenomenon of distance is not, of course, restricted to 
Ethiopia or the Third World genera3.1y:
Working-class-children grow up at a considerable social 
distance from institutions of higher learning, a distance of 
information, a. distance of motivation, a distance of culture.
(R. Dahrendorf, 'Inequality* Hope and Progress1 k 1976).
91 Worku Tafara, *Judicial Administration in Ethiopia . . .' 10 (1972).
See F. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries l8l (196^) and 
Friedman, on.cit. 19o. On the appropriateness of the term customary 
law, see Sawer, Note 103i infra.
92 See, e.g.: Shack, The Gurage; H. Lewis, A Galla Monarchy (1965);
Hoben, Land Tenure among the Amhara . . .' ; Billilign Mandefro, 
'Agricultural Communities and £he Civil Code', 6 J. Eth. Lav; 156 
(1969)5 A. Morton, 'Mystical Advocates', in Marcus, ed., Proceedings 
. . .  73? and N. Singer, 'The Use of Courts as a Key to Legal 
Development . • in Id.., 365. W. Howard (Public Administration 
in Ethiopia 78 (1955) states that: 'Little light has been throv/n on
the variegated patterns of Ethiopian customary law”. Many of the 
earlier Ethiopian studies were undertaken either by travellers or 
professional or amateur cultural anthropologists who gave (usually 
static) descriptions of life, work and survival and viewedconflicts 
and changes as "disturbances” (see Myrdal, Asian Drama 3 (1977)).
93 J* Paul, 'Problems of Public Law and Political Development', in 
Marcus, ed., Proceedings. . . 3231 at 331*
9k Worku, op.cit. 7^; Morton, op.cit. 88; Lev/is, A Galla Monarchy
63-8, Ill; Syoura Gebregziabher, 'The Structure and Functions of the 
Civil Service in Ethiopian Public Administration' 26-7 (i960);
Howard, op.cit. 79-80; C. Walker, The Abyssinian at Home, passim 
(1933); ICaplan, et al., op.cit. 292; Per ham, op.cit. 3.88; and Shack,
The Gnrage 163* See E. Johnson, An Introduction to the Soviet Legal 
System 13 (1969). Or Islamic Law, see, e.g.: J. Anderson, 'The
Adaptation of Muslim Law in Sub-Saharan Africa', in H. and. L. Kuper, 
eds., African Law 189 (1965); M. Smith, 'The Sociological Framework 
of Lav;' , in Id. 28; and Bryde, op.cit. 119.
95 Scholler, op.cit. 503* Article III, I ,  states that:
If a king dies they would put his dead body in the Grand 
House. They would bring out one of his sons or brothers 
chosen by the late king and his army, and they would enthrone 
him. (Id. 518)
• An important statute of Emperor Za Dengal of 1603-8 reads: "Let
all the men be .soldiers and the land pay the tribute" (Id.) - the 
beginnings, perhaps, of more specifically feudal arrangements.
96 J. Vanderlinden, 'Civil Lav; and Common Law Influences on the Developing 
Law of Ethiopia', 16 Buffalo Law Rev. 250, 251-2 (1966) ; A. Paulos " 
Tzadua (transl. from Ge'ez), Fetha Negast iv (n.d.); N. Marein, The 
Ethiopian Empire: Federation and Laws 151 (1955); Sedler, op.cit'.” ’
568; Messing, op.cit.” 112;r Doresse, op.cit. 119, l60;and Scholler, 
op.cit. 509* The relationship between theFetha Negast and customary
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laws is similar to the one existing between Islamic and customary 
laws in many Islamised countries; see J. Anderson, op.cit, 153*
G.Krzeczunowicz (’Code and Custom in Ethiopia’, 2 J. Eth. Lav/
425, 428, 1965) adds:
Ethiopia cannot be considered in a purely African cvistomary 
context. Its tradition embodies elements of Mediterranean 
civilization, with its Judeo-Christian and Greco-Roman com­
ponents. . . .  The ^thiopian.7 Kingdom of Axum was an ally
of Justinian.
97 Quoted by e.g., Worku, op.cit. 2-5* This statement could be unreser­
vedly accepted as true up to the promulgation of the 1931 Constit­
ution, and was subject to fairly minor qualifications after that 
date and prior to the Revolution; see Ch. 3*
98 Sedler, op.cit. and Perham, op.cit. 139* See E. Johnson, op.cit.
14 and R. Unger, op.cit. 119.
99 No. 31 of 1975, Neg. Gqz. 34/26 - see Ch. 6.
100 J. Ross and Zemariam Berhe, ’Legal Aspects of Doing Business. . .’,
J. Eth. Lav/ Occasional Paper No. 1, 11-14-, 19-20, 35-9 (1972) *
Shack, The Gurage 163, 165; Hoben, Land Tenure Among the Amhara. . .
157; Marein, op.cit. 249-50; Worku, op.cit. 34; Singer, op.cit.
372; and Bauer, op.cit. 244. See: A. Von Mehren, The Civil Lav;
System 10 (1957); Hayek, op.cit. 98; and K. Bentsi-Enchill,
’African Law: Development and Reform’, in Arkhurst, op.cit. 130,
at 1371 v/ho argues that litigiousness is a symptom of, for example, 
administrative neglect and the absence of a systematic determination 
of land boundar’ es and rights.
101 A. Schiller, ’The Changes and Adjustments. . in A* Tunc, ed.,
Legal Aspects of Economic Development 193» at 200 (1966). The impact 
of the attitudes towards customary laws adopted by the draughtsmen
of Ethiopia’s Civil and Commercial Codes is discussed in Ch. 7*
102 linger, op.cit. 58. E.A. Hoebel (’The Functions of Lav/', in Grossman 
and Grossman, op.cit. 13, at 14) utilises an approach similar to 
Unger’s:
Purposive definition of personal relations is the primary lav/ 
job. /T7he lav/ derives its working principles (jural postulates) 
from the postulates previously developed in the nonlegal 
spheres of action. However, the law’s important contribution 
to the basic organization of society as a whole is that the 
lav/ specifically and explicitly defines relations. It sets 
the expectancies. . . In its essence it is what the social- 
contract theorists recognize as the foundation of the social 
order.
103 Barkun, op.cit. 130. See H. Berman, Justice in the U.S.S.R. 268-9 
(1963)• Reviewing anthropological studies carried out in New 
Guinea by Salisbury and by Reay, Sawer, op.cit. 36-7, argues that 
legal rules in "primitive” societies resemble in content (as opposed 
to the excessive concern with form displayed by many anthropologists) 
the laws of many Western systems. Rules are discussed and taught to
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the young, their content and implications are argued about,and past 
disputes are recalled and summarised in proverbs and myths. "Custom" 
connotes an unvarying content and mechanical repetition - an unsatis­
factory word for observances that are verbalised and subject to 
interpretation. In the same vein, Unger (op.cit. ^9) maintains 
that
every act leads a double life: it constitutes obedience or
disobedience to custom at the same time as it becomes part of 
the social process by which custom is defined. j
Bryde, op.cit. 102 adds:
All known societies have developed some notion of abstracting 
general norms from behaviour; all know differences between 
general principles and more specific rules; and all have 
"rules of adjudication", i.e., general procedural rules that 
determine how a variety of different substantive cases are 
disposed of.
All of lav/ represents experiences in settling problems in more or 
less just and rational ways (see Hall, op. cit.* 67-8).
10^ - B. Malinowski, quoted by, e.g., T. Elias, The Nature of African 
Customary Lav; 69 (1962).
105 See: J. Stone, Social Dimensions of Lav; and Justice 7^3-5 (1966) ;
Friedman, cp. cit. 20^ ;' and Sawer, op.cit. ^8. While smaller social 
groups are better able to develop informal social controls and 
sanctions, all relatively large communities are based on some kind 
of coercive order: "primitive" and international communities only
lack specialised and centralised organs for the creation, application 
and enforcement of lav/s. In all societies, lav/ Is concerned with 
defining relationships and permitted, encouraged and proscribed 
activities, taming naked force and directing it towards the main­
tenance of order, the allocation of authority, and the disposition
of "trouble" cases. (R. Schwartz and J. Miller, 'Legal Evolution and 
Societal Complexity', in L. Friedman and S. Macaulay, eds., Lav/ and 
the Behavioral Sciences 976, at 982, 1969; H. Kelson, cited in Lloyd, 
op.cit. 269, at 27^-5, 1972; and Hoebel, op.cit. 13)•
106 For examples of conventional anthropological analyses touching on 
lav/ but irrelevant to development studies, see: E. Evans-Pritchard
Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande (1937); B. Malinowski,
Crime and Custom in a Savage Society (1976) ; M. Glnckman, The Ideas 
'in Baro'tse Jurisprudence; (1972J ; and P. Bohannan, 'The Differing 
Realms of the Law*, in ^Friedman and Macaulay, op.cit. ^7. The great 
pains taken to distinguish law and custom is in' part the result of ^al- 
inowski (loc. cit.) having confused the two (E. Schur, Lav/ and Society 
7^, 1968).>milar confusions can be noted in the writings of Rene 
David, which adversely affected the Civil Code he drafted for Ethiopia 
(see Chap. 7)* With notable exceptions such as Alan Hoben's work 
inHSthiopia, anthropologists exaggerate differences between social 
groups and are interested in describing and preserving an ethnic 
museum uncontaminated by "disturbing" social changes and the policies 
of central governments. Many Third World politicians see these 
academic aims as hindering attempts at development and integration and 
as affronts to national dignity. Anthropology of lav; and anthropology
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generally are preoccupied v/ith insular theoretical concerns, particularly 
the issue of whether structure (the alignment of corporate groups 
vis a vis each other), function (distinguishing among principles of 
social control and the ways in which sanctions are used) or ideation 
(interpretation of notions of justice, rights, property, etc,) 
ought to dominate anthropological studies. (See H. and L. Kuper, 
'Introduction', in H. and L. Kuper, op.cit, 3i at 3-4). From the 
perspective of lav; and development, all three approaches are of 
roughly equal importance, and placing an excessive emphasis on one 
of them will only serve to distort the analysis. Anthropological 
studies are nevertheless interesting because they constitute some 
evidence - but no more than that « of the immense variety of normative 
idealLs end practices that necessitate the reformulation of theories 
of jurisprudence, comparative law and sociology of lav;* See Bryde, 
op.cit. 3 and Ch. 2.
107 See: .M, Rheinstein, 'Problems of Law in the New Nations of Africa’ , in 
Geertz, op.cit. 220, at 224—5; R* Seidman j 'Law and Economic Devel­
opment. . .' 1966 Wisconsin Law Rev. 9991 at 1042; E. Johnson, op.cit. 
23-4; Sawer, op.cit. 52; and M. Smith, op.cit. 25-6.
108 G. Constanzo-Beccaria, 'Traditions, Legislations and Customary Lav;s 
in Ethiopia', 3 Proceedings of the Third International Conference of 
Ethiopian Studies 175i at lSo '(1970) ;Marein, op.cit. 250;' and Se'dler, 
op.cit. 588* Intimacies found in the extended family and village 
are obstacles to the establishment of dealings on a straightforward 
commercial basis (L. Fuller, 'Human Interactions and the Lav/1, in
R. Wolff, ed., The Rule of Lav; 171, at 207 (1971). The Wilsons 
(op.cit. 162) add:
Any attempt to bolster up a legal system based on kinship is 
doomed to failure in an expanding society,for it is part of 
a small-scale system. Wide-scale law is a necessary part of 
wide-scale society.
109 See K.-F. Koch, 'Lav; and Anthropology', 4 Law and Society Rev. 11, 
at 21 (1969) and Schur, op.cit. 128.
110 See text accompanying Note 71, supra.
111 The arguments sketched in this paragraph are more fully developed in
Ch. 2. They parallel Worku's (op.cit. 2) call for an Ethiopian legal 
reform which can be implemented from today if goodwill in overcoming 
constraints is assumed -4 rather than for the creation of an ideal lav; 
for a remote future (see Chap. 7).
112 Cohen and Sileshi, op.cit. 12.
113 See: Id. and, e.g.: Guilder Frank, op.cit.; C. Thomas, Dependence
.and Transformation 51 and passim (1974)rf Griffen, op.cit". "9 and
passim;' IdY Apter,' ‘Political 'Change 204 (1973); and”BFooIcfield, op.cit. 
203-4. Gunder Frank's central argument, echoed by Griffen and 
Thomas, is that developed states may once have been undeveloped, but 
never underdeveloped. Underdevelopment is a recent'state of 
affairs brought about by the "imperialist" structure of world capit­
alist development. Prior to the nineteenth century, much of the
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Third World saw the spread of the money economy, the primitive 
accumulation of capital, the technological improvements and the 
growth of trade networks that are the rough equivalents of European 
experiences, Europe’s advantages stemmed largely from more modern- 
ised social conditions and were made decisive through the conquest, 
plunder and slavery that destroyed indigenous social forces working 
for a developmental transformation, (Thomas, op.cit, 58, Griffen, 
op.cit. 9 end Gunder Frank, op.cit. x-xii, tb-dfiZ Gunder Frank 
T l d T x i )  says that he
examines the North American Emperor’s social scientific )
clothing and exposes the scientific nakedness behind his 
ideological sham.
In general, dependence theorists are stronger on diagnosis 
than on the cure, which often involves breaking off relations with the 
capitalist world in favour of autarchy or an increasing dependence 
on socialist states - policies which do not seem to advance the 
cause of development markedly. A few modest successes have, however, 
been registered in the areas of international commodity marketing 
and development project funding. Their pre-colonial Arcadias of 
nascent development and socialism are usually grossly overdrawn as, 
for example, our brief review of Ethiopian history suggests. (See 
also our analysis of African Socialism in Chap. 4) • We agree with 
Barrington Moore, Jr. (see his Reflections, on the Causes of Human 
Misery. • • .44 1972) that, while the attempts by developed states 
to obtain crucial raw materials, the cultural effects of domination 
and repression (particularly by the U.S.), and the blindness to 
social alternatives inherent in according primacy to technology do 
made a contribution to misery in the Third World, a convincing case 
has never been made that dependence is the determinate cause of these 
miseries.
114- C. Thomas, op.cit. 30, 60, 63*
115 Cohen and Sileshi, op.cit. and Shack, ’Occupational Prestige. . .’
174. See: Furtado, op.cit. 129-30? flote 18, supra; and Bondestam,
op.cit. 539, 549.
116 Id., 539.
117 Conflicts within the Berg and its urban opposition are discussed in 
Chs. 5 and 7, and rural revolts related to land reforms in Ch. 6.
118 Gilkes,op.cit1; ‘ 185-6, 257-9 dnd passim. See “-Ch. 6.
119 ’Bandits, Others Surrender to Ethiopian Authorities', Rgdio Addis 
Ababa, 9 Oct. 1973, referring to incidents in Borana, Wolio.
120 'Les Militaires I^vitent la Population a se Mobilizer Face aux 
Risques de Secession dans le Nord', Le Monde, 10 Apr. 1976, 3?
C. Legum, 'Dergue Suffers Another Defeat1', The 0bserver(London - 
hereinafter Observer) 23 Jan. 1977, 6? M. Uwen, '"Feudal Duel’,
The Guardian (London - hereinafter Guardian) 22 Dec. 1975, 17?
'FT kiesevand, ’Anthropologist Stabbed "to“Death by Troops’, Guardian,
8 Oct. 1975, 3? M. Dobbs, ’A Bloody Farewell to Feudalism’, Guardian,
22 Nov. 1976, 4; D. Torgerson, ’Afars Describe Ethiopian Uprising*"," ’ 
International Herald Tribune, 21-2 June 1975, 1-2; W. Lee, ’Ethiopia:
A Review of the Derg*,£2 Africa Report 7, at 8 (March 1977)?
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J, MacManus, 'Ethiopia1s Armed Rabble Ready for Front', Guardian 
21 May 1977* 1? 'No Time for Compromises', Africa No. 67, 19 at
20 (March 1977); Gilkes, op.cit. 214; Kaplan, et al., op.cit. 99; 
and Clapham, Haile Selassie's Government 81-2. In our opinion, the 
effectiveness of the EDU has been exaggerated by, e.g., C. Legum, 
'Fighting on Three Fronts in Ethiopia', Observer, 12 Oct. 1975*
6, which largely reproduces a self-serving Press Release issued in 
London by the EDU on 9 Oct. The execution of a rebel leader, Brig. 
Gen. Teferra Yehayes, was said to be carried out by local "residents 
who regard the Revolution as the apple of their eye" (Radio Addis 
Ababa, 8 July 1975)* A former District Governor and large landowner, 
Fitewari Bekele Ogoto, was "put to the sword of the broad masses", 
a reminder that others
who cannot see that the sun of truth has begun to rise will 
be similarly dealt with. . . .  The people who want to rein­
state the old regime will be exposed by the light of Ethiopia- 
Tigdem and eliminated by the sword of Ethiopia Tigdem. (Radio 
Addis Ababa, 8 Oct. 1975)*
See the 1974 'Declaration of the ENDU', reproduced in H. Scholler 
sind P. Brietzke, Ethiopia: Revolution, Lav; and Politics 151-3 (1978)
and Chaps• 4-6•
121 G. Morrison, ’Eritrea and the Southern Sudan', Rev. Ed., 3-5 
(1978) - an extremely balanced survey; C. Legum, 'Ethiopiate Legacy 
is Poverty and Instability', Mew York Times, 31 Aug. 1975» S3; 
Federation of Eritrea Proclamation, NoV 124 of 1952, Neg. Gaz.
12/1; Termination of the Federal Status of Eritrea. . • Order,
No. 27 of 1962, Meg. G^z. 22/3; Hess, op.cit. 503, Markakis, op.cit. 
362;Kaplan, et al., op.cit. 64-5; and Farer, op.cit. 24-9* See Id.,
21 and Gilkes, op.cit. 179*
122 Morrison, op.cit. 5-9; Lee, op.cit. 8; and Farer, op.cit. 31-2.
123 Proc. 22 of 19751 Neg. Gaz. 31/18, which was changed slightly by 
Proc. 102 of 1978, Neg. Gaz. 38/3* The powers of the Special Conrts- 
Martial, created in November, 1974, are discussed in Chap. 5*
A nation-wide state of emergency was declared on 30 September 1975 
(Proc — 551 Neg. Gaz. 35/4) and repealed on 5 Dec. (Proc. 63»
Neg. Gaz. 35/10).
See P. Enahoro, 'Ethiopia Tikdem', Africa No. 44, 10, at 10 
(Apr. 1975) and R. Uwechwe, 'Editorial: Eritrea', Africa No. 53?
7 (Mar. 1975):
To neutral observers it has appeared all along that what the 
majority of Eritreans really wanted was a more democratic 
regime in Addis Ababa, which recognised their special 
circumstances and which offered them a squarer political paid 
economic deal. . . .  But since the shooting last November of 
Gen. Aman Andom, himself a respected Eritrean and known 
conciliator, opinion. • . has sharply hardened in favour of 
the SLF's demand for independence. (See Chap. 4).
124 E.g.: M. Dobbs,'Eritrean Guerrillas in New Offensive', Guardian, 18
November 1978, 4; D. Ottauay, 'New Ethiopian Drive Against Eritrea 
Likely', Guardian, 13 Oct. 1978, 4; Temene Asmare, 'Peasant March 
Halted for Talks with Eritrea. Rebels', Guardian, 8 June 1978, 3»
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D. Connell, ’Ethiopian Army Retreats', Guardian, 22 Mjgy 1976,
M. Owen, 'Ethiopia Recruits a Peasant Army to Crush Rebellion*,
Guardian 13 May 1976, 2; 'Teferi Banti’s Speech*, Addis Ababa Radio,
12 Sept. 1975s
bandits - drunk with the dollars of some enemies of the 
Ethiopian people - have become an obstacle to the Eritrean 
people, preventing them from sharing the achievements of the 
Revolution.
The Derg*s foreign affairs spokesman argues:
since Ethiopia’s unity and territorial integrity are not 
negotiable, the only alternative left. * • is to crush the 
treacherous successionist movements (’Ethiopia to Crush 
Rebels*, Guardian 28 May 1978, 9)*
We have found the reportage of David Ottaway, "Tamene Asmare11 and 
Peter Enahoro to be consistently accurate and perceptive. Since the 
Derg does not permit foreign journalists to enter Eritrea, the few 
first-hand reports of separatist activities come from those who 
travel with Eritrean spearatists and are surprisingly uninformative 
(e.g., R. Trench, ’Just Blow Yourself up if we are Caught*, Observer,
10 July 1977♦ 6 and S. Dring, ’Behind the Scenes with the Patient 
Guerrillas’, Observer, 26 June 1977* 6). Peasant associations are 
discussed in Chap- 6.
125 Quoted by H. Pick, ’Shaba Invasion not in Cuba’s Interests’,
Guardian 19 June 1978, 6. See also, e.g.: M. Wells, ’Between the Devil 
and the Deep Red Sea', Guardian 20 Jan. 1978, 11; V. Brittain,
'Ethiopia Launches Full-scale Offensive in^Eritrea’, Guardian,
17 May 1978, 6 and'Mengistu Defies Cuban Advice on Eritrea Offensive*, 
Guardian 29 May 1978, 6; C. Legum, ’Now Eritreans in Firing Line1, 
Observer32 Mar. 1978, 11; 'Siege of Massawa*, Guardian, 31 Dec.
1977» 47 ’Eritrean Guerrillas Claim New Victories', Guardian, 23 
Feb. 1978 , 6; and ’Addis Bombs Eritrea*, Guardian 20 Apr. 1978 , 6.
126 E.g., J. Markakis and Nega Ayele, Class and Revolution in Ethiopia 
UC-5 (1978); 'Eritrea Guerrillas Confident They Can Seize Asmara’,
New York Times 7 Mar. 1975* R* Trench, 'Eritreans Link Up in 
Fight for Own Country', Observer 1 May 1977, 6; D. Ottaway,
'Eritreans Fear Victory by Rebels will Bring Civil War', Guardian,
2 Feb. 1977, 2; J. Randall, op.cit. and ’Eritreans Unhappy in 
Victory', Guardian, 10 Aug. 1977, 6; Morrison, op.cit. 9, and 
Uwechwe, op.cit.
127 E.g.: Kaplan et al., op.cit. 321, 66-7; J* MacManus, 'Somalia
Goes Softly. .' , Guardian, 15 Sept. 1976, 3 end 'Peace Talks
Start on Ogaden Dispute' , Guardian, 5 Aug. 1977, 6; 'Britain Ready 
to Increase Somalia Aid', Guardian, 19 Jan* 1978 , 6; 'War on the 
Horn of Africa', New Internationalist No. 62, 8, at 9 (Apr. 1978);
C. Smith, 'Somalia: We Send Army into Ogaden', Observer 12 Feb.
1978, 1; Markakis and Nega, op.cit. 172-3; and I.M. Lewis, 'Has the 
Dergue Had its Day?', Guardian, iff Aug. 1977, 11# While Prof. Lewis
is an extremely perceptive observer of Somali affairs and while there is 
much that is valuable in the article cited, we find it to be unduly 
biased in ,fgv<^ r of the Somalis. In particular, he argues that 
the basic Somali ’’political problem" is "to extend the state front­
iers to embrace the whole nation". This sounds like the Sudetenland 
argument that has never been recognised under international law.
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Ethiopia is "rapidly returning to the anarchic eighteenth century era 
of the princes which preceded the making of the modern state by 
Emperor Menelik", he argues, suggesting that such modernisation as 
has occurred in the interim is reversible* We have argued, supra, 
that a "modern state" has never existed in Ethiopia and can only now, 
perhaps, be created. The Somali invasion certainly does not further 
this process*
E*g*s J* MacManus: 'New Weapons for Old Rivalries’, Guardian, 13 
Sept. 1976, 11; ’Outright War Looms in the Horn*, Id. 11 Aug* 19771 
*f; ’Ethiopia Rebels take Desert Towns’, Id*, 26 July 1977, 6;
’Ethiopia Angry at Moves to Create "Arab Lake"*,Id., 28 July 1977,
7; and ’Major Taik Kills Claimed in the Desert’, Id*, 30 July 
1977, D- Ottaway, ’Ethiopia Charges Somalia is Preparing for War’, 
International Herald Tribune,2 Nov. 1976, 1-2; ’Kenya and Somalia 
Hold Border Talks’, Guardian 21 July 1977, 3\ ’Somalia Raids Desert 
Convoys*,Id., 22 Feb. 1977, 2; V. Brittain, ’Ogaden Has Been Overrun’, 
Id., 10 Aug. 1977 , 6; R. Wilkinson, ’Somalia Accused of Invasion 
by Addis’, Id*, 25 July 1977 , 6; E. Rogers, ’Ethiopia Shows Somalia 
Battle Claim False’, Id., 15 Aug. 1977, 7; and Farer, op.cit. 101.
At a press conference some two months before the invasion, the 
President of Somalia stated: "We don’t believe that bloodshed,
torture and killing is Socialism" (quotfed lay D. Ottaway, ’Somalia Bees 
Change in Soviet Policy’, Guardian, 17 May 1977, 7)*
129 E.g.: M* Woollacott, ’Two of the World’s Poorest Countries. • .’,
Guardian 6 Mar. 1978, 14 and ’Trapped Asmara is Ethiopia’s Weakest 
Spot’, Guardian, 22 Feb. 1978, 5; H.Pick, ’Somalia Pulls Out of the 
Ogaden’, Guardian, 10 Mar. 1978, 1; J. MacManus, ’Somalis to Fall 
Back on Guerrilla Tactics’ Guardian, l*f Feb. 1978, 1; V. Brittain, 
’Somalia Hit by Revenge Raids’. Guardian, 23 June 1978, 1; C. Legum, 
’Now Eritrea in the Firing Line*, Observer, 12 Mar. 1978, 11; and 
’Russian Buildup Shocks the West*, Observer, 22 Jan 1978, 7;
’Key Town Falls. • .’, Guardian, 6 Mar. 1978: 1; ’Another Town 
Falls. . .*, 9 Mar. 1978, 10;’Troopships Head for Ethiopian War', 
Guardian, 8 Feb*1978, 1; ’Ethiopia.Retakes Railway’, Guardian, 13 
Mar. 1978, 6; ’Ethiopia Denies Ceasefire’, Guardian, 11 Mar. 1978,
6; and ’Somali Leader Stronger', Guardianj 11 Apr. 1978, 6.
E.g.: M. Woollacott, ’Dismal Trade of the Gun Runners’, Guardian
15 Feb. 1978, 6 and ’Ethiopia Talks of Break With West, Id. at 1;
J. MacManus, ’Russia Raises the Stakes’, Guardian, 22 Feb. 19?8,
15; J. Steele, ’TIS Studies Arms Supply to Somalians’, Guardian, 21 
Jan. 1978, *f; V. Brittain, ’Somalia Closes Door to Russia’, Guardian 
1^ Nov. 1977,1; Legum, loc. cit.; ’Somali Leader Visits Khaled for 
Talks', Guardian, Ik Sept. 1977, 8; ’Kenyans Ground Egyptian Arms 
Lift’, Guardian.16 Feb. 1978, 7; ’Somali Arms Halted*, Guardian,
20 Oct. 1977, 6; ’Arab Countries Behind Major Arms Shipments to 
Somalis’, Guardian117 Feb. 1978 , 6.
131 E.g.: J. Borrell, *0AU Dispute on Djibouti Declaration', Guardian.
29 June 1976 , 2; J. MacManus, ’Scenario for an African Nightmare*,
Id., l*f Sept. 1976 , 3; P* Webster and J. MacManus, ’Confusion 
Reigns as France Stops Ruling', Id., 22 Mar. 1977, 2; and I. Lewis, 
’The Key to the Horn of Africa’, Id., 22 June 1977, 12.
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152. E,r.{ ’Airlift Plans by Rebels’, Observer, 20 July 1975, 6;
D. Ottaway, 'Numeri Ready for Conflict1, Guardian, 27 Jan* 1977*
3 and 'Lagu Home Rule Takes Root', Id., 7 Apr* 1977, 9; F. Bridgeland, 
’Khartum Talks Aim to Heal Rifts’, Xd*i l*f Oct. 1977 * 9; ’Ethiopia 
and Sudan Settle’, Id., 20 Dec. 1977, 6; ’Ethiopia Accuses Sudan 
Militia’, Id*i 13 Apr. 1977, 8; ’Moscow Backs Wrong Horses’, Id.,
2 June 1977, 6; ard Kaplan, et al., op.cit, 316• We disagree with 
Lee (op.cit. 11), who argues that Sudan poses the most dramatic 
threat to the Derg's existence.
133 J. Spencer, 'Haile Selassie. . .’ 18 Orbis 1129, at 1129 (1975);
P. Schwab, op.cit. 97, Kaplan, et al., op.cit. 307-8, 318; and 
Scholler and Brietzke, op.cit. 3k* See Wheeler, op.cit. 5**-5*
13^ For contradictory analyses of the U.S.S.R.'s strategic interests in 
the Horn, see, e.g., C. Legum, 'The Gorshov Strategy', Observer, 20 
Mar. 1977, 13 and Farer, op.cit. 105-19* Subsequent events seem 
to have validated Farer's arguments, rather than those of Legum.
135 E.g.: 'Ethiopia Warned by U.S.’, Guardian, 20 May 1976, 2; J. Steele,
'U.S. Cuts Aid on Rights Grounds’ Id., 2& Feb. 1977, 2; Lee, op ,cit. 
11; Farer, op.cit. 1^3-^; Ottaway, ’’Ethiopia Attempts to Improve
its Poor Relations with the U.S.’, Guardian, 23 Sept. 1977, 8; 
Woollacott, ’Ethiopia Gets U.S. Supplies', Id., 2k Feb. 1978, 1;
S. McBee, 'Compromise by Carter Saves the Foreign Aid Bill',
Id., l*f Oct. 1977, 9; and A. Brummer, 'Anti-Aid Lobby Threat to 
Carter', Id., 3 July 1978, 6. Human rights in Ethiopia are discussed 
in Chaps. 5 and 8. A senior Ethiopian Foreign Ministry official 
has said1
America has suddenly invented the code phrase "human rights" 
with which to slander those cpuntries it does not like. The 
phrase means no more than the other great cliche we heard from 
Washington in the sixties, the need to make the world one. I 
see no difference between Jimmy Carter and his predecessors 
• • • • For us, it remains a most inhuman country. (Quoted by 
J. MacManus, 'Ethiopia Stands Firm on Djibouti’, Guardian;
2k May, 1977, 5)«
It. seems that, for a variety of reasons, including the Derg’s social­
ist inclinations and internal struggles, the felt need to engage in 
bloody repressions, and increased friendship with the U.S.S.R., 
the U.S. lost influence in Ethiopia.' (see MacManus, ’Big Power 
Scramble for the Horn’, Guardian, 16 Sept. 19?6, k) *
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Dec. 1977, See C. Thomas, op.cit. 69 and,e.g.: J. Dimbleby,
'Time Passed. • .', Guardian, 23 Feb. 1977, 12; L. Adamson, 'Prompt 
Response*, Id., 2*f Feb. 1977, 13? and L. Gamer, 'Hunger and After', 
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IhO Greenfield, 'The Eritreans. • at 2117; D. Grieg, International 
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CHAPTER 2
See International Legal Center, Law and Development 15 (197*0*
•Record of the First Development Decade*, in G. Meier, ed., Leading 
Issues in Economic Development 2d Ed., 34, at 3*f-5 (1970).
Seers, in N. Uphoff and W. Ilchman, *Development in the Perspective 
of Political Development*, In Uphoff and Ilchman, The Political 
Economy of Development, 75« at 75 (1972). Tawia Ocran, *Law, African 
Development, and Social Engineering*, 3 and *1- Zambia Law 
Journal 16, at 17* 1971-2 adds: "It is indeed an error to think of
development merely as a campaign of production, to be fought with 
budgets and monetary policies, and to be measured by indices of output 
and income. The development process is much wider and deeper ••••** 
Ralf Dahrendorf (op.cit. l*f, 22) stresses the need for qualitative 
rather than quantitative development in the First and Second Worlds, 
and reminds us that it flis not the human condition which is at 
fault; rather, it is real conditions created by human beings, and 
they can therefore be changed.1* In other words, Ethiopia is not 
underdeveloped because her people are stupid, immoral or lazy, often 
described at a higher level of analytical sophistication as a high pre­
ference for leisure or the existence of a backward-bending supply 
curve of labour.
International Legal Center, op.cit. 23? H. .Brookfield^ Interdependent 
Development X (1975) ; A* Klinghoffer, ’Modernisation and Political 
Development in Africa*, 11 J. Mod. Af. Studs. 1, at 1-2 (1973);
C. Thomas, Dependence and Transformation *f8 (197*0? and N. Uphoff and 
W. Ilchman, The Political Economy of Change 20-1 (1969)* Brookfield 
(op.cit. 2) adds: f,No Melanesian cargo-cult prophet has been more
emphatic in his assertions of revealed truth than have some of our 
development economists.'* The impact of the social mythology of the 
observer’s culture is described by IgcrKopytoff (’Socialism and 
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or behind the substratum. So far so good, given Renner's chosen 
analytical framework. We begin to part company with him, however, 
when he argues that legal leads and lags create repercussions iz> the 
substratum but cannot change it fundamentally. Renner argues that 
extensive changes in the nature and use of property in a relatively 
short time show that a fundamental social change is possible without 
corresponding changes in the legal system. He even goes so far as to 
suggest that the collectivisation of all property through law would 
not alter the nature of the economic system; property and contracts 
would retain all of their capitalist functions. In one sense,
Renner suggests nothing more than a commonplaces law may be a 
condition of capitalist development but does not create it. This
is consistent with our argument that two country's laws and the 
manner in which they are applied can differ considerably from a 
lawyer's viewpoint, yet have a similar impact on development.
Criteria other than those used in traditional legal analysis ought 
therefore to be devised. Three examples can be offered to illustrate 
the limitations inherent in Renner's views. First, it cannot be 
denied that contemporary English land law is influenced both by 
feudal concepts of tenures and estates and the laissez faire spirit 
introduced by judges in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Nevertheless, contemporary judge-made rules and statutes have 
effected considerable changes in the law of property. It can even 
be argued that the Rent Acts of 1968 and 197^ (regulating some rents 
and conferring security of tenure on certain tenants) and the 
Community Land Act, 1975 (authorising local governments broadly to 
acquire all land they may wish to use for "relevant development") 
have operated so as to change the English property 'substratum* 
markedly. Second, an old concept such as that of a trust can be 
given new meanings. In the U.S., when elections fail to provide an 
adequate safeguard against abuse of office by a labour union official, 
the court will impose fiduciary responsibilities in favour of the 
members upon the official. In theU.K., a fiduciary relationship has 
recently been imposed in favour of the "deserted mistress" for 
purposes of property distribution, in certain circumstances. The law 
is probably changing in advance of community mores, since some
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mistresses are treated like wives for property distribution purposes* 
Today, Renner might argue that the basic idea of a trust (which 
exists only imperfectly in civil law) has not changed* but certainly 
the range of fact situations to which the concept applies has ex­
panded markedly since it was first devised* Applications of the law 
thus change to meet changing ideals of justice and empirical theories 
of temptation* Third, the Soviet Union had a quasi-feudal or prim­
itive capitalist economic system prior to the gradual collectiv­
isation of property that created enormous changes in the *substratum1• 
As Chaps* 6-7 show, the same kind of process is occurring in Ethiopia 
today. It can be argued that these are primarily political changes, 
but we would argue that law also plays an important role. In sum, 
we cannot foreclose the possibility that meaningful ©cio-economic 
change can be achieved through law, and other arguments are developed 
in this regard in Chaps 6-7* Renner develops many other arguments 
which are useful to our analysis and are discussed in Chap* 7*
See Renner, op.cit*, 251-61 and passim, and Selznick, op.cit* 35*
92 Other one-dimensional modernisation theories related to law and not 
included in the text are: from endogomy to exogamy; from feuds to 
punishment by organised political society; and Dicey*s growth of 
statute-making, representing the increased articulateness and power of 
public opinion* See; R. Schwartz and J. Skolnick, Society and the 
Legal Order (1970); R. Schwartz and J. Miller, 'Legal Evolution 
and Societal Complexity1, in L. Friedman and S. Macaulay, eds.,
Law and the Behavioral Sciences 976, at 976 (1969); M* Mead, 'Some 
Anthropological Considerations Concerning Natural Law', in Lloyd, 
op.cit. lMf, at 1*16; R* Pound, 'The Scope and Purpose of Sociological 
Jurisprudence', 25 Harvard Law Rev. I*t0, Ibb (1912); Hall, op.cit.
2b; Habermas,op.cit. 86; and Friedman, op.cit. 288-9*
93 Sawer, op.cit. 29. Schwartz and Miller, op.cit. 978, argue for 
the criteria of specialised counsel, non-kin mediation and police.
9*f Seidman, 'Law and Modernization in the Developing World', 1:77*
See Galanter, op.cit. 153* Contrast Galanter's criteria with those 
of J. Nyhart ('The Role of Law in Economic Development', 1962 Sudan 
Law J. Rev. 39^» at *f00-2): predictability - "men come to guide
their own actions in relation to others and to have confidence in 
their assessment of how others will act"; procedural capability - 
increased efficiency and decreasing arbitrariness; the habit forming 
force of education; the definition and clarification of the 
status of people and property; the maintenance of balance and a sense 
of proportion in society's goals; and the accommodation of change 
that permits a return to a state of equilibrium. The last two 
criteria assume a high level of social consensus which is typically 
lacking in Third World states. Nyhart notes,however, that modern­
ization criteria necessarily embody the value judgements of the 
theorist rather than the ones inherent in the law itself.
95 Unger, op.cit. 135*
96 See: A. Sereni, 'The Code and Case Law', in Schwartz, op.cit. 55, at 
73-^; Bryde, op.cit. 96; Ghai, 'Notes. • .* 35-6; Friedman, op.cit. 
2085 and Nyhart, op.cit. b03-b.
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Two of the celebrated paradoxes of the law ares law must be 
general and abstract, but justice requires attention to the 
individual case and its concrete detail; law must be stable 
and yet it cannot stand still* (Sawer, op.cit* l*fl).
Meir Heth (The Legal Framework of Economic Activity in Israel 251 , 1967) 
concludes that, in Israel, the "neglect of comprehensive planning and 
the confusion of guiding principles have led to the uneven development 
of the legal framework of economic activity". As Chaps* 3 and 7 
indicate, these criticisms can be applied to Ethiopia also*
97 R. Sedler, *The Development of Legal Systems: The Ethiopian Exper­
ience1, 53 Iowa Law Rev* 562, at 56^ (1967)*
98 R* Baldwin, Social Justice 3 (1966)* See P. Harrison, *6unnar 
Myrdal: Relying on Human Goodness1, Times 19 July 1976, 5*
99 Barzun and Graff, op*cit* 217^18* To cite but one example, consider 
Blacks argument (op*cit* 5*0 *
A legal problem is a problem of value and is forever beyond 
the reach of sociology* Jurisdictional conflict arises only 
when the sociologist makes policy recommendations in the name 
of science: In matters of legal policy, the lawyer must rely
on his own wits*.
Economists and political scientists (and politicians) might be heard 
to argue that policy questions belong to them* Note that if law is
not viewed as a science, recommendations made in the name of another
"science" are perceived as a threat to lawfs competence - which cannot 
be too great if it must rely merely on its "own wits". Characterising 
a problem as one of "jurisdictional conflict" tends to predetermine 
the result, for it is just this sort of problem that the lawyers are 
usually called upon to resolve*
100 See Id* 14-3 and Friedman, op.cit* vii.
101 See: R* Bribanti, fThe Role of Law in Political Development1, in
R. Wilson, ed*, International and Comparative Law of the Commonwealth 
6 , at 6 (1968); A* Gegenav, in Georgian Conference on Law1, in 
Lloyd, op.cit* 667, at 667; Lenski, op.cit* 23; T. Cowan, 1What Law 
can do for Social Science1, in Evan, op.cit* 91, at 108-9; Seidman,
^aw and Modernization in the Developing World1 1:122; and Friedman, 
op.cit. 10, k3m According to Myrdal (Asian Drama 15* 1977)* the 
problem of objectivity cannot be solved by attempting to eradicate 
valuations, as every study of social problems is necessarily a study of 
valuations. Research becomes objective - in the only sense in which 
that term can be used - when value premises are expressly incor­
porated.
102 T* Arnold, ^he Symbols of Government1 in M. and F. Cohen, eds., 
Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal Philospphy 836, at 837 
(l951)> See Russell, op.cit.' 190-1*
10^ See: G. Sartori, Democratic Theory 306 (1962) ; H. Berman and R.
Gendarme, quoted in Seidman, fLaw and Modernization in the Developing 
World1, 1:60; and Hall, op.cit. 117-18.
10*f See: David Riesman, quoted by Schur, op.cit* 6 ; Sawer, op.cit. 15*
126; Cairns, op.cit. 126-7; and Unger, quoted by P. Brietzke, ed.,
A Source-Book of Ethiopian Law and Development 89-90 (1975).
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Schwartz and Skolnick, ('Introduction1 3* at 5) add:
Sociology is committed to the understanding of the social 
order; law provides the framework of formal norms within which 
complex societies function. Sociology concerns itself with 
the processes of social control and social change; legal 
institutions comprise a major agency through which society 
seeks authoritatively to exercise its control function and to 
limit or direct social change* Sociology studies the forms 
of organization through which men seek to accomplish their 
purposes; legal organization provides a fascinating mixture of 
purposive action and unintended consequence*
Unger, op.cit* 250 adds: "A society's law constitutes the chief
bond between its culture and its organization; it is the external 
manifestation of the embeddedness of the former in the latter"*
105 The author was advised to delete this footnote because of the threat 
of a libel action* For those who are familiar with writings about 
Ethiopia, the references will be immediately apparent* If the statement 
in the text cannot be accepted on this basis, it should be disregarded.
106 See e.g., Thomson, Ethiopia: The Country that Cut off its Head (1975)*
107 While Marx equated law and ideology, Western jurisprudence finds 
that the two are in,conflict, as a result of the arbitrariness of 
ideology and its disregard for the procedures, pluralism and consensus 
formation alleged to be the essence of law. We describe these 
attitudes as a part of the ideology of legalism, and an ideologist
is bound to view legalism - but not necessarily law itself - as a 
constraint on necessary action. See: Ghai, 'Notes. « 32;
Chap. 4; and text following Note 112, infra* Related ideologies of 
law, such as the Rule of Law, are discussed in Chap* 5*
108 See: D. Riesman, 'Law and Sociology', in Evan, op.cit* 12, at 
1(d~17; Seidman, 'Law and Stagnation in Africa*, 43-^ ;""D. Trubeck,
'Max Weber on Law and Capitalism', 1972 Wisconsin Law Rev. 720,
at 7^0; Farrar, op.cit* 149, 170; Mayhew, op.cit* 209; Freeman, op.cit* 
116-7; and J. Shklar, 'Legalism' , in Lloyd, op.cit* 33, at 33-4*
That legal education in the Vest perpetuates legalism is illustrated 
by a UNESCO study (C* Eisenmann, The University Teaching of Social 
Science - Law 10, 1973): !
The training of lawyers today. . . is in a state of crisis, as in­
deed is the science of law itself. Many lawyers think that 
the remoteness of that science from the social, political and 
moral realities of law. . . , which had been denounced at the 
end of the nineteenth century, still exists, and declare that 
they will no longer* accept it. The practicing profession 
demands purely technical knowledge, teaching methods divorce 
law from social reality,and theorists fear that an integration 
of law and social sciences could endanger the Rule of Law*
109 Bankowski and Mungham, op.cit. 33* See: N. Chomsky, cited in
Id. 36-7; Id., 39; A. Hunt, 'State and Class Struggle*, Marxism Today 
178, at 185 (June 1976)? Shklar, op.cit. 34, 36; and Friedman7 o'p.ci't'.
vii. The mystifying professionalism of Western lawyers has-been 
best described by W.H. Auden (quoted by Bankowski and Mungham, op.cit* 
37):
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Law is as I’ve told you before,
Law is as you know I suppose,
Law is but let me explain it once more,
Law is the law*
The cult of legal professionalism is widespread in socialist 
countries as well, with the exception of China and a few other 
countries* There are differences, however: in the Soviet Union, for
example, there is a greater appreciation of social control tnrough soc­
ial relations based on group membership, and large areas of public 
life, including politics and policy-making processes, are viewed as 
within the realm of coercion and the preservation of common unity 
rather than reason and law* See Berman, Justice in the U.S.S.R.
268-70.
110 See: Seidman, ’Law and Stagnation in Africa1, *f5; R. Wasserstrom,
quoted by H. Zinn, ’The Conspiracy of Law’, in R. Wolff, ed., The 
Rule of Law 15, at 31 (1971); D* Lloyd, ’Meaning of Law’ in Lloyd, 
op.cit* 39, at 39; Kahn-Freund, ’Introduction’, 8-9; Freeman, op.cit* 
108-9; Hayek, op.cit. 66; and Shklar, op.cit. 3*N 36-7* Shklar argues 
that English judges and practitioners have ’’almost leant over backwards” 
to adapt to English ’’socialist legislation”* This argument is only 
partly true: the appellation ’’socialist” is debatable, Bench and Bar
have vitiated some important statutory provisions (e.g., the Housing 
Act 1957, s. 32 and the Rent Acts generally) and Parliament often 
circumvents the traditional legal system by establishing non-judicial 
tribunals in which legal aid cannot be obtained.
For Austin and Kelsen, law is no more than the rules of the litigation 
game; they begin by postulating the nature of law and deducing con­
clusions instead of creating a definition of law as a rational gener­
alisation in relation to the subject matter. See Seidman, loc.cit* 
and Lloyd, loc. cit. k5*
111 See P. Merkl, Modem Comparative Politics *f25 (1970) and Smart, op.cit*
157.
112. Sawer, op.cit. 15. Sawer’s last point serves an effective criticism 
of Renner’s views concerning property. (See Note 91, supra).
113 G* Keeton, personal communication*
114 Unger, Law in Modem Society 251. See: J. Finnis, ’Revolutions and
Continuity of Law’, in Simpson, op.cit. ¥f, at 66; Lloyd, ’Sociological
Jurisprudence*, 350; E. Hoebel, ’’The Functions of Law’, in Grossmans, 
op.cit. 13, at 16; ’Introduction to Part II’, in Schwarts and Skolnick, 
op.cit. 113; and F. Davis et al., op.cit. 1^ 2.
115 P. Self, Administrative Theories and Politics 210-13 (1972). See:
W. Gellhora, Ombudsmen and Others ^23 (1988) ; Evan, op.cit. 7, 5? 
Fitzgerald, op.cit. 23; Kelsen, op.cit. 88; H. Shepherd and B. Sher,
Law in Society: An Introduction to Freedom of Contract 2 (i960) ; and
T. Mcdarthy, 'Introduction1 in HahermasV op.cit. vii, at xi. Myrdal 
(quoted in Furtado, op.cit. approaches the issues discussed by 
Self from a different perspective • When economists advance their views 
of social imperatives in the name of their science, their
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conclusions unmistakably imply the notion that economic analysis 
is capable of yielding laws in the sense of norms and not merely 
laws in the sense of demonstrable recurrences and regularities 
of actual and possible events#
We would argue that this tendency gives rise to competition between 
lawyers and economists for the power to create norms#
116 J# Robinson, op#cit. 122. See: J. Cohen and Sileshi Sisaye,
’Research Problems in Describing and Explaining Ethiopia's Socio­
economic Development* 2 (1976); Russell, op.cit# 64-5-6; Friedrich, 
op.cit# 7i 172; McCarthy, op.cit# x; Selznick, op.cit. 18; Kuhn, 
quoted in Lloyd, 'Introduction', 5; Apter, op.cit. 190; and Warshay, 
op.cit. 157- Legal positivism, and other social science positivisms, 
cannot achieve the precision found in the natural sciences, yet they 
cannot escape the limitations inherent in scientific thought either.
They can only study phenomena rather than essences. For the positivist, 
ideas require concrete empirical referents and concepts such as 
justice, the rule of law and due process can only be studied to the 
extent that they are grounded in concrete experience. Value judge­
ments supposedly have no cognitive meaning in science, which cannot 
discover them in the empirical world. See Black, op.cit. 46-7•
117 See: Friedman, op.cit# 14-9. Keynes (quoted by, e.g., A. Ewing,
Industry in Africa xvii, 1968) argues that:
The difficulty lies, not in new ideas, but in escaping from the 
old ones. . . .  Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the 
air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler 
of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested inter­
ests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroach­
ment of ideas.
Yash Ghai ('Notes# « 31). adds that ideologies operate at the level
of ideas which influence consciousness and, ultimately, behaviour.
By way of contrast, law is thought to operate more concretely in the 
West, changing behaviour through the application of sanctions. Else­
where, Ghai notes numerous interrelations of law and ideology. See 
Note 107, supra and the text following Note 112.
118 Hall, op.cit. 82-5. See: Selznick, op.cit. 19; Myrdal, in Lloyd,
op.cit# 17; aidj. Robinson, op.cit. 123. "The legal system is at once 
an embodiment of high ideals and a means by which men can deal with the 
quite mundane and often messy conflicts and problems that arise in 
everyday living". (Schur, op.cit# 202)# "Legal rules, save the most 
technical or procedural, are value-loaded precepts par excellence" 
(Ocran, op.cit. 23)- Lawyers only practice a trade while they are 
settling disputes, but a "fuller professional development”occurs when 
law is used as "an embodiment of values ^ /albeit in a stratified 
society rather than as sheer social technique". (Nonet and Carlin, 
quoted ip 'Introduction to Part III', Schwartz and Skolnick, op.cit#
263, at 263)- Neil MacCormick (quoted by Stein and Shand, op .cit.
258) contends that —
principles express the underlying purposes of detailed rules 
and specific institutions, in the sense that they are seen as 
rationalising them in terms of consistent, coherent and desir­
able goals. Thus legal principles are the meeting-point of rules 
and values.
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Unlike scientists, lawyers cannot repeat experiments to verify their 
hypotheses, but the principles they create decide cases, while scientific 
•cases’ are part of the material from which a scientific principle is 
drawn* Legal principles change in response to changed moral and 
and policy considerations, as well as to changes in fact situations# 
Lawyers reason by analogy and choose from among competing analogies, 
while scientists cannot use analogies (Dias, Jurisprudencet 4th Ed*
208 1976). The process of legal reasoning is closer to the manner in 
which politicians, administrators and businessmen actually make 
decisions than are social' science methodologies#
119 In Asian Drama (559, 1977) Myrdal argues that changes in per capita 
national income can only be a rough-and-ready indicator of more complex 
changes in the entire social system, and that emphasising this crit­
erion results in an undue concentration on the more easily accessible 
and measurable economic conditions of underdevelopment*
120 See W* Harvey, 'Comment' in Arkhurst, op.cit* 147, at 149 end Myrdal, 
in Lloyd, op.cit* 18. Karl Popper (2 The Open Society and its Enemies 
260-1 , 1965/ takes the position that
all scientific descriptions of facts are highly selective 
• * * . It is not only impossible to avoid a selective point 
of view, but also wholly undesirable to attempt to do so; for 
if we could do so, we should get not a more "objective" 
description, but only a mere heap of entirely unconnected 
statements. But, of course, a point of view is inevitable; 
and the naive attempt to avoid it can only lead to self 
deception and to the uncritical appreciation of an unconscious 
point of view.
121 T. Cowan, op.cit* 105-4, 109* See Dias, Jurisprudence 208 (1976) and 
Friedman, op.cit* 216. "Legal thinking is sui generis* Its logic is 
instrumental and functional, and though precise, it is not mechanical.
It is creative and purposive, but not haphazard". (Dias, Jurispru­
dence 4th Ed. 215 1976)*
122. See T. Cowan, op.cit. 94, 96, 106-7, 109; Habermas, op*cit* 112-13,
119; Schur, op.cit., 202; d'Entreves, op.cit. 153, l60; J. Robinson, 
op.cit* 119; and R .Pound, 'Contemporary Juristic Theory', in Lloyd, 
op.cit* 369, at 372.
123 Myrdal, Asian Drama 15, 27, 364 (1977). Traditional values are 
defined as part of inherited cultures long identified with stagnating 
societies (Id., at 37).
124 Id., at 30-6. The best authority for the theoretical validity of 
these ideals is, of course, the creative use Myrdal makes of them*
125 Id., 36-7.
126 Id., 6 , 27-8. See Harrison, op.cit*
127 Self, op.cit. 258.
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128 P. Sarnuelson, Economics; An Introductory Analysis 5 (6th Ed. 196*f). 
Sarnuelson emphasises resource allocation, income level determination 
and income distribution, but a fourth factor which concerns at least 
some economists - organisation and control or the structure of 
power - receives insufficient attention. See W. Samuels, 'Law and 
Economics' 7 J* of Ec. Issues 535* at 536-7 (1973)• We have therefore 
incorporated this fourth factor in our analyses.
129 As used by Uphoff and Ilchman in 'The New Political Economy' (see at 
1). According to A. Grunchy (’Law, Politics and Institutional 
Economics', 7 of Economic Issues 623, aud 626-7 (1973) i all pol­
itical, economic and legal systems are decision-making processes 
concerned with the allocation or distribution of scarce resources, 
with the authority to enforce decisions through separate but closely- 
related institutional systems. We argue that these systems are 
separable for analytical purposes only.
130 Barth, quoted by Seidman, 'Law and Stagnation in Africa', 52•
131 Hurst, Law and Social Order in the United States *f3» 105•
132 See Uphoff and Ilchman, 'The New Political Economy', 78, 80-3 and 
The Political Economy of Change 53, and Tangri, op.cit. bjfc. Easton 
(quoted by P. Merkl, Modem Comparative Politics 306, 1970) makes 
the related argument that, as economics deals with scarce resource 
allocations, so political science deals with the "authoritative- 
allocation of values" by means of governmental processes. We argue
. that this approach seems to divide unduly an essentially unitary 
process, merely because two academic disciplines approach the subject- 
. matter differently. We note, however, that law is the primary 
means used for the "authoritative allocation of values".
133 See Habermas, op.cit. 5,8.
13b See: Uphoff and Ilchman, 'The New Political Economy', 88-92 and
The Political Economy of Change 31, 97 (1969); B. Gross, The Managing 
of Organizations 35 (1964) ; S. Eisenstadt, 'Social Change and Devel­
opment*, in Id., ed., Readings in Social Evolution and Development 
3, at b (I970T; Hurst, Law .and Social Order in the United States 119-205 
Habermas, op.cit. 36; S. Huntington, The Soldier and the State 06 
(1957); Furtado, op.cit. 8*f; Finer, op.cit. 12-3;and G. Lenski, Power 
and Privilege b$ (1966) • Lenski terms "privilege" what we have char­
acterised as 'property*.
135 .Xd- 515.
136 Hayek, op.cit. bm
137 See C. Ganang and R. Pearce, Law and Society 76 (1965)*
Samuels (op.cit. 537) argues that law's fundamental impact on the 
economy lies in the division of power between public aidprivate spheres 
and within each sphere. Robert Lee Hale (Freedom Through Law 132 1952) 
maintains that "we rely on coercive bargaining power, not only for 
distributing the output of our collective processes of production but 
also for bringing that production into existence". Clive Thomas
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(op.cit. 309) adds that the most fundamental contradictions which 
occur during the transition from underdevelopment to development are 
between state and social forms of property and between juridical and 
formal controls over the means of production. As a result, the nation­
alisation of property leaves social relations and the forms of approp­
riation and exploitation unchanged. These arguments are similar to 
Renner’s: see Note 91, supra.
138 See A. Allott, ’African Law in the 1980’sf, in Arkhurst, op.cit. 163, 
at l6*f and Ghai and McAuslan, op.cit. 516.
139 Hurst, op.cit. 17-18.
140 See A. Hirschman, ’Obstacles to Development*,'in The Political Economy 
of Development 55, at 59-61, discussing Leon Festinger’s Theory of 
Cognitive Dissonance. Hirschman would therefore reject Hagen’s 
assertion that an integrated social science theory is necessarily a 
theory of personality formation in childhood - the best framework for 
human behaviour studies. (See E. Hagen, On.the Theory of Social 
Change 5 1962). Myrdal (Asian Drama 360 (1977) defines policies as 
induced changes in causal circles of underdevelopment which can be 
coordinated through development planning (see text, supra, however). 
Policies are easily changed vhile attitudes and institutions are
stubborn and especially resistant to change through indirect means*
l*fl Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice, I, ii, 13.
1^2 See Freeman, op.cit. 7 and W. Evan, ’Law as an Instrument of Social
Change’, in Grossmans, op.cit. *f3, at
I*f3 See Uphoff and Ilchman, ’The Political Economy of Land Reform*, 
in The Political Economy of Development 279, at 28l
lMf Quoted by Meier, Leading Issues in Economic Development 7^- (1970).
1^5 G. Myrdal, 1 Asian Drama 66-7 (1968).
I*f6 Baro Tumsa, ’Decentralization and Nation-building in Ethiopia’
' 8 (1973)• See: Lenski, op.cit. 18-19; Chap. 1, supra.; and, e.g.,
the (Ethiopian) Planning Commission Order, No. 63 of 1970, Neg. Gaz. 
29/19, discussed in Chap. 3*
1^7 See: S. Eisenstadt, Modernization, Protest and Change 39, 52
(1966); B. Nwabueze, Constitutionalism in Emergent States 168 (1973);
M. Esman, ’The Politics of ^Development Administration’, in J. Mont­
gomery and W. Siffen, eds. / Approaches to Development 59, at 70 
(1966); M. Smith, cited in H. and L. Kuper, ’Introduction*, in African 
Law 5, at 18 (1965); C. Anderson et al., Issues of Political Devel­
opment 28, 75 (1967); Cohen and Sileshi, op.cit. 2, 10; and Kling- 
hoffer, op.cit. l*f.
1^8 G. Keeton, personal communication. See: R. Jackson and M. Stein,
Issues in Comparative Politics 206 (1971); R. Tucker, The Marxian 
Revolutionary Idea 85 (1970) ; G. Ifeeger, The Politics of Underdevel­
opment 13** (197*0 ; Jaguribe, op.cit. 9^; Lenski, op.cit. 57V Farrar, 
op.cit. 10; Dahrendorf, op.cit. 290; Friedman, op.cit. 112; S. Finer, 
Comparative Government 29-30 (1970); and Uphoff and Ilchman, The Political
5<$3
Economy of Change, 73* Marx believed that the exercise of power could 
never be rightful, and that the dictatorship of the proletariat was a 
necessary evil (Tucker, op,cit. 8l)# This view posed grave difficulties 
when socialist states were created, and Marx's anarchistic position 
was discarded by practical politicians. The locus of legitimacy 
in a socialist state (analogous to the Western concept of sovereignty) 
is typically a vanguard party, which fortifies the leadership#
See G# Kennedy, TheMilitary and the Third World 19-22 (197*0 •
1^9 See: Id# 6; B# Moore, Jr# Reflections on the Causes • • • 52-3
(1972) ; McCarthy , op.cit# xiv-xvi (on Habermas'sviews) ; Uphoff and 
Ilchman, The Political Economy of Change 112; Friedman, op.cit# 213-1*M 
Freeman, op.cit# 5~4; J*Kaut^sky, Communism and the Politics of Devel­
opment l8i-*2 (1968); and Nwabueze, op.cit# 25# G# Kennedy,op.cit#
55,adds:
The legitimacy crisis in the developing world rests on the 
inability of any of the competing elites to sustain a political 
leadership for a long enough time for its concepts of public 
good to be supported by other elites and by the masses# The 
conflict situation is a permanent feature of the political 
system; it is pluralistic, involving conflicts within the 
governing elite# . «, and between the traditional and modern­
ising, between village and city, peasant and worker, landlords 
and tenants, collective and individual, Europeans and nationals, 
administrators and subjects and the rising and falling groups#
In pre-Revolutionary Ethiopia, competing elites were not allowed to 
achieve meaningful political leadership, and many of the conflicts 
Kennedy mentions are only now having a real impact on political events# 
Kennedy’s description also characterises legitimation crises in the 
First and Second Worlds nicely#
150 Kelsen, quoted in J. Eekelar, ’Principles of Revolutionary Legality’, 
in Simpson, op.cit# 22, at 27# See K# Boulding, ’The Legitimacy
of Economics', in The Political Economy of Development 2*f, at 24#
151 Niklas Luhmann, quoted by Habermas, op.cit# 98#
3-52 See: Renner, cited in R. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in
Industrial Society 291 (1959) 5 M# Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Pol­
itics 139 (196*f); Zinn, op.cit# 17-18; and Friedman, op.cit. 56, 116, 
'118-9# See Chapters 1 and 5 on stratified social and legal systems 
and the Rule of Law respectively. Peter Self (op.cit# 251) adds:
Modern life is highly organised ^ except in the Third World^ hut 
commitment or loyalty to particular organisations is a very 
variable phenomenon depending upon such factors as social 
culture, career systems and (in public administration) 
political and professional allegiances# Organisations are 
frequently valued instrumentally rather than intrinsically, 
so that their survival or growth depends upon their capacity to 
serve the goals of their members and sponsors.
155 See: D# Apter, Political Change 116 (1973) » F# Riggs, Administration
in Developing Countries 127 (19&*f) ; Schur, op.cit. 59; V. Uchendu, 
’Comment', in Arkhurst, op.cit# 118, at 122; Barkun, op#cit# 117;
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Moore, Jr*, Social Origins * * « 721; and Uphoff and Ilchman,
The Political Economy of Change 70. Edelman, op.cit* 114- adds:
The employment of language to sanctify action is exactly 
what makes politics different from other methods of allocating 
values* * * * Force signals weakness in politics, as rape does 
in sex*
154 See: Lenski, op.cit* 51* Griffen, op.cit* 66; Uphoff and Ilchman,
The Political Economy of Change 136; and H. Bienen, Violence and 
Social Change 72-5, 94 (19&S)• Bienen sees a "vicious cycle" in 
which absolute power fosters isolation, leading to ©n insecurity which 
results in suspicion and fear, breeding the violence that reduces the 
flow of information to the regime, thereby increasing its isolation 
(Id. at 98)*
155 See W. Shack, The Gurage 163, 165 (1966) and Shepherd, op.cit* 4-*
John Cohen (’Ethiopian Provincial Elites and the Process of Change*
11 J* Ethiopian Studs. 93* at 107* 1973) found that 42.9% of the Chilalo 
Awraja elite believed that local government institutions had no 
effect on daily life. 28.6% saw some effect and 20*5% believed the 
effect to be great, If a similar survey were carried out among ordin­
ary farmers in areas where contact with central government institutions 
is not so pronounced, the percentage of "no effect" would undoubtedly 
increase radically.
156 See: J* LaPalombara, ’Penetration* in L* Binder etal*> eds., Crises 
and Sequences in Political Development 205, at 205 (1968); A* Diamant, 
’Bureaucracy in Developmental Movement Regimes*, in F. Riggs, ed., 
Frontiers of Development Studies 486, at 513* Wilber, op.cit. 23;
Schur, op.cit* 59? and Klinghoffer op.cit. 14. Binder (’Crises of 
Political Development*, in Binder et al., op.cit. 1, at 62) argues that 
penetration represents an equalisation of political obligations among 
individuals rather than among collectivities. We would argue that 
this Western assumption of the evolving individualisation of the 
political process is accurate neither in the West nor in the Third 
World.
157 L. Friedman, ’Legal Culture and Social Development’, 4 Law and Society 
Rev. 29* at 68-9 (1969)* Merkl, op.cit. 254; and Lenski, op.cit. 53-4.
158 Allott, op.cit. 168. Some legal theorists attempt to account for 
this fact' byTlocating an ultimate sovereignty in the people, who 
can then limit the exercise of power by withdrawing allegiance 
(e.g., Hayek, op.cit. 93)-
159 See: B. Barber, Social Stratification 235 (1957)* M. Weiner,
'^Political Participation and Political Development* in Weiner, 
op.cit* 206, at 208; N Roberts, The Reform of Planning Law 108,
'112-3 (1976) ; Moore, Jr., Reflections. . . 62-3; Nwabueae, op.cit. 139* 
Self, op.cit. 287; Myrdal,“Asian Drama 139-40 (1977)* and dagurioe, 
op.cit. 5i- C.H. Dodd (Political Development 25-61, 1972) reminds us 
'that political participation by individuals in the West does not mean 
playing an equal part, as parties, trade unions and bureaucracies
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dominate politics. Half Dahrendorf (The New Liberty 10-11) adds 
that permanent participation by all in everything results in a total 
immobility and that a balance must therefore be struck between part­
icipation and innovation by a minority. Keith Griffen (op,cit,
66-8) argues that the major aim of participation is to encourage 
variods groups to associate their own interests with the stability of 
society as a whole. We part company with him, however, when he 
suggests that this participation must be democratic: patterns of
social stratification make this an impractical goal in many Latin 
American countries. Development must be the art of the possible, 
and an insistence upon democracy may be an excessively optimistic 
and Westernised viewpoint (see Chapter 4).
160 Edward Shils (Center and Periphery 423, 1975) argues that: "History 
is the graveyard of rulers who would not listen to criticism - and 
it is just as often the graveyard of their peoples, condemned by the 
obstinacy of their rulers11,
161 Mouzelis, op,cit. 56«
162 R* Seidman, *Law and Development: A General Model*, 6 Law and Src.
Rev. 311, at 316 (1972).
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PART II
See: G. Heeger, The Politics of Underdevelopment 112 (197*0 »
Bretton, cited by R. Seidman, 'Law and Development in * . • Africa*
1966 Wisconsin Lav/ Rev. 999» at 1069 (1966); and B. Davidson, Black 
Star: A View of the Life and Times of Kwame Nkrumah, passim (1973)'•
R. Dumont and M. Mozayer (Socialisms and Development 330, 1973) 
interpret Mao's dictum, **Politics is in Command”, to mean that pro­
ducers must achieve the reality of political power. We argue that 
it is also a statement of the practical philosophy of most politicians, 
recognising that political power is used to attempt to gain a wide 
variety of political aims;
See Davidson op.cit. 20-1, who states that Nkrumah did not begin 
teaching until 1926.
See, e.g.: W. Siffen, 'Introduction*, in J. Montgomery and Siffen,
eds.. Approaches to Development 1, at 6 (1966) - economic development 
is "inherently instrumental" to the achievement of the aims of pol­
iticians and "the political system"; R. Jackson and M. Stein, Issues 
in Comparative Politics 26 (1971) - many political scientists who 
adopt the consensus model see development as "a prescriptive policy 
process for achieving whatever may bo the dominant goals of society";
J. Coleman, 'The Resurrection of Political Economy', in N. Uphoff 
and W.Ilchman, eds., The Political Economy of Development 3O1 at 
37 (1972) - unless the accumulated bitterness is too great, political 
instability can be counteracted by extending opportunities for economic 
growth to discontented groups; and J. Robinson, Freedom and Necessity 
59 (1970) - governments are bound to be concerned with economic 
affairs, if only to establish a sound tax base.
See: Chap. 1, supra; R. First, The Barrel of a Gun, passim (J-972);
Heeger, op.cit.; * Dumont and Mozayer, Rote 1, supra; and Gene
Ellis (quoted by J. Cohen and Sileshi Sisaye, 'Research Problems in 
■. . • Ethiopia's Socioeconomic Development* 57, 1976), discussing 
the activities of Zemecha students whr were expected to, inter alia, 
help to implement the 1975 Ethiopian land reform:
' /In the south7 pressures for land reform had been building up 
long before the actual proclamation, and the influx of the 
Zemacha with their tales of the revolution had had the effect 
of further inflaming tenant imaginations. In these areas, 
students often obeyed Mao's injunction to 'fight first the 
political fight* and worked at organizing and /In some areas/ 
arming the peasantry. Landlords' cattle were stolen, houses 
burnt, and parades arranged to show both landlord and peasant 
that power had indeed passed hands. In some areas /"for example, 
Jimma and Wollamo Soddu/, students fought provincial admin­
istrators and project officials, and conducted kangaroo courts. 
In other areas /?or example, the Jijiga Plains, where many 
retired officers had received land in pension/, the reforms were 
stoutly /and violently/ resisted.
Those who were opposed to the activities of zemecha students were, of 
course, fighting the political fight also, as are other traditional 
elites, intellectuals, labour leaders and bureaucrats.
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5 See: Chaps* 1 and 2; B# Csikos-Nagy, Socialist Economic Policy 18
(1973)> J* LaPalombara, Alternative Strategies for Developing Admin­
istrative Capabilities in Emerging Nations’, in F. Riggs, ed*, Frontiers 
of Development Studies I7I1 at 186 (1970); Heeger, op*cit* 1;
Siffen, op * cit * 6; and Seidman, op* cit* Government is bound to play 
the dominant role in development activities when, as in Ethiopia under 
the Derg: a great range of ends and high levels of attainment are
sought; a relative economic backwardness and poor resource and factor 
endowment is apparent; and a variety of institutional barriers 
perpetuate underdevelopment (Alexander Eckstein, cited by T. Ocran,
’Law, African Development and Social Engineering*, 3-**- Zambia Law 
Rev* 16, at 30» 1971-2). Ocran adds (Id.) that the type and extent of 
state involvement in development activities illustrate social conceptions 
of state power and of the role of law. M. Smith ('Institutional and 
Political Conditions of Pluralism*, in L. Kuper and M*;Smit£,’eds.,. . 
Pluralism in Africa 27? at $8-9* 1969) inverts Matx while arguing that 
economic inequalities /"and underdevelopment/ presuppose and are 
based upon conditions of political and jural domination. In Chap. 1, 
we argued that the factors inhibiting Ethiopian development were 
primarily the outcome of long-term political processes, and that what 
was created politically can also be dismantled politically. We also 
argued in Chap. 2 that, while economists emphasise production and 
political scientists focus on distributive issues, these concepts are 
separable only analytically, lying as they both do at the nexus of 
structure and process. (See Uphoff and Ilchman, 'Development in the 
Perspective of Political Development', in Uphoff and Ilchman, op.cit.
75, at 78).
6 These are the ’'priority research" topics listed by Cohen and Sileshi, 
op.cit* They express the hope (Id.) that scarce research time
will not be wasted on less important topics: whether Ethiopia was
feudal prior to 197**-; whether Haile Selassie was a modernizer blocked 
by traditional forces; the means by which the aristocracy exploited 
peasants; the rise of the centralised state and its dependence on 
traditional elites with a localised power base;the failure of a 
national bourgeoisie to emerge; the effects of delaying land 
reforms, particularly with regard to rural development projedts;
the dichotomy of rural and urban development; and the reasons for a 
failure of economic growth and development prior to 197**-. While we are 
in general agreement with Cohen and Sileshi, we have felt it necessary 
to deal with many of these topics briefly (see, e.g., Chap. 1) and 
with the latter topic in detail (see Chap. 1, supra and Chap. 5, 
infra.)•
7 Societies cannot function without political organisations, which 
necessitate inequalities in the distribution of power. Organisations, 
in turn, create a functional requirement for leadership posts, and 
competitions for scarce resources take place within these organisational 
frames. To some extent, the scarcity of resources is due to dissipations 
resulting from these competitions and, instead of constituting a check
on the abuse of power, competitions often produce the abuses, part­
icularly during revolutions. One of the best ways of understanding the 
politics of a particular state is to examine political conflicts, the 
kinds of coalitions and bargaining that take place, the kinds of rewards, 
punishments, propaganda and persuasion used or threatened and the monopoly
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over particular resources possessed by various groups* Where a 
voice is raised, a decision is made: not to decide is a decision in
favour of the status quo* There is an immense gap between elites, who 
can select from various modernities on the basis of international 
information systems, and the ordinary people. See: Chap. 2; Mosca,
cited by G. Lenski, Power and Privilege 13 (196®) ; S* Finer, Comp­
arative Government 9 - 12 (l970); B. Moore, Jr., Reflections on the 
Cau'sesof Human Misery . . .  47, 64 (1972); J. Kautsky, 'An Essay on 
the Politics of Development*, in Id. ed., Political Change in Under­
developed Countries 3, at 5 (I962TT K. Griffen, Underdevelopment in 
Spanish America 68-70 (1969); and J. Nettl, 'Strategies in the Study 
of Political Development', in C. Leys, ed.. Politics and Change in 
Developing Countries 13, at 24 (1969)#
David Apter (Political Change 3* 74-5* 96-7 (1973)) adopts an inter­
esting definition of politics as the interplay of the three dimensions 
of political choice - normative, structural and behavioural - which 
constitute the critical center of social life. The normative aspects 
of government concern such abstract values as justice, equality and 
legitimacy; the arrangements and instruments of decision-making, 
particularly the distribution of political power, constitute the 
structural dimension of politics; and the behavioural ingredient in 
politics consists of socialisation processes,motivation and other 
forces operating within political cultures. We shall examine all 
three of these political dimensions. The connection between law and 
a normative approach to politics - such as that of J. Habermas (Legit­
imation Crisis, 1976) - is obvious, and we argued in Chap. 2 that the 
normative aspects of development receive too little attention among 
theorists. As the formal structures of many Ethiopian institutions do 
not match the actual functions performed, our analyses will tend to 
focus on political functions. While the behavioural approach is 
potentially of great value, it receives little emphasis in this study 
because of the paucity of reliable studies of the values and motivations 
of various Ethiopian groups, and because of the problematic effect of 
law on behaviour (see Chap. 1).
8 J. Bruce, 'Ethiopia: Nationalization of Rural Lands Proclamation', .
Land Tenure Center Newsletter 1, at 3 (Jan. 1975)* See J. Markakis, 
Ethiopia . . .  8 - 1? (197*0. Uphoff and Ilchman (%e“Political 
Economy of Change 43 (1969)) discuss the political'"relations various
of the public have with government. They are: those falling
within the regime's ideological bias ^ /Bruce's "core constituency^; 
the group essential to political stability (including elites which can 
be co-opted from time to time - see Chap. 1) ; those falling outside the 
regime's stability conditions (elTtes which could not be co-opted - 
e.g*, Ethiopian students qua students, intellectuals, certain elements 
in organised labour); and sectors which are unmobilised (peasants and 
the urban poor - prior to the Revolution). The sector to which 
individuals and groups belong determines the order in which their 
demands will be met,and whether demands will even be recognised - an 
important qualification on Roscoe Pound's jurisprudence of interests 
(see Chap. 2)•
9 D. Levine, 'Amhara Culture and Ethiopian Politics' (n.d.); V. Uchendu, 
'Comment*, in F. Arkhurst, ed., Africa in the Seventies and Eighties 
118, at 124 (1970) ; and C. Clapham, Haile Selassie's Government 33
569
f
(1969)» who adds that such political development as occurred in Ethiopia 
was ’’two steps forward, one step back” (Id.)*
10 See: E* Lefever, Spear and Sceptor 8 (1970) - a study of the role of 
the military in Ghana, the Congo (Zaire) and Ethiopia; C. Anderson, 
et al., Issues of Political Development 145-6 (1967); A. Diamant, 
•Political Development’, in Montgomery and Siffen, op.cit. 15* at 35, 
and Nettl, op.cit. 27*
11 Galbraith, quoted by G. Myrdal, Asian Drama 164 (Abridged Ed., 1977)* 
See: L. Pye, ’Communication, Institution Building, and the Reach of
Authority1, in D. Lerner and W. Schramm, eds., Communication and Change 
in Developing Countries 33* at 50 (1967); F. Arkhurst, 'Introduction', 
in Arkhurst, op.cit. 3* at 3; and Heeger, op.cit. 1. The political 
preoccupation with order is, of course, not a new phenomenon. For 
example, Robert Bella (quoted in Lenski, op.cit. 295-6) argues that:
When the Islamic ulema said, 'A hundred years of despotism are 
better than one day of anarchy*, they were not just apologists 
for the ruling classes. /Tjhey knew what days of anarchy are 
like in such societies*
Ethiopia has known both 'despotism' and anarchy during her long history, 
and the ways in which local communities have dealt with anarchy have 
interesting implications for anarchist political philosophies which 
are beyond the scope of this study. The inability of particular elites 
to control specific territories for long periods of time, and the lack 
of settled life generally, retarded development in Ethiopia (Addis 
Hiwet, Ethiopia: from Autocracy to Revolution 17* 19» 1975)*
12 Seidman, op.cit. 1062.
13 See R. Dahrendorf, The New Liberty 26-7 (1975)*
14 See: J. Paul and C. Clapham, 1 Ethiopian Constitutional Development
71-2 (1972); Levine, op.cit.; P. Schwab, Decision-Malting in Ethiopia 
49 (1972); S. Eisenstadt, Modernisation, Protest and Change 4 
(1966); F. Heady, 'Bureaucracies in Developing Countries', in F. Riggs, 
ed., Frontiers of Development Studies 459* at 483 (1970)* a&d 0. Dodd, 
Political Development 21 (1972).
15 R. Hess ('Ethiopia', in G. Carter, ed., National Unity and Regionalism 
in Eight African States 44l, at 504-5* 1966) terms ^ traditional Eth- 
iopian politics "overdeveloped”, in the context of an astuteness in 
everyday situations, a personalism and the formation of factions.
See, e.g., B. Van Arkadie, 'Planning, Plans and Planned Economies',
in E. Morgan, ed., The Administration of Change 164, at 165
(197Zf); ^
the societies we are concerned with . . .  are underdeveloped 
in a material sense - in a social or political sense there is no 
reason to suggest that they are "underdeveloped” or "poor”,
except insofar as they are weaker dependent as a result of
their material poverty.
There is some force to these submissions when they are applied to 
Ethiopia: traditional politics was extremely sophisticated and
absorbed large amounts of scarce resources. We argued in previous
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Chapters, however, that asymmetrical exchanges in small political 
markets were a primary cause of Ethiopian underdevelopment. Under­
development and political underdevelopment are thus closely related*
16 E.g., M* Esman, 'The Politics of Development Administration*, in 
Montgomery and Siffen, op*cit* 59» at 112:
The effectiveness of any regime depends on numerous specific 
environmental factors which vary enormously* Success under 
such diverse conditions cannot be correlated with any group of 
doctrinal variables or styles of action#
Siffen, op.cit. 1, takes a less extreme view: the relations between
economic and political development are often obscure, to the actors 
as well as to analysts* Compared to economic development, political 
development is a diffuse and amorphous concept, with different time 
dimensions and means-ends relations. While taking Esman's point, we 
contend that development and political development prospects can be 
correlated through contemporary Ethiopian ideological predilections, 
policy choices and an analysis of development constraints. Siffen-*s 
assertion is perfectly valid; it also indicates the need to clear up 
these obscurities (in an Ethiopian context), for he notes that the 
values of leaders will prevail where they conflict with the requisities 
of economic development.
■**7 See, e.g.,L* Binder, 'Crises of Political Development*, in Id., ed.,
Crises and Sequences in Political Development 1 (1971) and R. Bribanti,
'The Role of Lav/ in Political Development*, in R. Wilson, ed*, Inter­
national and Comparative Law of the Commonwealth 6 , at 2 (1968):
Political development is essentially a series of ultimate 
progressions (with periodic regressions and even oscillations) 
from ascription to personal achievement, from ambiguity to 
certainty in the use of public power, from alienation and 
withdrawal to enlightened participation in collective social 
life, from coarseness and coercion to refinement and sensit­
ivity in public action, from contraction to expansion of free 
choice.
While there are a few useful elements in this definition, it is 
imbued with the assumptions underpinning the consensus model that we 
rejected as an accurate description of Ethiopian affairs in Chap. 1.
The extent to which political development is reversible is a hotly 
debated topic: See A. Klinghoffer, 'Modernisation and Political
Development in Africa*, 11 J. Mod. Af. Studs. 1, at 3-5i 11-12 (1975) 
and R. Holt and J. Turner, The Political Basis of Economic Development 
7 (1966),who discuss political development theories which postulate 
movement on a continuum between polar opposites (Gemeinschaft-Gese11- 
schaft, status-contract, and folk-secular societies). See the criticisms 
of these theories in Chap. 2. Apter (op.cit. 170) adds: "Developmental 
policy is inevitably social engineering, the more so as it becomes 
improved and predictive. • .". Perhaps, but we have noted the distinct 
limitations on the usefulness of social engineering - as that concept 
is applied in the West - in Chap. 2.
18 See: Levine, op.cit.; Holt and Turner, op.cit.; R* Tucker, The Marxian 
Revolutionary Idea 'fe (1970); and M. Halpern, quoted by Eisenstadt, 
op*cit. kit "the revolution of modernisation involves. . • the transformation
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of all systems by which man organises his society. • • ." This is the 
first revolution to require stability: "an enduring capacity to
generate and absorb persistent transformation.11 Eisenstadt assumes 
the ubiquity of political change in a reconsideration of this topic 
(’Social Change and Development*, in Id., ed., Readings in Social 
Evolution and Development 3i at 21, 1970): the central problem of
modernisation is sustained growth and the "ability to deal with con­
tinuous changes of political demands is the crucial test of such sus­
tained growth." Governments must therefore identify social forces or 
conditions which facilitate or impede growth and which create an 
institutional structure capable of absorbing change. Heeger (op.cit.
3-5) notes that political development is concerned less with initiating 
change (which is viewed as inevitable) than with managing it. As a 
result, he argues, political theory does not explain stagnation or the 
fact that change is
sporadic, erratic and unpredictable in its consequences. Fixity 
and resistence to change seem as ubiquitous as change itself. 
(See the arguments of Dahrendorf, and Cohen and Hutton, in Chap. 1,
Sec. XII )
Conditions in Ethiopia are not very favourable to political develop­
ment. For example, Uphoff and Ilchman (The Political Economy of
Change 213) suggest that:
Political development may be facilitated where the population 
speaks a common language (Tanzania as opposed to Uganda), or is 
ethnically homogeneous (Tunisia as opposed to Morocco), or
lives contiguously (Cambodia as opposed to Indonesia) or is
used to participating in some form of local government (India 
as opposed to Iran)•
Orice her rugged typography is taken into account, Ethiopia possesses 
none of these advantages. *
19 Apter, quoted in Id., 25#
20 See: Id. 33; R* Seidman, * Administrative Law and Legitimacy in
Anglophonic Africa*, 5 law and Soc. Rev. 161, at 163 (1970); Levine,
op.cit.; Klinghoffer, op.cit. 15; Habermas, op.cit. 49; Myrdal, op. 
cit. 150, 358; and W. Friedman, The State and the Rule of Law in a 
Mixed Economy 3 (1971)* While many of the political and adminis­
trative decisions taken during Haile Selassie *& reign were irrational 
from the standpoint of political and economic development, they often 
served to maintain the power of the Emperor and his core constit­
uency; they thus represented a more or less rational pursuit of pol­
itical self-interest.
21 P. Mgrkl, Modem Comparative Politics 429 (1970); A. Honore**, *Groups, 
Laws and Obedience*, in A.Simpson, ed. Oxford Essays in Jurisprud­
ence 2d Series 1, at 2 (1973); H. Cairns, Law and the-Social Sciences
'2^ 0—1 (1969); and W. Harvey, * Comment*, in" Arkhurst, op.cit. i4y,
at 151* See R. Wolff, ’Introduction*, in Id., ed., The Pule of Law 
7, at 8 (T97l) • W.J. Samuels (*Law and Economics: JnTjrEroducTTon1*,
7 J. Economic Issues 535» at 538, 1973) adds:
The legal process of government is not a neutral black box but 
a system of control of some by others; all legal systems dis­
criminate between social groups and are used for that end; there
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is no sharp separation between private and state action; funda­
mental state action governs the relative power of economic 
parties and is therefore an object of use if not also of cap­
ture*
22 See: R. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society 290
(1959); J.W- Hurst, Law and Social Order in the United States 25 (1977)i *
J. Lee, African Armies and Civil Order 8B T 1969); Finer, op*cit* 2*f-5; 
and Chap- 5* infra-
23 Hartley and J. Griffith, Government and Law 11 (197$) • See Finer, 
op-cit- 8-10.
2f\ K- Boyle, etal., Law and State: The Case of Northern Ireland 1 and
passim (1975)•
25 See P- Stein and J- Shand, Legal Values in Western Society Zh (197*0- 
Shis perspective is more realistic than the one commonly offered,
of "the province of law" as a stable politipal and legal framework 
(K- Bentsi-Enchill, 'African Law: Development and Reform', in Arkhurst,
op-cit- 130, at 130)-
26 Finer, op-cit- xi*
27 J -  Lee, op-cit. 88. See R. Schlesinger, 'Justice in Russia', 60 
Yale Law J. 976, at 979 (1951).
28 See Syoum Gerbregziabher, 'The Structure and Function of . . . Ethiopian 
Public Administration* 13 (i960) and Chaps. 3 and 5i infra.
Holt and Turner, op.cit. 8-9- No theory of political devel­
opment is perfect, and certain adaptations have been made in an attempt 
to remove the Western bias of Almond's theory. The main criticism 
of his theory is that it produces anomalous results when applied to 
'totalitarian' states. Nevertheless, we feel that the degree of 
specialisation and autonomy is understated for so-called totalitarian states 
and overstated for democratic states by Almond's critics. See, e.g.:
Id. 13-5; Levine, op.cit.; R. Seidman, 'Constitutions in • . * Africa',
1969 Wisconsin Law Rev. 83, at 8*f; H. Scholler, 'Ethiopian Constit­
utional Development', 25 Jahrbuch. . .' *f99» at 52*f (1976); and H.
Bienen, Violence and Social Change XIV (1968). M. Edelman, The Sym­
bolic Uses of Politics 15 (196*0 adds:
The permanent Hegal and political institutions reassure people 
and make of them a supporting bulwark, even while they respond 
to particular developments with fear or hope.
This is, of course, not the case in Ethiopia.
30 R. Seidman, 'Law and Development: A General Model*, 6 Law and Society
Rev. 311 (1972). See Uphoff and Ilchman, The Political Economy of 
Change 210-11. Analysing American legal systems, Samuels op.cit- 
5$6) argues for certain "interdependence propositions": — -
the working rules of law govern the distribution of power, and 
the distribution and exercise of power govern the development of 
the working rules; the power structure is a function of law and
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the use of law is a function of the power structure; and, inter 
alia, both income and wealth distribution are a function of law 
and law is a function of income and wealth distribution.
If "governed1* is replaced by "are closely related to1*, the statement 
offers accurate insights into the interdependence of Ethiopian law and 
politics.
See: R. Seidman, *Law and Development', The Interface between Policy
and Implementation', 13 J* Mod. Af. Studs. 64l, at 646 (1975);
A. Zolberg, 'The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States', 
in TTphoff and Ilchman, The Political Economy of Development 1551 at 
155-6 ; J. Nettl, 'Strategies in the Study of Political Development', 
in C. Leys, ed., Politics and Change in Developing Countries 13» at 
27 (1969) ; and HurstV op.cit. 25. Citing KelsW, Seidman ( 'Law and 
Economic Development. . .', at 997) notes that every state institution 
is a manifestation of state power, which can be viewed institutionally 
or legally. Merkl (op.cit. 330-1) adds that the legal-institutional 
approach to politics is a highly effective response to the challenges 
posed by constitution making, institution building and the preoccu­
pations of politicians in 18th and 20th Century Europe and America.
As political interests and problems in the Third World differ 
significantly from tlie "challenges" Merkl mentiors, an analysis which 
gives roughly equal prominence to structural, functional and normative 
aspects of politics is called for.
32 See: Coleman, op.cit. 33; Stein and Shand, op.cit. V, 1, 5* 29;
Hurst, op.cit. 47, 5^ ; and J. Farrar, Introduction to Legal Method
165 (1977).
33 B. Moore,Jr., Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery. • • 52-3
(1972). See; U. yriedrich,1 The Philosophy of Law in Historical Per- 
spective T92 (2d Ed. 1963) ; CT Thomas',1 Dependence and Transforation 
I'oV (197*0; Chaps. 5 and 8 , infra.; B. deJouvenal, 'Sovereignty*, in 
e.g., D. Lloyd, ed., Introduction to Jurisprudence 377» at 377
(3d Ed. 1972). A.P. d’kntreves (Natural Law I&2-5, Hd Ed. 1970) 
argues that, unlike lawyers, political’ scientists neglect the differ­
ence between might (power we are forced to obey) and authority (power 
we are obliged to acknowledge). The matter is not that simple, how­
ever. As Harold Berman ('Soviet Justice and Soviet Tyranny' 55 Columbia 
Law Rev. 795* 1955) notes, a tyrant can be defeated easily if all 
aspects of social life are dependent on his caprice. The use of 
terror (political and ideological discipline) is often clothed in law 
and justice (social and moral discipline). The only way to dis­
tinguish law from terror, we argue, is to examine the ways in which 
particular laws are actually used. Edgar Friedenberg ('The Side 
Effects of the Legal Process', in Wolff, op.cit. 371 at 45) points out 
some of the complexities arising from analyses' of the relationship 
between !hws and order:
The assertion that law preserves order is logically similar to 
the statement that the medieval Church preserved and trans­
mitted the culture of antiquity. It is both true and false, 
and altogether too simple. It preserved some of it, deliber­
ately destroyed some, and allowed fjir more than could be either 
preserved or destroyed to perish /gr to survive!/ because it could 




We have tried to take account of this assertion by examining the 
particular kind of order which is being maintained and its relation to 
justice, and (inevitably) development*
34 Farrar, op.cit. 20.
35 See Stein and Shand, op.cit. 1*
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R. Greenfield, Ethiopia (1969),; C. Clapham, Haile Selassieys Government
(1969); J* Markakxs,1 Ethiopia (197*0 and P. Gilkes, The Dying Lion 
(1975).
J. Cohen and Sileshi Sisaye, ‘Research on Socio-economic Development 
in Ethiopia* 19 (1977)•
T. Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa 6 (1976) argues that the 
reigns of Emperor and Tsar displayed the following **main features1*: 
an ethnic mosaic ruled by a highly centralised monarchy; the 
monarch*s legitimacy resting on an ancient tradition and a 
national church; and the monarch himself surrounded by a horde 
of more-or-less dependent nobles and docile bureaucrats, sup­
ported by a large army, and committed only to that degree of 
modernization which would enhance his power and dignity.
In Haile Sblassie’s case the degree wad not very great, since 
the twentieth-century brand of modernization could not be harnessed 
to the purposes of an ancient monarchical order*
Syoum Gebregziahber, *The Structure and Functions of * • « Ethiopian 
Public Administration*, 13-OA (I960)* See also Farrer, op.cit* and 
J. Markakis and Asmelash Beyene, ‘Representative Institutions in 
Ethiopia* 5 J. Mod. Af. Studs. 193* at 195 (196?). If despotism is 
defined as a marked absence of institutional restraints on the exer­
cise of power (H. Lewis, A Galla Monarchy *f-5 1965)* it can be seen 
that institutions such as the Church and the landed elite restrained 
Haile Selassie’s despotic tendencies. Further, the Emperor’s pol­
itical control was less complete than the despotism found in other 
states. Consider, e.g., the arguments of Gaetano Mosca (The Ruling 
Class XkZ (H. Kahn transl., 1939);
when the class that monopolizes wealth and arms embodies its 
power in a centralized bureaucracy and an irresistible standing 
army, we get despotism in its worst form - namely, a barbarous 
and primitive system of government that has the instruments of 
an advanced civilization at its disposal, a yoke of iron which 
is applied by rough and reckless hands and which is very hard 
to break, since it has been steeled and tempered by practical 
artisans.
Ethiopian politics diverge from this pattern somewhat: the bureau­
cracy has never been fully centralized, groups opposed to central Govern­
ment have fairly ready access to arms and, most importantly, the public 
has never fully acquired the habit of obedience that constitutes the 
foundation of any state’s monopoly of power* Further, this habit has 
never been diffused widely in'institutions like the army and the bureau­
cracy, and it is therefore difficult for Government to delegate vital 
functions without jeopardising its own effectiveness. See P. Amoun, 
•Revolution: A Redefinition’, in R. Jackson and M. Stein, Issues in
Comparative Politics 361, at 361 (1971).
P. Schwab, Decision-Making in Ethiopia 86 (1972); D. Levine, 'Class Cons­
ciousness and Class Solidarity in the New Ethiopian Elites’, in
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P. Lloyd, ed#, The New Elites of Tropical Africa 512, at 31**, 519 
(196*0; Syoum , op.cit, 9; Markakis and Asmelash, op.cit. 195-6;
Lewis, op.cit. 3-4; Markakis, op.cit. 210; Note 4, supra; and Chap.
2.
6 D. Levine, Wax and Gold 5 (1972) and 'Arahara Culture and Ethiopian 
Politics* (n.d.); R. Hess, *Ethiopia*, in G. Carter, ed., National 
Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States *f*fl, at 50*1-5 (1966) ; 
and Clapham, op.cit. 5, 72-5- See; R. Dahrendorf, Class and Class 
Conflict in Industrial Society 511 (1959); M. Esraan, *The Politics of 
Development Administration*, in J. Montgomery and W. Siffen, eds., 
Approaches to Development 59, at 88 (1966) ; and A. Zolberg, *The 
Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Africa*,
in N. Uphoff and W. Ilchraan, The Political Economy of Development 155, 
at 162 (l972). Hess (op.cit.Vadds that, given a political astuteness 
in everyday situations, traditional Ethiopian politics could almost 
be termed **overdeveloped**. Clapham (op.cit. 7) finds that Ethiopian 
politics provides Ma setting in which neither Othello nor Iago seems 
in the least implausible** •
7 Markakis,op.cit. 208.
8 See: D. Levinson, *Idea Systems in the Individual and in Society*,
in G. Zollschon and W. Hirsh, eds., Explorations in Social Change 297, 
at 299-302 (196*0; Esraan, op.cit.; and Dahrendorf, op.cit. 517.
9 D. Crummy, *Ethiopia: New Approaches*, 9 Canadian J. Af. Studs. 3**0,
at 5*t-l-2 (1975); Greenfield, op.cit. 39-*K>; Hess, op.cit. 505; and 
Levine, Wax and Gold 153* See: C. Anderson, et al., Issues of Pol­
itical Development 20 (1967") •
10 S. Messing, The Target of Health in Ethiopia 113 (1972); N. Singer, 
’Modernization of Law in Ethiopia*, 11 Howard Int. Law J. 73, at 
75 (1970); Levine, *Amhara Culture, .*; and Crummy, op.cit.
See B. Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy *f27
(1973), who adds that a state need not go through fixed historical 
stages; each state carries political development a certain distance 
within its own institutions (Id. - see Chap. *f).
11 I. Kaplan, et al., Area Handbook for Ethiopia 29** (2d Ed. 1971);
Markakis, op.cit. 8-9; and Gilkes, op.cit. 175. See: J. LaPalom-
bara, ’Values and Ideologies in the Administrative Evolution of Western 
Constitutional SJates*, in R. Bribanti, ed., Political and Admin­
istrative Development 166, at 176-8 (1969); C T  PoddT Political Devel­
opment 45 (1972); and Moore, op.cit. 193-200. Margery Perham (The 
Government of Ethiopia xxvi, 1969)states that, from 19*+6 to i960,
"• . .Ethiopia /like Iran7 was maintaining a continuity not far removed 
from immobility1'. "*
12 Id*, lix; P. Koehn, ’Ethiopian Politics* 20 (2) Africa Today 7, at 
9 (1975); Markakis and Asmelash, op.cit. 196; Clapham, op.cit.
186-8; Schwab, op.cit. 90, 151? Gilkes, op.cit. 176;Hess, op.cit.
505; and Markakis, op.cit. 329-31. See: S. Huntington, Political
Order in Changing Societies 166-8, 177 (1968); M. Janowitz, The Mil­
itary in the Political Development of New Nations 3 (l96*f); E. Shils,
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’The Military in the Political Development of New Nations’, in J*
Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Nations 7, 
at 61 (1962); and S. Finer, Comparative Government *f*fl (l970)*
13 Structurally, constitutions .can be viewed as regulating the aggre­
gation, allocation and delegation of political power as a broad and 
vague governmental blueprint. See: P. Fitzgerald, ed., Salmond on
Jurisprudence 83 (12th Ed., 196STT Hayek, 1 Law, Legislation and
Morality 13^ (1975) ? and L* Friedman, The Legal System 12, 309 )
"([T975JV Some constitutions do nothing more than this, and the instit­
utionalisation of power may be symbolic only, lacking real substance.
Most constitutions do, however, embody some version of Lincoln’s 
government of, by and for the people, the rules of ’’fair play” which 
describe how to play the political game properly, and a catalog of 
citizens* rights. Normatively, in other words, rights which the state . 
asserts for itself and against citizens are counter-balanced by 
the rights that the state permits to be exercised against itself.
(see Chap. 8). From yet another viewpoint, a constitution is an 
autobiographical digest of the incumbent elite, a revealing choice 
of national symbols, historical references and ideological arguments.
J. d’Entreves, Natural Law 131 (2d Ed., 1970); Sir William Anson, cited 
by 6. Marshall, Constitutional Theory 32 (1971); and I Duchacek,
Rights and Liberties in “the World Today 30, 250 (1973)* B.Nwabueze 
(Constitutionaiism in Emerging States ix-x 1973) expresses a common 
view when he argues that:
It seems clear that the whole concept of ^ Jestern^ constit­
utionalism is in danger in the new nations, as authoritarian 
regimes replace the carefully balanced constitutions set up at 
independence. The attractions and temptations of power have 
led to a widespread and systematic perversion of the con­
stitutional system. • * - 
Nwabueze implicitly adopts a view of constitutional law as
a set of rules according to which political conflict is carried 
on, political changes take place, and one government succeeds 
another in au orderly way. If the rules were abandoned, such 
changes could take place only by violent revolution. Labour 
law has similar objectives. (P. Stein and Ot Shand, Legal 
Values in Western Society 31, 197*0*
Constitutional (or labour) lawsseldom perform these functions in most 
Third World states, and it is unlikely that rulers intend law to have 
these kinds of effects on political processes. We prefer a view - echoed 
in Marxian legal thought - of constitutions as weapons of political 
struggle; they are not the neutral umpires of politics throughout the 
Third World (Y. Ghai and J. McAuslan, Public Law and Political Change 
in Kenya 511, 1972). See Chap. 2.
l*f See E. Shils, Center and Periphery ^75 (1975)* The suspension of the 
1953 Constitution and the 197** Draft Constitution are discussed in 
Chapter 5, infra.
15 Assefa Bequele and Eshetu Chole, A Profile of the Ethiopian Economy 16
(1969); J* Cohen and P. Koehn, ’Local Government in Ethiopia’ 2 (197*0;
Haile Selassie, My Life and Ethiopia’s Progress 17 (E. Hllendorff transl., 
1970; H. Scholler, ’Ethiopian Constitutional Development', 25
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Jahrbuch Des Offentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart ^99* 528-9 (1976);
Worku Tafara, * Judicial Administration in Ethiopia* k (1972) ;
Clapham, op.cit. 56; Kaplan, et al,, op.cit. 272; and Markakis and 
Asmelash, op.cit. 201. See R. Dias, Jurisprudence 99 (4-th Ed.,
1976). James Paul ('Problems of Public Law and Political Development', 
ii'H. Marcus, ed. Proceedings of the First U.S. Conference on Ethiopian 
Studies 323, at 323-4, 1975) notes that the 1931 Constitution was 
never widely publicised or understood. The text was "prospective", 
ambiguous, a "facade", and an "echo" rather than a "cause" of pol­
itical change. Ladisiaus Farago (quoted by Greenfield, op.cit. 169) 
remarked that the Emperor was
the only speaker of this unique Parliament; he makes no replies 
and there are no debates. The members' duty is simply to listen 
to their ruler and take note.
16 Haile Selassie, quoted by Id., 170.
17 Haile Selassie, op.cit. 183.
18 Id., l8l. According to the translator's (Ul^end^orff's) note, the 
English translations of rest and gult are Alan Hoben's.
19 Tekle, quoted by Id., 191
20 B.-O. Bryde, The Sociology of African Legal Development 137 (1976); 
Assefa and Eshetu, on.cit. 16; Clapham, op.cit. 39; Markakis and 
Asmelash, op.cit. 204-6. The Eritrean Constitution contained a Bill
of Rights and adequate guarantees of democratic processes, and the 1955 
Constitution was so designed that it appeared to match these pro­
visions. Despite the Federation of Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1952,
Art. 1 of I the Revised Constitution (P. 1^9 of 19551 Neg. Gaz. 15/2,
1 Consol. L. Eth. 1) provides that the
. . .  Empire. • • comprises all the territories. • • under the
sovereignty of the‘Ethiopian Crown. Its sovereignty and ter­
ritory are indivisible. Its territories and the sovereign 
rights therein are inalienable.
Art. 26 adds:
The Sovereignty of the Empire is vested in the Emperor and the 
supreme authority over all the affairs of the Empire is exer­
cised by Him. . ., in the manner provided for in the present
Constitution.
Although this Constitution impressed few political scientists, many 
Western lawyers became excessively enthusiastic; see, e.g., K. Redden, 
The Legal System cfEthiopia 201 (1968):
The transition from an absolute to a Constitutional Monarchy in 
Ethiopia has been smooth and enlightened. /M o r e / powers of 
government are constantly being transferred. . . to the people. 
. . .  In terms of political stability and growth of democratic 
institutions, Ethiopia could thus well be held out as a model 
for all Africa, if not the entire world (emphasis supplied).
In light of Ethiopia's atypical political history and institutions, 
its monarchical model is of dubious relevance to the Third World.
While Redden treats constitutional monarchy as an accomplished fact, our
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analysis of the conflict between traditional and Western jural postulates 
(infra) shows that this was simply not the case. It is more difficult 
to criticise the perspective adopted by a much more careful scholar,
James Paul (op.cit. 327-8):
The Revised Constitution , • , is a complex law, and, despite 
•die tendency of political commentators to misread or disparage, 
it defies easy generalization and requires some modicum of 
learning and professionalism for honest interpretation, at 
least in the legal sense.
All of the prerogatives of the Emperor remained, but the 
obligation to exercise each within the framework of law, not­
ably the Constitution, was quite explicit; the monarchy was 
now subordinated to law. . . .
We suspect that Prof. Paul - a commited scholar - inclined towards 
optimistic interpretations of the Constitution, in the hope that his 
students would do likewise (and many of them did). While it is true 
that Imperial power was often - but not always w exercised within a 
legal framework, it does not necessarily follow that the Emperor was 
subordinated to law in any meaningful sense. As we shall see, the 
Constitution continued to permit the unbridled exercise of the trad­
itional prerogatives that were, however, circumscribed by traditional 
laws to some extent. We agree with Markakis (op.cit. 277-86), a 
political scientist, that the Constitution was little more than a 
statement of the facts of Ethiopian political life and that little 
increase in political participation occurred under it.
21 J. Paul and C. Clapham, 1 Ethiopian Constitutional Development 427
(1972); Scholler, op.cit. 342; Markakis and Asmelash, op.cit. 206;
and Paul, op.cit. 328. See: E. Wade and 6 . Phillips, Constitutional
Law 1-2 (7th Ed., 1966); J. Triska, Constitutions of the Communist 
Party-States xl (1968); and Duchacek, op.cit. 23-8, 47.
22 Clapham, op.cit. l8l. See Marshall, op.cit. 1-2.
23 See D. Lloyd, Introduction to Jurisprudence 3 (3d Ed., 1972) and
E.A. Hoebel, *The Functions of Law1, in e.g., J. and M. Grossman, 
eds., Law and Change in Modern America 13* at 14 (1971)s
Purposive definition of personal relations is the primary law 
job. The law derives its working principles (jural postulates) 
from the postulates previously developed in the non-legal 
spheres of life, ^fhe/ law specifically and explicitly defines 
relations. It sets the expectancies. . . .
One source of the weakness of Western jural postulates in Ethiopia is
the fact that they had not been "previously developed ii the non-legal
spheres of ^ thiopian^ life” (See Chap. 7).
24 Mahatma Selassie, in Zikre Nager, translated and quoted by Worku, op.cit.
3; Scholler, op.cit. 516V 520; Tekle, quoted in the text accompanying ' r T
Note 19* supra; and Claude Sumner 1 Ethiopian Philosophy passim (19'?4‘)* 
Much of Ethiopian jurisprudence can he found in Vols. 2 and 3 of Prof. 
Sumner*s monumental study. Unfortunately, these volumes are not yet 
published, but I was privileged to read portions of the MS. See:
C. Friedrich, The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective 371 
42-3 , 47-8 (2ci jscl.', 1963) ; d. boam, ’Six Books of tne Republic’, in
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Lloyd, op.cit* 177, at 177; and B. Chapman, Police State 12-13
(1970)* Markakis (op.cit* 207) uses Anglo-American terminology to 
describe a principle of Ethiopian public law: nNo concept of ultra
vires applies to the King1'. On the Ser’ata Mangest and the Fetha 
Negast, see Chap* 1, supra*
25 C* Rosen, ’The Governor-General of Tigre Province*, in Marcus, op.cit*
171, at 173; Marcus, The Life and Times of Menelik II* * . 277 (19755 ; 
Syoum, op.cit* *f2; Worku, op.cit* 3; and Scholler, op.cit* 516,
518, 522* See Friedrich, op.cit* *f7*
26 S* Diamond, ’The Rule of Law Versus the Custom of Order*, in R.P.
Wolff, ed., The Rule of Law 115, at 129, 132-3 (1971); Bryde, op.cit*
23; and Nwabueze, op.cit* 139* In civilian jurisdictions, the proprietary 
theory of the state was based on the ’’rediscovery” of a mythical lex 
regia, in which the prince’s private property in the imperium was 
derived from ingenious interpretations of Roman property law* This 
tendency was less marked in England, as the king's personal and 
political functions were treated as distinct at a fairly early stage*
(Chapman, op.cit* l*f and Marshall, op.cit* 17)*
27 1955 Constitution, Arts. 27-30, 311 33, 35, and 92* Subject to Art.
2 6, the only restraint on these powers was that the advice and consent
of Parliament was required for a declaration of war (but not for 
declarations of states of emergency). See: the definition of Ethiopian
sovereignty in Art. 1, Note 20, supra; Paul and Clapham, op.cit*
and F. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries 197 (196*0 *
28 Central Personnel Agency Order, No. 23 of 1961, Neg. Gaz. 21/3,
8 Consol* L* Eth* 2.
29 Scholler, op.cit. 5^8, 555* Analogous observations have been made
with regard to ”non-European legal systems” by Rudolf Schlesinger, 
Comparative Law *f79 (1959)* See; Lewis, op.cit* 7; Markakis and 
Asmelash, op.cit* 198; and Constitution, Art. 36:
The Emperor, as Sovereign, has the duty to take all measures 
that may be necessary to ensure at all times, the defense and 
integrity of the Empire; the safety and welfare of its inhab­
itants, including their enjoyment of the human rights and 
interests abroad. Subject to the other provisions of this 
Constitution, He has all the rights and powers necessary for the 
accomplishment of the ends set out in the present Article*
Arguably, no doctrine of implied' powers :c«a>b5e> read into the Con- . 
stitution, for the residue of power is expressly conferred on the 
Emperor* The most sensible interpretation of this proviso - the 
interpretation adopted de facto in Ethiopia - is that the Emperor 
was unfettered in his choice of means to achieve a constitutional 
end* Art* 62,for example, permits suits to be brought against Govern­
ment instrumentalities (a right that is restricted by proclamations 
which are thus arguably unconstitutional), yet a suit cannot be brought 
against the Emperor.
30 Although the Ethiopian Church was”founded in the fifth century on the 
doctrines of St. Mark”, strong Hebraic, archaic Semitic and pagan
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was created in 1967 under Order (0.) 48 of 1967, Neg. Gaz. 26/9,
51 Consol, L. Eth. 3 (as amended slightly by 0, 83 of 1973, Neg.
Gaz, 32/ I I  f 31 Consol, L. Eth. supp, l) • The impact of these laws on 
Church administration was minimal, and that was undoubtedly their 
intended effect. An attempt was, however, made to replicate state 
administration: specialised departments were set up in a rudimentary
fashion and bishops were appointed for each province. The Church failed 
to spread education or evangelism effectively, or, from 1942 onwards, 
to exercise its spiritual and temporal powers aggressively. The 
latter may have been some sort of quid pro quo for Haile Selassie’s 
refusal to punish many churchmen who had collaborated with the Ital­
ians during the 1930s. (j. Spencer, 'Haile Selassie. • 18 Orbis
1129, at 1136 (1975); Shenk, op.cit. 227-3**-; Clapham, op.cit. 83-**; 
Markakis, op.cit. 36; Perham, op.cit. 131; Gilkes, op.cit. l8, 54; and 
Syoum, op.cit. 37)#
31 Perham, op.cit. 29; Schwab, op.cit. 21; Gilkes, op.cit. 54-61;
and Shenk, op.cit. 361. See: B. Russell, A History of Western Phil­
osophy 16, 389 "(New Ed. 19Sl) ; E. Johnson, An Introduction to the
Soviet Legal System 12 (1969); and Note 30, supra.
32 Farer, op.cit. 21; Kaplan, et al., op.cit. 229, 244; and Shenk, 
op.cit., 333n« See Lenski, op.cit. 6 7 and Note 30, supra .
33 Quoted by Perham, op.cit. 102. See G. Myrdal, Asian Drama 42 
(Abridged Ed., 1977)1
3** See D.Mathew, Ethiopia 16 (1947) and Mosca,op.cit. 70.
35 1955 Constitution, Arts. 66-7**; Clapham, op.cit. 20, 22, **5, 126-9,
147; Spencer, op.cit. 1142; and Syoum, op.cit. 70. See Paul and Clap­
ham, op.cit. 393-**, **00. Art. 7** was too vague to do justice to the 
problem of ministerial corruption. During the speech promulgating the 
Constitution, Haile Selassie (quoted by Id., 390) re-stated Art. 68:
We have. • • provided that Our Minsters shall be responsible
to Us and to the State for the proper fulfilment of their
highly responsible functions.
An Ethiopian State distinct from the Emperor was a remote abstraction; 
it is clear that, for the Emperor, L'Etat,c'est Moi. In our brief 
analysis, we have chosen to omit 0. 44 of 1966, Neg. Gaz. 25/10 , 
which had a negligible impact. Art. 11 of that Order, for example, 
reserves all"policy decisions" to the Emperor.
36 1955 Constitution, A£ts. 33, 76-92; W. Ewing, 'Some Observations on 
Ethiopian Legislative Development', in Marcus, ed., Proceedings. . .
337, at 338-fe; Schyab, op.cit. 107, 110, 126; Kaplan, et al., op.cit. 
298; Clapham, op.cit./144-6Paul, op.cit. 330; and Markakis, op.cit. 
279, 331* Art. 92 provided that the Emperor may issue decrees while 
Parliament is not in session. A subsequent Parliament may nullify 
such a decree by a majority vote in each House. Under Art. 33, how­
ever, there was no restriction on the number of times the Emperor could 
dissolve Parliament. Gilkes, op.cit. 64 termed Parliament "a place 
where the nobility could get together".
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elements coexist with the Christian tenets of the parent Egyptian 
Church* Ethiopia*s Church serves as a storehouse of cultural, social 
and political life (Assefa and Eshetu, op*cit* Ch* 9)* Nevertheless, 
James Westfall*s characterisation of the Catholic Church (in Lenski, 
op.cit. 262) can be applied to Ethiopia*s:
Democratic, yet aristocratic; charitable, yet exploitative; 
humanitarian, yet cruel; indulgent, yet surely repressive of 
some things; progressive, yet reactionary* * * - all these 
are qualities of the Church in the Middle Ages.
Like medieval Christians in Europe (and many colonial missionaries) 
Ethiopian priests acknowledged in principle the brotherhood of man, yet 
regarded "pagans’* as semi-outsiders, who had been called to membership 
in the Christian community but were not yet members of it (see Unger, 
op.cit. 1^9) *
The Church is anchored in the experiences of an isolated peas­
ant civilisation and views itself as the embattled repository of true 
Ethiopian nationalism, a claim that is today outdated and rather 
tragic: the Church’s social conscience goes no further than the feed­
ing of individual beggars. Isolation and an over-extended priesthood 
comprising some 20^ of the adult male Christian population has created 
something of a religious caste although, once priestly duties are 
performed, the life of most priests is similar to that of the peasants. 
Despite the conspicuously worldly ways of many of its priests, the 
Church retains an aura of sanctity. (Perham, op.cit. Ill; Levine,
Wax and Gold 128; Kaplan, et al., op.cit. 236-7; and Greenfield, 
op.cit. 26).
Monophysitism, the belief in the single rather than dual (human 
and divine) nature of Christ, is conducive to the^  view that Church and 
State are one - in contrast to the medieval European conception of a 
two-edged sword. Priests stimulate a localised patriotism by infusing 
it with religious fervor, and en^oy a large measure of authority over 
secular affairs since the parish is often the only unit of political 
loyalty. Church a nd state are linked at the national level through the 
divinity of the Solomonic line of Emperors: a "pearl** was passed from
Adam to Solomon and then to Hanna, mother of the Virgin Mary. Emperor 
and Christ are thus kinsmen and, when the Jews repudiated Christianity, 
Ethiopians became the Chosen People. They already possessed the 
Ark of the Covenant, stolen by Menelik I, son of Solomon and Sheba.
In general, the Ethiopian Church possessed a greater political authority 
than did Islamic institutions in Arab states. (C. Shenk, ’The Devel­
opment of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. . .* 367 (1972); Kaplan, ed: 
al., op.cit. 3^; Greenfield, op.cit. 27; and Hess, op.cit. **78).
Coulbeaux termed tie Ethiopian Church and S£ate "a single moral being, 
an amphibious personality*1 communicating movement to life as motor 
does to machine (in Perham, op.cit. 102). The wealth of the Church was 
as important a source of power as was its ethnical influence, and the 
Church was an integral part of the feudal system. Priest and peasant 
recognise their interdependence, but_jneeningful organisational links 
between this base and the central Church leadership are still lacking. 
Vague Regulations concerning the clergy and Church lands were pro­
mulgated in 19^2 (Decree No. 2, Neg. Gaz. 2/3, 31 Consol. L. Eth.
1) and an Ecclesiastical Council with "secular" administrative powers
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37 Paul and Clapham, op.cit. *KX>, *f33-*M Markakis, op-cit* 286; and 
Bryde, op-cit* 19* See J* Williamson, The Tudor Age 437-8 (3d Ed.,
196*0 and J. Farrar (Introduction to Legal Method o§,1977): "Until 
the nineteenth century Parliament was primarily a deliberative body 
and in practice legislation was not a very productive source of law”.
The same can be said of Haile Selassie's Parliament.
38 D. Foulkes, Introduction to Administrative Law b~5 (1972) ; L.Kuper, 
'Plural Societies1, iiKuper and M. Smith, eds*, Pluralism in Africa
7 , at 9 (1969); and Marshall, op.cit. 100, who adds that separation of 
powers is a "jumbled portmanteau of arguments for policies which ought 
to be supported or rejected on other grounds". It is rarely clear 
whether and in what sense a separation exists and what is separated, 
as legislation, execution and adjudication cannot be precisely defined 
(Id., 12*f).
39 Worku, op.cit. 7-8. The refashioning of the court system was one of 
Haile Selassie's first acts after the Italians were defeated. The 
Supreme Court consists of 7 divisions,headed by an Afe Negus ('Chief 
Justice', lit. "mouth of the king"), 8 Vice Afe Neguses and 20 
justices. The Court hears appeals and the bench may be constituted 
by 3 to 7 judges. Majority and minority opinions are written but
not published except, occasionally, by the Law Faculty. The High Court 
has 80 judges who sit in benches of 3 in more than 20 divisions. There 
are specialised divisions for an original criminal juris­
diction, criminal appeals, civil appeals, commerical disputes and land 
cases "sitting in Addis fbaba, and a division in each province. The 
Court has unlimited civil and criminal jurisdiction. Awraja Courts 
have original jurisdiction over more minor civil and criminal matters 
and hear appeals from Woreda Courts. The 800 Woreda judges are 
supervised directly by the Ministry of Justice. The jurisdiction of 
Awraja and Woreda Courts is regulated by the Civil and Criminal Proced­
ure Codes and, ir practice, several appeals are often permitted.
Atbia daghia judges are appointed by the local governor, and their 
decisions rely heavily on customary laws. Their jurisdiction and status 
are uncertain, their decisions are often unenforceable if not accepted 
by both parties, and they perform miscellaneous administrative functions 
similar to those of an eighteenth century English magistrate. Advo­
cates are registered by the Ministry of Justice,which makes minimal 
inquiries into their "sufficient /traditional/ qualifications" and "good 
character". They can be suspended by the Minister on the recommen­
dation of a Disciplinary Committee. A separate hierarchy of Muslim 
courts of original jurisdiction (Nuibas Councils) intermediate appeals 
(Kadis Council) and final appeal Tcourts of Shariat) received legal 
sanction in ±9kk . When the Civil, Civil Procedure and Criminal Pro­
cedure Codes cast doubt on their legitimacy, Muslim leaders secured 
Haile Selassie's assurance of their continued legality. (Administration 
of Justice P. 2 of 19**2, Neg. Gaz. 1/1; Registration of Advocates Rules, 
L.N. 166 of 1952, Neg. Gaz. ll/ll; Local Judges P. 90 of 19**7,
Neg. Gaz. 6/10; Worku, op.cit. 10-16, 20-6; Markakis, op.cit. 298;
W. Howard, Public Administration in Ethiopia ?6 (1955)T and Kaplan, 
et al., op. ci t. 283-5• There are, 01 course, a bewildering variety of 
customary Tribunals which are not recognised under state law. In
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6-7*
40 -See Dias, op.cit* 131 and Bryde, op.cit. 68-9, 73*
41 Worku, op.cit. 34, 36-7* 63, 67-8 and Marcus, Menelik. • • 197*
See; Bryde, op.cit. 6?-9* 73-51 162; Dahrendorf, op.cit. 294; and 
Duchacek, op.cit. 140.
42 Krzeczunowicz, cited by R. Means, 'The Constitutional Right to Judicial 
Review of Administrative Proceedings', 3 J. Ethiopian Law 175* at 
175-6 (1966). See: Id., passim; Paul and Clapham, op.cit. 4l4-17
and V. 2, 6l7-l8";Scholler, op.cit. 549; end R. David and J. Brier- 
ley* Major Legal Systems. • V 88 (l968).
43 E.g., Goplan v. State of Madras, A.I.R.1950 (S.C.) 27 and Maw Naing 
v. Rangoon Commissioner of Police /195.27 Burma L. R.p. 17 (SC).
In Goplan, detention was held to interfere only indirectly with the 
freedoms of speech and assembly protected under Art. 19 (due process), 
and the relevant standard was therefore Art. 21: "except according
to procedures established by law". This standard is complied with 
where there is a reasonable use of police powers, since the detention 
law was enacted for the public good. In Maw Naing, the court rejected 
American due process cases, reasoning that " in accordance with law" 
referred to positive law, enacted in due form. C.F. Mebratu, 
in the text, infra. But see Paul, op.cit. 328, suggesting that the 
Ethiopian courts have acted 'per incuriam*.
44 E.g., St. of Uttar Pradesh v. Deoman, A.I.R. i960 (S.C.) 1125, at
1131-2: Since Art. 14 of the Constitution was "adopted" from the
U.S. l4th Amendment, it is reasonable to assume that the Assembly 
adopting it was aware of the American judicial gloss on due process* 
American case law does not, therefore, contain foreign principles or an 
alien jurisprudence.
45 1955 Constitution, Arts. 40-1, 44-7* See, ®*g* 4 Sutra Porlalin the
text, infra and the fact that despite Art. 44, the property of persons
accused of serious political offenses was confiscated. The Ethiopian 
'bill of rights* is "a monument to formalism". (Markakis, op.cit.
214, 334) .
46 Marx ('The Eighteenth Brumaire. * .', in 1 Selected Works of Marx and 
Engels 398, at 409, 1969) makes the same criticism of the i64& ~
French Constitution, which embodied identical language: see Note
511infra. Means, op.cit. 188-90 and Paul, op.cit. 330 offer rather 
optimistic interpretations which are opposecT to mine. Means suggests 
that Art. 65 is redundant unless it is interpreted as converting 
other rights into absolute rights, overriding "in accordance with law" 
qualifications. If so, interpretations by the European Commission on 
Human Rights are wrong and the American presumption of constitution­
ality is also redundant# Paul argues that, while the Constitution is 
"confusing", a "careful reading" shows that: government must prove a
threat to public order, overly broad sanctions are implicitly proscribed,
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and due process must be observed. The careful reading and implicit 
proscriptions envisaged by one person are not necessarily those of 
another, and due process is mentioned only in the unofficial
English language version of Art, 43.
47 Ewing,op,clt, 343*
48 Clapham, op,cit, 42 and Scholler, op.cit. 524. See: H. Groves,
Comparative Constitutional Law 49 (l9®) ; P • Merkl, Comparative Pol­
itics 457 ( 1970) ; and K. Boyle, et al. , Law and State: The Case of
Northern Ireland 179 (1975)*
49 Speaking in 1931» Tekle Hawaryat, the Minister of Finance and alleged 
draftsman of the 1931 Constitution argued that:
It is needful for us to have patience, for it always takes a 
lot of time to accomplish a great concept. . . .  Some people,
lacking the patience to wait for the right time, claim that the
law has been set down in writing but has not been acted upon; 
lest they should annoy the people and make them lose hope, it 
is our duty to explain matters to our friends wherever we go 
. • . until they are able to analyse the advantages and dis­
advantages. (quoted by Haile Selassie, op.cit. 199)•
Much of what Tekle says is, of course,true but it is also an excellent 
illustration of the Amharic tag ishi naga, roughly ’Okay, tomorrow’ - 
the Amharic version of manana. See: K. Lowenstein, ’Reflections on
the Value of Constitutions. • in A. Zurcher, ed,, Constitutions and
Constitutional Trends since World War II 191, at 204-5 (1951)'*
Etzioni, quoted by J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis 128 (1976);
G. Myrdal, ’The ’’Soft State” in Underdeveloped Countries’, 15 
U.S.L.A. Law Rev. 1118, at 1128 (1968); F. Burke, Africa’s Quest 
for Order 13 (1964); Bryde, op.cit. 137-8; Markakis and Asmelash, 
op.cit. 200; Zolberg, op.cit. 157» Scholler, op.cit. 528; and Merkl, 
op.cit. 460-1.
50 See: W. Andrews, Constitutions and Constitutionalism 13-14 (1968) ;
B* Moore, Jr., Reflections on the Causes of Human Miseries. * .
88-9 (1972); D. Apter, Political Change 7^-7 (1973) ; Nwabueze, op.cit. 
x, 5? Paul and Clapham, op.cit. 429; Ghai and McAuslan, op.cit.; and 
my criticisms of quotations from Nwabueze and Stein and Shand, Note 
■*■5* supra. Nwabueze (op.cit. 10) cites S.A. de Smith for the proposition 
that Western constitutionalism entails three minimum restraints: 
government must be genuinely accountable to an organ independent of 
itself; free elections and the organisation of parties must be permitted ; 
and civil liberties must be enforced effectively by an independent 
judiciary. There is a definite Western bias in de Smith’s list, but 
it is interesting to note that, apart from the organisation of parties, 
these restraints are guaranteed formally by the 1955 Constitution. In 
practice, however, none of them were effective.
51 E.g., Marx (op.cit. 4)9) found that the Constitution, with its call for
organic laws, appealed both to the friends of order who abrogate liberties 
and Democrats who demand liberties:
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j/E&ch? paragraph of the Constitution contains its own anti­
thesis, its own Upper and Lower House, namely, liberty in the 
general phrase, abrogation of liberty in the marginal note.
/ f r $  a legal way, the constitutional existence of liberty 
remained intact, inviolate, however mortal the blows dealt to 
its existence in actual life.
52 See Apter, op.cit. 86 and Lenski, op.cit. 67*
53 W* Weieslender, 'The Political Ecology of Amhara Domination', 13,
325-6 (1965); D. Levine, 'Class Consciousness and Class Solidarity in 
the New Ethiopian Elites', in P. Lloyd, ed., The New Elites of Trop­
ical Africa 312, at 31*1—5, 317 (196*0. Marcus, Menelik. .' . 2l4;
Clapham, op.cit. *f7; and Kaplan, et al., op.cit. 111-12, 26*f, 292.
See; D. Goulat, 'Development Administration and Structures of Vulner­
ability*, in E. Morgan, ed., The Administration of Change 27, at 36 
(197*0; U. Kautsky, 'An Essay in the Politics of Development', in Id., 
e<*., Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries 3, at 19 (1962);
G. Heeger, The Politics of Underdevelopment 5*J—5~(197*0 ; N. Mouzelis, 
Organization and Bureaucracy 16 (1967); and Moore, Reflections. • .
71-2. Syoum (op.cit. 171) adds that, in Ethiopia, "a social (and 
economic) power are acquired primarily by close association with or 
membership of the group of toengest serategna (public service)".
5 Addis Hiwet, Ethiopia. • • 5*1—5, 78-80 (1975); Haile Selassie, op.cit.
65; Marcus, Menelik. • • 227-8; Greenfield, op.cit. 172-3; and Markakis, • 
op.cit. 229-32. See F. Riggs, 'The Structures of Government and Admin­
istrative Reform', in Bribanti, op.cit. 220, at 222-*f. The ministries 
nominally created in 1908 included: Justice, Interior, Commerce and
Foreign Affairs, Finance, Agriculture and Industry, Public Works, War,
Pen (the transmission of Imperial orders), and Palace/Post, Telephone 
and Telegraph (Scholler, op.cit. 527)#
55 Weisslender, op.cit. 17; Gilkes, op.cit. 63; Clapham, op.cit. 21; 
and Markakis, op.cit. 30*1-5* See; V. Thompson, 'The Administrative 
Objectives. • .*, in G. Ness, ed., The Sociology of Economic Develop­
ment 517, at 525 (1970); F.Riggs, Administration in Developing Count­
ries 253 (I96*t) ; and Lenski, op.cit. 230. See; L.G. Cowan, 'The 
Political and Administrative Setting for Rural Development', in F. 
Arkhurst, ed., Africa in the Seventies and Eighties 87, at 102-3
(1970) and Haile Selassie, op.cit. 5i
We have set out to the best of Our ability to improve, grad­
ually, internal administration by introducing into the country 
Western modes of civilization through which Our people may 
attain a higher level; hence Our conscience does not rebuke 
Us.
56 Clapham, op.cit. 90, 102 and Markakis, op.cit. 392. See Adu, cited
by W. Lamouse-Smitfy 'Complexity and African Development Administration*, 
in Morgan, op.cit. 131, at 138 and J. LaPalombara, 'Alternative 
Strategies • • .', in F.Riggs, ed., Frontiers of Development Admin­
istration 171, at 187 (1970). .
57 G. Lipsky, Ethiopia 275 (1962); Clapham, op.cit. l83-*f; Kaplan, et al. 
op.cit. 299; and Addis, op.cit. 9*U See Myrdal, Asian Drama 3I8.
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In a novel about Ethiopia, E* Murray (Kulubi 12, 1973) remarks:
A degree, especially a foreign degree, was a passport to the 
• . * bureaucracy and the endless drinking of coffee and the 
endless shuffling of papers*
58 M* Abir, Education and National Unity in Ethiopia*, 69 Af. Affairs 44, 
at 57 (1970); Gilkes, op.cit* 89; Kaplan, et al., op.cit* 264;
Clapham, op.cit. 18; Schwab, op.cit. 51; nnd Markakis, op.cit. 248,
357* See F. Marx, The Administrative State 38 (1957)*
59 Lipsky, op.cit. 297 and Markakis, op.cit* 355* See Farer, op.cit*
15 and L. Palmer, *Indonesia*s Agenda of Corruption*, New Society 
16/9/76, 59^, at 596.
60 Z. Plater, 'Legal Development and Public Administration /in Ethiopia/', 
in Marcus, Proceedings * * . 319, at 320. See M. Esman, *The Politics 
of Development Administration*, in Montgomery and Siffen, op.cit*
591 at 81, 90.
61 J* Habermas, Legitimation Crisis 49 (1976)* See Chap* 2*
62 See Lamouse-Smith, op.cit* 154-5 and Esman, ’Administrative Doctrine 
and Developmental Needs', in Morgan, op.cit*, 3, at 4*
63 Clapham, op.cit* 6, 10, 31> 48, 74, 78, 101, 112; Kaplan et al*, op.cit*
263-4; and Levine, *Amhara Culture* . .** D. Korten, Planned Change in 
Traditional Society 78 (1972) adds that,for most Ethiopians, "admin­
istration is not a problem of skill, ability or training, but, rather,
a simple matter of exercising privilege. . . See: Myrdal,
Asian Drama 75? H. Wheeler, Democracy in a Revolutionary Era 137
(1971)7ISnouse-Smith, op.cit. 154; and F. Marx, op.cit. 657 94*
64 Paul, op.cit. 325* See: J. Farrar, Introduction to Legal Method 30,
145-6 T1977Y; E. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries 199- 
200 (1964); Friedman, op.cit. 30-5, G* Sawer, Law in Society 128 
(1965); B. Schwartz, 'The Code and Public Law', in Id., ed., The Code 
Napoleon and the Common-Law World 247, at 250 (1975T? J.W. Hurst, Law 
and Social Order in the United States 139-40 (1977); and Bryde, 
op.cit* 180* "
65 Clapham, op.cit* 182. Analytical distinctions between Ethiopian 
public and private laws are discussed in Chap. 7, infra*
66 M* Norris, 'Ethiopian Municipal Administration and the Approach to 
Local Government Reform', 1 Planning and Administration 47, at 47
(1974).
' ’ '>
67 Weieslender, op.cit* 2.
68 See Foulkes, op.cit. 1.
69 E.g.: Fed. Prosecutor v. Lisci Sofia, F.S.C. Cr. Ap. 7/7 (1959) ;
Mesfin Zelellew v. Min. of Public Works, 2 JEL 298 (1965) ; and Ababiya
et al* v. H.S.I.U., H. Ct. 593/58 (1968). See R. Seidman, 'Administrative
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Law and Legitimacy in Anglophonic Africa1, 5 and Soc. Rev. 161, 
at 175 (1970). In Lisci, the Ministry of Finance had promulgated a 
regulation penalising the importation of foreign currency, where the 
relevant Proclamation conferred the power to regulate currency exports.
The Court struck down the regulation: Parliament has the sole auth­
ority to create new offenses under the Constitution, unless it has 
expressly delegated that authority. In Mesfin, the number of buses the 
plaintiff could run from Addis Ababa to Jimma was cut from 8 to 6 per 
month by the Transport Board. Although the Board was empowered to 
impose conditions as it saw fit to promote an "effective schedule” , 
the Court found that it had misused its powers. Having issued too 
many licenses, the Board attempted to decrease the numbers of runs 
in order to reduce competition. This aim, the Court held, was within 
neither the letter nor the spirit of the Transport Proclamation, Art.
21 (iii). The most interesting of this line of cases is Ababiyai 
the Court held that the E.U.S. (national service) programme estab­
lished by the University was ultra vires the University Charter, since 
this service could not be imposed as an "academic requirement”.
This decision was later Vacated by the Supreme Court and one of the 
High Court judges who delivered the judgement was dismissed in dis­
grace.
70 Paul, op.cit. 329 and Paul and Clapham, op.cit. V. 2, 660.
71 * Kaplan, et al., op.cit. 109; Syoum, op.cit. 12*f; Marcus, Menelik. • •
19^-5; and Clapham, op.cit. 139* See: Ghai and McAuslan, op.cit.
173; Edelman, op.cit. 139; and Riggs, op.cit. 280-2, 381; and Marshall, 
op.cit. 114-5.
72 D. Karsten, (Ethiopian) 'Economy', in Africa South of the Sahara, 304, at
306 (1970; Assefa and Eshetu, op.cit/ l6; Markakis, op.cit. 215;
and Cohen and Koehn, op.cit. 17* Howard, op.cit. 56 notes that 
Ethiopian "ministries, superimposed upon the medieval organization of 
the country, were conducted upon lives quite different from those of 
their European models”. In 19731 for example, Ethiopian administration 
involved the following ministries: Prime Minister's Office (Secre­
tariat of the Council of Ministers and supervision of the Planning 
Commission, Technical Agency and Statistical Office) ; Pen 
(Tsahafe Tezaz) - the Emperor's spokesman, Government archivist and the 
publisher of the Negarit Gazeta; Palace (administration of Imperial 
offices, lands and other properties); Foreign Affairs; community development 
(welfare programmes and labour relations); Health; Land Reform and 
Administration; Information (including censorship, the administration 
of the media and a printing quasi-monopoly); Communications, Tele­
communications and Post; Justice (including the preparation of draft 
laws for other ministries); Mines, Public Works and Water Resources 
(including public housing) ;Education and Fine Arts; Commerce, Industry 
and Tourism; Agriculture;and Finance. Ministers (Definition of Powers) 
Order, 1 of 1943 ♦ Neg. Gaz. 2/5, as amended - 3 Consol. L. Eth. 1 and 
Kaplan, et al. 201-2. See also Scholler, op.cit. 537* A Ministry of 
Planning and.' Development" was created in 1986 and abolished in 1970 - 
see infra.
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73 Ministers* • • Order, supra Note 72, Art, 7r as amended by Order kk 
of 19^6,
7k Clapham, op.cit. 95-7; Kaplan, et al,, op,cit, 115, 280; and Lipsky, 
op.cit. 178-9*
75 See Central Personnel Agency Order ("Order") ,23 of 1962 , Neg, Gaz,
2l73 and the ancillary Regulations, L,N, 269 of 1962, Neg, Gaz,
22/6. Under the Order, the Agency is responsible to the Council of )
Ministers (Art. *0, and broadly empowered: to issue and interpret 
regulations (Arts. 6, 29-30), to establish and revise a uniform class­
ification of bureaucratic salaries and positions (Arts. 7* 28) and 
to recruit, select, appoint, transfer and promote civil servants (Art.
9). Arts. 12-28 contain "public service principles", including: 
obligations to denote "his whole energy and ability to the welfare" 
of Empire and nation (the distinction is irrelevant) , to take an oath 
of loyalty to Emperor and Constitution (Art* 17), and "to maintain . « • 
a high standard of integrity and conduct" (Art. 19); and rights to 
"the special protection of the state"(Art. 20, which has no concrete 
meaning in Ethiopian law), to resign "at any time" (Art. 25 - flatly 
contradicted in practice, as the Emperor1 s consent was necessary - see 
Chap. k), and to a "formal procedure" in the event of dismissal for 
"inefficiency" (Art. 26 - often ignored in practice). Under the 
Regulations, vacancies are filled only in the event of "indispensible 
need", posts are widely advertised, and candidates are evaluated 
through a written and/or performance test and/or interviews, "as 
suitable" (Arts. 8(1), 10)• Transfers are ordered "in the interest 
of the administration" (Art. 19(1)). Promotions are based on per­
formance, aptitude for the new position and seniority (Art. 21(1)), 
ascertained primarily on the basis of periodic efficiency reports 
(Art. 22(l)). In practice, as we noted, these Regulations are ignored: 
the powerful attempt to place their proteges in sensitive positions or 
take their staff with them to a new job, whether or not vacancies 
exist and regardless of the qualifications required in theory. This 
tends to support Korten's assertion, Note 63, supra.
76 See: Myrdal, Asian Drama 107-9 (1977); (Ethiopian) Ministry of Planning
and Development, 'A Guide to Development Planning* (cyclostyled,
1967); H.Jaguribe, Political and Economic Development 18-19 (1968); 
and G. Papi, *The Role of the State in Mixed Economies*, inJL Margolis 
and H. Guitton, eds. Public Economics 1, at 12 (1969)*
77 Clapham, op.cit. 23 and *A Guide to Development Planning*. See:
A. Hirshman, *Economic Policy inUnderdeveloped Countries*, in Ness, 
op.cit. 505» at 506-7; C. Thomas, Dependence and Transformation 70 
’(197 )^ i B. Van Arkadie, 'Planning, Plans and Planned Economies*, 
in Morgan, op.cit. 16*+, at 167-71, l8l.
78 Myrdal, Asian Drama 302.
79 G. Gill, 'Introduction' to 'Resource Mobilisation', in Id., ed.,
Readings on the Ethiopian Economy 2*f8, at 2*f8 (197*0 and R. Disney,
'Notes on the National Accounts of Ethiopia', in Gill, op.cit. 17,
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80 Order 15 of 195**, Neg* Gaz. 14/3. On this topic generally, see I*
Fraser, 'The Administrative Framework for Economic Development in 
Ethiopia', 3 <7. Eth* L* 118 (1966)*
81 Order 46 of 1966 ,Neg. Gaz* 25/23*
82 Order 65 of 1970, Neg* Gaz* 29/19*
85 !£*» Art* 5? Fraser, op.cit. 125-6, 135-40; and T. Bodman 'Income Tax
Exemption as an Incentive to Invest in Ethiopia', in 6 J. Eth* L.
215 (1969)* See Domestic and Foreign Trade and Industrial Licence 
Procs*, 1971, Neg* Gaz* 30/31-2 and Investment Proc., 1966, 19 
Consol* L* Eth* 3, discussed in Chap* 7*
84 Eshetu Chole, 'Taxation in Ethiopia* 1-2 (1968); S. Stanley, 'The
Role of a(n Ethiopian) Budget in Promoting Economic and Social Develop­
ment* (cyclostyled, n*d.); Kaplan, et al*, op.cit. **37; Gilkes, op.cit* 
160-2; and Assefa and Eshetu, op.cit* 17* See 0. Hiner, Business 
Adroinistration 221 (1969) end Riggs op.cit* 304-5*
85 Clapham, op.cit. 155-67, Hess, op.cit. 499; Markakis, op.cit* 328; and 
Schwab, op.cit. 101. See Ministers (Definition of Powers) Order,
Art. 29* The Minister of Finance approves the draft budget and, after 
Parliamentary approval, determines: whether individuals are auth­
orised to claim a budgeted sum, which budget heading is to be charged, 
and whether a reallocation of funds among headings is to be permitted 
(Bulcha Demeksa, 'The Ethiopian Budget*, k J* Eth. L. 369, at 376, 
380-1, 1967)*
86 Eshetu, op.cit. 112-13* See N. Kaldor, 'Taxation for Economic Devel­
opment* , ini. Livingstone, ed., Economic Policy for Development
313, at 315 (1971).
87 Eshetu, op.cit. 104, 122. See: Gilkes, op.cit. 165; J* Due, 
'Requirements of a Tax Structure in a Development Economy', in 
R. Bird and 0. Oldman, eds., Readings on Taxation in Developing 
Countries 33, at 36 (1967); Kaldor, op.cit. 316; and Myrdal, Asian 
Drama 86-7*
88 Lewis, op.cit. 11-12; Eshetu, op.cit. 109-10, 125; Fraser, op.cit. 122; 
and Kaplan, et al., op. cit. 43o. See: Customs Proc. (145 of 1955,
Neg. Gaz. l*f/7); and Regulations (L.N. 153 of 1951, Neg. Gaz. 10/8) as 
amended in 16 Consol. L. Eth. 1,7; Excise Tax Procs. (204 of 1963,
Neg. Gaz. 22/17, 217 of 1965, Neg. Gaz. 2yi0, and 24-9 of 1967, Neg. 
Gaz. 2S7l*0as amended in 17 Consol. L. Eth. 4-6; Transaction Tax 
Procs. (205 of 1963, Neg. Gaz. 22/ltt and~307 of 1972, Neg. Gaz.
31/21); Riggs, op.cit. 289-92; and M. Heth, The Legal Framework of 
Economic Activity in Israel 208 (1967)•
89 Eshetu, op.cit. 28, 51-8; Fraser, op.cit. 122; and Kaplan, et+al., 
op.cit. kk&m^ See: Income Tax Proc. 173 of 1961, Neg. Gaz.' 50/15, 
as amended in 17 Consol. L. Eth. 9, particularly Arts. 7, 10 and 12;
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in Bird and Oldman, op.cit. 155, at 163*
90 Land Tax Proc. No. 70 of 1944, Neg. Gaz. 4/2, as amended in 17 Consol.
L. Eth. 11; Taye Guillat, 'The Tax iiLieu of Tithe and the New Agri­
cultural Income Tax', 2 Dialogue (Addis Abaha) No. 1, 17-21 (1968) ; and 
Kaplan, et al., op.cit. 442.
91 Schwab, op.cit. 63. Although Schwab is specifically referring to ) 
land measurement failures in Go j jam in 1962, his comment is equally 
applicable to the Agricultural Income Tax Proclamation (see Art.
17D (b) of the Proc.) and, perhaps, the 1975 Land Reform Proclamation 
(see Chap. 6).
92 Eshetu, op.cit. 68-9* See Cattle Tax Proc., 142 of 1954, Neg. Gaz.
14/1.
93 Redden, op.cit. 172 and Markakis, op.cit. 328. See S. Surrey, 'Tax 
Administration in Underdeveloped Countries', in Bird and Oldman, op.cit.
497, at 498, 500 and Heth, op.cit. 208-9*
94 J. Cohen and D. Weintraub, Land and Peasants in Imperial Ethiopia 91
(1975)* Municipal administration is discussed in Chap. 7, infra.
95 Cohen and Koehn, op.cit. 2, 17; Norris, op.cit. 50-1; Gilkes, op.cit.
45? and Markakis, op.cit. 2331 307*
96 Cohen and Koehn, op.cit. See Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictator­
ship and Democracy 43r 417 and Riggs, op.cit. 223, 225*
97 Bekele Geleta, 'Asosa Awraja People and Local Government* 9-12,
57 (1968); Rosen, op.cit. 174-6; Markakis, op.cit. 306; and Clapham, 
op.cit. 76 (but see Id., 77)* See P. Raup, 'Some Interrelations between 
Public Administration and Agricultural Development', in Uphoff and 
Ilchman, The Political Economy of Development 439, £.t 44l.
98 Markakis, op.cit. 87-8. See Bekele, op.cit. 30.
99 J* Lyons, 'Functions of Local Government in Ethiopia', (cyclostyled,
1969) and Markakis, op.cit. 298. See Administrative Regulations,
Decree 1 of 1942, Neg. Gaz* 1/6, as amended in 6 Consol. L. Eth. 1 
and, e.g., the breadth and generality of Pt. 2, IcTS —
'ihe Governor-General is the Government representative for the 
Teklay Ghizat ^ rovince^ to which he is appointed. Governors 
shall exercise general supervision over all officials appointed 
. . .  by the Ministry of Interior and other Ministers. But 
they are responsible to • . . other Ministers according to the 
nature of their business. On matters directly affecting a 
particular Minister, governors shall communicate derectly 
/sic? with that Minister. On matters of direct concern to a 
particular Minister but also affecting general administrative 
policy they will consult with the Minister of Interior.
The only other relevant piece of legislation, the Local Self-Admin­
istration Order, is discussed infra in this sub-section.
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100 Bekele, op.cit. 6-7, 30, b6; Clapham, op.cit* 11; Rosen, op.cit. 173; 
Markakis,op.cit. 33-2; and the Administrative Regulations of 19^2. Rules 
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and Cohen and Koehn, op.cit. 3* 11 • See Chapman, op.cit. 'yi* Under 
Art. 26 of the Ministers-(Definition of Powers) Order, the Minister 
is to: "ensure the maintenance of peace and security"; "ensure the 
lawful administration" of local administration, including chartered 
municipalities; secure,, the implementation of town planning programmes 
(discussed in Chap. 7* infra.); and direct and supervise the police, 
prisons, the exercise of control over foreign nationals, census-taking, 
inland waterways and Parliamentary elections. Some amendments by 
implication have occurred since the Revolution.
102 Markakis, op.cit. 288, 305-6.
103 Id* and Cohen and Koehn, op.cit. 3-4-* 6.
10k Id., 4.
105 Norris, op.cit. 66, 70; Baro Tumsa, decentralisation and Nation- 
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2 R.L. Hale, Freedom Through Law 30 (1952), referring specifically to 
inheritance taxes. See Id., viii, xiii and K. Griffen, Underdevel­
opment in Spanish America 183 (1969).
3 J* Cohen and Sileshi Sisaye, *Research on Socio-economic Development
in Ethiopia* 27 (1977)* I am indebted to these Ethiopianists for many
of the insights that can be derived from a centre/periphery analysis.
4 J. Cohen, and P. Koehn, ’Rural and Urban Land Reform in Ethiopia*,
l4 Af. Law Studs. 3, at 4 (1977). See: J. Holmberg, ’Pricing Strat­
egies for Agricultural Produce in . . . Ethiopia* 4, 11-12 (1976);
G. Myrdal, Asian Drama 79 (Abridged Ed. 1977); J. Robinson, Freedom 
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CHAPTER 6
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Guardian, 6 Mar. 1978, 14* See; H. Brookfield, Interdependent Devel­
opment 108 (1975)? R* Dumont, False Start in Africa 30 (1966);
J. Mellor, ’The Subsistence Farmer in Traditional Economies*, in
C. Wharton, Jr., ed., Subsistence Agriculture and Economic Development 
210, at 218-19 (1969); and E. Whetham and J. Currie, The Economics of 
African Countries 45 (1969).
3 Gill, 'Ethiopian Agriculture in Perspective*, in Gill, op.cit. 47 at 
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zania, Uganda and Zambia. See also K. Redden, The Legal System of 
Ethiopia 158-9 (1968) and Cohen and Sileshi, op.cit. 20. Previously, 
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budget and never exceeded 556 (Assefa and Eshetu, op.cit. 48).
4 S. Messing, The Target of Health in Ethiopia 94 (1972). See: U. Lele,
The Design of Rural Development 27 (1975) ; S. Wolf, Peasant Wars in 
the Twentieth Century 289, 295 (1969); R. Firth, *A General Comment*, 
in Id*, ed., Themes in Economic Anthropology 3, at 3-4 (1970);
R. Redfield, Peasant Society and Culture 135 (1956); Mellor, op.cit. 
218-19, 226; E. Whetham and J. Currie, The Economics of African 
Countries 33 (1969); and Chayanov, cited by Brookfield, op.cit. 154.
5 E. Murray, Kulubi 419, New York Crown (1973)* This citation should 
not be construed as an acceptance of other views expressed by Murray.
6 P. Gilkes, The Dying Lion 101-2 (1975); M. Perham, Ethiopia 277-8 
(2d Ed. 1969); N. Marein, The Ethiopian Empire: Federation and Lav/s 
249 (1955); Assefa and Eshetu,"’"op.’cff.1""42? A. Hoben, fSocial 
Anthropology and Development Planning - a Case Study in Ethiopian Land 
Reform Policy*, 10 J. Mod. Af. Studs. 561, 582 (1972); H. Dunning,
’Land Reform in Ethiopia*, 18 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 271 (1970) ; J. Cohen 
’Ethiopia After Haile Selassie*, 72 African Affairs 365, 380 (1973);
R. Greenfield, ’The Ogaden. . .: Before the Scramble', West Africa,
26 Sept. 1977, 1965, at 1968; and Alemante G. Selassie, 1 Property 
Relationships in Ethiopia and their Implications for Development*,
2 (1972). The discussion adopts the following definition of the land 
tenure system:
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(It) embodies those legal and contractual or customary arrange­
ments whereby people in farming gain access to productive 
opportunities on the land. It constitutes the rules and pro­
cedures governing the rights, duties, liberties and exposures 
of individuals and groups in the use and control over the 
basic resources of land and water.
Tenure systems help to shape rural income distribution and are a 
principle source of political and economic power in non-industrial 
society.( P. Dorner, Land Reform and Economic Development 17-18
(1972)). Although this definition is fairly broad, discussions con­
cerning land reform, infra, will expand the concept of tenure by 
linking it with integrated rural development and by defining reform as 
encompassing all of the necessary measures that improve the structure of 
men’s relations with'respect to land rights (See P. Raup, ’The Cont­
ribution of Land Reform to Agricultural Development’, in N. Uphoff and
W. Ilchman, The Political Economy of Development 284, at 285-6
(1972)).
7 Quoted by, e.g., Assefa and Eshetu, op.cit. 7*
8 Quoted by, e.g., Eshetu Chole, ’Taxation in Ethiopia’ 36 (1968).
9 In Ethiopia, land is measured in hectares (1 ha. = roughly 2.5 acres) 
and gashas (l gasha = roughly 35-55 has. with 40 has. as the ’official* 
definition). Arable land totals some 89 million has. (68?5 of Eth­
iopia’s total surface area), while less than 10 million has. are 
actually cultivated. Much of the balance is used as pasture and (prior 
to 1975) the Government owned some 11.8 million has. (mengist - the 
size of Liberia) that are either arable or potentially arable if 
irrigation*is used. Cultivated land is classified as fertile (36.2%), 
semi-fertile (1 Wo) and poor (49%) • With a 1970 estimated population 
of 24.3 million, of which all but 2*3 million are rural, 4.3 million 
familes (averaging 4.65 persons/family) cultivate an average of just 
over 3 has. each. (**00,000 families (2 million people) are pastoral- 
ists, grazing their animals on 5*5 million has.). This average is 
misleading: of the farms were one ha. or smaller and, in Tigre
Province 4Jfo of the farms are smaller than % ha. Only 10^ of Ethiopia’s
cultivated land was held by smallholders, while 62& was held by large
. landowners. The lion’s share of this was held by the royal family, and 
Ztyo of the total held by the Church. Harar Province offered the most 
extreme example of inequality of land distribution: 4¥/o of the land­
owners owned 3 of the land, a further by/0 of the owners held 13*Wo 
of the land and two persons owned 7 ^  of the land. One of the latter 
paid taxes on an estimated 1% of his holdings! Further, land holdings 
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16, 27, Addis Ababa (1971); A. Lexander, ’Land Ownership, Tenancy 
and Social Organization in the Waji Area” 10, CADU Pub. No. 50
(1970); H. Weatherall, ’Land Administration in Ethiopia* 252, 253 
in Seminar Proceedings on Agrarian Reform (1970); an£ Alemante, 
op.cit. 7, 32). If a land reform attempted to provide a farm of
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roughly 10 has. for each of the *f«3 million peasant families, clearing, 
resettlement and, in some cases, irrigation programmes would have to 
cover some 82.5 million acres. In the densely populated provinces of 
Tigre and Wollo, vacant arable land has entirely disappeared in the 
last ten years. Providing each of the existing families with a farm 
that is economically viable in the long run - about 20 has.- would 
exhaust arable land without allowing for population increases.
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the Church. It is also virtually identical to many of the tenures 
existing in southern Ethiopia prior to Menelik*s conquests* Many
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What we witness today in the underdeveloped world is a re­
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able clarity in the socio-economic position of the peasant 
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cana 55, at 62 (1975)* See also: M. Ottaway, ’Land Reform and Peasant
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52 Art. 1205* See Farer, op.cit. 44* Further, ’’transfers*1 are pro­
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'Practice Statement* (1966) and S. Asante, 'Stare Decisis in the Supreme 
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122 Of the 68 public companies organised under the Commercial Code, 21 were 
wholly owned by Government prior to 1974-: Addis Tyre Co, S.C., Adwa 
Flour Mills, Agro-Industrial Development Bank, Bahar Dar Textile Mills, 
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, Debre Berhan Wool Factory, Development and 
Hotels S.C., Ethiopian Airlines S.C., Ethiopian Cement Corporation S.C., 
Ethiopian Petroleum S.C., Ethiopian Shipping Lines, Ethiopian Tannery 
S.C., Ethiopian Tourism and Hotel Investment Corporation S.C.,
Ethiopian Tourist Trading Co., Maritime and Transit Service, National 
Resources Development S.C., Northern Ethiopian Railways, Rubber and 
Canvas S.C.(shoes), Saving and Mortgage Corporation of Ethiopia,
Wanza S.C. (agriculture), and Awasa Agro Industrial S.C.
The 14- companies in which Government owned 50?£ or more of the shares are: 
African Match and Paper Factory S.C., Agricultural Input and Marketing 
Services, Eritrean Cement Factory S.C., Ethio-Italian Hotel S.C.
(Asmara), Ethiopian Hotels, Ethiopian Abattoirs S.C., Ethiopian Light 
Industries, Ethiopian Metal Tools S.C., Ethiopian Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturing Co. S.C., Ethiopian Pulp and Paper S.C., Ras Hotel,
Real Estate Development Center, Suntu Coffee Processing Corp., 
and Abadir Agricultural Development S.C.
The ten companies with 20-5096 Government ownership were: Berhana Selam
Printing Press, Kassem-Kebgna Farm S.C., Elidoo(?) , Ethio-Japanese 
Synthetic Textiles S.C., Ethio Lime Senkelle S.C., Ethi Meat Con­
centrate S.C., H.V.A. Metahara (sugar), Mutual Fund Management S.C., 
Societe du Ted j d’Ethiopie Saba (alcoholic drinks), Tendaho Plan­
tation (cotton).
The 22 companies where Government ownership was less than 2096 were:
Addis Ababa Bank, Adulis Private Ltd. Co. S.C. (shipping and travel 
agent), Aerated Y/ater of Harar S.C., Ashange Private Ltd. Co.,
Automotive Manufacturing Co., Banco Di Napoli S.C., Blue Nile Insur­
ance Co. S.C., Bottling Co. of Ethiopia, Cotton Co. of Ethiopia,
Elaberet Estate S.C. (Mixed farming), EPHARM (pharmaceuticals),
Ethiopian Chipwood and Furniture S.C., Ethiopian Distribution Co.
S.C. (EDISCO), Ethiopian Fabrics S.C., Ethiopian Livestock Development 
S.C., Ethiopian Spice Extraction S.C., General Ethiopian Transport
S.C., H.V.A. Ethiopia (Sugar), Imperial Insurance Co. of Ethiopia S.C., 
Indo-Ethiopian Textiles S.C., International Air-Radio Ltd., Kaliti Food 
Prod. S.C., Meta Ato Brewery (Ethiopia) Ltd. S.C., National Soft 
Drink Corp., Sabean Metal Products, Sabean Utility S.C., Scrap Iron Board, 
Shenker of Ethiopia Pvt. Ltd. Co. (shipping), Societe En Particip­
ation Pour L ’etud. Voie Feree Nazareth-Dilla, Tigrai Agricultural 
and Industrial Developments S.C., and United Touring Company.
(Getu Aberra, ’Public Corporations in Ethiopia’, 123-6 (1974*)).
See Friedman, in Friedman and Gamer, op.cit. 334-•
123 Getu Aberra, op.cit. 90.
124* J. Paul and C. Clapham, 2 Ethiopian Constitutional Development 459-60 
Cl972 )• See Ghai, op.citT l6 o . '
125 Chartered (public law) Corporations in Ethiopia, 1974 (adapted from 
Getu Aberra, op.cit. 9-10 and passim).
6^8
125 Chartered (public law) Corporations in Ethiopia, 197^ - (adapted from 
Getu Aberra, op.cit. 9-10 and passim)":
Key to the Table Below
a s corp. independent to extent that it uses its own resources, receives 
Treasury funding and returns any surplus annually* 
b = cofp. receives grant-in-aid to the extent that it can justify the 
receipt of funds; sums are not tied to Government’s annual Budget 
headings*
c = corp* virtually self-financing; largely independent from direct 
political controls. 
d = corp* employees are not civil servants (otherwise they are, except 
for h below) •
e = corp* chief executive appointed by Emperor on Board’s recommendation*
f = chief executive appointed by Board on Minister’s recommendation*
g = chief executive appointed by Board only.
h = corp. employees can form union and bargain collectively, etc. under
Labour Relations Proc.; h therefore encompasses d. 
i = corp. may be able to interfere with private property rights, yet 
be immune to attack under the Constitution.
I. Created by Proclamation 
Addis Ababa Water and Sewage Authority - c,e,i 
Dairy Development Agency - b,e 
Ethiopian Grain Board - c,g 
Eth. Standards Institute - b,e 
Imp. Board of Telecommunications - c,g,h,i 
Imp. Highways Authority *• b,g,i 
Imp* Eth. Tobacco Monopoly - c,g,h 
Imp* Savings and Home Ownership Assn. - c,g,h 
National Coffee Board - c 
Nat’l Lottery Administration - c,d,g,h 
Post Office Administration - c,d,e
II. Created under G.N* (Regulation)
Awash Valley Authority - a,e,i .
Central Medical Stores Corp. - c,d,h
Eth* Electric Light and Power - c,e,h,i
Eth. Grain Corp. - c,d,g,h
Haile Selassie I Univ. - b,e
H.S.I. Foundation - accepts gifts - g
Municipality of Addis Ababa - c (Mayor elected)
III. Created by Order
Centre for Entrepreneurship and Management - b,f
Civil Aviation Administration - a,e
Health Tax Board - a
Livestock and Meat Board - a , e
Institute of Agricultural Research - a,f
Malaria Eradication Service - b, f
National Bank of Eth. - c,e,h
Nat’l Water Resources Committee - b,e
Rehabilitation Agency -
Road Transport Admin. - a,g
State Forest Dev. Agency - b,e
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(Other chartered organisations are purely charitable - YMCA, Boy 
Scouts, etc. - and are created by G.N.)
126 Getu Aberra, op.cit. 58-60, 105-6. See; Ghai, op.cit. 168; Friedman, 
in Friedman and Garner, op.cit. 304, 327-30; and Daintith, op.cit. 209,
215, 264, 286.
127 See; Id. 236; Ghai, op.cit. 182-3; Drago, op.cit. 15, 27; Friedman, 
in Friedman and Garner, op.cit. 325; and Note 122, supra.
3-28 See; F. Riggs, 'The Context of Development Administration', in Id., 
ed., Frontiers of Development Studies 72, at 86 (1970); F. Sherwood, 
■The Problem of the Public Enterprise*, in Id. 348, at 3^1; W. Fried- 
man, The State and the Rule of Law . . .  11; and Ghai, op.cit. 157.
129 'Declaration pn Economic Policy of Socialist Ethiopia', Addis Ababa, 
Feb. 7, 1975; 'Banks and Insurance Companies Nationalized', Ethiopian 
Herald, Jan. 2, 1975, 1, 6; '72 Companies Made Public Property',
Id., Deb. 4, 1975, 1; and Radio Addis Ababa News, Feb. 3, 1975*
130 P. 19 of 1975, Neg. Gaz. 34/15, 4 Feb., Art. 2(2), and P. 20 of IO75, 
Neg. Gaz. 34/15, 4 Feb. Arts. 3-H.
131 P. 26 of 1975, Neg. Gaz. 34/22, 11 Mar., Arts. 2-5, 7-8, 10.
132 Ld. See Chap. 6, Sec. II.
153 39 of 1975, Neg. Gaz. 34/33, 25 «June, Arts. 3,5, amending P.
26 of 1975, Arts. 2(lT(d),3.
134 P. 93 of 1976, Neg. Gaz. 35/34, Arts. 2, 3(1).
135 P. 70 of 1975, Neg. Gaz. 35/14, 13 Pec., Prologue and Art. 2.
136 Civil Code Arts. 1474, 1475(2), and 1476 (2) provide that compensation
for expropriation "shall be equal to the amount of actual damage caused 
by expropriation" on the day the committee takes its decision, less 
"the increase of value arising from the construction of public works" 
and "any speculative increase of value" arising from the announcement 
of public works projects. It is unlikely that these provisions are 
applied, although they have never been repealed expressly or, arguably, 
by implication.
137 See Heth, op.cit. 58 and Friedman, in Friedman and Garner, op.cit. 326, 
330, 332, 335.
138 P. 76 of 1975, Neg. Gaz. 35/1&, 29Dec.>Arts. 3(2) , (3) , 4(1), supple­
menting the Industrial Licence Proclamation, Foreign Trade Proclamatioh 
and Domestic Trade Proclamation, Nos. 292-4 of 1971 (supra). Art.
2(2) declares P. 76 inapplicable to "construction work, surface 
transport, inland water transport /and^ the publishing of newspapers 
and magazines."
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139 L.N. 13 of 1975, L.N. 14 of 1975 and L.N. 33 of 1976, Neg. Gaz, 35/27.
140 Salt - l.N. 24 of 1975, Neg. Gaz. 35/12, 11 Dec., issued under the same 
authority as L.N. 21. The Corp. mines salt or obtains it through the 
evaporation of sea water. Authorised capital is Eth* $15 millions,
of which $6.5 millions has been paid in cash or kind (Art. 5)* Gum -
P. 94 of 1976, Neg. Gaz. 35/35* Building Materials - L.N. 34 of 1976,
Neg. Gaz. 35/23•
141 L.N. 21 of 1975, Neg. Gaz. 34/43, 9 Sept., issued by the Minister of 
National Resource Development under the authority of P. 20 of 1975,
Art. 10 (sic - should read Art. 11)., The authorised capital totals 
Eth. $100 millions, of which $83*9 millions has been paid in cash or 
kind (Art. 6).
142 P. 68 of 1975, Neg. Gaz. 35/13, 12 Dec. The Authorised and fully-paid
capital totals Eth. $11 millions (Art. 13)*
143 P* 68 of 1975, Arts*7, 22-3- The Bank has a capitalisation of Eth.
$20 millions, fully-paid (Art. 3.4).
144 P. 68 of 1975, Arts. 7, 22,?3* See Commercial Code, P. 166 of i960,
Neg. Gaz. Extraordinary, Arts.. 'Ph-59, 654-712.
145 P. 69 of 1975, Arts. 5,7*
146 Road Transport Proc., No. 107 of 1976, Neg. Gaz. 36/9, Arts. 2, 3(1),
8-9, 16, 2k and Road Transport Associates Regs., L.N. 49 of 1976,
Neg. Gaz. 36/9, Arts. 4(l) , 5-8.
147 Paul and Clapham, Vol. 1, op.cit. 68-9. See: B. Csikos-Nagy, Social­
ist Economic Policy 24-6, 44, 75, 84 (1973)"; Friedman in Hansen, op.
cit. 13; Stjepanovic, op.cit. 238-9; Hauriou, quoted by A. Honore,
*Groups, Law and Obedience1, in A. Simpson, ed., Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence 1, at 1? (2d Series, 1973); Margolis, op.cit. XIV-XV; 
Friedman, The State and the Rule of Law . • .64; and Hale, op.cit. 385, 
401, 5PL.
148 Gill, op.cit. 1 and Gill, introduction to the Manufacturing Sector1, 
in Id. lTP,~at 114; Karsten, op.cit. 307; and Brietzke, A Source-book 
• • -37- See; Myrdal, Asian~Drama 179, 184, 187, 357; Whetham and 
Currie, op.cit. 89-93; and Moore, Jr., op.cit. 115, kkl,
1^9 See: G. Soares, *Economic Development and Class Structure*, in R.
Bendix and S. Lipset, eds., Class, Status and Power 190, at 190-2
(1966); R. Unger, Law in Modern Society I56 (1976) ; M. Roberts, *A 
Socialist Looks at African Socialism*, in W. Friedland and C. Rosberg, 
eds., African Socialism 83, at 90; R. Dumont and M. Mozayer, Socialisms 
eaad Development 9k (1973); and Bryde, op.cit. hO,
150 Decree 49 of 1962, Neg. Gaz. 21/18, amended and renumbered by P. 210 
of 1963, Neg. Gaz. ^ 375~C'Eo which our citations refer). See ^aplan, 
op.cit. 385-6, 398.
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151 Gilkes, op.cit# 167-8. The Board consisted of five members appointed 
by the Emperor and was empowered to attempt initially to conciliate 
and, as a last resort, arbitrate labour disputes and unfair labour 
practices and "to enforce its decisions and awards by appropriate 
means” (Arts# 5(a)i 12(a), 16), Decisions could be appealed to the
Supreme Imperial Court on questions of law only, within 30 days of
receipt of the Board*s decision (Art# 19(a)).
152 Minimum Labour Conditions Regulations, L.N. 302 of 196*1-, Neg# Gaz.
24/5 and Labour Standards Proc., P. 232 of 1966, Neg# Gaz. 25/13,
Arts. 1-6, 10-17 (repealing the Factories P. of 1944)•
153 Labour Standards P., Arts. 7-9 and Labour Inspection Service Order,
No. 37 of 196*1-, Neg. Gaz. 24/4.
15*f Bondestam, op.cit. 5**0 and Kaplan, et al., op.cit. 396.
155 Sao B. Hoselitz, *The Role of Cities in the Economic Growth of Under­
developed Countries*, in G. Breese, ed., The City in Newly Developing 
Countries 232, at 233 (1969) and Renner, op.cit. 115, 296.
156 See Hurst, op.cit. 235. Similar patterns have been noted elsewhere in 
the Third World: see B. Millen cited in P. Merkl., Comparative Pol­
itics 313 (1970).
157 P. 26 of 1975, Art. 9.
158 *Dergue Turns Heat on Counter-Revolutionaries*, Africa No. 69, 53,
at 59 (May, 1977).
159 E.g., R. Chapman, *IL0 in Test of US Charges*, Guardian 19/11/75*2.
160 P. 6*f of 1975* Neg. Gaz. 35/11, 6 Dec. as amended, in a minor fashion, 
by Corrigendum 6 of 1976, Neg. Gaz. 35/28 and P. 85 of 1976, Neg. Gaz. 
55/29.
161 Subject to more favourable terms in a contract of employment or col­
lective agreement, the following conditions - largely restated from 
L.N. 302 of 196*f ^ will apply: overtime may only be worked under
stringent conditions and after 8 hours per day or 48 hours a week, and
to 2}£ times the hourly rate must be paid (Arts. 31-3); in addition 
to paid public holidays, the paid holiday entitlement ranges from 14 
to 35 days (depending on the length of service), and 2*f consecutive 
hours of rest must be granted each week (Arts. 35(l)-(3), 36(1)); 
paid maternity leaves of 45 days and sick leaves (one month on full 
pay, two months on half pay and three months without pay) must be 
granted (Arts. 38(2), 39(2)); educational, union activity and mourning 
leaves, or leaves for **unforeseen circumstances” are granted under 
certain conditions (Arts. 40-2); the "same initial wages shall be paid 
for similar jobs in an undertaking** (Art. 43), but the express pro­
hibition of sex discrimination found in P. 232 of 1966, Art. 14, is not 
repeated; and the attachment or assignment of wages is prohibited, 
except where authorised by lavr or by a collective agreement and subject 
to a ’statute of limitations’ of one year (Arts. 47-8).
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kk See: Schur, op.cit. 12, 6l; Dahrendorf, The New Liberty 2^; Smith,
'Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralism*, in Kuper and 
Smith, eds., Pluralism in Africa 27, at 60 (1969) ; M. Barkun, 'Lav;
and Social Revolution', 6 Law and Soc. Rev. 113, at 126 (1971) ;
J. Hildebrand, 'The Sociology of Soviet Law* • .^22 Case Western 
Reserve L. Rev. 157, at 163 (1971); A. Hunt, 'Law, State and Class 
Struggle* Marxism Today 178, at 186 (dune 1976); and H. Wheeler, 
Democracy in a Revolutionary Era 225 (1971) ♦
^5 Coke's Commentaries on Littleton 97b (1628).
*f6 Schumacher, op.cit. 162.
^7 0* Lewis, 'The Culture of Poverty* Scientific American No. 219,
19 (Oct. 1966). See: D. Waldo, 'Foreword', in Morgan, op.cit. vii,
at vii-viii; Kennedy, op.cit. 55; Schumacher, op.cit. l6T-2;and 
Moore, Jr., Reflections . . .  bS»
*f8 Lewis, op.cit. 25* Sesld., 20-5 and Schumacher, op.cit. 160-1,
172.
k9 Norman Girvan (quoted by Brookfield, op.cit. 176) argues that:
the search for a 'relevant' economics for underdeveloped
countries becomes a search for a relevant and valid economics 
for the metropolitan economies as well.
Robert Hutchins ('Natural Law and Jurisprudence *, in J. Cogley, ed., 
Natural Law and Modern Society 29 (1966) adds that:
±t seems clear that in the next generation the great struggle 
in the lav; is going to be about its fundamental principles. The 
. search for a normative jurisprudence is being resumed. /TheJ
debunking era is over and the constructive period must begin.
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